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2ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the process of liberalization started by the PCE 
in 1956 was of a very limited nature and never managed to change the party’s 
Stalinist internal structure. This in turn obstructed the success of the party’s policies, 
its programmes and campaigns inside the country, as the leadership in exile, far 
removed from the Spanish reality, imposed from above its views on underground 
activists, thus limiting their influence and impact. I demonstrate this by looking 
mainly at the relationship that flourished in 1956 between the leadership in exile and 
the intellectual and student organizations inside Spain. Just as it had happened in the 
1940s with other underground Communist organizations, this relationship soon 
started to deteriorate and eventually led to one of the most important purges ever to 
take place inside the PCE. My thesis thus concludes that the party’s lack of internal 
democracy, which became evident during this period, in the long term discredited the 
transformation attempted through Eurocommunism and hence, sheds new light into 
one of the reasons behind the party’s failure during the transition to democracy in 
Spain.
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7INTRODUCTION
Since its foundation, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has been a significant 
agent in the most important chapters of contemporary Spain. After the outbreak of 
the Civil War in 1936, the PCE moved to the front line of politics thanks to the 
support given by the Soviet Union to the Republican side. The ensuing dictatorship 
of General Francisco Franco would see the Communists become the dominant force 
in the opposition movement; the Communist-influenced trade union, Comisiones 
Obreras, making a major contribution to the erosion of the regime in its final years. 
During the Spanish transition, the PCE under the command of Santiago Carrillo, 
would give an important endorsement to the new democracy. The party was, 
nevertheless, unable to translate into electoral strength the prominence it had gained 
during the dictatorship and would in the long term only see its power diminished.1 
Instead, the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) won the support of the left, denying the 
Communists a decisive role in national politics. The irony was that, unlike the 
Communists, the PSOE had practically been absent from Spanish politics during the 
Franco years. This thesis will attempt to shed some light on one of the most 
important reasons behind this particular development by tracing it back to 1956 and 
the events that followed thereafter.
Indeed, 1956 has been pointed out by scholars, journalists and Communists 
alike as a critical point in the history of the PCE.2 Prior to this year, the submission
1 In the elections of June 1977 the Communist garnered only 9.2 percent of the national vote while the 
PSOE took 29 percent.
2 Fernando Jauregui and Pedro Vega, Cronica del antifranquismo, 1939-1962 (Barcelona: Argos 
Vergara, 1983-1985), p. 228; Gregorio Moran, Miseriay Grandeza delPartido Comunista de Espana. 
1939-1985 (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1986), p. 276; Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain,
of the Spanish Communists to Moscow, a feature since the party’s foundation, had 
only deepened. As a result, during the following years, the PCE made several 
contradictory changes of policy, damaging its relationship with other exiled Spanish 
political forces that were already extremely suspicious of the Communists after the 
role they had played during the Civil War. The situation inside the country was not 
much more encouraging: the repression made the reorganization of an underground 
Communist movement very difficult. Furthermore, the party’s Stalinist internal 
structure brought about a number of purges that usually ended with the destruction of 
the emerging Communist organizations inside the country, since they were seen as a 
threat to the exiled leadership’s power.
A decisive period in the history of the party would begin after the death of 
Joseph Stalin in March 1953, when a liberalization process started in the Communist 
movement that would reach its peak during the XX Congress of the CPSU in March 
1956. There and then, Nikita Khrushchev read his soon-to-be famous secret speech 
where he denounced Stalin’s crimes. In the context of the ensuing climate, the PCE 
reshuffled its leadership, permitting the rise of the younger members of the politburo 
(Santiago Carrillo and Fernando Claudin) over the hard-line-Stalinists (Dolores 
Ibarruri and Vicente Uribe). This shift of power was accompanied by increasing 
criticism of the party's internal structure, its lack of democracy and the cult of 
personality it had suffered from. From then onwards, the PCE allegedly renounced its 
Stalinist past for once and all, and was prepared gradually to embrace a more
Dictatorship to Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), p. 163; Joan Estruch Tobella, 
El PCE en la clandestinidad. 1939-1956 (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1982), pp. 228-229; Irene 
Falcdn, Asalto a los cielos: mi vida junto a Pasionaria (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1996), p. 308; Ramon 
Mendezona, La Pirenaica y  otros episodios (Madrid: Libertarias/Prodhufi, 1995), pp. 133-134; 
Ramon Bucley, La doble transicion, (Madrid, Siglo Veintiuno, 1996) p. 7; Santiago Carrillo, 
Memorias (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1993), p. 456; Eusebio Mujal-Le6n, Communism and 
Political Change in Spain (USA: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 22, 35; Jordi Sole Tura, “La
democratic and open spirit. In addition, the party's policy changed from one of 
violent confrontation against the regime to one of National Reconciliation, in 
harmony with the USSR's foreign policy of Peaceful Coexistence. This shift has been 
seen as a breakthrough in the Communists’ approach to the situation inside the 
country, the more so because it would coincide with the cultural awakening of a 
generation of students and intellectuals that had not fought in the Civil War and 
whose most active members would look to the Communists for answers they could 
not find within the regime.3 In view of these developments, it is only logical that 
1956 is often described as a turning point in the history of the PCE. Moreover, a 
connection is often made between the liberalisation process started at this time and 
the party’s breakaway from Moscow in 1968 and its subsequent adoption of 
Eurocommunism.4
The main purpose of this thesis will be to challenge this view and show that even 
though the party underwent certain changes in 1956, its internal Stalinist culture 
never disappeared. During the years that followed the secret speech of Khrushchev, 
the thaw that had originated in Moscow proved to extend only as far as had been 
required for the changes in leadership to take place. Once Santiago Carrillo was
oposicion comunista al franquismo” in Fontana, Joseph (Ed.). Espaha bajo el franquismo (Barcelona: 
Biblioteca de Bolsillo, 2000), p. 128; Antonio Elorza, “El viaje a ninguna parte”, El Pais, 3 July 2000.
3 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001; Fernando Claudrn, Santiago Carrillo. Cronica de un 
secretario general (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1983), pp. 118-119; Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 455- 
457; Mujal-Leon, Communism, pp. 1, 22; Guy Hermet, The Communists in Spain. Study o f an 
Underground Political Movement (Hants: Librairie Armand Collin, 1971), p. 57; Andres Carabantes 
and Eusebio Cimorra, Un mito llamado Pasionaria (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1982), p. 287.
4 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 225, 246; Simon Sanchez Montero, Camino de libertad. Memorias 
(Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1997), p. 230; Falcdn, Asalto, pp. 308, 355-356, 358; Mariano Asenjo and 
Victoria Ramos, Malagon. Autobiografla de un falsificador (Spain: El Viejo Topo, 1999), p. 223; 
Paul Preston, “The PCE’s long road to democracy 1954-77” in Richard Kindersley, In Search o f 
Eurocommunism, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), p. 57; Carrillo, Memorias, p. 457; Jose 
Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, Spanish History since 1808 (New York: Arnold Publishers, 2000), 
p. 287.
safely in his position, the old autocratic management of the party was back in action. 
The deceit became apparent as the policies that the party was applying in Spain began 
to fail, leading to further repression and to the weakening of the underground 
organizations as well as to the disillusion of many activists. Criticism arose in the 
PCE, not just among the rank-and-file but also within the leadership itself. It was felt 
that the party lacked a realistic appreciation of the situation in Spain, partly due to the 
leadership’s refusal to relinquish power and rely on the judgement of its forces inside 
the country. The ensuing crisis would mainly affect the generation that had joined the 
party in 1956, making it all the more relevant because the initial success of the PCE 
with these activists had been the result of the leaders’ ability to catalyse their 
initiatives instead of just imposing their will on them. The crisis also led to the 
complete expulsion in 1964 of the party’s two most prominent champions of reform, 
the intellectuals Jorge Semprun and Fernando Claudin, both members of the PCE’s 
Executive Committee. By expelling them, the party cut off its most likely means for 
future reform, making it clear for those inside Spain that its policies could never be 
questioned.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that paradoxically the crisis of 1964 still 
represented an important step towards the PCE’s liberalisation.5 After Claudin and 
Semprun’s expulsion, Carrillo claimed some of their arguments as his own, and in 
fact, the dissidents’ ideas shared common ground with the ideas later on advocated 
through Eurocommunism. On this basis, it could be claimed that if the expulsion was 
not itself very democratic, the results in the long term helped the party’s 
democratisation process. In contrast, I will argue that 1964 was a return to the old
5 Hermet, The Communists, p. 78; Preston, “The PCE’s long road...” in Kindersley, Eurocommunism, 
pp. 43, 54; Mujal-Le6n, Communism, p. 24.
ways of the party. Thereafter, the contradiction between what the PCE advocated 
through Eurocommunism and the party’s refusal to question its internal Stalinist 
structure, proved to be ultimately unsustainable. The PCE would pragmatically 
espouse a far more lenient ideological programme but the party itself remained under 
the despotic control of one individual, Santiago Carrillo, who, whilst prepared to 
compromise on programmatic points, was not as willing to risk his own position by 
democratising the party. In fact, this attitude coincided with the pattern followed by 
the PCE throughout the dictatorship, according to which the party changed its 
policies when the external conditions demanded it, no matter what ideological 
contradictions were involved. This had happened on several occasions, the most 
obvious being in relation to the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact, when the 
Communists found themselves partners with the German allies of Franco during the 
Spanish Civil War.
In order to understand the party's history, including its poor fortunes in the 
1970s and 1980s, it is crucial to lay bare this continuity. In this study, this is exactly 
what I purport to do, mainly by looking at the crucial period between 1956 and 1964. 
It was then, and only then, that the hegemonic culture within the PCE was seriously 
challenged and an alternative future beckoned. But this was not the road followed. At 
the end of the day, Carrillo forcefully reconfirmed the traditional ways of his party. 
And it was there, and then, that he decided its future.
This thesis relies mainly on primary sources from the Spanish Communist Party, 
such as congress minutes, reports, correspondence, publications, theoretical journals, 
party newspapers, circulars, speeches and statements. Most of the research has been 
done in the archives of the PCE, which hold vast amount of documents relevant to
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this work, including material of those who differed with the party line. In addition, 
the use of memoirs and personal interviews with the most prominent individuals of 
the period covered in the thesis has been extremely useful. The testimonies of those 
students and intellectuals that joined the party in 1956 have proven an invaluable 
source for understanding their motivations as well as the evolution that led them to a 
break with the party less than a decade later. Similarly, those leaders interviewed by 
the author have brought with them considerable insight into the internal workings of 
the PCE, particularly the conversations held with Jorge Semprun and Javier Pradera. 
Newspapers of the time have also contributed to this research as well as the police 
documentation about the student movement in the mid 1950s edited by Roberto Mesa 
in Jaraneros y  alborotadores. Documentos sobre los sucesos estudiantiles de febrero 
de 1956 en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.6 At the same time, a 
considerable body of secondary literature has been examined to gain an 
understanding of the Franco regime and the position of the diverse opposition 
movement that developed in Spain particularly in the late 1950s and continued to 
grow thereafter. In addition, the literature on the history of the PCE before 1956 has 
been used to draw a complete picture of the above-mentioned pattern followed by the 
party since the end of the Civil War.
Indeed, one of the reasons that makes this work all the more important is that 
the majority of the historical studies on the PCE never go further than 1956. Joan 
Estruch Tobella’s first two books on the Spanish Communists cover the period from 
1920-1939 and 1939-1956.7 His most recent publication, Historia Oculta del PCE,
6 Roberto Mesa (Ed.), Jaraneros y  alborotadores. Documentos sobre los sucesos estudiantiles de 
febrero de 1956 en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad 
Complutense, 1982),
7 Joan Estruch Tobella, Historia del PCE (1). (1920-1939) (Barcelona: Inciativas Editoriales S.A., 
1978); Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956.
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dedicates only a few pages to the years covered in this thesis.8 Rafael Cruz in El 
partido comunista de Espana en la Segunda Republica analyses the role of the PCE 
during the Second Republic while Antonio Padilla’s El movimiento comunista 
espanol goes only as far as 1939.9 At the same time, the studies on the transition to 
democracy in Spain usually lack an in-depth analysis of the roots of the PCE’s 
failure. On a more theoretical level, there are two books, Guy Hermet’s The 
Communists in Spain and Eusebio Mujal-Leon’s Communism and Political Change 
in Spain, which have been particularly useful for this study.10 The most important 
publication on the subject to date remains Gregorio Moran's Miseria y  Grandeza del 
PCE.11 The author, a journalist who had belonged to the PCE in the 1960s, had 
access to a great deal of unpublished material and produced a sharp and detailed 
description of the history of the Party. I am much indebted to his work as well as the 
help he has always provided me during our conversations. Unfortunately, there are no 
references to the origins of the primary material he uses in the book. In addition, his 
judgements seem to be somewhat affected by the fact that he had left the PCE in 
disillusionment during the 1970s. The constant pejorative references to Santiago 
Carrillo and his poor intellectual education, though arguably justified, seem to reflect 
a degree of personal retaliation in his study.
Hence, I believe this thesis will fill a very important gap in the historiography 
of the Spanish Communist Party, as well as shed new light on the opposition 
movement to Franco and the transitional process to democracy in Spain. Moreover, it 
will provide detailed attention to the crucial student and intellectual Communist
8 Joan Estruch Tobella, Historia oculta del PCE (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 200).
9 Rafael Cruz, El Partido Comunista de Espana en la II Republica (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1987); 
Antonio Padilla, El movimiento comunista espanol (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1979).
10 Hermet, The Communists.; Mujal-Le6n, Communism.
11 Moran, Miseria.
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organizations that developed in Spain during 1956. The relationship of the leadership 
with these new generations will help to explain the reasons for its initial success. In 
the same manner, the study of the crisis that these organisations underwent during 
1964 will serve the exact opposite purpose: to reveal how the Stalinist structure of 
the party led to the failure of its policies in the country and to the destruction of one 
of the strongest underground organizations it ever had. The leadership’s unrealistic 
perception of the situation in Spain will account for the problems it cencountered 
with the policies applied by the party to fight the regime, mainly through the use of 
General Strikes. Finally, by looking at the true nature of National Reconciliation and 
tracing its origins to previous party policies all the way back to the Civil War, it will 
possible to show that it was not the breakthrough it has often been taken to be, as 
some authors have partially acknowledged.12
This thesis is structured in the following way: Chapter I, which deals with the period 
1939-1952, serves as a historical background and sets out some of the issues that will 
be dealt with in the following chapters. Emphasis is given to the relations of the party 
with Moscow and how, in turn, this affected its relationship with other Spanish 
political forces in exile. The internal political struggles and the purges that took place 
during this period are also covered in detail, particularly the relationship between the 
leadership and the Communist organizations that emerged in Spain, as well as in 
France during the Second World War. This serves as a kind of historical template 
against which the destalinisation process in the PCE will be measured.
12 See Arasa’s explanation about Jose Diaz’s speech in 1938, “Lo que Espana ensena a Europa”, 
Daniel Arasa, Anos 40: los maquis y  el PCE (Barcelona: Editorial Argos Vergara, 1984), p. 31. On the 
1940s, see Falcon, Asalto, pp. 312, 319; Rafael Cruz, Pasionaria. Dolores Ibarruri, Historia y  
Simbolo (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1999), pp. 183-184; Valentina Fernandez Vargas, La resistencia 
interior en la Espana de Franco (Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 1981), p. 168; Estruch Tobella, 1939-
Chapter II concentrates on the power struggle that developed inside the party 
in 1955 and whose outcome was decided by the events that took place during the 
CPSU’s XX Congress in March 1956. By looking at this power struggle in detail, it 
will start to become evident that, from the very beginning, the destalinisation process 
did not bring about a real democratisation of the party’s internal structure. A first 
attempt will also be made to understand the policy of National Reconciliation in the 
context of the history of Spanish Communism. In addition, this chapter gives a brief 
description of the events that led to the PCE’s policy of “infiltration” into the 
regime's trade unions and mass organisations.
Chapter HI examines the emergence of an opposition movement in Spain, 
mainly at the University of Madrid, and the contribution made by the PCE to its full 
development. Emphasis is given to the student riots of February 1956 as they led to 
one of the most important crises of Franco’s regime. This serves two purposes: on the 
one hand, it is an example of the prominence that the new leadership placed on the 
struggle inside the country and on the other, it establishes the party’s potential to 
catalyse the discontent of those who felt constrained by the regime. Moreover, 
through the use of party and police documents related to this period, this chapter 
attempts to give an accurate chronology of the events surrounding the riots, which up 
until now has not been properly done. It will also serve to clarify the origins of the 
democratic movement inside the university that would continue to develop from then 
onwards. Following this, the figure of Jorge Semprun will receive special attention 
not just because, as the head of the party in Madrid, he was in charge of the 
intellectual and student organizations, but also because his physical presence inside
1956, p. 226. Estruch Tobella, Historia oculta, p. 197; Mujal-Leon, Communism, p. 22.
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the country would eventually become a major factor in his later criticisms against 
party policy.
Chapter IV looks at the first signs of the limits of the destalinisation process 
both in the Communist movement and inside the PCE. It also studies the relationship 
of the PCE with the other emerging political forces inside Spain, which will help to 
understand the mistrust these would eventually develop regarding the Communists. 
At the same time, the transport strikes that took place at the beginning of 1957 will 
be used to explain the reasons behind the party’s policy of general strikes adopted 
soon after. In order to place the strikes in context, a brief analysis of the workers 
movement in 1950s Spain will be provided.
Chapter V describes the events that preceded and followed the General 
Strikes called by the PCE in 1958 and 1959 as well as the party’s VI Congress. This 
will serve to reveal the irreconcilable distance that existed between the Spain as 
perceived by the exiled leadership and the Spain the underground activists were 
living amidst. The strikes not only failed to achieve their goals but also provoked 
waves of repression. Even so, the party turned a blind eye to the negative results and 
portrayed the events as successful. The VI Congress would also result in a great 
number of arrests and the weakening of the underground organisations, mainly due to 
the fact that the party had not taken proper care of the security during the event. This 
chapter will create the framework that explains the discontent of the party forces 
inside the country and the beginning of dissent within the leadership.
Finally, Chapter VI analyses the crisis the led to the expulsion of Fernando 
Claudin and Jorge Semprun from the PCE and the collapse of the student and 
intellectual Communist organizations that had emerged in 1956, particularly in 
Madrid. An explanation will be given regarding the character of the divergences
17
between the latter and the majority of the Executive: mainly a different appreciation 
of Spanish reality that subsequently developed into a discussion about the party’s 
internal structure. Because of this, the first section of the chapter is entirely dedicated 
to the development in Spain of the workers movement, the opposition forces and the 
students movement during the 1960s, which is essential to place into context the 
divergences within the leadership. Emphasis is laid upon the manner in which 
Santiago Carrillo dealt with the crisis. It is thus concluded that the purge that 
followed shared all the characteristics of those that took place inside the party during 
the Stalinist years, hence confirming the real limits of the destalinisation process 
inside the Spanish Communist Party.
Accordingly, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that the process of liberalization 
started by the PCE in 1956 was of a very limited nature and never managed to change 
the party’s internal structure, which in turn would discredit in later years the 
democratisation process attempted through Eurocommunism.
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I. THE FIRST YEARS IN EXILE
A. Introduction
The Spanish Communist Party emerged at the end of 1919, as a result of a series of 
schisms within the Socialist ranks. The diverse political backgrounds of those who at 
first joined the Communists meant that from its birth the PCE had a heterogeneous 
structure that soon led to a great number of internal confrontations and purges. In 
addition, the Spanish Communists became increasingly unpopular with other left 
political forces that accused them of trying to steal their members and being under 
the control of the Third International.1 For the following years, the PCE would only 
play a minor role in Spanish politics, particularly after it was declared illegal during 
the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930). Nor would the PCE’s 
power increase after the proclamation of the Republic in 1931 as the Spanish 
Communists, following an order from the Comintern, alienated many by refusing to 
support the new regime.2 Moreover, the nomination of Jose Diaz in 1932 as the new 
General Secretary tightened even further the control of the PCE by the Soviets, who 
appointed him in order to assure the party’s loyalty to the Comintern.3 The policy of
1 For more information on this early period of the PCE see Antonio Elorza and Marta Bizcarrondo, 
Queridos Camaradas. La Intemacional Comunista y  Espana, 1919-1939 (Barcelona: Editorial 
Planeta, 1999), pp. 21-42. This book is the latest and most extensive work published on the subject. It 
also has the advantage of including material from the archives in Moscow, which is not to be found in 
other publications about the early years of the Spanish Communist Party. Also see Estruch Tobella, 
1920-1939; Padilla, El movimiento comunista.
1 For this period see Cruz, El Partido Comunista; Estruch Tobella, 1920-1939; Padilla, El movimiento 
comunista.
3 He replaced Jose Bullejos who had run into trouble with the Soviets after refusing to accept some of 
their suggestions. At the same time as Jos6 Diaz, other figures such as Antonio Mije, Vicente Uribe
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the PCE during the period of the Republic closely followed the dictates of the Soviet 
Union. It was not until the Popular Front policy was adopted by the Comintern that 
the PCE fully supported the Spanish Republic. This policy change led to its support 
for the Popular Front that would come to power in April 1936.
Subsequently, on 17-18 July 1936, the Civil War broke out in Spain. During 
the three years that the conflict lasted, the PCE would see its power and influence 
increase strikingly. This was principally due to the support given by the Soviet Union 
to the Republican government. Other governments, including countries such as 
Britain and France, refused to help the Republic under the facade of the Non- 
Intervention Agreement. The role of the PCE in the Spanish Civil War is a complex 
matter that has filled the pages of many history books.4 In the context of this study, 
the important point is to mention the damage it inflicted on the relations of the party 
with other political forces. Under the control of the Comintern, the PCE was not 
averse to ridding itself of its adversaries inside the Republican camp using whatever 
means were within its reach. Moreover, its refusal to capitulate once defeat became 
clear did little to increase the party’s popularity. When the Casado Coup took place 
4-5 March 1939, the streets of Madrid became a battleground between Communists 
and the supporters of Casado, the latter looking to end the conflict in the hope that
and Dolores Ibdrruri were promoted to the highest positions in the PCE.
4 E.H. Carr, La comintem y  la guerra civil espafiola (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986); Estruch 
Tobella, 1920-1939’, Helen Graham, Socialism and War (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1991); Helen 
Graham and Paul Preston (Eds.). The Popular Front in Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); Paul 
Preston, Las tres Espanas del 36 (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes Editores, 1998); Palmiro Togliatti, 
Escritos sobre la guerra de Espana (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, 1980); Manuel Azcarate & Jose 
Sandoval, Spain. 1936-1939 (London: Lawrence & Wishart LTD, 1963); Fernando Claudin, 
Socialismo y  guerra civil (Madrid: Pablo Iglesias, 1987). For memoirs of this period see Valentin 
Gonzdlez, “El Campesino”. Comunista en Espana y  antistalinista en la URSS (Madrid: Ediciones 
Jucar, 1941); Jesus Hemdndez, Yo, Ministro de Stalin en Espana. Prologo y  notas de Mauricio 
Carlavilla (Madrid: NOS, 1954); Francisco-Felix Montiel, Un Coronel llamado Segismundo (Madrid: 
Editorial Criterio-Libros, 1998); Manuel Tagueiia Lacorte, Testimonio de dos guerras (Mexico: 
Ediciones Oasis, 1973); Aurora Amdiz, Retrato hablado de Luisa Julian (Madrid: Compaiiia 
Literaria, 1996); Manuel Azcarate, Derrotas y  esperanzas. La Republica, la Guerra Civil y  la 
Resistencia (Barcelona: Tusquet Editores, 1994).
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some form of negotiated peace was still possible with Franco.5 In the weeks that 
followed, the leaders of the PCE and the Soviet emissaries began to flee the country, 
leaving behind, on the one hand, many activists but on the other, little in the way of 
organisation to deal with the underground status they would now have to face.6 On 1 
April 1939, Franco announced: “Today, with the Red Army captive and disarmed, 
our victorious troops have achieved their final military objectives. The war is over”.7
As we shall see, the first decade in exile of the Spanish Communist Party 
witnessed a continuation of the PCE’s submission to the Soviet Union and the CPSU. 
This is unsurprising taking into account that the party was now in exile and hence 
depended all the more on the help and reputation of the Soviets. In this chapter, we 
will look at the consequences these factors had on the party’s relations with other 
political forces in exile and with its clandestine organisation in Spain. The pattern 
followed by the party from the end of the Spanish Civil War until the death of Stalin 
will be established, making it possible to assess subsequently if the destalinisation
5 It is worth mentioning the personal impact that the Casado coup had on Santiago Carrillo. His father 
Wenceslao Carrillo, a Socialist leader, had been one of the brains behind the operation. Two months 
and half after the coup, the son wrote a letter disowning his father. "No, Wenceslao Carrillo, between 
you and I there cannot be any relations, because we have nothing in common”. This reaction was not at 
all uncommon in the Stalinist era when the sins of your family were considered to taint your own 
reputation. Moreover, Carrillo had started his career as a Socialist, and had in the past praised Trotsky. 
He had to act quickly and decisively in order to prove his loyalty to the PCE and avoid any suspicion 
about himself. And so he did. Letter from Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the JSU, to his father 
(Wenceslao Carrillo), Socialist leader and accomplice of Casado, Historical Archive of the Spanish 
Communist Party (AHPCE) (DIRIGENTES, Santiago Carrillo, Correspondencia, Sig. 3, Carp. 1.2). 
Wenceslao Carrillo responded to the letter with an open letter to Stalin, attributing to the Soviet leader 
the letter signed by his son. He defended the Casado coup and denounced Communist tyranny as well 
as giving testimony of the pain that had been inflicted on him as a father, Amdiz, Retrato, pp. 290-291.
6 Dolores Ibdrruri, El unico camino (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1962), p. 476. Dolores Ibdrruri, also 
known as Pasionaria, was bom on 9 December 1895 in Vizcaya. She joined the Socialist Party in 1917 
but joined the Communist Party during its First Congress in 1921. She was nominated to the PCE’s 
Central Committee in 1930, and became a member of the party’s Political Bureau in 1932. From there, 
she continued to rise in the party’s hierarchy until she became the General Secretary of the PCE after 
Jose Diaz’s death in March 1942. Throughout this text, Pasionaria and Dolores Ibarruri will be used 
inter-changeably. For more information on Dolores Ibarruri see her memoirs, Ibdrruri, El unico. There 
are also several biographies of Dolores Ibdrruri: Cruz, Pasionaria; Falc6n, Asalto; Teresa Pamies, 
Una espafiola llamada Dolores Ibdrruri (Mexico: Ediciones Roca, 1975); Andrds Sorel, Dolores 
Ibdrruri Pasionaria. Memoria humana (Madrid: Libertarias/Prodhufi, 1989); Manuel Vdzquel 
Montalban, Pasionaria y  los siete enanitos (Barcelona: Editorial Plantea, 1995); Carabantes and
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process, which began in 1956, indeed marked a turning point in the history of the 
party.
B. The aftermath o f 1939
1. From unity to confrontation
As the last vestiges of the Republic fell into the hands of the enemy in 1939, the
leaders of the PCE began their exodus, travelling to France and from there to the
Soviet Union and Mexico. The capitals of these countries would become the
headquarters of the Party during the following years. Soon after the leaders’ arrival in
Moscow, a series of discussions between the PCE and the Comintern on the reasons
for the defeat took place.8 As expected, the Comintern was absolved of any blame
while the PCE reluctantly agreed to assume part of the responsibility.9 There was no
overall or real self-criticism of the Party’s policies during the conflict and the
resolution was never made public.10 According to Paul Preston:
This process assured the PCE’s loyalty to Moscow but left great reserves of 
bitterness among the senior cadres. Moreover, the consequent commitment to 
Stalinist methods robbed the party of flexibility in the difficult years to follow.11
Cimorra, Un mito.
7 Paul Preston, Franco (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), p. 322.
8 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 50-51.
9 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 66.
10 Taguefia, Testimonio, p. 354; Cruz, Pasionaria, p. 143; Enrique Lister, Asi destruyo Carrillo al 
PCE (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1983), p. 26.
11 Paul Preston, “The Anti-Francoist Opposition: The Long March to Unity” in Paul Preston (ed.), 
Spain in crisis (Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1976), p. 131.
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In addition, the meeting had an impact on the leadership of the PCE. Jose 
Diaz was put in charge of Indian and Latin American affairs inside the Comintern. 
Being the General Secretary of the party, this shift of responsibility in reality meant 
that the Soviet leaders no longer considered him to be the number one in the PCE. It 
was also decided that in Latin America there was to be a Secretariat of the party 
formed by Vicente Uribe, Jesus Hernandez, Santiago Carrillo, Antonio Mije and 
Francisco Anton.12 This measure took three years to be implemented due to the 
outbreak of the Second World War.13
On 23 August 1939, whilst the leaders of the PCE were still settling into their new 
exile, the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact was signed by Von Ribbentrop and 
Molotov. This Pact ostensibly meant an agreement of non-aggression and neutrality 
between the two countries. However, the Soviet and German emissaries had also
12 Vicente Uribe was bom in Bilbao in 1902. He was a former metal worker who had been the editor- 
in-chief of Mundo Obrero, the party’s newspaper, during the II Republic. He then became a member 
of the Central Committee of the PCE. Uribe was elected deputy for Asturias (along with Dolores 
Ibarruri) in the government of the Popular Front in 1936. During the war, he became part of the PCE’s 
Political Bureau and remained a major figure in the party until his downfall in 1956.
Co-founder of the PCE, Jesus Hernandez became part of its Central Committee in 1930, when he left 
for Moscow to receive military education. In 1933, he returned to Spain and was appointed editor-in- 
chief of Mundo Obrero. At that time, Hernandez was considered the number two of the PCE following 
Jose Diaz, and both were followed by Pasionaria. He won a seat in the Parliament of the Republic in 
1936 (Cordoba) and after intense parliamentary activity, became the Minister of Ins true cion Publica y  
Bellas Artes during the Civil War. Under Negrin’s government, Hernandez was appointed political 
commissar of the Central-South zone of the Republican army. He then left for the Soviet Union. 
Santiago Carrillo was bom in Oviedo in 1916. He was the son of Wenceslao Carrillo, a leader of the 
Spanish Socialist Party. During his youth, he had belonged to the Socialist party. It was during the 
creation of the JSU that he became a member of the PCE and eventually developed his political career 
inside the party. For more information see Claudin, Carrillo’, Santiago Carrillo (interviewed by Regis 
Debray and Max Gallo), Dialogue on Spain (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976); Carrillo, 
Memorias.
Antonio Mije joined the Political Bureau of the PCE during the Second Republic, as part of the group 
led by Jose Diaz that had been placed at the head of the party by the Comintern after the purge of the 
Bullejos troika. He won a seat as a deputy for Seville with the victory of the Popular Front in 1936. 
During the Civil War, he took over the war regional ministry at the Junta de Defensa of Madrid. 
Francisco Ant6n had been the secretary of the Provincial Committee of Madrid during the Civil War 
and then became the Commissar General of the Republican Army. Apparently, Indalecio Prieto tried 
to send him to the front but the Communists refused, Cruz, Pasionaria, p. 152. In 1937, Anton became 
part of the Political Bureau of the PCE. During the war, he started a romantic relationship with 
Pasionaria, which many used to explain his rapid ascent along the road to power.
23
signed with it a much more lethal secret protocol that led to the partition of Poland 
and a large part of Eastern Europe.14 Though the Communist parties around the 
world did not know about the secret protocol, the pact still meant that they had to 
change their whole mental structure to one where the fight against Fascism was no 
longer predominant. In fact, through this agreement, the Nazis had now become their 
allies instead of their enemies, a dramatic turnaround that no doubt took most 
Communists some time to digest.15
Nevertheless, the loyalty of the Communist parties to the USSR was strong, 
even if “once more they were to damage their own prospects by supporting Soviet 
foreign policy”.16 More dramatic was the case of the PCE whose activists had just 
been fighting against the German allies of Franco during the Spanish Civil War. They 
knew very well that the support given by Hitler to the Spanish Fascist forces had 
been a major factor in their victory. The shock for the rank-and-file was profound. 
The leadership was startled. But whatever the surprise and confusion, the pact would 
not have a major destabilizing effect on the PCE. Now, more than ever before, the 
Spanish Communists were dependent on the support of the USSR, both morally and 
economically. Their loyalty, even during this sad episode, was unshaken. Indeed, a 
fanatical defence of Moscow's justifications for the pact immediately replaced the
13 Moran, Miseria, p. 27.
14 On 1 September, the Nazi forces occupied Poland all the way to the Bug River. On 17 September, 
the Soviet Union invaded the eastern part of the country. Soon Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were 
annexed to the USSR On 29 November, after initial resistance, Finland signed a pact with the Soviets. 
In the meantime, free from the threat of a war on two fronts, Hitler continued his "conquest" of the 
world. It was clear by then that the appeasement policy of the United Kingdom and France had been a 
fiasco.
15 It was of course the third dramatic change in international Communist policy in less than ten years: 
from the doctrine of labelling social democrats as ‘social fascists’ to that of the Popular Front, now 
followed by this pact.
16 J.N. Westwood, Endurance and Endeavour. Russian History 1812-1992 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 340.
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initial shock and hesitation it had caused. The war was defined as inter-imperialistic 
and therefore, it was reasoned, the USSR did not have to become involved.17
The pact also had a dramatic effect on the relations between the PCE and the 
rest of the Spanish political parties in exile. As if their relationship with the Socialists 
was not strained enough after the Spanish Civil War, the German-Soviet Pact brought 
back to the fore the insults once commonly used by the Communists against them, 
such as ‘Social-Fascists’.18 In addition, the policy of the Popular Front was 
abandoned and replaced with a so-called United Front that followed the Comintern's 
guidelines. It aimed at the unity from below of all the workers* forces, which was 
perceived by the leadership of the other workers’ organisations as an attempt to steal 
their members.19 Once again, the Communists’ search for unity with other left wing 
forces was understandably interpreted by others as confrontation.
Two years later, in June 1941, with the German invasion of the Soviet Union 
in what came to be known as “Operation Barbarossa”, another dramatic shift in 
Communist policy took place. The Nazi-Soviet Pact had been broken and Stalin had 
been betrayed by Hitler. This series of events meant that the USSR now needed to 
pact with the Allies in order to survive. As soon as their support for the Soviet Union 
was confirmed, the Communist parties around the world were instructed by Moscow 
to back the war effort of the Allies.20 Once more, the common enemy was Fascism; 
the war and the Western democracies were no longer imperialistic; the Socialists
17 Dolores Ibarruri, Manuel Azcarate, Luis Balaguer, Antonio Cordon, Irene Falcon and Jose 
Sandoval, Historia del Partido Comunista de Espana (La Habana: Editora Politica, 1964), p. 217; 
Taguefia, Testimonio, p. 364; Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 313-314; Carrillo, Ha muerto el comunismo? 
(Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 2000), pp. 79-85; Falc6n, Asalto, pp. 187-188; Taguefia, Testimonio, pp. 
360-361.
18 The term Social-Fascists had already been used against the Socialists in the 1920s. The Socialists 
and the Fascists were accused of being two sides of the same coin.
19 The United Front policy had its origins in the shift to the left that took place in the VI Congress of 
the Third International in 1928.
20 Westwood, Endurance, p. 362.
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were no longer Fascists. The end of the Nazi-Soviet pact came as a relief to many 
activists who had been trapped between two loyalties. The clearest example of this 
division of loyalties can be found among those in France who had been invaded by a 
foreign force to which they were theoretically allied as Communists. As for the PCE, 
these shifts of policy would further isolate it from other political groups in exile in 
the fight against Francoism.21
2. The Party in Spain
After the defeat of the Republic, those members of the PCE that had remained in 
Spain attempted to maintain the cohesion of an almost non-existent underground 
organisation and help those who were on the run or in prison. As was to be expected 
given the situation both in Spain and worldwide, contact with the leaders in exile was 
almost impossible. Moreover, the early post-war years in Spain were characterized by 
a fierce repression. Under the laws of Political Responsibilities and of Repression of 
Communism and Freemasonry, there were thousands of arrests that made it almost 
impossible for the Communists to achieve more than just keeping themselves alive. 
Prisons were the only place where they managed to develop some kind of 
organisation, though without much political impact.22 Heriberto Quifiones was in 
effect the first individual to create any serious clandestine organisation inside
21 The entrance of the Soviet Union into the war further aggravated the precarious conditions of the 
majority of the Spanish immigrants that had arrived in Russia after the Civil War. Some of those who 
had fought in the Spanish conflict joined the war effort against the Nazi invaders. Among them was the 
son of Dolores Ib&rruri, Ruben Ruiz, who died in the battle of Stalingrad. His death was a blow for 
Pasionaria. For a time, she withdrew from Spanish immigrant and political circles in the USSR. For 
more information see Falcon, Asalto, p. 213: Law, Pasionaria, p. 130; Cruz, Pasionaria, p. 157.
22 For more information on the first attempts to reorganise the PCE in Spain see Estruch Tobella, 
1939-1956, pp. 20-22
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Spain.23 He was the key figure in the rebirth and reconstruction of the PCE under 
Franco.24
Quifiones, who had been bom in Moldavia, was a so-called “instructor” of the 
Comintern.25 These instructors were meant to work amongst the middling levels of 
the Communist parties around the world. They were fairly independent from Moscow 
and had to survive on their own means wherever they went, a role that took Quinones 
to many different places where he always pursued a very active political role. At the 
beginning of the 1930s, Quinones had arrived in Spain where he would stay until his 
death in 1942, always acting on the behalf of the Communist organisation. Once the 
Civil War was over, Quinones quickly began reorganising an underground party but 
he did so without any help or contact with the leaders in exile. He soon called for a 
policy of National Unity for all those who opposed to the Franco regime, including 
right wing sectors such as the Monarchists.26 According to his programme, the re­
establishment of the Republic was no longer a priority in the fight against Francoism. 
The policy of National Unity proclaimed by Quifiones was very similar to the policy 
supported by the Soviets in relation to the Allies after the German invasion of the 
USSR. Nevertheless, the fact that Quinones had launched it without the specific 
approval of the Spanish leadership in Moscow and Mexico, is an indication of his 
level of political autonomy.
Furthermore, in August 1941, through a document called “Anticipo de 
orientation politicd\ Quinones’ committee declared itself to be the replacement
23 For more information about the first years of Heriberto Quifiones in Spain see David Ginard, 
Heriberto Quinones y  el movimiento comunista en Espaiia (1931-1942) (Palma: Ediciones Documenta 
Balear, 2000).
24 Hermut Heine, La oposicion politico al franquismo (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, 1983), p. 69.
25 Estruch Tobella, 1920-1939, pp. 157-158.
26 The policy of National Unity was established by the PCE in 1938 in an attempt to include in the 
Popular Front those right wing sectors who wanted to fight against the Italian and German invaders,
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97inside the country of the leadership in exile. Quifiones claimed that the PCE could 
not be led from abroad by people who knew nothing about the realities of the country 
and who had abandoned the rank-and-file in Spam to their own fortunes. In 
addition, he asked for the return to Spain of all those activists who were not under the 
threat of the death penalty by the Francoist authorities. He also contacted the party in 
exile to inform them of the developments of the underground organisation and the 
political views already expressed in Anticipo.29 Quifiones probably felt confident in 
doing so because of his condition as an "instructor" of the Comintern. It was at this 
point that his fate was sealed.
Soon after Quifiones* Anticipo became known to the leaders in exile, they 
began a campaign to regain control over the organisation of the party in Spain. First, 
the party sent two delegates from Mexico into the country to report on Quifiones and 
to impose the orders from the leadership in exile.30 They achieved no results and due 
to their lack of experience were soon arrested by the police, leading to the downfall 
of many other activists.31 At the same time, the leadership in Mexico sent Quifiones a 
letter in September 1941 reproaching him for many of his positions and attitudes.32 
They argued that the policy of National Unity followed by Quifiones had nothing to 
do with the policy of National Unity defended by the Soviets and the PCE after the 
Nazi invasion of the USSR. This seemed to be an exaggeration: they were mainly 
referring to Quifiones’ abandonment of the demand to re-establish the Republic after
Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 71.
27 This document is 132 pages long and is very valuable in order to interpret the position taken by 
Quifiones and the differences between his organisation and the PCE in exile. The document was 
recently published by the Fundacion Nacional Francisco Franco as part of the series, Documentos 
Ineditospara la Historia del Generalisimo Franco, tomo II-2 (Madrid: 1992), pp. 186-294.
28 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 25.
29 According to Ginard, the document did not really reach anyone other than the leaders in exile and 
the police, Ginard, Quinones, p. 69.
30 The two activists were Perpetua Rejas, known as "Irma", and Eleuterio Lobo, known as "Leandro".
31 For more information see Ginard, Quinones, pp. 89, 108, and Heine, La oposicion, pp. 194-195.
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the overthrow of the Franco regime, and to the prominence given to the right-wing 
forces in the alliances proclaimed by Quinones’ policy. Nevertheless, as we will later 
see, by 1942 the party had already adopted both of these positions.
To complicate matters further, due to the arrests that had followed the arrival 
of the activists sent from Mexico, Quinones assumed the drastic measure of cutting 
off all further contact with the leadership in exile. Consequently, another activist, 
Jesus Carreras, was sent from France by the leadership to report on him. However, 
before he had time to act on the "insubordination", the police began an operation that 
led to the crushing of Quinones’ organisation. Quifiones himself was arrested on 30 
December 1941 and suffered terrible torture during the month and half that his 
interrogations lasted.33 Whilst in prison, fellow Communist prisoners told him that he 
had been expelled from the PCE. The campaign orchestrated by the leadership in 
exile to discredit him and portray him as a traitor was now at full speed. On 2 
October 1942, Quifiones was executed.34 Even then, the party held that he had been 
working for the Franco regime and was responsible for the arrest of fellow 
comrades.35
The case of Quifiones brought the party leadership face to face with the problems 
deriving from its underground organisations based inside the country, which from 
then on they tried to keep under their firm control. It was the beginning of a 
complicated domestic-exile relationship that became more complicated as time
32 Ginard, Quinones, pp. 70-72
33 For more information on the police actions that led to the arrest of Quifiones and the downfall of his 
organisation see Ginard, Quinones, pp. 95-97.
34 He could not walk as the police had broken his spine during the interrogations, and he had to be 
carried to his execution by two who were to share the same fate, Luis Sendin and Angel Cardin.
35 Heine, La oposicion, p. 81. Daniel Arasa argues that the informer was Luis Sendin, who was the 
Secretary of Action and Propaganda in Quifiones’ group and as mentioned, would later be executed by
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passed, as those in exile grew even further apart from the realities of a country they 
had left behind in 1939.36
3. The fight for power: Hernandez v La Pasionaria
As was explained at the beginning of this chapter, the meeting between the PCE and 
the Comintern after the defeat of the Spanish Republic in 1939 prompted the 
restructuring of the party leadership. Though Jose Diaz maintained his position as the 
General Secretary, in reality he was no longer considered as such by the Soviets. He 
had become ostracized from the decision-making body of the PCE ever since a 
serious illness had kept him bed-ridden.37 In March of 1942, he killed himself at the 
terminal stage of his illness. The power vacuum inside the PCE increased when 
Pedro Checa, who was in charge of the organisation of the party, died a few months 
later in August 1942.
Two candidates stood for the post of General Secretary: Dolores Ibarruri, a 
gifted orator and a popular symbol of the Republic, and Jesus Hernandez, a powerful 
figure in the PCE and the Minister of Education during the Civil War. Pasionaria had 
the support of the Comintern and Hernandez the support of the rank-and-file in
the Franco regime, Arasa, Maquis, p. 41.
36 Only as late as 1986 was there a gesture to rehabilitate Quifiones as well as other "traitors" such as 
Jesus Monz6n and Joan Comorera, whose cases will be examined below. Even so, no profound 
analysis of the circumstances that allowed these purges to take place has yet been produced by the 
PCE. “Rehabilitaciones tardias en el PCE", El Pais, 25 April 1986.
37 Jose Diaz had been suffering from cancer since the Civil War. He had gone through several 
operations that had failed to cure him. He missed the last year of the Civil War while he was being 
treated in the Soviet Union. Initially, he was in a hospital in Barvija, near Moscow. Once the Second 
World War broke out, he was sent to a hospital in Pushkin and then to Tbilisi, capital of Georgia. 
There, in a lot of pain caused by his illness, he committed suicide by jumping out of the window from 
the third floor of his house. His suicide was kept secret from the rank-and-file of the PCE because, as 
Falc6n says, "at the time, the suicide of a Communist leader was, like it is for religious people, a sin 
for our fighting morale. It was not well considered because they said that a Communist should not take 
his life, and least of all, a General Secretary", Falcon, Asalto, pp. 228-229.
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Moscow. As we shall see, the support of the Soviets would be the decisive factor in 
this power struggle for the party leadership.38
In the summer of 1943, Hernandez left for Mexico accompanied by Ant6n.39 
Hernandez took the opportunity to try to gain more adherents to his cause amongst 
the Latin America diaspora. However, he found himself unable to create a rupture 
between the leadership in Mexico (Uribe and Mije) and Dolores Ibarruri 40 Anton had 
gone with him for no other purpose than protecting Pasionaria's interests, and he did 
so efficiently. In the meantime, she was alone in Moscow with her hands free to 
secure her position.41 Hernandez achieved the rank-and-file support that Pasionaria 
lacked by offering the Spanish exiles in the USSR the possibility of leaving the 
country, a proposal that did not please the Comintern and put into question his 
fidelity to the "motherland".42
By 7 April 1944, while still in Mexico, Hem&ndez was expelled from the 
Central Committee and soon afterwards was thrown out of the party. He was accused 
of factional activity against the new leader, Ibarruri. The party published a press 
released announcing the expulsion. Among other things, it stated:
Hernandez ... has started an infamous operation against the sacred unity of our
Party; slandering our adored General Secretary, the great comrade Dolores Ibarruri.
38 Falcon, Asalto, p. 230; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 71; Carmen Parga, Antes que sea tarde (Madrid: 
Compafiia Literaria, 1996), p. 101.
39 There is disagreement on whether the Comintern instructed Hernandez to leave, Victor Alba, El 
partido comunista de Espaha (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1979), p. 268; Hermet, The Communists, 
p. 52. Or whether he decided himself to go, Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 57; Taguefia, Testimonio, 
p. 468. It does not really matter because whatever the case nobody could leave the USSR without the 
permission of the authorities. Hence, it is fair to assume that the Comintern agreed to Hernandez’s 
departure for Mexico.
40 Moran, Miseria, p. 74.
41 "For those of us who lived in the USSR, everything was resolved for there she was left in charge of 
everything. Her position was well above that of other leaders who, before Hemdndez left, used to act 
under his wing", Taguefia, Testimonio, p. 467.
42 Many authors cite this factor as one of the main reasons Hernandez lost the support of the 
Comintern, Alba, El Partido, p. 268; Taguefia, Testimonio, pp. 467-468; Sergio Vilar, Por que se ha 
destruido el PCE (Barcelona: Plaza y Jands, Barcelona, 1986), p. 90; Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 
57; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 71.
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To slander Dolores Ibarruri is to attack the most beloved thing of our Party and our 
people.43
Hernandez’s downfall was the only possible consequence of a power struggle 
that, with the help of the Soviets, Pasionaria had finally won.44 Hence, his supporters 
or those who had not clearly supported Pasionaria found themselves in a delicate 
position and soon faced the same fate as their leader.45 Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that if the balance had shifted towards Hernandez, there is little doubt he 
would have also purged those who had not backed him.
The purge of the Hemandists revealed the extent of the submission of the party to the 
Comintern and the Soviet Union. Neither in Moscow nor in Mexico was there ever a 
meeting of the Central Committee or the Political Bureau to nominate Pasionaria. By 
May 1944, it was clear to all concerned that Ibarruri had succeeded in her rise to the 
high command of the party. The power struggle of the PCE had yet again been 
decided in Moscow.
C. The Second World War
43 Declaration of the CC of the PCE concerning the expulsion of Hernandez, 21 July 1944, AHPCE 
(DIVERGENCIAS, DOCUMENTOS ANO 1944-I-XII, Caja 107, Carp. 25).
44 As Paul Preston points out, Hernandez did enjoy the support of certain members of the Comintern, 
such as Dimitrov and Manuilsky. Had he acted more wisely, he might have held a chance to overthrow 
Pasionaria but this was not the case, Paul Preston, Comrades! Portraits o f the Spanish Civil War 
(London: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 307.
45 Moran, Miseria, p. 76; Vilar, PCE, p. 91. There are several memoirs from the protagonists of this 
episode in the history of the PCE: Hernandez, Yo, Ministro; Taguefia, Testimonio; Parga, Antes; 
Enrique Castro Delgado, Mi fe  seperdio en Moscu (Mexico D.F.: Populibros “La Prensa”, 1972).
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1. The Party in France
After the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the dramatic shift in Soviet 
foreign policy to one of alliance with the Western democracies led to a change of 
policy for the rest of the Communist parties in the world. In the Spanish case, the 
PCE made an attempt at reconciliation with the Socialists as well as those political 
forces that opposed or disagreed with Franco, including those on the right. By the 
summer of 1941, the party was hoping that under a so-called policy of National 
Unity, they would be able to fight together against Spain’s possible participation in 
the war on the side of the Axis, eventually overthrowing the Franco regime.46 Among 
other things, the policy demanded: the unity of all forces that opposed Franco to 
achieve the recognition of the Republic’s continued legality; the re-establishment of 
the Negrin government; the re-establishment of the freedom of the press, of opinion 
and of assembly; the disruption of any connection with Hitler and the Axis powers; 
and regional autonomy within Spain 47
However, this abrupt shift of policy was too sudden to convince anyone, least 
of all the Socialists. Some of the PCE’s potential allies were put off by the wide 
spectrum of political forces included in the supposed alliance, with sectors far to the 
right, such as Monarchists and Carlists. At the same time, it is easy to imagine that a 
Republican government led by Negrin with Communist participation did not seem 
like an appealing prospect for those very same right wing groups. In addition, the 
doctrine of National Unity excluded groups that ideologically were much closer to
46 The National Unity policy had its origins in the Civil War. Quifiones had continued to apply it 
without the approval of the party in exile. For more information see Francisco Moreno G6mez, La 
Resistencia Armada contra Franco (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, 2001), pp. 241-245.
47 To spread the message of National Unity, the party published a manifesto in September 1941 called 
“A la Union Nacional de todos los espafioles contra Franco, los invasores italo-germanos y los 
traidores. Contra la participation de Espafia en la guerra que Hitler hace a la URSS, Inglaterra y sus
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the party but with whom the Communists had had confrontations in the past, such as 
certain Socialists, Libertarians and those who had taken part in the Casado coup 
against Negrin in 1939.48 Finally, this shift in position lacked any analysis, let alone 
criticism, of the Soviet Union's recent alliance with Germany.49
All of these contradictions put together should have been enough for the 
policy of National Unity to fail. The only reason it survived for some time was due 
mainly to the perseverance of the Communists in France, where the organisation of 
the PCE put great efforts into promoting it.
At the beginning of the Second World War and, once the PCE had been declared 
illegal in France as a result of the Soviet-German pact, most of the party leaders left 
Paris in a rush to seek refuge in Moscow and Mexico.50 The group that remained on 
French soil included the activists Jesus Monzdn, Carmen de Pedro, Gabriel Le6n 
Trilla and Manuel Azcarate.51 In theory, de Pedro had been appointed as the person
aliados...”.
48 Heine, La oposicion, p. 105; Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 71.
49 In the official History of the PCE, the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact is not even mentioned: 
“At the beginning of the war, France and England as well as Germany were fighting an imperialistic 
war. But later on its character was modified. This change had its origins, mainly, on the resistance of 
the people to Hitler’s aggression, on the entrance of the Soviet Union in the war and the formation of a 
powerful coalition between the USSR, England, the USA and other countries”, Ibarruri & W AA, 
Historia del PCE, p. 217.
50 The pact had made the PCE some sort of fifth column in France.
51 Jesus Monz6n Reparaz was bom to a wealthy family of Navarra sometime between 1907 and 1910. 
He became a lawyer and joined the PCE in 1931. He soon took over the General Secretariat of the 
provincial committee of Navarra. Once the war broke out, Monzdn acted as prosecutor in one of the 
popular tribunals established in Bilbao. He would later work in Madrid and Valencia. With the loss of 
the Northern front, Monzdn left for France and then returned to the Centro-Levante zone. There, he 
was appointed Civil Governor of Alicante and Cuenca, and subsequently, Negrin proposed him as the 
new General Secretary of the Ministry of War. The war finished before he took over the post. In 
exchange for his brother, who was captured in Pamplona, Monzon liberated a Carlist conspirator jailed 
in Madrid (the Carlist was Antonio Lizarza and when Monzon was arrested by the police in 1945, 
Lizarza helped him to avoid the death penalty.) Monzon did not belong to the Central Committee or 
the Political Bureau of the PCE but he was well considered inside the party, as shown by the fact that 
after the Casado Coup, he left Spain in the same aeroplane as Dolores Ibarruri, the delegate of the 
Comintern Stepanov and the French deputy Jean Catala. For more information see Manuel Martorell, 
Jesus Monzdn, el lider comunista olvidadopor la historia (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2000).
Carmen de Pedro had worked as a typist for the Central Committee of Madrid and Barcelona. She had
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in charge of the party but once the leadership was gone, Monzdn took over the role.52 
In the view of Azcarate, the only reason the party had chosen her over Monzon was 
because the leadership did not hold him in great regard.53 In contrast, Monzon is 
described in most activists’ accounts as a “natural leader”.54
From 1940 onwards, the team worked to reorganise the Communist activists 
in France and help those in the concentration camps to flee to America or the Soviet 
Union.55 Azcarate's detailed recollection presents a very active organisation that 
managed to expand itself throughout France, even in the occupied territory.56 
Monzdn fought to maintain the independence of the Spanish Communists from the 
French Communist Party (PCF), and eventually participated in the planning of the 
first guerrilla actions against the Germans that would eventually develop into the 
Spanish Maquis in France in 1941.57 He also worked hard to promote the policy of 
National Unity. In August 1941, he launched a newspaper called Reconquista de
also worked as Togliatti’s secretary in Madrid and had been in charge of facilitating visas to the 
Spanish emigres at the Chilean Embassy in France at the end of the Spanish Civil War, Martorell, 
Monzdn, p. 73; Amaiz, Retrato, p. 134. Aurora Amaiz met Carmen de Pedro after the Spanish Civil 
War in Paris and they became close friends.
Gabriel Le6n Trilla was an intellectual who came from a military family of Valladolid. He was one of 
the founders of the Partido Comunista Espanol, predecessor of the PCE. He had a degree in 
Philosophy from the universities of Valladolid and Madrid. In 1927, he became part of the Political 
Bureau of the party. Together with Adame and Bullejos, Trilla formed the troika that was in charge of 
the PCE until 1932. He also worked for the Comintern in Moscow until this time. In 1932, Trilla was 
expelled from the PCE as part of the Bullejos leadership due to disagreements with the Comintern. He 
was readmitted into the party again during the Civil War and worked as a translator of the Ministry of 
Public Instruction. During the conflict, Trilla also became the editor-in-chief of Nuestra Bandera. 
After the war, Trilla worked as a French teacher in Aix-en-Provence when Monzon found him and 
convinced him to become an activist for the party again.
Manuel Azcarate was a party activist and an intellectual. His father was the ambassador of the 
Republic in London.
52 By then, Carmen de Pedro and Monzon had started a romantic relationship.
53 Azcarate, Derrotas, pp. 227, 248; Law, La Pasionaria, p. 138; Carrillo, Memorias, p. 411. Moran, 
on the other hand, points out that "Dolores, who always liked domineering men made to succeed, or at 
least to appear so, had a good opinion of Monzdn”, Moran, Miseria, p. 84.
54 Azc&rate, Derrotas, p. 218; Mariano Asenjo and Victoria Ramos, Malagon. Autobiografia de un 
falsificador (Espafia: El Viejo Topo, 1999), p. 97; Mordn, Miseria, p. 84.
55 Among those who they helped to flee was Palmiro Togliatti, who escaped to the USSR in February 
1940.
56 Azcdrate, Derrotas, pp. 259-265.
57 The Maquis was a rural guerrilla movement that acted in the rearguard, fighting against the Nazi 
forces in occupied France. There is no agreement on when exactly the first action of the Maquis took
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Espana. A year later, he created an organisation called Spanish National Unity 
(UNE), and appointed himself as the president. The UNE managed to gather support 
from some individuals who were not Communists but never from any other political 
party.
During this period, communication between the group in France and the party 
in Moscow and Mexico was difficult to maintain, particularly in the early years of the 
war.59 Nevertheless, Monzon made a great effort to follow the directives of the party, 
with more success once he was able to listen to Radio Moscow from September 
1941, and the PCE's Radio Espana Independiente, also known as Radio Pirenaica, 
from 1943. In addition, Monzdn drafted several reports that he tried to send to the 
leadership in Mexico and Moscow, of which at least one reached Carrillo in Cuba in 
the summer of 1942.60 Though at first his attempts to receive a response from the 
party failed, later Carmen de Pedro would travel to Switzerland with the specific task 
of contacting the exiled leadership and indeed succeeded in doing so.61 In fact, most 
authors agree that Monzdn never developed his own political line and they manage to 
demonstrate this by using the documents left from this period and showing among 
other things the similarities between the declarations of the organisation in France 
and those of the organisations in Moscow and Mexico.62
place, but it was sometime in 1941.
58 For more information see Martorell, Monzon, pp. 95-96.
59 Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 232.
60 Martorell, Monzdn, pp. 98-99,106.
61 Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 271.
62 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 97; Arasa, Maquis, pp. 299-300; Heine, La oposicion, p. 203. 
Moreno Gomez, author of one of the most extensive books on the guerrilla movement against Franco, 
also argues that National Unity was a policy of the whole PCE and of the International, not a policy 
invented by Monzdn. See Moreno Gomez, La resistencia, pp. 242-243. Another example of the 
leadership’s approval of the National Unity policy can be found in an article written by Santiago 
Carrillo on the substitution of Ramdn Serrano Suner, “Declaraciones de Santiago Carrillo”, HOY, 
Montevideo, 5 September 1942, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Santiago Carrillo, Articulos, Caja 3, Carp.
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Aside from the activities carried out in France, Monzdn soon turned his attention to 
the party in Spain. Following the downfall of Quifiones, the clandestine organisation 
had never recovered. In an attempt to bring it back to life, Monzon began to send into 
the country cadres from France, who worked under his direct orders. One of these 
men would be Gabriel Leon Trilla.63 Jesus Monzon himself entered the country and, 
soon after his arrival, began to work on the arduous task of finding allies for the 
UNE.64 In Madrid, while trying to give the UNE some credibility, Monzon launched 
the Junta Suprema de Union Nacional (JSUN) in September 1943. It was supposed 
to be the representative of the UNE inside Spain and have the support of Socialists, 
Cenetistas65, and Catalan and Basque nationalists. However, there is strong evidence 
that the Junta never really existed.66
While this was happening, the Latin American version of the UNE, the Union 
Democratica Espanola (UDE), had also been created. It was in charge of expanding 
the ideas and programme of National Unity in the New World. Through the UDE, the 
PCE obtained the support of a few intellectuals and what was more important, the 
support of the Negrinist sectors of the PSOE and the UGT. Unfortunately, this was 
just a delusion. Soon, the rapprochement between the PCE and the rest of the exile 
forces in Latin America that had begun after the German invasion of the USSR was 
challenged again. The PCE published a new manifesto in the summer of 1942 in
1.1.5).
63 Monzdn’s decision to give Trilla a position of responsibility was a bold thing to do. Trilla had been 
expelled from the PCE in 1932 and though he had been readmitted into the party during the Civil War, 
in Communist terms his past was reason enough to make him untrustworthy for life.
64 For more information see Moreno Gomez, La Resistencia, p. 243.
65 Those who belonged to the Syndicalist trade union Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo, (CNT).
66 A very extensive inquiry into the matter was undertaken by Estruch Tobella. He also concluded 
“that the Junta Suprema never existed”, Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 78-85. Also see Sergio Vilar, 
Historia del Anti-franquismo (Barcelona: Plaza y Jan6s, 1984), p. 100; Moran, Miseria, pp. 83-95; 
Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 272; Moreno Gomez, La Resistencia, p. 243. On the other hand, Arasa 
maintains that the Junta existed but that it gathered nothing more than a few individuals who could not 
have been said to represent their parties, Arasa, Maquis, p. 43.
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which the party no longer called for the re-establishment of a Republican 
government.67 Rather, it called on the Spanish people to elect a Constituent 
Assembly that would then draw up a constitution. This measure, which was not 
welcomed by the Spanish Republican forces in exile, came as a result of the 
Communists’ attempt to appeal to right wing forces such as the Monarchists. 
However, not only did the Manifesto trouble many of those the PCE was 
theoretically trying to gain as allies, it also failed to find any allies among the right 
wing forces. The difficulty for the Communists in attempting to build bridges with 
conservative anti-Francoists was compounded by the anti-Communism of these 
sectors. Even so, the policy of National Unity to a certain extent served to break the 
isolation in which the PCE had found itself ever since the German-Soviet Pact.68
2. The Aran Valley invasion
The guerrilla invasion of Spain in 1944 came about as a result of the party’s 
combined approach that defended, on the one hand, the policy of National Unity, and, 
on the other, supported the guerrilla option to overthrow the Franco regime. In 
August 1944, Monzon wrote a letter to the Communist organisation that he had left 
in France, asking them to organise an invasion of Spain through the Pyrenees. After 
the liberation of Paris, at a time when the euphoria of victory was at its highest, 
Monzon wanted to take advantage of the Spanish forces that had fought on French 
soil during the Nazi occupation.69 It was sensible to anticipate that in the struggle 
against Fascism, Spain would be the next stage. The aim of the invasion was to
67 “Llamamiento del Comite Central del PCE.”
68 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 72; Moran, Miseria, p. 81; Heine, La oposicion, pp. 107, 109.
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occupy a strip of Spanish territory that would serve as a bridgehead where a 
provisional government could be established provoking a national insurrection and
7ftthe subsequent intervention of the Allies. Those Spaniards who had fought in 
France against the Nazis were now organising themselves as the Agrupacion de 
Guerrilleros Espanoles (AGE), to prepare an Army for the “conquest” of Spain.
As with everything else relating to Monzon, there is some debate about 
whether or not the leadership of the party in Mexico and Moscow knew about the 
invasion, and approved of it. While the party maintained that the decision had been 
taken by Monzdn alone, several authors have suggested that the invasion plans must 
have been known to the leadership in Moscow for several reasons. At the time France 
had already been liberated and communications between the PCE and its organisation 
in France were possible. Azcarate and De Pedro had held a meeting with two leaders 
of the PCF, Andrd Marty and Jacques Duclos, to inform them about the operation 
and very likely, the French would have informed the PCE leadership about it. And 
finally, the preparations for the invasion were not kept secret: the British Intelligent 
Services, the Franco regime and the French Authorities all knew about the plans of 
the guerrilleros making it almost impossible for the Soviets and hence, the PCE 
leadership not to have known about it.71
Soon after receiving Monzdn’s letter, the group in France agreed to go ahead with the 
invasion that came to be known as the “Reconquest of Spain”. They chose the Aran
69 For information on the participation of the Maquis in the liberation of France against the Nazis see 
Moreno Gomez, La Resistencia, p. 246.
70 Moreno Gomez, La Resistencia, p. 247.
71 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 94, 97; Heine, La oposicion, pp. 203, 211; Azc&rate, Derrotas, pp. 
286-287; Arasa, Maquis, pp. 94, 106, 108, 303. Other authors that agree with this view are Lister, 
/2fasta/(Madrid: Gregorio del Toro, 1978) pp. 180-181; Vilar, Anti-franquismo, p. 136; Falc6n, 
Asalto, p. 234. On the other hand, according to Moreno G6mez, the decision to invade was an
valley as the crossing point. Azcarate believes that there were three main reasons why 
they welcomed this idea. Firstly, they had a false vision of the reality of the situation 
in Spain, which made them believe that conditions were such that the invasion would 
be followed by a general insurrection of the populace against the dictatorship. 
Second, they were very much influenced by the experience they had just lived 
through: the guerrilla victory over the Nazis in France. And finally, there was a 
general feeling that they ‘had to do something’ with the Republican Army of 
Spaniards located in the south of France, which had numerous weapons and high 
morale.72 Moreno Gomez, in his extensive book on the guerrilla movement against 
Franco, argues that the invasion was in fact a logical action: “It was coherent to rely 
on the Allies’ support for the reestablishment of a democratic order in Spain, and it 
was coherent to expect that an armed action of the Spanish exiles against Franco 
would attract European solidarity”.73
At 6 a.m. on 19 October 1944, the operation “Reconquest of Spain” officially 
began.74 The guerrilleros had a few early successes but, very soon after the invasion 
began, they were overpowered by the Spanish army. In addition, it soon became clear 
that the people were not ready to support them. Their onward march halted at the 
town of Viella, which they failed to conquer. At this point, Carrillo arrived in 
France.75 He then took over the command of the party organisation, which was not 
hard to do since he was the only top party leader present in the country. He travelled 
into the Aran valley with Azcarate, and on 28 October held a meeting with the
autonomous one made by the PCE’s delegation of France and Spain, Moreno G6mez, La Resistencia, 
p. 246.
Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 286.
73 Moreno G6mez, La Resistencia, p. 245.
74 There were groups of guerrilleros coming inside the country before and after this date. For more 
information about the invasion see Arasa, Maquis, pp. 121-189 and Moreno G6mez, La Resistencia, p. 
247.
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leaders of the guerrilleros where it was decided to order the troops to retreat.76 
According to Carrillo, he was the one that took this decision because he had been 
informed in Paris that a Francoist regiment was marching towards the frontier to 
close it, which would have left the guerrillas without an escape route.77 However, 
Vicent Lopez Tovar, the military chief of the guerrilleros, has argued that the order 
had already been given when Carrillo arrived: he had been the one to convince 
Carrillo to go ahead with it.78 In fact, Lopez Tovar had refused to attack Viella 
against the orders of the party as he thought they could not succeed.79 However, it 
was not until Carrillo arrived that the decision became official.
As the venture came to an end, it was clear that the invasion had been a 
mistake. Monzon’s days as a party leader were coming to an end. However, as we 
shall see, the tactical errors made during the Aran valley invasion, though important, 
were mainly used as excuses for his downfall.
3. The downfall of Jesus Monzon
Due to the conditions imposed by the Second World War, the underground 
Communist parties in Europe were forced to develop independently from their 
Political Bureaux in exile. However, the centralism that characterized the Communist
75 He was in Oran when Ibdrruri ordered him to go to France immediately to take charge of the 
situation, Carrillo, Dialogue, pp. 91-92; Arasa, Maquis, p. 194.
76 Until the publication of Moreno Gdmez’s book on the guerrilla movement against Franco, the date 
for Carrillo’s arrival into the Aran Valley had been 27 October (Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 288; Martorell, 
Monzdn, p. 144; Arasa, Maquis, p. 192). Moreno Gomez, basing his argument on the version of events 
given by Vicente Lopez Tovar, maintains he only got there on 28 October, which gives weight to the 
theory that the decision to retreat had already been taking before Carrillo’s arrival, Moreno Gomez, La 
Resistencia, p. 248.
77 In his book about the Maquis, Daniel Arasa argues that it was unlikely that such a regiment existed, 
Arasa, Maquis, p. 201.
78 Asenjo and Ramos, Malagon, p. 139 and Moreno G6mez, La Resistencia, pp. 248-249.
79 Arasa, Maquis, p. 188.
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movement at the time could not allow these autonomous organisations to exist for 
long, much less so if they had been successful in their respective countries. Once the 
war ended and the communication channels were opened, it was just a matter of time 
before the party leaders regained control over the activists in the field, often 
destroying their organisations in the process. In the case of the PCE, the policy of 
National Unity and the Aran valley invasion would both be used to crush the 
organisation created by Monzon. Obviously, the failure of the guerrilla operation 
made this process easier, but it was not the reason Monzon fell in disgrace after the 
end of the war. As Vazquez-Montalban explains, “the leadership of the PCE was 
ready to come of age and take charge of the party in Spain, even it they had to pass
Q A
over the political corpse of Monzdn and the physical corpse of Trilla”.
Monzon's downfall was the result of the party’s democratic centralism, the 
rule of a leadership that did not want to lose any of its power.81 It cannot be forgotten 
that the core of the PCE leadership had been safely waiting in Mexico and Moscow 
for events to unfold, while Monzdn succeeded in creating an autonomous party 
organisation in occupied France. The two groups represented the central dilemma of 
activists against bureaucrats that had unfolded in the international Communist 
movement as a result of the Second World War, a conflict that had previously been 
exposed within the PCE by the case of Quifiones. The activists were indirectly 
questioning the legitimacy of the bureaucrats, as previously the Communist forces in 
Spain had questioned the leadership in exile. An autonomous organisation even when 
acting in accordance with party policy, as has been shown to be the case with the 
policy of National Unity and with the Aran valley invasion, would threaten the very
80 V&zquez-Montalb&n, Pasionaria, p. 123.
81 The principle of democratic centralism basically meant that the minority had to adhere to the line 
adopted by the majority and that there could not follow any deviation or public disagreement.
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essence of a centralized Communist party, therefore leaving no other option for the
exiled leadership than to crush the newly emerging activists. The downfall of
Monzon was the result of this conflict; the failure of the Aran valley invasion was
just the excuse to carry it through.82 Indeed, a month after the invasion, Carrillo made
a speech in which he described the guerrilla action of the Aran valley as a success:
In the north of Catalonia -in the Aran valley- the patriotic guerrilleros have 
occupied during ten days sixteen villages. ... ten days of power for National Unity, 
during which there has been no act of revenge or reprisal and during which, for the 
first time, the Spanish people have lived together.83
Until at least 1951, the party pursued the guerrilla policy as part of its strategy 
to overthrow the Franco regime even if the idea of an invasion had been abandoned.84 
And even as late as 1960, the official history of the Spanish Communist Party still 
described the application of this policy during the Second World War in very 
positive, if unrealistic, terms: ‘The guerrilla activity contributed towards preventing 
the wishes of Franco and his people in joining the war”.85 However, even if the party 
did not immediately disengage itself from the invasion or from the policy of National 
Unity, the objective of its leadership, in this case represented by Carrillo, remained 
focused on the destruction of Monzon.86 He soon became isolated in Spain where 
frictions were developing with activists such as Sebastian Zapirian and Santiago 
Alvarez, who had been sent to Spain by Carrillo in an attempt to regain control of the
82 It is important to remember that Monzon imposed on his organisation the same despotic leadership 
he later suffered from those in Moscow and Mexico. For information on the abuses committed by 
Monzdn and the UNE see Heine, La oposicion, pp. 207, 445-446; Moran, Miseria, p. 88; Estruch 
Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 87; Arasa, Maquis, p. 92; Heine, La oposicion, p. 217; Vilar, Anti-franquismo, 
p. 137.
3 (Unidad y  Lucha, Toulouse, Ediciones Espaiia Popular, November 1944, p. 1). Estruch Tobella, 
1939-1956, p. 99.
84 Carrillo places the end of the guerrillas in Spain in 1949 but there seems to be enough evidence to 
confirm that they were active until 1951, Carrillo, Dialogue, p. 101.
85 Ibarruri & W A A , Historia del PCE, p. 219.
86 Arasa, Maquis, pp. 246-247; Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 98; Asenjo and Ramos, Malagon, p. 
153.
43
underground organisation. In February 1945, the exiled leadership published an 
"Open letter from the Delegation of the CC inside Spain”. Its goal was to discredit 
Monzdn and everything he had done until then. However, Moran argues that the 
letter was not written by any delegates in Spain but rather by Carrillo himself in 
France.87 Subsequently, the leadership called Monzon, Trilla and Pilar Soler, another 
activist that worked with Monzon, back to France for a meeting. Apparently, Monzon 
and Soler planned to leave Spain through different channels than those normally used 
by the party activists, fearing that they could be betrayed and even killed by the latter. 
Monzdn got as far only as Barcelona where he was arrested by the police while 
preparing his departure.88 Eventually, he was sentenced to 30 years in prison.89 
According to Lister, Monzdn’s arrest saved his life because the person in charge of 
helping him to leave Spain was in effect going to take him to his place of 
execution.90 Trilla, on the other hand, opted not to follow the orders of the party and 
stayed in Madrid, breaking contact with the PCE activists. Monzdn and Trilla’s 
suspicions were soon confirmed when Trilla was murdered by a group of Communist 
guerrilleros on orders from the PCE.91 In December 1947, while in jail, Jesus 
Monzdn was officially expelled from the PCE accused of being a provocateur.92
87 Mor&n, Miseria, pp. 100-102; Ibarruri & W A A , Historia del PCE, p. 226.
88 Soler managed to escape and soon crossed the frontier with the help of the PSUC's activists. For 
more information see Martorell, Monzdn, pp. 153-164.
89 Monzon avoided the death penalty thanks to Bishop Olaechea and a man called Antonio Lizarza, a 
Carlist from Navarra he had saved during the civil war (see note 51 in this chapter). Apparently, 
Lizarza gave proof that Monzdn had been in Switzerland during the Aran valley invasion, Heine, La 
oposicion, pp. 224-225; Moran, Miseria, p. 106, Martorell, Monzon, pp. 153-182.
90 Lister, Carrillo, p. 79.
91 There were other activists that suffered from the repression of the PCE. According to Mordn, 
Carrillo and Serradell were directly responsible for the death of Pere Canals, Monzon’s delegate in 
Catalonia, Moran, Miseria, p. 173. Llibert Estartus, who also belonged to the PSUC, disappeared in 
strange circumstances, Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 110-112; Vilar, Anti-franquismo, p. 150. 
Alberto Pdrez Ayala, in charge of the political contacts of the JSUN, was killed in October 1945 
probably by the same group that killed Trilla, Arasa, Maquis, pp. 293-294. And Arriolabengoa, 
another member of Monzdn’s group, was arrested by the police in 1945, Moran, Miseria, p. 107.
44
As the Monz6n affair drew to a close, it became clear that the main beneficiary of his 
downfall had been Santiago Carrillo. During the evacuation of the guerrillas, his 
reputation grew dramatically. According to many authors, it placed him on the
Q<1
‘trampoline’ towards the general secretariat of the party. The rest of the Communist 
leaders in Mexico and Moscow had arrived in France much later than Carrillo, a time 
difference which allowed him to become settled and take control. Carrillo, the 
bureaucrat, had won the battle against Monzon, the activist, a pattern that will be 
repeated throughout this study.
In December 1945, the PCE held a General Assembly in Toulouse that helped 
to affirm the party’s centralized structure, validating in this manner the authority of 
the exiled leaders. The purge of Jesus Monzdn confirmed a pattern in the PCE that 
had already started with the case of Heriberto Quinones. The birth of an autonomous 
clandestine movement had met with the resistance of the bureaucratic leadership in 
exile. This resistance translated itself into open confrontation to finally crush 
Monzdn and those close to him. As a consequence, the party also destroyed one of 
the most active organisations the Communists ever had.
D. The Beginning of the Coid War
1. The PCE and the Republican forces
92 Arasa, Maquis, p. 301.
93 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 79; Moran, Miseria, p. 97; Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 102; Heine, La 
oposicion, p. 220; Arasa, Maquis, p. 196; Falcon, Asalto, p. 234.
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The end of the Second World War signified further change for the PCE as well as for 
the Spanish Republican forces in exile, the latter having undergone serious internal 
confrontation since the end of the Spanish Civil War.94 The initial indications that 
policies were taking a new turn appeared on 10 January 1945, when the Cortes 
(Spanish Parliament) in exile held its first session. From then onwards, it became 
clear that the Republican forces were attempting to rebuild a unified and stable 
platform with which to attract the support of the Allies. As the Communists became 
aware of the dangers in not being part of this alternative, they decided to revive the 
claim for the re-establishment of Republican legality that had been eliminated in their 
1942 manifesto.95 Slowly but surely, the PCE was disentangling itself from the policy 
of National Unity that started to become the object of subtle criticism in the party’s 
newspapers and the leaders' speeches.
In 1946, the party applied to join the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas 
Democraticas (ANFD), an organisation created by the Socialists in Madrid 1944, 
which brought together members of the PSOE, the UGT, the CNT and the Spanish 
Republican Parties. Soon after its creation, the ANFD entered into negotiations with 
the Monarchists and with the Republican government in exile.96 Once accepted into 
the ANFD, the PCE could no longer portray the guerrillas as the force heading the
94 After the resignation of Manuel Azafia on 27 February 1939, the Republican government in exile 
went through a very difficult period. Diego Martinez Barrio, President of the Cortes (Spanish 
Parliament) refused to replace Azafia and subsequently, on 27 July, the Standby Committee approved a 
motion that assumed the dissolution of the Republican government. However, Juan Negrin, the Prime 
Minister since 1937, refused to accept this resolution for he argued the Committee did not hold the 
constitutional power to take such a measure. There followed a period of great animosity between the 
Republican forces in exile, particularly between those who supported Negrin, mainly the Communists, 
and those Socialists who supported Indalecio Prieto.
95 This manifesto supported the idea of the people choosing the Constituent Assembly that would 
elaborate the constitution.
96 The difficulty in these negotiations, the confrontations between the different political groups inside 
the organisation, the strong repression of the Franco regime against the ANFD’s activists and the lack 
of support of the Western democracies, would all contribute to the dissolution of the ANFD between 
1947 and 1948. For more information see Heine, La oposicion, pp. 369-388.
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planned overthrow of the Franco regime. It now had to favour the goal supported by 
the majority of the Republican forces for an allied intervention in the country. 
Nevertheless, the Communists did not abandon guerrilla action and were in reality 
always eager to praise it, especially since it was the only ace the party could claim to 
have. This attitude did not help to unite the opposition as the Communists were 
suspected of being two-faced.
The next step for the PCE entailed membership of the Republican 
government in exile now headed by the Socialist Jose Giral. This government had 
been formed with great difficulty on 21 August 1945 in Mexico, following years of 
internal disputes between Indalecio Prieto, Diego Martinez Barrio and Juan Negrin, 
the main adversaries in the Spanish political arena in exile. In order to be included in 
the new government, the Communists had to overcome strong opposition from the 
Socialists led by Prieto, who refused to forget past confrontations. Nevertheless, by 
March 1946, Carrillo became Minister without portfolio in the new government of 
the Republic.97 However, despite the efforts of the political forces in exile and the 
guerrillas inside Spain, the dissolution of the Franco regime was still not an 
immediate possibility.
As we have seen, the guerrillas were unable to provoke the emergence of a 
popular revolt against Franco. In fact, their effects seemed to be the reverse of those 
intended. According to Preston, “they (the guerrilleros) made possible the revival of 
the Civil War mentality, gave the Army something to do and generally reunified the
97 In the meantime, the PSUC went through a similar process. The ANC, which had been created as the 
PSUC counterpart of the UNE, disappeared in August 1945. The Catalan Communists were then 
accepted in a new unitary platform called Solidaritat Catalana, led by Josep Tarradellas. On 14 
September 1945, Comorera became part of Josep Irla’s government of the Generalitat. But the efforts 
of this government would not get them very far and on 22 January 1948, it was dissolved by its 
president.
officer corps around Franco”.98 Those who had fought and lost the war against 
Franco, and were now experiencing the terrible effects of post-war repression and 
appalling economic circumstances, were likely to prefer to wait for a solution to 
come from the outside. However, it soon became clear that international factors 
would no longer work against the regime. The Republican forces in exile had 
achieved little other than symbolic measures against the Franco regime. Firstly, there 
was the exclusion of Franco’s Spain from the United Nations on 19 June 1945, 
ratified during the Potsdam Conference in the summer of that year.99 Secondly, there 
was condemnation of the regime in the Tripartite Declaration of the United States, 
Great Britain and France on 4 March 1946.100 By then, it was clear that the Spanish 
exiles’ hopes for intervention in the country had been wishful thinking. Once again, 
the international state of affairs favoured Franco as in reality, Spain fell under the 
Western powers’ sphere of influence. The fear of Communism, adequately exploited 
by the regime, erased any intention the western powers might have had of an 
intervention whose result could be unpredictable.
Moreover, the world was on the verge of the Cold War. The anti-Communist 
sentiment implanted in Europe through American aid meant that the Communist 
parties that at first had been part of the post-war coalition governments, as had been 
the case in France and Italy, were now being ostracized. As a response to this change, 
the Communists re-adopted their old sectarian habits against the rest of the forces on 
the left and against countries like the USA and the UK.101 The policy of the United- 
Front-from-Below from the years of the German-Soviet Pact, which stood in total
98 Preston, Franco, p. 518. Of the same opinion are Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 302 and Moran, Miseria, p. 
117.
99 2 August 1945. For more information on Franco and the Allies see Preston, Franco, pp. 532-562.
100 This took place during the Assembly of the United Nations.
101 The Cominform was created in September 1947 to replace the Comintern, which had been
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contradiction with the policy of National Unity, returned to the fore. This once again
1 (Y)led to the isolation of the Spanish Communists.
In August 1947, Vicente Uribe resigned as Minister of the Economy in the 
Republican Government, after the PSOE had violently attacked the PCE. Rodolfo 
Llopis, the General Secretary of the PSOE, had been appointed Prime Minister of the 
Republic in exile in February of that year. The Socialists favoured an alliance with 
the Monarchists, a policy thought to be more in line with the desires of the 
international community. Once it became clear that there was not going to be any 
intervention, Llopis was replaced by the Republican Alvaro de Albomoz on 27 
August 1947. The new government contained only ministers from Republican parties 
and would have no further impact on Spanish politics. The alliance of the Spanish 
political forces in exile had failed drastically.
As the new shift towards confrontation left the PCE isolated from other Spanish 
political forces, the party became concerned again with its guerrilla strategy. 
However, by this time, the repression had limited the guerrilla activity in Spain to the 
Front of the Levant and Aragon, which was directly controlled by the PCE.103 
Elsewhere, the guerrilla presence was declining.104 Desperate for a solution to these 
failures, the Spanish Communists decided to go to Yugoslavia to ask Tito for help 
with the guerrillas. The Spanish wanted Tito to help them with the planes they
abolished earlier in the war.
102 From November 1947 to the spring of 1948, the organisation of the PCE in Moscow would go 
through a new purge connected to the above-mentioned downfall of Jesus Hernandez. For more 
information see Moran, Miseria, pp. 151-160
103 For a detailed account on the repression against the guerrilla in Cordoba, Albacete, Ciudad Real 
and Ja6n during this period see Moreno Gomez, La Resistencia, pp. 468-676.
104 As with the number of guerrilleros that crossed Spain during the Aran valley invasion, the number 
of casualties that the guerrillas suffered during their existence until 1951 varies greatly from one 
author to the other. For different accounts see Moran, Miseria, p. 118; Carrillo, Dialogue, p. 101; 
Heine, La oposicion, pp. 430-436; Vilar, Anti-franquismo, pp. 157-160; Moreno Gomez, La
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needed in order to parachute men into Spain. The PCE leadership was unaware of the 
growing tensions between Belgrade and Moscow.105 In February 1948, Carrillo 
headed an expedition to Yugoslavia but only managed to obtain 30,000 dollars from 
the Yugoslavs.106 Tito was about to break from Moscow and the last thing he wanted 
was to challenge the West by helping the Spanish in an armed struggle.
Nevertheless, though the Yugoslavs did not give them the help they expected, 
the encounter prompted the Soviets to call their own meeting with the Spanish 
Communists. In all probability, they wanted to reaffirm the PCE’s fidelity to the 
Soviet Union in the confrontation between Tito and Stalin.107 The meeting took place 
in October 1948 between the Soviet delegation formed by Stalin, Molotov, 
Voroshilov and Suslov, and a Spanish delegation formed by Dolores Ibarruri, 
Francisco Anton and Santiago Carrillo. According to most accounts, Stalin suggested 
a reduction in guerrilla action, which could then be used in combination with a policy 
of Communist infiltration in the regime's trade unions and mass organisations.108 The 
Spanish delegation was disappointed: there seemed to be a hint of capitulation in the 
measures recommended by Stalin. However, as Claudin explains, “the meeting 
finished with the Spanish not totally convinced but ready, nevertheless, to apply with 
discipline the wise advice of the great chief'.109 The PCE was not about to contradict 
the orders coming from Moscow: at a time of extreme isolation from other political 
forces in exile, the Spanish Communists depended all the more on the support and
Resistencia, p. 687.
105 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 417; Carrillo, Comunismo?, p. 201.
106 For Carrillo’s description of the meeting see Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 417-418. Also see Moran, 
Miseria, pp. 134-136 and Law, La Pasionaria, pp. 151-152.
107 Carrillo, Comunismo? p. 202.
108 Ibarruri, Memorias, pp. 618-620; Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 420-422; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 97; 
Sanchez Montero, Memorias, p. 206; Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 153-154; Moran, Miseria, pp. 
137-141. On the other hand, Azcarate, Vilar and Lister argued that Stalin ordered the dissolution of the 
guerrillas altogether, Azcdrate, Derrotas, p. 321; Vilar, Anti-franquismo, pp. 169-171; Lister, Carrillo, 
p. 54.
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legitimacy given to them by the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet dictator also 
gave the PCE half a million dollars, sealing once more the Spaniards’ economic 
dependence on the Soviet Union.110
Nevertheless, it could be argued that in the short term, Stalin’s orders had 
little effect on the party. By 1948, the guerrilla movement seemed to be at a point of 
no return. The Civil Guard had finally managed to break the Front of the Levant and 
Aragon. A reduction of guerrilla activity was therefore a fact, not a choice. It would 
not be until the tram strike of Barcelona in 1951 that the PCE finally ordered the 
guerrillas to withdraw. Moreover, the possibilities of infiltrating the mass 
organisations and regime’s trade unions were remote in 1948. The regime’s control 
over industrial relations was very tight and the workers’ representatives were 
carefully appointed from above. In fact, the infiltration of the official trade unions 
only happened on a large scale in 1957 when Spain’s economic growth following the 
abandonment of the autarchic model by the Francoist regime, opened new routes of 
negotiation in labour relations. It was at that point that the underground groups were 
able to use the newly available legal instruments of workers’ representation, giving 
rise later to the first Comisiones. Nevertheless, even if it took several years for 
Stalin’s orders to have an impact in the development of the party, both the 
abandonment of violence and the use of legal platforms to fight the dictatorship 
eventually became the mainstay of the PCE’s policy.
2. Titoism and the PCE.
109 Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 96-97.
110 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 422; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 97.
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At the beginning of the Cold War, the Communist world embarked on a witch-hunt 
that came to be called anti-Titoism. Josip Broz Tito had been the General Secretary 
of the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) since 1937. During the Second World War, 
he became responsible for an all-Yugoslav Partisan Force created to resist the 1941 
German invasion. These partisans acted with autonomy from the Soviet Union and 
would become the main force in the subsequent liberation of Yugoslavia.111 By 
March 1945, Tito was the new Prime Minister of the country, and after defeating the 
Germans, he set up a one-party dictatorship.
However, his subsequent refusal to come under Soviet domination angered 
Stalin and eventually led to the expulsion of the YCP from the Cominform in June 
1948. It is interesting to point out that except for Albania, Yugoslavia had been the 
only country under the Soviet sphere of influence whose leaders had stayed in the 
country fighting for its freedom during the Second World War and eventually led to 
their liberation from the Germans. Hence, the YCP did not suffer from the activists 
vs. bureaucrats' dilemma that had affected most of the Communist parties in Eastern 
Europe at the end of the Second World War. In countries such as Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland, the leaders who had fled into exile during 
the war would later return to purge those who had stayed home fighting against the 
enemy. Needless to say, these leaders had to rely on the Soviet Union to regain power 
and influence, something Tito did not have to do.112 This confidence allowed him to 
stand up to the Soviets when they tried to interfere in his affairs and resist attempts to 
convert Yugoslavia into a satellite state. Consequently, Titoism became a new form 
of heresy under Soviet eyes, replacing Trotskyism as the label used to justify
1,1 The partisans started to receive military aid from the Soviets only in the spring 1944. In contrast, 
the Western Allies had been supplying war material to them since May 1943.
112 Westwood, Endurance, pp. 370, 379.
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repression. From then onwards, anyone threatening or questioning in any manner the 
authority of the orthodox Communist leaders could be accused of Titoism, which 
would lead to his/her automatic fall from grace.113
In the case of the PCE, the anti-Titoist campaign would be directed 
principally against the leader of the PSUC, Joan Comorera.114 For many years, 
Comorera had worked to maintain his party’s independence from the PCE. His most 
important achievement was the PSUC’s acceptance into the Comintern in 1939, 
which legitimised the autonomy of the party. It was only a matter of time before the 
PCE would attempt to regain control of the Catalan party. The opportunity came after 
the Second World War. The Comintern had disappeared in 1943 as a result of the 
Soviets’ attempt to show moderation to the Allies. Hence, the PSUC no longer had 
the protection derived from its membership in this international organisation. In 
1946, the PCE’s campaign to take over the Catalan party began, reaching its peak 
three years later.115
When the crisis turned into open confrontation, Comorera fought to keep 
control of the PSUC but his efforts proved to be in vain. By this time, the Catalan 
party was totally dominated by the PCE. Comorera had allowed those who favoured 
an organic fusion with the Spanish Communist Party to take over critical positions in
113 This happened to many leaders in Eastern Europe, who under torture confessed to treacheries they 
had not committed and were thereupon executed. Such were the cases of Mijail Kostov in Bulgaria; 
Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia; Lucretiu Patrascanu and Ana Pauker in Rumania; Wladislaw 
Gomulka in Poland; Kotchin Dzodze in Albania; and Laszlo Rajk in Hungary. The western 
Communist parties also underwent their own Titoist clean up, but in their case the results were less 
dramatic as they lived under the watch of democratic governments. A good account of these events can 
be found in Arthur London, The Confession (William Morrow, New York, 1970).
114 Monzon and those who had worked with him were also accused of being Titoist, though this would 
happen long after their downfall, which took place at the end of the Second World War. Hence, the 
timing of Comorera's purge was better and could be presented to the Soviets as proof of their 
continuous hunt for Titoists. Comorera had become an ideal prey.
115 For information on the events that lead to the confrontation between Comorera and the PCE see 
Miquel Caminal, Joan Comorera. Comunisme i Nacionalisme (1939-1958) (Barcelona: Editorial 
Empuries, 1985), pp. 214-246; Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 177-180; Moran, Miseria, pp. 171- 
176.
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the PSUC.116 On 8 November 1949, the Spanish Communists published a manifesto 
informing the rank-and-file of the expulsion of Comorera from the PSUC and 
accusing him, amongst many other things, of being a Tito supporter.117 The 
confrontation between the Yugoslav leader, Josip Tito, and Stalin had finally 
exploded. Hence, the PCE was happy to present Comorera as their Titoist sacrifice. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the campaign against Comorera had 
started long before the beginning of the Titoist witch-hunt. The accusations of 
Titoism against the Catalan leader were therefore pure opportunism, though it was 
relatively easy for the leadership to target Comorera with nationalist tendencies, as 
had been the case with Tito. In August 1951, Mundo Obrero would publish an article 
about Comorera in which he was accused of being a Francoist agent. Amongst other 
things, it said: “Comorera and his gang are complying with their role as footmen and 
police agents of the imperialists and Francoist forces, just as that Judas Tito and other
1 I Q
‘masters* of Comorera have done in Yugoslavia.”
Once Comorera realised there was little more he could do in exile, he moved 
into an area that he had previously ignored: the clandestine movement in Catalonia. 
On 31 December 1951, he crossed the frontier into Spain. He went to Barcelona and 
lived there for three years in terrible conditions accompanied only by his wife, Rosa 
Santacana, and the activist Celesti Marti.119 Soon after his arrival, through Radio 
Pirenaica and the party's newspapers and theoretical journals, the PCE began a 
campaign against Comorera accusing him of being a Francoist agent and an
116 Such were the case of Jos6p Moix, Rafael Vidiella, Ramdn Soliva, Wenceslao Colomer, Roman i 
Margarita Abril, Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 129; Moran, Miseria, p. 173; Caminal, Comorera, p. 
249.
117 Declaration by the Secretariat of the PSUC about the political conduct of Juan Comorera, 8 
November 1949, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, ANO 1949-I-XII, Carp. 30)
118 “El papel policiaco de los provocadores comoreristas’, Mundo Obrero, August 1951.
119 For more information on this period see Caminal, Comorera, pp. 289-351 and Estruch Tobella,
54
imperialist spy.120 In this manner, not only did they inform the police of Comorera's 
presence in Barcelona but also ensured that those Communists inside the country 
would treat him as a traitor. It is no wonder that, at this point, in the clandestine party 
newspaper Comorera published in Barcelona, Bulled Interior del PSUC, he wrote in 
reference to the PCE: "What is left for you to do? A protocol M?", M standing for 
muerte, death in Spanish.121 The discrediting campaign led by the leadership in exile 
continued until Comorera’s arrest on 9 June 1954.122 As happened with Quinones 
and Monzon, the PCE presented the arrest as a manoeuvre by the police to disguise 
the informer Comorera. Three years passed before his trial took place in August 1957 
when he was condemned to thirty years in prison.123 Comorera died after a long 
illness on 7 May 1958 in the prison's infirmary.
Ironically, Comorera's downfall was not followed by the absorption of the PSUC by 
the PCE. It was only logical that once the Catalan party had been brought under the 
control of the PCE, there was no longer a need for a fusion. In fact, the Spanish 
leadership could see the benefits of having a Catalan Communist party in name, 
which would be more attractive for the Catalan rank-and-file than a national Spanish 
party. Moran has argued that between the PCE and the PSUC there had been no 
political or tactical difference, and that Comorera’s purge was rather the result of 
political interest, a power struggle. The Catalan leader was defending the
1939-1956, pp. 185-192.
120 “El papel policiaco de los provocadores comoreristas’, Mundo Obrero, August 1951; Caminal, 
Comorera, p. 310.
121 ("El que ha de saber el Buro Politic del PCE", Bulled Interior del PSU de C. n. 11, 11 June 1950) 
Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 191. Lister would later accuse the party of indeed planning to kill 
Comorera, Lister, jBasta!, p. 229.
122 For information on the party’s campaign against Comorera see Caminal, Comorera, pp. 320-324.
123 The attacks on the Catalan leader by the PCE would weaken after 1956 due to the start of the 
destalinisation process.
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organisational autonomy of the party not the political one.124 Indeed, it is clear that 
the Catalan leader had run his party in the same manner as the Spanish leaders had 
run the PCE. However, Comorera's purge did stand for something more than just a 
power struggle. The autonomy that a strong Catalan party represented in the eyes of 
the PCE was reminiscent of the underground movements that had developed in Spain 
at the end of the Civil War, and in France during the Second World War. The three 
purges that followed exemplified the PCE's inability to deal with its inferior 
organisations, refusing to give them the necessary autonomy they needed to survive. 
In the short term, this allowed the leadership to keep the PCE's centralized internal 
structure untouched but in the long term, it hampered their chances of understanding 
Spanish reality and hence, applying sensible policies in Spain. The physical distance 
between the exiled leaders and the activists inside the country meant that the party 
needed to rely on the latter to gather information about the country and subsequently 
decide upon the policies to follow. However, as we shall see, this never happened.
3. The PCE in France. Anton
On September 7 1950, the Spanish Communist Party was outlawed in France. The 
Cold War had made the French government very distrustful of the Communists 
living in their country. Not daring to attack the PCF directly because of the 
implications it could have for the legitimacy of their democracy, the French 
government punished a weaker target, the PCE. Moreover, the Spanish Communists 
were suspected of maintaining arms and the guerrilla structure of the Maquis, which
124 Mor&n, Miseria, p. 180.
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gave the authorities another motive to ban the party.125 The PCE’s newspapers, 
Mundo Obrero and Lluita, and theoretical journals, Nuestra Bandera and Cultura y  
Democracia, were closed down and more than one hundred activists were deported 
to Algiers, Corsica, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.126 The leaders of the party 
had been aware of the possibility of police action and managed to avoid arrest.127 
Nevertheless, their new clandestine condition further limited the PCE’s sphere of 
political action.
For security matters, Vicente Uribe, Enrique Lister and Antonio Mije moved
1 7ftto Czechoslovakia and established a new centre of the party in Prague. In this 
manner, they wanted to create an alternative and more fluid communication channel 
with Moscow, where the General Secretary Dolores Ibarruri had been residing since 
1948.129 Carrillo and Francisco Anton stayed behind in Paris in a semi-clandestine 
condition, the former in charge of the party organisation inside Spain and the latter of 
the rest. In reality, the new structure of the party, which now had headquarters in 
Prague, Moscow and Paris, only made its functioning more complicated and 
provoked serious problems within a leadership that was already divided.130 In fact, 
these confrontations were the first hint of a new power struggle that would come to 
its peak in later years; a generational conflict inside the PCE between the old guard
125 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 169.
126 Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 332; Carrillo, Memorias, p. 432; Mor&n, Miseria, p. 193; Jauregui and 
Vega, Antifranquismo, 1939-1962, pp. 133-134. Malagon says that they were first sent to Tunisia and 
Algiers and later on received by countries like East Germany or Poland, who would then grant them 
their nationality, Asenjo y Ramos, Malagon, p. 177.
127 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 432.
128 Uribe, Mije and Gallego were not in France at the time of the party’s banning. For security reasons, 
they would not return and would soon meet with Lister in Prague, Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 432-434.
129 In December of 1948, Dolores underwent gall bladder surgery. The operation had complications 
and Dolores would not fully recover until the middle of 1950. For more information on her fight 
between life and death see Law, La Pasionaria, p. 155.
130 Mexico ceased to be a party centre at the end of the Second World War when the leaders who were 
living there returned to Paris. Mexico, nevertheless, retained its position as the party’s most important 
enclave in America.
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and the so-called Parisians, or young guard. But before it actually exploded, a new 
purge would take place: the political elimination of Francisco Anton.
Francisco Anton had been Commissar General of the Republican Army during the
Civil War and since 1937 belonged to the Political Bureau of the PCE. A year earlier,
he had started a romantic relationship with Ibarruri, a fact that many believed to be
behind his rapid rise on his road to power. In 1943, the affair came to an end.131 Six
years later, Anton was to marry a younger comrade in Paris, again a fact many
believed to be behind his equally rapid descent. As has been described above, by the
time the party was banned in France, the leadership of the PCE was anything but
unified.132 Carrillo and Ant6n had a strong dislike for Uribe and accused him of
ignoring his duties and hiding behind the bottle. Pasionaria was also displeased with
Uribe’s work and attitude. Apparently, when Carrillo and Antdn talked to her about
the “Uribe question" in 1947, she had agreed with their complaints but decided not to
act on them as she thought doing so could lead to the division of the party 
1leadership. Uribe in return did not have much respect for Anton, Mije and Lister, 
and complained to Pasionaria in the spring of 1951 about the lack of information the 
group in Prague was receiving from the comrades in Paris.134 He demanded to be 
notified of their activities on a regular basis. Carrillo and Anton considered this 
demand to be physically impossible and, by June, they sent a report to Pasionaria 
complaining about the burden imposed on them by those in Prague.135
131 Preston, Comrades! p. 307.
132 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 100.
133 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 101
134 Moran, Miseria, p. 189.
135 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 435.
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This would mark the turning point in the political future of Francisco Ant6n. 
After receiving the report from the Paris group, Dolores Ibarruri called Anton to 
Moscow where he arrived at the end of 1951. There, she unexpectedly accused him 
of trying to take over Uribe's position in the party and behaving in a dictatorial 
fashion.136 A period of turmoil began within the leadership. It was clear to all that 
Pasionaria wanted Anton out of the picture and punished. During two years, from 
1952 to 1954, a series of discussions, or what could be described as trials, took place 
in Paris during which Anton was accused among many other things of abusing his 
power and attempting to divide the party. His former lover was never present. As we 
shall see, the explanation for this episode in the history of the PCE and in the life of 
Dolores Ibarruri is very complex.
Two different versions have come out of this affair. The most commonly held states 
that Pasionaria was outraged by Anton's marriage to a younger comrade and decided 
to take revenge on him.137 It is important to remember, however, that IMrruri’s 
comrades never forgave her for having a younger lover. In fact, throughout the years 
there were plenty of denigratory comments made by other Communists regarding her 
romantic relationship with Anton.138 Moreover, those who defend the first argument 
usually forget to mention that the relationship between Pasionaria and Anton had 
already been over for some years by the time Anton was purged and it had been 
Pasionaria who had ended it.139
136 Law, Pasionaria, p. 158.
137 Mor&n, Miseria, p. 206; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 102; Law, La Pasionaria, pp. 155-156.
138 Tagueiia, Testimonio, p. 356; Lister, Carrillo, p. 97; Hernandez, Ministro de Stalin, pp. 99-100.
139 Irene Falcdn maintains that their relationship was over by the summer of 1943 and that it had been 
Ibdrruri who had decided to break it up, Falcdn, Asalto, pp. 216, 230. Paul Preston also places their 
break up at this time, Preston, Comrades! p. 307.
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The second version argues that in a time of great instability for the leadership 
of the Communist world, when the trials in Czechoslovakia were taking place, 
Pasionaria decided to sacrifice Anton in order to avoid any possible repercussions 
because of her affair with him.140 Her own secretary, Irene Falcon, had suffered from 
Stalinist repression because of her romantic relationship with one of the prosecuted 
leaders of the Czech Communist party, Bedrich Geminder. According to Paul 
Preston, Pasionaria was also trying to protect Falcdn by presenting Anton as a new 
victim to the Soviets.141 The same thing happening to Pasionaria, if unlikely, was 
nevertheless possible. However, there is no evidence to prove that the Soviet leaders 
held anything against the PCE’s General Secretary. On the contrary, it seems more 
likely that they would have preferred to protect her. Rather, the danger would have 
come from the enemies she had inside the party who had used her relationship with 
Ant6n in the past and could be willing to use it again.
Eventually, Anton would accept the most outrageous accusations made against 
him.142 After an agonising wait, in March 1953, he was sent to Warsaw without 
anyone knowing about it, not even his wife.143 Anton was not allowed to come into 
contact with any of the PCE exiles living there.144 A few months later, he was 
expelled from the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the party.145
140 Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 434-437. Rafael Cruz seems to agree with this version of Antdn’s downfall. 
Though he does not say so explicitly, he transcribes Carrillo’s explanations, and summarises the 
ostracism suffered by Irene Falcon “for a very similar case”, Cruz, Pasionaria, pp. 166-167.
141 Preston, Comrades! p. 311.
142 For the whole description of the process see Moran, Miseria, pp. 187-207.
143 Eventually, his wife with their two daughters would join him. But they had hardly enough to live 
on, especially since one of the girls was mentally handicapped and needed special care.
144 Preston, Comrades! p. 309.
143 He was partially rehabilitated in 1956. The party stated that the sanction imposed on him had been 
just but accepted that after following the proper investigation it became clear that the had not acted in 
accordance with the enemy and hence he could be readmitted into the party. By 1964, he was even re­
admitted to the Central Committee and moved to Prague. In May of that year, Santiago Carrillo would 
write to Dolores Ibarruri to ask her if she would consider the possibility of nominating Ant6n as the
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On the other hand, Carrillo, who at first attempted to defend Ant6n, 
understood early enough that if he wanted to ensure his own political survival, he 
would have to join the accusation team, and so he did. In a meeting on 8 August 
1952, he said:
I believe that the factional activity o f Anton is due to his vanity, his egomania, and 
the practice o f personal methods that in the Political Bureau can only lead to the 
division o f the leadership, and it was these practices that led Anton to struggle 
against the comrades o f the party leadership that were abroad, thus showing 
resistance and hostility to all o f their opinions.146
This meant that once more Carrillo had chosen his professional ambition over 
his personal feelings.147 He would continue to be in charge of the party's affairs in 
Spain and was joined by Ignacio Gallego, Anton's replacement, who in the words of 
Claudin "had always seen Carrillo as his direct superior".148 The purge of Francisco 
Antdn had come to an end but the confrontation between the old guard and the so- 
called Parisians remained latent within the party.
E. Conclusion
As has been established throughout this chapter, after the Spanish Civil War, the 
PCE underwent a number of shifts in policy as well as a number of internal purges 
that throughout these years were to prove and confirm the Stalinist character of the
new editor-in-chief of the theoretical review Realidad. We can assume she rejected this proposal as 
Anton did not take the post. Law, Pasionaria, pp. 159-161; Vazquez-Montalban, Pasionaria, pp. 126- 
128, 224-227; On the question posed by the Comrade Francisco Anton, 6 November 1958, AHPCE 
(DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 39); Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 20 May 1964, 
AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores Ib&rruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
146 Moran, Miseria, p. 196.
147 Not so long before this episode, Carrillo had publicly renounced his father for his involvement in 
the Casadist cop at the end of the Civil War, (see note 5).
148 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 103.
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party. As was the case with many other Communist parties, the Soviet Union dictated 
the policy to be followed by the PCE while the CPSU's democratic centralism was 
used as a guide and example to handle dissent inside the party. This led to 
incongruous and radical shifts of policy that further isolated the party from the rest of 
the Spanish opposition forces. In fact, as we shall see, due to its isolation and the 
repression inside Spain during the years that followed the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the PCE reduced its activities to those related to international issues, 
leaving the struggle against Franco to one side. On the other hand, the purges that had 
taken place since the end of the Spanish Civil War had exposed a culture of 
despotism that would eventually eliminate any attempt at renewal or autonomy inside 
the party. The leaders of the party, though settled in exile and hence with little idea of 
Spanish reality, would continue to impose their will on the Communist movement 
inside the country, thus curtailing its independence and chances of success. The 
effects of these factors, strongly intermingled, would in the long term prove to be 
extremely damaging for the PCE.
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II. FROM APATHY TO ACTIVITY
A. Introduction
As we have seen so far, the history of the Spanish Communist Party from 1939 to the 
beginning of the Cold War was marked by three main international developments: 
the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact in 1939, the entrance of the USSR into the 
Second World War in 1941 and the intensification of the Cold War after 1945. As the 
world split in two confronting camps, the PCE and its underground organisations 
entered a period of stagnation in the struggle against Franco. Unity with other 
political forces had been replaced by confrontation and to make matters worse for the 
party, the tactic of using the guerrillas was not producing results due to Francoist 
repression. As a consequence, the PCE continued to remain closely identified with 
the Soviet Union’s foreign policy. The activity of the Spanish Communists during 
these years was shaped by the Movement for Peace supported by the Cominform, as 
well as the anti-American policy encouraged by the USSR. A further factor being the 
new relations between the United States and the regime of General Franco.
However, even if  these years saw little activity from the Communists in 
Spain, the PCE still underwent important changes in policy which became all the 
more relevant in the years following destalinisation. As we shall see in this chapter, 
the tram strike of Barcelona in 1951 would prompt the PCE finally to confirm the 
long overdue termination of the guerrilla policy. It would also consolidate the
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acceptance of a policy of infiltration into the regime’s trade unions and mass 
organisations. More significantly, the death of Stalin in March 1953 started a process 
of opening up in the Soviet Union that would reach its peak during the XX Congress 
of the CPSU in March 1956. The destalinisation process would affect the entire 
Communist movement, including the PCE, which at this point was undergoing a 
brutal power struggle. The arrival of a new leadership in the Soviet Union would be a 
decisive factor in the consolidation of a new leadership in the PCE. The latter would 
renew its interest in Spain and would lead to the implementation of the so-called 
policy of National Reconciliation to fight the regime.
B. The dormant years
1. Peace
As has been mentioned in the introduction, during the years between the party’s 
banning in France in 1950 and the death of Stalin in 1953, the two main concerns that 
marked the policy of the PCE were related to international politics rather than the 
underground struggle against the Franco regime.
The Movement for Peace was a policy that had originated in the USSR and 
was promoted by the Cominform against what they described as the imperialistic 
policy of war of the Western countries, including in this group the “traitor” Tito. In 
effect, as Azcarate argues, the movement for peace was an attempt by the USSR to
challenge the United States’ presentation of itself as the champion of freedom.1 It 
was expected that the movement would create currents of opinion, mainly among 
intellectuals, in favour of Soviet foreign policy, which would lead to the elevation of 
the USSR’s prestige in the West. Moreover, it was hoped that a concept as broad as 
the “defence of peace” would gain support from many who were not particularly 
sympathetic to the Communist cause. To this end, the Communist parties of the 
world were used to propagate the movement, and several Congresses for Peace were 
organised. Aside from attending the congresses, the PCE also made a special effort to 
gather signatures in favour of the movement. However, the refusal of the rest of the 
anti-Francoist parties in exile to support what they clearly perceived as Soviet 
propaganda, met with strong criticism from the Spanish Communists, which would 
add to their isolation.
At the same time, the party supported in Spain an anti-American policy that can also 
be seen as part of the Soviet Union’s campaign against the American camp, but that 
was also a response to the developing relationship between the USA and the Franco 
regime. From the beginning of 1950, the United States started to have contacts with 
Spain in an attempt to assure its position on the side of the Western democracies in 
the case of a coming international conflict. On 26 September, the Initiatives 
Commission of the United Nations voted to reconsider diplomatic relations with the 
Franco regime. Soon after, on 31 October 1950, the UN’s General Assembly 
authorised the return of ambassadors to Spain, having advocated their withdrawal 
only four years earlier.
1 Azc&rate, Derrotas, pp. 319-320.
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The PCE described the UN’s ruling as an attempt by the Anglo-Americans to 
make Spain a centre of aggression and war against the Soviet Union and the Popular 
Democracies.2 Consequently, it proposed the creation of a Republican and 
Democratic National Front that would fight against the Franco regime and for the 
reestablishment of the Republic. But this policy did not really attempt to bring all the 
opposition forces together, even though its name might suggest the opposite. In the 
same document in which Dolores Ibarruri called for the National Front, she also 
described the Socialists as those who “specialised in police service and the 
denunciation of Communists”.
At the end of 1950, the USA appointed Stanton Griffis as ambassador to 
Madrid. General Franco was relieved: to the Spanish people, he presented his new 
relationship with the United States as proof of the regime’s strength and legitimacy. 
Moreover, an important financial contribution was also expected from the Americans 
to help alleviate the terrible effects Franco’s economic policy of autarchy was having 
on the country.4 By November 1952, Spain had also been admitted into UNESCO. 
Less than a year later, two more events would consolidate the position of the country 
as part of the Western sphere of influence. On 27 August 1953, the regime signed a 
Concordat with the Vatican. According to Preston, “while significantly less important 
than the regime was to make out, the Concordat was a major step towards
2 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 195-196. This interpretation would change with the United Nations’ 
recognition of Spain in 1955, which was also approved by the USSR.
3 Dolores Ibarruri, Por la paz, la independencia nacional y  la democracia, 25 October 1951, in 
Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 195-196.
4 The autarchic model was meant to transform the country into a self-sufficient economic unit and 
achieve rapid industrialization by replacing imports with national goods, protecting non-competitive 
and costly private industries, using protectionist tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions on imports, 
Jos6 Maria Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent. Worker and Students in Franco's Spain 
(Tavistock Publications, London, 1978), p. 19.
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international recognition for the Caudillo”.5 A month later, on 26 September 1953,
Spain signed the Pact of Madrid with the United States.
(The Pact) was an important landmark in a slow change o f economic orientation 
within the Spanish regime, which consisted o f a progressive shift away from 
autarchic industrialisation to a liberalisation o f economic policies.6
By the late 1950s and especially the 1960s, these economic changes would 
have an important effect on the country’s industrial relations and the development of 
the Communist trade union, Comisiones Obreras, which also benefited from the 
PCE’s decision to infiltrate the regime’s trade unions and mass organisations, and in 
1956, from the policy of National Reconciliation. While the latter will be looked at in 
the next section, it is important to explain here the context that prompted the 
adoption of the policy of struggle-from-within to fight against the Franco regime.
This move by the PCE away from the violent confrontation of the guerrillas, 
came during the developments surrounding the tram strike of Barcelona in March 
1951 that had begun as a response to the announcement of a 40 percent increase in 
the tram fares at the beginning of February.7 In contrast, the fares had not been 
increased in Madrid. This led to people in the street spontaneously reacting by 
boycotting public transport and stoning the trams. In effect, the protests were an 
expression of the frustration felt by the Catalans as a result of the terrible living 
conditions produced by an enduring post-war economy and an extremely repressive 
regime. Among those who participated in the strike, mainly industrial workers and 
students, were also many Falangists whose presence reflected the bitterness that had 
developed in certain sectors of the Falange against a regime that since the end of the
5 Preston, Franco, p. 621.
6 Maravall, Dictatorship, p. 23.
7 This strike was followed by similar strikes in Bilbao and Madrid in May 1951. For an extensive 
account on the Barcelona general strike of 1951 see Michael Richards, ‘The Barcelona General Strike
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Second World War had been reducing the party’s power. As the protests escalated, 
the central government finally agreed to return the prices back to normal. However, 
the pressure exercised by the rank-and-file of the official trade unions resulted in the 
latter calling a strike on 12 March. The claims of the demonstrators had now 
extended to questions of wages, working hours and political freedom. The strike was 
a great success with mass participation. However, by 1 p.m. the Civil Guard had 
already managed to restore order to the streets of Barcelona. The reprisal carried out 
by the authorities led to about 1,000 arrests. On 17 March, the Civil Governor of the 
region was dismissed by the regime; the sectors inside the Falange which had been
Q
involved in some manner in the protests were also punished. Nevertheless, as 
Michael Richards writes on his article about the strike, “it signalled a shift from the 
brutal military-fascism of the 1940s, characterized, in part, by anti-Catalanism, to a 
more rational-bureaucratic authoritarian rule in the 1950s”.9
Though the PCE had little to do with the strike, it still wanted to capitalise on 
it.10 The official history of the PCE describes the events in the following unrealistic 
terms; “The patient and insistent work of the PCE and the PSUC to elevate the 
consciousness of the workers and to organise them for the struggle was finally paying 
off.”11 It is important to mention here that the Comorera crisis was at its height at this 
point. The party took credit for the strike not only for the obvious implications it had
of 1951” European History Quarterly, n. 29:4,1999.
8 These sectors had supported the tram boycott but not the subsequent strike and indeed participated in 
the following “clean up” operations carried out by the authorities. They, nevertheless, criticised the 
leadership for allowing the protest to escalate as it did, Richards, “The Barcelona General Strike of 
1951”, pp. 569-570.
9 Richards, “The Barcelona General Strike of 1951”, p. 573.
10 According to Richards, a few PSUC militants that had entered the official trade unions as part of the 
PCE’s tactic to infiltrate the latter encouraged the continuation of the protests during the Assembly of 
the local trade union organisation on 6 March. In addition, they were responsible for producing one of 
the printed notices calling for a new strike on 12 March, Richards, “The Barcelona General Strike of 
1951”, pp. 562-563.
11 Ibarruri & W AA , Historia del PCE, p. 236.
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in the fight against the regime, but also to kill any attempt by the Catalan leader to 
take credit for the action.12 More importantly, however, the success of the strike 
consolidated the party’s decision to start work from inside the official trade unions, 
something they had never contemplated until Stalin had so “recommended” during 
his 1948 interview with the PCE delegation. However, as is explained in Chapter I, 
this policy would not bear fruit until 1957-58. In addition, the PCE also accepted that 
the guerrilla strategy had now become obsolete and should finally be called to an end. 
As Carrillo explains, “when we decided to start working inside the official trade 
unions, we realised this was incompatible with the policy of guerrillas”.13 This 
strategic and tactical change that took the PCE from a policy of violent confrontation 
against the regime to struggle-from-within would become very important in later 
years, when the economic and social changes of the Franco regime would allow for 
an actual infiltration of the activists into the official institutions of labour bargaining. 
For the time being, however, the impact of the party in Spain and its infiltration in 
the trade unions still remained minimal.
2. The V Congress
12 Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, who had been in Barcelona ever since the arrival of Comorera but just 
happened to be in Paris at the time of the demonstration, went back into the country with the following 
challenging tasks: to destroy Comorera, to become a new leader for the PSUC, to capitalise on the 
March strikes in Barcelona and to reorient policy regarding the official trade unions. Lopez Raimundo 
and another 26 activists were then arrested by the Francoist police under the accusation of being the 
organisers of the Tram strike, which brought about a large solidarity campaign organised by the PCE 
for their release, partly explained by the exiled leaders’ desire to shadow Comorera. The massive 
international attention achieved through the campaign helped in the reduction of the prosecutor’s 
demands from a sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment to one of four years. The party would then 
accuse Comorera of having been responsible for the arrest of Ldpez Raimundo, Moran, Miseria, pp. 
184-185; Preston, Franco, p. 618; Caminal, Comorera, p. 315. Gregorio L6pez Raimundo entered the 
party during the war and fought in the 31 Division of the X Corp. After the war, he went to France and 
from there to Mexico, where he worked as an accountant. Lopez Raimundo returned to Europe at the 
end of the 1940s where he was in charge of improving the relations with the activists in Spain.
13 Interactive interview with Santiago Carrillo, El Mundo, November 2000.
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One of the few events that would break the monotony of the PCE activities during 
these years was the organisation of its V Congress. It came a year and a half after the 
death of Stalin in March 1953, whose effects on the PCE will be looked at in the next 
section. It is worth pointing out that, regardless of its timing, the V Congress of the 
PCE was not an example of the process of destalinisation that spread through the 
Communist movement after Stalin’s death. Though there was some internal criticism 
and some of the cadres that had fallen in disgrace during the party’s past purges were 
rehabilitated, the congress still retained most of the Stalinist characteristics of 
previous years. Those present in the Congress avoided the flattering and venerating 
verbosity normally dedicated to Stalin, but more than anything else this suggests that 
while aware of things changing, they did not yet know in which direction or how far 
these changes would go.
The V Congress of the PCE took place in Prague from 12 to 21 September 1954.14 It 
had been more than 22 years since the Spanish Communists had held their last 
Congress on 17-23 March 1932 in Seville. In fact, the V Congress had been 
scheduled for 15 August 1936 but it had to be cancelled after Franco’s military 
uprising on 17 July. In subsequent years, and following the Soviet example, no more 
congresses took place even though the party would have been able to organise one 
during its legal period in France from 1944 to 1950.
14 There is great confusion on the dates of the Congress as well as in those of many other events in the 
history of the party, mainly due to the fact that the PCE was trying to confuse their Francoist 
persecutors. The official account given by the party places the Congress on 1-5 November 1954, and 
that is in fact the date most commonly use by historians. In his memoirs, Lister places it from 1 to 15 
of November. I will be using those given by Gregorio Mor&n in his book, Miseria y  Grandeza del 
PCE, as he seems to be the first one to point out the mistake. The Congress in his account took place 
from 12 to 21 September.
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At any rate, the V Congress was finally held in September 1954, at a time
when the PCE was in a position of extreme isolation from other political forces.15
During the Congress, the idea of an Anti-Francoist National Front was strongly
defended. With this Front, the PCE wanted to bring Republicans, Monarchists and
even disappointed Falangists, under a common roof to fight for the re-establishment
of a democratic government.16 The party’s attitude towards the leaderships of the rest
of the Spanish opposition forces, however, did not change. During her eight-hour
long speech, Pasionaria described the Socialist leaders as the “Social-Democrats who
helped Fascism on its road to power”. Subsequently, she called on the Socialist rank-
and-file to unite with the Communists in the fight against Francoism. She said:
Due to its clear and well-determined stand, the Communist Party is at the head o f all 
the other parties and forces o f the anti-Francoist opposition. Only the PCE offers a 
way out o f the current situation, gives a perspective for other forces to follow and 
presents a concrete, precise and real programme. This programme answers the needs 
o f our country today and in the immediate future, and it can be accepted by the 
different forces o f the opposition.17
Though there was a certain degree of criticism about the autocratic manner in 
which the party had been run until that date, the leadership made sure to place the 
blame elsewhere. Most of the responsibility was attributed to the erroneous 
judgement of middle cadres or leaders who had already fallen in disgrace, such as 
Francisco Ant6n. The party did welcome back some of the activists that had been
15 The data gathered by the organisation of the party showed some interesting figures. Of the 94 people 
(106 with the Political Bureau) that attended the V Congress, 31 of them came from inside Spain and 
the other 65 from France, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Latin America. 53 were workers, 5 
peasants, 23 intellectuals, 11 shop assistants and employees and 2 military men. The number of the 
intellectuals in this Congress being a bit less than half of those of the workers and peasants showed the 
new prominence this class was gaining on the eyes of the PCE leaders. Only 3 percent of those 
attending were younger than 30, which meant that people who either had fought in or remembered the 
Civil War formed the immense majority of those present. In addition, the numbers also showed that the 
students were not yet represented in the party. For more information see Material on the preparation of 
the V Congress/ biographies of the delegates and guests to the V Congress, AHPCE (V CONGRESO, 
Carp. 35).
16 Programme of the PCE, September 1954, AHPCE (V CONGRESO, Actas Congreso).
17 Report by Dolores Ibarruri, AHPCE (V CONGRESO, Actas Congreso, Tomo 1).
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expelled from the party under irregular circumstances. However, purges like the ones
carried out against Comorera or Monzon still retained the approval of the
leadership.18 This was not at all surprising taking into account the direct
responsibility that those still in power had in the latter. In fact, Ibarruri was far from
shy when describing the crimes of such old “traitors”:
We have had to fight ... the betrayal o f the people who accidentally came into our 
ranks with the hope o f making a career and who after seeing their hope evaporate, 
they became like stinking dogs that salivated their hydrophobia o f impotence and 
idiocy over the party.19
Regarding Spain, the party reaffirmed its belief in the regime’s crisis and its
imminent downfall. The agreements with the United States, they argued, were clear
evidence of the country’s deep economic crisis. Moreover, they told the rank-and-
file, the regime was losing support among its own people. Pasionaria added:
There is in Spain a petty bourgeois ... whose life is every day more difficult, and 
even though their mentality approaches that o f the bourgeois, as they attempt to 
reach the same status, their interests are every day closer to those o f the working 
class.20
Further proof of this deterioration was found by the PCE in the recent 
disturbances created by the students in Spain. Though these will be looked at in the 
next chapter, suffice to say here that during 1954 the students had started to show 
their opposition to the regime through various demonstrations and cultural events. In 
response to this awakening, the party published in April of that year a document 
called, “Message from the PCE to the patriotic intellectuals”.21 This report was 
supposed to serve as an explanation of the party’s policy towards the intellectuals and 
as an accusation against the imperialistic policies of the United States in Spain.
18 Progamme of the PCE, September 1954, AHPCE.
19 Report by Dolores Ibarruri, AHPCE.
20 Report by Dolores Ibarruri, AHPCE.
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According to this message, the Americans were not just colonising the country’s 
economy but also its culture. In addition, the PCE advocated the application of 
Socialist Realism to express artistic and literary concerns against Franco and the 
imperialist forces.22 As for the V Congress, the role of the intellectuals and students 
was also strongly emphasized.23 Among other things, Carrillo said:
We appreciate the role o f the Communist and progressive intellectuals that are 
successfully taking advantage o f all the possibilities to break with official 
conformism, to give a sense o f opposition to the activity o f the intellectuals and 
students, in favour o f peace, freedom and independence.24
This new interest of the party in the intellectuals and the students would 
develop in a strong underground movement in Spain, as we shall see in the next 
chapter.
In the programme of the PCE, delivered by Vicente Uribe, there was further mention 
of what the Communists called the 1953 “Yankee-Francoist Agreement”, which it 
was said to have reduced Spain to nothing more than a military base for the United 
States.25 The anti-American agenda was well absorbed by the rank-and-file: it is
21 “Mensaje del PCE a los intelectuales patriotas”, April 1954, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS PCE, Carp. 
35).
22 Socialist Realism was proclaimed as the only method for Soviet art during the First All-Union 
Congress of Soviet writers in 1934. Socialist realist works were to "display a historically concrete 
representation of reality in its revolutionary development." Under this principle, the arts were meant to 
glorify the political and social ideals of communism with a realist aesthetic and educate the people in 
the spirit of socialism.
23 “I want to point out the role of the intellectuals in the road towards progress and democracy. It is not 
coincidental that the PCE has published a document called “A message to the intellectuals” of which 
you all know about. The role of the students and intellectuals in the different democratic and liberal 
revolutions in Spain is not unknown to us, or to our people. ... From this Congress, I greet the 
intellectuals, students and men of science that are coming towards us, coming towards Communism, as 
they believed that Communism is the only way to give man the measure of his human value, and the 
possibility to develop their capacities...” Report by Dolores Ibarruri, AHPCE.
Report by Santiago Carrillo, AHPCE (V CONGRESO, Actas Congreso, Tomo Tercero).
25 Report by Vicente Uribe, AHPCE (V CONGRESO, Actas Congreso).
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almost impossible to find a speech that forgot to attack the pacts made by the United 
States with the Franco regime.26
As in the past, the Congress was anything but democratic. Not only did the leadership 
use more than suspicious methods to gather the mandatory approval of the Central 
Committee to hold the Congress, but they also had agreed on the party’s programme
77before hand. In the view of Azcarate:
To call a meeting like the one in 1954 a “Congress” is an exaggerated euphemism. 
The “delegates” were people chosen by Carrillo and Uribe to attend. Not even in 
France, where it was possible to do it, was there anything close to an election o f 
delegates.28
In contrast, Lister argues that the Programme and Statutes of the party, which 
were delivered by Carrillo during the XII session of the Congress, had in fact been 
given to the rank-and-file ahead of time so that they could study and discuss them 
long before they arrived at the Congress, as the regulations demanded.29 But this is 
very hard to believe. Only the leaders of the party would have had access to it and 
time to discuss it before the Congress.30 In fact, as can be seen in the minutes of the 
Congress, everything was approved by unanimity without any previous discussion.31 
More importantly, however, the Congress reflected the arrival of a new generation of 
leaders who, though not yet in control of the party, were gaining important ground. 
They were defined as the Jovenes (youngsters or young guard), for they came from
26 AHPCE (V CONGRESO, Actas Congreso).
27 Moran, Miseria, pp. 238,240.
28 Azcarate, Derrotas, pp. 334-335.
29 Lister is most likely trying to prove the existence of democratic methods before the arrival of 
Carrillo to the General Secretariat, but this is very unlikely, Lister, jBasta!, p. 177.
30 Moran maintains that before the Congress, the programme had been previously discussed in Paris 
for two days by those responsible of the party organisation in Spain. By the end of the two days, the 
programme had hardly changed from what Vicente Uribe and Tomas Garcia had previously written in 
Paris, Mor&n, Miseria, pp. 240-241.
31 AHPCE (V CONGRESO, Actas Congreso).
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the ranks of the party’s youth organisation, the JSU. As their main centre of action 
was in Paris, they will be referred to throughout this thesis as the ‘Parisians’. Among 
these were Fernando Claudin and Santiago Carrillo, whose main role was the 
organisation of the party in Spain. When the Congress came to an end, many of their 
followers, such as Victor Velasco, Julian Grimau, Jorge Semprun or Tomas Garcia, 
and activists from the interior, such as Sim6n Sdnchez Montero, had become 
members of the Central Committee, presaging the changes in the leadership that took 
place two years later.
C. The breaking of the deadlock
The death of Stalin on 5 March 1953 had been one of the biggest shocks ever to hit 
the Communist world. Ram6n Mendezona, director of Radio Pirenaica at the time, 
wrote:
The scenes o f authentic pain in Moscow and the whole o f the Soviet Union were 
very impressive. There were endless lines o f people waiting to walk by his coffin 
displayed in the Room o f Columns at the House o f Syndicates. On one occasion, at 
the Trubnaia Square, the floor collapsed due to the excessive weight, taking many 
lives.32
It would only take three years for the pain to turn into shame. During the XX 
Congress of the CPSU in February-March 1956, Nikita Khrushchev accused Stalin of 
the most horrible crimes. Thereafter, the “father” became the villain; thousands were 
rehabilitated; and some of those responsible for crimes during the Stalin’s era, such 
as the NKDV’s chief L.V. Beria, were sentenced to death and executed.
32 Mendezona, La Pirenaica, p. 105.
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“Dogmatism” was considered the new danger that could damage the prospects for the 
success of Communism. The so-called thaw brought about a new openness in the 
Communist world. As a consequence, this soon led to many questioning Soviet 
power and Communist institutions, especially in the satellite states of Eastern 
Europe. However, as we shall see below, the limits to the thaw were set by the Soviet 
Union with the invasion of Hungary in the autumn of 1956.
In the case of the PCE, the shock produced by Nikita Khrushchev’s secret 
speech came at a time when the party was in the middle of one of its most important 
crises. A few months before the XX Congress of the Soviet Union in March 1956, 
significant signs appeared inside the PCE of a new power struggle developing 
between the old guard of the party and the so-called ‘Parisians’ or young guard. The 
old guard were those such as Pasionaria and Uribe who had become important during 
the Civil War and had since then been in command of the party. The ‘Parisians’ 
included those such as Carrillo and Claudin who came from the party’s youth 
organisation, the JSU. They had gained prominence only after the end of the Second 
World War, and as their name indicated, they were based in Paris. Differences 
between these two factions had already appeared after the banning of the party in 
France in 1950. The PCE’s new illegal status prompted the creation by Uribe, Lister 
and Mije of a new party, centre in Prague. Confrontations between the latter and those 
who like Ant6n and Carrillo had stayed behind in Paris soon arose. At the time, 
however, the Anton affair managed to disguise and postpone the prospect of open 
challenge for a few more years. As we shall now examine, the transition that the 
USSR went through as a result of Stalin’s death would become a decisive factor in 
the imminent confrontation inside the PCE.
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1. Spain's incorporation into the UN
On 8 December 1955, Spain was incorporated into the UN with the approval of the
USSR and the Socialist Republics. This shift in the treatment accorded to the Franco
regime was the first in a series of events that honoured the new policy of “peaceful
coexistence” between political regimes in absolute contradiction with each other,
which could nevertheless live in harmony by respecting each other’s spheres of
influence. At the same time as Spain, the West had incorporated into the UN
countries such as Nepal, Libya, Cambodia and Jordan, while the USSR sponsored the
incorporation of countries such as Mongolia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and
Albania. The recognition of Spain by the UN coincided with Dolores Ibarruri’s
birthday on 9 December, which as the tradition of the Communist parties demanded,
was celebrated in a magnificent manner. Uribe, Mije and Lister decided to wait until
the celebrations were over to voice the party’s opinion on the new international
situation.33 On 30 December 1955, they aired through Radio Pirenaica a declaration
approved by Pasionaria that criticised Spain’s incorporation into the UN and blamed
it on the imperialistic policies of the USA, while at the same time it relieved the
USSR of any responsibility. However, as the pro-Francoist Luis Suarez Fernandez
makes clear in his book Franco y  la USSR:
Because o f the rotation in the presidency, Sobolov, the Soviet delegate, was the one 
to invite the Security Council to accept the entry o f Spain in the UN. It was thus 
confirmed that unless it was approved by the USSR, Spain would not be able to join 
the Assembly; such approval was expressed and not tacit.34
In the meantime, those in Paris had come to a very different conclusion about 
this event. The young guard argued that the fact that Socialist states such as Hungary,
33 Mor&n, Miseria, p. 254.
34 Luis Su&rez Fem&ndez, Franco y  la URRS (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1987), p. 145. Luis Suarez
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Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania were being incorporated into the UN at the same 
time as Spain, would strengthen the peaceful coexistence policy proclaimed by the 
USSR, as well as end the international isolation of Spain and prevent the United 
States’ total control over the UN.35 Their views were expressed in an article written 
by Carrillo that was already at the printers of Nuestra Bandera by the time the old 
guard aired their opinion through Radio Pirenaica. At this point, the ‘Parisians’ 
decided to sent Jorge Semprun to Prague to talk to Uribe and Lister about the 
matter.36 They wanted to assess the possible consequences if they decided to go 
ahead with the publication of an article that contradicted the view of the old guard. 
According to Semprun, on his arrival in Prague, he explained to the old leaders the 
details of their difference of opinion. Uribe and Lister were both scandalised by his 
boldness and concluded that he had to meet with Pasionaria to discuss the matter.37 
He did so the following day in a train that took them from Prague to Bucharest. Later 
on:
In the house where she was staying, she communicated to me the decision she had 
taken. She read the notes she had on the table. In view o f  the profound divergences 
that had come to the light and with the objective o f not aggravating them, she had 
decided to withdraw the declaration on the entry o f Spain in the UN that had been 
written by those in Bucharest, a majority o f the Political Bureau. The discussion had 
to be postponed until a meeting o f the Political Bureau, which would take place 
shortly.38
Pasionaria also told Semprun that she had not had the time to read the article, 
something which the Parisians did not believe.39 Irene Falcdn, in an attempt to
Fernandez was in charge of editing the documents of General Franco after his death.
35 Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 108-110; Carrillo, Memorias, p. 442; Jorge Semprun, Autobiografia de 
Federico Sanchez (Editorial Planeta, Barcelona, 1977), p. 217.
36 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau (restricted), Claudin’s second speech, February-March 1956, 
AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Reuniones).
37 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 219.
38 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 223.
39 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau (restricted), Claudin’s second speech, February-March 1956, 
AHPCE.
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present Pasionaria as a democratic leader, gives a different version of this whole 
affair: “Semprun went to see Dolores. She listened to the arguments expressed by 
those in Paris. She did not say anything. A few days later, Dolores let them know that 
she was in favour of the recognition of Spain by the UN”.40 However, as we shall 
see, she took much longer to side with the young guard.
When Semprun returned to Paris after his conversation with Ibarruri, the 
Parisians agreed the time had come for them to move ahead and publish the article, 
therefore challenging the old guard. They would later argue that they had proceeded 
in this manner for they had not received any kind of indication from Ibarruri that the 
article should not be published.41 Nevertheless, as we shall see, they were well aware 
what their action was about to unleash. In the article the Parisians argued that to leave 
Spain out of the UN and therefore, out of the policy of peaceful coexistence “meant 
that the American imperialists, supporters of Franco, would have a free hand in the 
country”. The only reason why the acceptance of Spain in the UN “had sowed 
confusion among many anti-Francoists” was due to the fact that some of them 
believed that a “solution to the Spanish problem had to come from the Great 
Powers” 42 Here, Carrillo was referring to the Spanish Socialist Party, which he 
accused of having destroyed the unity of the anti-Francoist forces after the Second 
World War in order to assure the support of the imperialist powers for a change of 
regime in Spain, a policy that Carrillo seemed to have conveniently forgotten the 
PCE had also supported at the time 43 In addition, he later said: “The article I wrote 
approving Spain’s incorporation in the UN practically marked the starting point of
40 Falcdn, Asalto, p. 311.
41 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau (restricted), Claudin’s second speech, February-March 1956, 
AHPCE.
42 “Sobre el ingreso de Espafia en la ONU. Una victoria de la politica de paz”, Nuestra Bandera, n. 15, 
1956.
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the policy of National Reconciliation”.44 This policy, as we shall see, would be 
confirmed with the arrival of the Parisians into the high command positions of the 
party.
However, before going any further, it is worth taking a moment to understand the 
political implications behind the UN affair. Although the fact that the international 
community was giving its approval to the Franco regime could not be taken lightly at 
the time, the differences between both factions inside the PCE were greater than just 
divisions on this particular question. In fact, a split of opinion within the leadership 
had drastic connotations. As we have seen, inside the PCE there was no space for 
discussions. According to Carrillo, “I, as well as the others, was conscious that what 
we were doing could lead to our expulsion from the party”.45 However, if they were 
victorious, that would signify the beginning of a change of leadership in the Party. 
For quite sometime, those who belonged to the young guard of the PCE had been 
feeling restrained by the leaders in Prague and Moscow. Vicente Uribe and Dolores 
Ib&rruri had lost touch with the reality of the situation in Spain, ignoring the 
possibilities of action that could be taken in a society that was now quite different 
from the one existing in the immediate post-war. On the other hand, those working in 
Paris, more ambitious in their approach, considered that the time had come for the 
PCE to assume a new course that would take advantage of the present situation and 
push the underground organisations to the front line in the struggle against Franco. 
Spain’s incorporation into the UN was a useful device over which to start a power 
struggle. The Parisians realised that the old guard’s position was out of touch with
43 See Chapter I, section D (The PCE and the Republican forces).
44 Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 442-443.
45 Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 443.
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the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. They took a chance. As Carrillo says, “I 
knew that I was confronting the leadership, but I was sticking my neck out. There are 
moments, however, when you have to stick your neck out.”46 It was the turning point 
of Carrillo’s political career, but he would have to overcome a few obstacles before 
knowing if it was actually turning in the right direction.
2. The XX Congress of the CPSU
After the Parisians published the article that defended their position, Pasionaria asked 
Fernando Claudin to come to Moscow and be part of the PCE delegation that would 
attend the XX Congress of the CPSU. There, the meeting of the Spanish Political 
Bureau would also take place, during which it was expected that the Parisians would 
collapse under the weight of the old guard. Claudin explains in his biography of 
Carrillo that behind this invitation, the old guard was hoping to split the Parisians: 
“They thought that I, having originated in the Communist youth (unlike Carrillo who 
had been a Socialist), would be more receptive to the patriotic arguments about the 
party, that I would be more easily recovered and then could be used against 
Carrillo” 47 Nor was Carrillo more optimistic about the situation: “Waiting for me 
was not a debate about a new policy of the party, but an indictment trial. They were 
calling Claudin with the intention of convincing him to lean in their favour”.48
Once Claudin arrived in Moscow in February 1956, and at the same time as 
the XX Congress of the CPSU was taking place, the Spanish Political Bureau held its 
own parallel meetings to discuss the problems that had arisen inside the PCE over the
46 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001.
47 Fernando Claudin, Documentos de una divergencia comunista. Los textos del debate que provoco la
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UN question. As expected, the old guard tried to win Claudin over by placing the
blame on Carrillo, who was accused of factional activity and of trying to eliminate
the old leaders. Pasionaria said:
I want to draw attention to something that we have never questioned but which we 
may have to. It might not be a danger today but it could in the future. Santiago was 
the leader, very much respected by all o f us, o f the JSU. And we find ourselves 
facing the following situation: Santiago is no longer the leader o f the JSU, but there 
are a series o f comrades, old leaders o f the JSU, who work today not under the 
orders o f the Political Bureau but under the orders o f Santiago, even if  that has not 
been Santiago’s intention. But that is the reality. And in my opinion this is where 
what has been called Santiago’s apparatus comes from, as well as a number o f 
vicious practices to which comrade Fernando has not been giving enough attention 
... This is something that will have to change if  we want to have a united leadership 
that does collective work.49
However, back in Paris, the two young leaders had already agreed to stick 
together to the end. “Before I left for the Soviet capital, I had come to an agreement 
with Carrillo on the position that we were going to take and on the need to hold firm 
to our opinions, no matter the consequences”, writes Claudin.50 The boldness of the 
young guard could only be explained by the fact that the changes in the Soviet Union 
brought them hope for changes taking place in their own party. In the view of 
Claudin, “Carrillo had the advantage that he, and not the tandem Pasionaria-Uribe, 
was swimming with the current set by the new Soviet leaders, regarding both the 
question of foreign policy and the problems of the leadership”.51 Such had been the 
case with the incorporation of Spain into the UN, during which as we have seen, the 
Parisians had understood better the new Soviet foreign policy of Peaceful 
Coexistence. In fact, their timing could not have been more appropriate as the events 
during the CPSU’s XX Congress would soon surpass their expectations.
exclusion de Claudin y  Jorge Semprun del PCE (Barcelona: El viejo topo, 1978), p. II.
48 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 444.
49 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau (restricted), Pasionaria’s speech, February-March 1956, 
AHPCE.
50 Claudin, Documentos, p. II.
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Khrushchev’s secret speech on 24 February 1956 accused Stalin of the most horrible
crimes and blamed the Communist system’s inability to stop them on the cult of
personality and the CPSU’s lack of internal democracy. The speech was eventually
revealed to the top command of the world CPs. As Falcon explains, its content came
as a great shock to Pasionaria:
According to what Dolores told me later on, a few days after the secret session o f 
the XX Congress, a party official o f the Central Committee o f the CPSU came to her 
house with a small black case that contained the speech. He looked at her, and 
without saying a word, he gave it to her to read. She took it and read it with curiosity 
and surprise. It was unbelievable but true! Once she recovered she thanked the party 
official and he disappeared from where he had come with the copy o f the speech. 
What a sad moment in her life! Alone and shocked by the revelations, as she would 
later reveal.52
The meaning of the new shift in Soviet politics did not go unnoticed by the 
Spanish General Secretary. Since the Communist parties of the world had grown and 
developed under the image of the CPSU, their leaders and structure by implication 
were suffering from the same problems. Moreover, among the Spanish Communist 
leaders, the cult of personality had been carried out mostly around the figure of 
Pasionaria. She had been politically nurtured under the wing of Stalin and Stalinist 
culture, and represented the type of leader and organisation that had suddenly come 
into question. After living in Moscow for almost twenty years and seeing many 
established leaders fall into disgrace, Pasionaria knew how unstable her position 
could become. Her power over the PCE was based on the support she had from the 
Soviets. With the new changes in the Soviet Union, this support could very well shift 
to the Parisians, more in agreement with the new line and image of the CPSU. So by 
the time the Spanish Political Bureau resumed the meetings, it was clear to all that
51 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 110
52 Falc6n, Asalto, p. 304.
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things were no longer the same. Pasionaria was now favouring the challengers.
According to Claudin:
One day, an unexpected change o f attitude in the General Secretary took place. She 
suddenly said that maybe it was more convenient to examine in depth our positions, 
that maybe they had positive aspects, that in any case the presence o f Carrillo was 
necessary. As I found out later, this shift was determined by the impact that the 
secret speech o f Khrushchev had had on her, o f which she had knowledge before the 
rest o f us.53
On the other hand, Lister argues that the victory of the Parisians was not due
to Pasionaria’s change of heart but to the fact that they had eventually gained a
majority in the Political Bureau after Gallego moved towards their position.54 In the
minutes of the meetings held by the Political Bureau, it is clear nevertheless that up
until the CPSU held its secret session, the fate of Carrillo and Claudin was to be none
other than expulsion.55 Only when Pasionaria shifted positions did the young guard
begin to gain ground. As Claudin says:
What nobody could imagine is that the internal struggle among the Soviet leadership 
would go as far as it did in February 1956, and that its outcome would give Carrillo, 
by pine chance, the victory over Uribe -and  in effect over Pasionaria-, creating in 
this way the conditions for his rise to the General Secretariat.56
3. The young guard wins
On 5 April 1956, the Political Bureau held a new meeting and this time with Carrillo 
present.57 He first had a chance to talk to Pasionaria alone and, according to his
53 Claudin, Documentos, p. II. It is not true that the rest of the Spanish delegation only found out about 
the speech later. Uribe also received a copy at the same time as Pasionaria, and since he could not read 
Russian, Lister was asked to translate it.
54 Lister, Carrillo, pp. 121-122.
55 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau (restricted), Claudin’s second speech, February-March 1956, 
AHPCE.
56 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 110.
57 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau, April-May 1954, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Reuniones
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memoirs, he stood up before her and rejected her earlier accusation that he had been
carrying out factional activity.58 More likely, however, Carrillo had already been
informed by Claudin about the General Secretary’s shift towards their positions, and
took this occasion to agree with her on the tactic to follow during the coming
meeting.59 When the Political Bureau convened, Carrillo felt confident enough to
criticise within the PCE the same things that were now being criticised in the CPSU.
He argued against the lack of democracy and the cult of personality, finding in the
person of Uribe the origin of all crimes:
Comrade Uribe, especially in the latter years, has characterized himself by a conceit, 
by an egotism, which has led him to establish around himself a true cult of 
personality. He is always ready to call attention to his own role, the decisive 
importance o f his activity, the role o f his ideas in the running o f the party. He 
behaves like this with us on every occasion, with a truly appalling lack o f modesty 
and sense o f ridicule. When Uribe emphasizes his role, he is diminishing the role o f 
the Political Bureau and the General Secretary o f the party without any respect for 
either one o f them.60
It not surprising that Uribe was used as the scapegoat, as Pasionaria was still a 
very charismatic leader much venerated by the rank-and-file. According to Carrillo, 
“I thought myself at the time to be extremely lucky that the indisputable leader of the 
Party, Pasionaria, had qualities of which once again she was giving proof.”61 
Moreover, as described by one of Pasionaria’s biographers, “to invoke the figure of 
Dolores simplified, synthesised and symbolised the Communist struggle against 
injustice. That is why her symbolic figure was a major political recourse for the 
PCE”.62 This proved to be the case in the following years. Hence, when the time 
came, Carrillo was careful not to put too much blame on her. According to Lister, “of
C.C. 5 vols. I Tomo 7).
58 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 447.
59 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 111.
60 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau, April-May 1956, AHPCE; Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 448-453.
61 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 453.
62 Cruz, Pasionaria, p. 177.
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the 167 pages of the minutes of the meeting, 59 belong to one single intervention by
Carrillo, and of those, 30 are dedicated to demolishing Uribe and to setting Dolores
against him and sweetening the pill for her.”63 Among other things, Carrillo said
regarding Ibarruri when speaking about the cult of personality:
There are in the party certain external expressions o f the cult o f personality with 
comrade Dolores. ... It is only fair to say that comrade Dolores has always 
expressed her displeasure, in one way or the other, before these exaggerations. ... In 
her attitude with us and other comrades, Dolores has always shown great modesty. It 
has always been possible to discuss and disagree with Dolores. Showing great 
courage, she herself has given the example o f putting her own opinion up for review 
and under criticism. To express disagreement with Dolores has never been difficult. 
She created and creates an atmosphere o f trust.64
He also refuted the idea that he had ever doubted Ibarruri’s capacity to run the
party:
Since the death o f Jos6 Diaz, Dolores is the General Secretary o f the party. And she 
is so, not just because o f her great popularity, but also because she is the person 
most capable, most intelligent, best prepared among us; because her thought is the 
freshest, in tune with what is new. No one at the head o f the party could embody as 
she does what it is at the same time both traditional and new as it emerges in the 
party.65
Pasionaria in return admitted:
For the satisfaction o f comrade Carrillo, I have to declare that he was right and I was 
not; and that his article pointed at the mistake o f our own declaration, which avoided 
dealing with the fact that the party had not clearly appreciated the significance o f the 
Soviet Union’s vote in favour o f the entry o f Spain in the UN.66
Subsequently, the Central Committee of the PCE met in a Plenary Session 
from 15 July to 4 August 1956.67 The outcome of the Session was far-reaching and 
varied. Ibdrruri lost her dominance and was displaced by the young guard. She would 
retain the post of General Secretary until 1960 but in effect, Carrillo had now taken
63 Lister, Carrillo, p. 122.
64 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau, Carrillo’s speech, April-May 1956, AHPCE.
65 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau, Carrillo’s speech, 2 May 1956, AHPCE.
66 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau, Ibarruri’s speech, 10 May 1956, AHPCE.
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over the command of the party. The political death of Vicente Uribe was settled and
made public. There was a light revision of the Party’s history: its lack of democracy
and the cult of personality were criticised by the newcomers. Following the Soviets’
actions, the Spanish Communists began their reconciliation with Yugoslavia: Titoism
was no longer considered a heresy. Moreover, Jorge Semprun gained prominence and
appeared as the most important connection between the activists inside Spain and the
leaders in exile, a role he had been playing since 1953. He became part of the
Political Bureau with Simon Sanchez Montero and Santiago Alvarez68 Owing to
Semprun’s influence, the intellectuals would increasingly be accepted as an
important and influential fighting force in the eyes of the PCE. Finally and most
importantly, in harmony with the USSR’s policy of Peaceful Coexistence, the PCE
shifted to a policy of National Reconciliation, leaving behind the Anti-Francoist
National Front of previous years. Already a month before the Plenary Session, the
party had published a document entitled “For the National Reconciliation of all
Spaniards”.69 In the view of Claudin:
Its basic idea was that the division between winners and losers, prevalent as a part of 
Spanish reality since the Civil War as being greater than any class antagonism, was 
being pushed aside by the division between those who were the great beneficiaries 
of the dictatorship and the rest of the groups and social classes that were harmed by 
it. From here, we advocated ‘the understanding between the forces of the left and 
right’ so that ‘the changes towards democracy can take place peacefully’.70
67 “Resolution sobre la situation en la direction del partido y los problemas del reforzamiento del 
mismo”, August 1956, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 37).
68 Sim6n Sanchez Montero was an important activists from inside Spain. He had been arrested in 1945 
and spent the next 7 years in jail. He would become the person in charge of the workers organization 
in Madrid. Santiago Alvarez was a former leader of the JSU where he had met Santiago Carrillo. He 
left Spain after the Civil War but returned in 1944, only to be arrested short after. Alvarez spent the 
next ten years in jail and was expelled from the country in 1954. Tomds Garcia, Francisco Romero 
Marin and Sebastian Zapirdin also became reserve members of the Political Bureau at this time.
69 It called for an amnesty, the suppression of censorship, democratic trade unions and free peasant 
associations, respect to the university jurisdiction and freedom of association. “Por la Reconciliation 
nacional, por una solucidn democrdtica y pacifica del problema Espafiol”, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, 
Carp. 37).
70 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 118.
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On a practical level, this shift was followed by a new approach towards the
Communist organisations in Spain. Unlike the old leaders, the party’s young guard
put much more emphasis on the underground opposition movement. Carrillo was to a
certain extent aware of the changes taking place under Franco, if only because a new
generation that had not fought during the Civil War was now old enough to be
politically active. After the events of February 1956, which will be looked at in the
next chapter, the students and intellectuals became the new paladins of the Spanish
Communist Party. As Ramon Buckley notes in La doble transition:
In the 1950s, the Communist Party, under the leadership of Carrillo, abandoned 
Stalinist doctrine and initiated its so-called ‘national reconciliation’ programme. 
For this reconciliation, in order for the party to be accepted again by the Spanish 
people who live in Franco’s Spain, the intellectuals would have to play a major role. 
The intellectuals -and the writers in general- had to be the bridges, or rather, the 
Trojan horses to achieve the establishment of the party in Spain.71
All these changes regarding the policy to follow in Spain could wrongly be 
interpreted as the onset of a political opening inside the PCE. The policy of National 
Reconciliation is said to have marked the beginning of a new era in the PCE’s 
approach to Spain.72 Furthermore, 1956 has been described as the starting point of 
the Eurocommunist process of 1968.73 However, these interpretations are not 
substantiated by close examination. First of all, it is important to remember that a 
similar formulation of “reconciliation” and “unity” between all parties had already 
been advocated by the Spanish Communists with the policy of National Unity in the 
1940s and the subsequent Anti-Fascist Front, and it could even be argued that there
71 Buckley, La doble transition, p. 7.
72 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001; Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 118-119; Carrillo, Memorias, 
pp. 455-457; Mujal-Leon, Communism, pp. 1, 22; Hermet, The Communists, p. 57; Moran, Miseria, 
pp. 276-277; Carabantes and Cimorra, Un mito, p. 287,
Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, pp. 225, 246; Sanchez Montero, Memorias, p. 230; Falc6n, Asalto, pp. 
308, 355-356, 358; Asenjo and Ramos, Malagon, p. 223; Preston, “The PCE’s long...” in Kindersley,
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were also strong similarities between the policy of the Popular Front and that of 
National Reconciliation.74 Though some authors have noticed such precedents, it is 
still pointed out that, on this occasion, the shift of policy was accompanied by 
internal reform and the self-criticism of past dogmatic and sectarian positions, which 
had not been the case previously.75 Superficially, this might seem to be true but on 
closer inspection it becomes clear that the party’s internal reform and self-criticism 
would not lead to any real change in the long term.
As can be seen during the Plenary Session of the PCE’s Central Committee in 
the summer of 1956, the non-democratic procedures of the party in the past were still 
apparent. Everything that was discussed during the Session had already been decided 
during the Assembly of the Political Bureau. The power struggle that had just been 
won by the Parisians was a private matter and the Central Committee, theoretically 
the governing body of the party, did not have a say in its outcome. They were 
presented with the final results, which they were expected to accept not to discuss. 
Moreover, the manner in which Uribe’s downfall had been resolved behind closed 
doors further emphasized that Stalinist culture was still an intrinsic part of the party’s 
internal structure. There is an obvious contradiction in Carrillo’s criticism regarding 
the procedures used by the old guard against the Parisians, since they were the same 
as the ones now being used by Carrillo against Uribe.76 Prosecutor and accused had 
switched places while the methods employed to deal with dissent remained 
unchanged. Hence, this criticism was not just superficial but also opportunistic, and 
the same applies to the party’s review of previous purges. The Parisians used the
Eurocommunism, p. 57; Carrillo, Memorias, p. 457.
74 See Arasa’s explanation about Jose Diaz’s speech in 1938, “Lo que Espafla ensefia a Europa”, 
Arasa, Maquis, p. 31. On the 1940s, see Falcon, Asalto, pp. 312, 319; Cruz, Pasionaria, p. 183; 
Fernandez Vargas, La resistencia, p. 168; Estruch Tobella, Historia oculta, p. 197.
75 Estruch Tobella, 1939-1956, p. 226.
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same tactic that the old guard had used during the V Congress: they placed the
responsibility for past mistakes on the erroneous judgement of those who were no
longer in power. In this manner, the sins from the past were redeemed without any
real analysis: no one was guilty, except the scapegoat Vicente Uribe. In fact, the
purges of the Quinonistas, Monzonistas, or the Comoreristas, were never reviewed.
As Semprun writes:
Even if you (Semprun) do not share a direct responsibility in the campaigns of the 
time against ‘Quinonismo’, ‘Monzonismo’, ‘Comorerismo’, and ‘Titoism’, you do 
share responsibility for the fact that, after 1956, the leadership of the PCE has 
refused any public self-criticism, limiting itself to placing Stalinist rubbish in 
someone else’s backyard, rejecting any kind of objective historical analysis of its 
past.77
In the view of Irene Falcon:
The changes in the model of the party, in its internal workings and in its leadership 
never had the profundity of an authentic political opening. It was radical in form, 
with generational renewal, but superficial in what was fundamental, among other 
reasons because the persistence of clandestine conditions would not allow for the 
implementation of a democratic culture.78
Finally, as we shall see, although at first Carrillo’s new approach to Spain 
seemed to be in agreement with the changes taking place in the country, in the 
following years the exiled leadership would yet again lose touch with this reality, 
assuming a much too optimistic view of the situation. Dissent from inside the country 
began to grow, mainly from the intellectuals who demanded greater participation in 
the party’s decision-making processes. As a result, Santiago Carrillo increasingly 
resorted to the old way of keeping order: critical voices were simply ostracised from 
the organisation and the conflict between the leaders in exile and the activists in 
Spain once again rose.
76 Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 114-115.
77 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 131.
78 Falcdn, Asalto, pp. 309,310.
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Hence, it can be argued that the Communist rebirth of the XX Congress had 
only given the old structures a new legitimacy. As in most of the Communist parties, 
the destalinisation process in the PCE became little more than just a process that gave 
more credibility to its procedures and dictatorial organisation. There was no need for 
a profound analysis of the Communist structures such as that the Italian leader 
Togliatti had had the courage to suggest.79 Carrillo had cleverly used the party’s 
critique of Stalinism to win the battle over the old guard of the PCE. In effect, the 
transition of 1956 did not develop into a profound reform of the party’s Stalinists 
structure.
D. Conclusion
As we have seen, the banning of the PCE in France was followed by a period of 
inactivity by the party, particularly of its underground organisations in Spain. There 
were, nevertheless, significant policy changes: the tram strike of Barcelona in 1951 
prompted the party to abandon the guerrilla policy and confirm the use of legal 
platforms, such as the official trade unions, to fight against the Franco regime. In 
later years, this change would have an important effect in the development of 
Comisiones Obreras.
However, the turning point during this period was the death of Stalin and the 
subsequent destalinisation process that affected the entire Communist movement. In 
the Spanish Communist Party, this process materialised in a change of leadership that 
gave rise to the youngest members of the politburo over the hard-line Stalinists. The
79 For more information on the position of Togliatti after the XX Congress of the CPSU see Moran,
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policy of the party then shifted towards the so-called National Reconciliation policy, 
which, as we have seen, was not as new as some have suggested. In addition, these 
changes were accompanied by the flowering of an active underground movement in 
Spain, mainly among the intellectuals and students.
Nevertheless, the manner in which the outcome of the power struggle had 
been handled by the Parisians and the lack of any serious analysis of the party’s past 
mistakes, meant that the destalinisation process already in its early days was not 
developing, as expected, into a profound reform of the party’s internal structure. The 
years to come would serve to mark the limits of reform within the PCE as well as 
exposing the problems between the activists in Spain and the leaders in exile. 
However, before everything turned sour, the PCE would embark on one of its most 
successful ventures in the country: the revival of the underground organisation in 
Spain.
Miseria, pp. 286-287,300.
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III. THE BIRTH OF A NEW OPPOSITION
A . Introduction
This chapter will examine the relationship between the PCE and the intellectual and 
student opposition movement that developed in Spain during the 1950s. The birth of 
this relationship, which as we shall see was almost non-existent in the 1940s, 
reflected the changes that were taking place in the party after the death of Stalin in 
1953, particularly the Parisians’ emphasis on the underground organisation in Spain. 
In this manner, the party worked as a catalyst in expressing the feelings of discontent 
and frustration of a new generation against a stifling and repressive regime. At the 
same time, this generation initially helped the party to re-establish contact with the 
real situation in Spain.
During these years, the opposition movement among students was particularly 
intense at the University of Madrid.1 The organisation of events such as the Poetry 
Encounters and the Congress of Young Writers, the death of the philosopher Jose 
Ortega y Gasset, the publication of the Manifesto of 1956, which led to the famous 
events of February 1956, will be examined in this chapter to explain the development 
of a party organisation within the university and intellectual realm.
1 The University of Madrid will be the focus of this chapter. There was hardly any party activity in 
other universities at the time. The University of Barcelona will receive some attention in the next
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B. From Culture to Politics
1. The PCE and the intellectuals in the 1940s
Since the end of the Spanish Civil War, the activity of the PCE regarding its relations
with the intellectual world had been minimal.2 A harshly repressed society such as
the Spanish one made it very difficult for new cultural groups to emerge. In exile, this
world was limited to a small group in Paris and another in Mexico.3 In fact, the party
never welcomed the intellectuals with open arms. When talking about the standards
required to take new members into the PCE during the Civil War, Aurora Amaiz, a
party activist exiled in Mexico, wrote in her memoirs:
The high, middle and lower cadres of the party were chosen, first, by their working 
class origin, they should not be desclasadost which was the word used to refer to the 
people that came from the middle classes, especially against the academics, 
professors and intellectuals.4
In Spain, one of the few undertakings worth mentioning during this decade was the 
creation of the Union de Intelectuales Libres (Union of Free Intellectuals, UIL). This
chapter as the party’s student organisation in this city became more active after February 1956.
2 During the 1940s, Felix Montiel was in charge of the PCE’s relations with the intellectuals. He was a 
professor in Administrative Law and had been a Socialist deputy for Murcia during the Spanish 
Second Republic. In 1936, he had joined the PCE. Montiel was very critical of the attitude of the party 
leadership during the Casado coup. He would later argue that the coup had been nothing but a scheme 
planned by the Soviets to have an excuse to abandon die fight in Spain. The German-Soviet pact made 
him leave the party but he would later return when the USSR joined the Allies in the war. He left the 
party again in 1950 and ended up joining Jos6 Del Barrio in the creation of the Movimiento de Action 
Socialista (MAS) that year. For more information see Francisco-Felix Montiel, Un coronel llamado 
Segismundo (Madrid: Editorial Criterio-Libros, 1998); Moran, Miseria, pp. 210-211; Estruch Tobella, 
1939-1956, pp. 43-44. In 1950, Feliz Montiel was replaced by Victor Velasco, a member of the 
party’s Central Committee and editor of the theoretical journal of the JSU, La hora. He died in July 
1956, Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
3 In Paris, the group was formed by the painter Antonio Mufioz, the writer Jose Quiroga Pla, the 
musicians Mauricio Bacarisse and Palacios, the historian Emilio G6mez Nada, the journalist Victor 
Velasco and the self-taught Benigno Rodriguez, and at that time the poet, Jorge Semprun. In Mexico, 
the group was formed by Wenceslao Roces, Adolfo Sanchez V&zquez, painters such as Jose 
Bardasano, Antonio Rodriguez Luna, Josep Renau and writers such as Luisa Cam6s, Juan Rejano, 
Pedro Garflas, Gabriel Garcia Narezo. For more information see Moran, Miseria, pp. 222-223.
4 Amaiz, Retrato, p. 43.
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organisation, however, originated in Spain and did not represent a revival of the 
interest of the party in the intellectual world. It was rather an expression of the 
opposition to the Franco regime felt among certain progressive intellectuals that had 
remained in the country after the Civil War. It is important to note that at this point in 
time, the PCE continued to support guerrilla activity to overthrow the regime. It 
would not be until the mid 1950s that a policy of National Reconciliation was 
established.
The idea of the UIL began to emerge at the end of 1944, coming to life in 
March 1945. Initially, four people belonging to the teaching profession formed the 
secretariat of the organisation. The group’s main promoter was Rafael Guisasola, a 
teacher.5 Very soon, however, the UIL expanded to include doctors, lawyers, 
engineers and writers. The political affiliation of the members was varied: 
Communists, Socialists, Republicans, Anarchists and those without a party, all had a 
place in the organisation.6 As they themselves described it, “the UIL is not a political 
party and it is open to all the Republican intellectuals, without distinction of party 
ideology. And it is organically independent, at least for the time being, of any 
political or syndical entity”. However, the Communists dominated and had the most 
influence. In fact, the UIL had from its foundation a few contacts with the exiled 
leadership of the party though these were described in an internal report as 
“demoralising” and subsequently ended. Nevertheless, a relationship with the party 
was renewed in June 1946.8 The UIL supported the reestablishment of a Republic
5 Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 82; A. Ruiz Ayucar, El Partido Comunista. 
Treinta y  siete anos de clandestinidad (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1976), p. 294.
6 Report by the Union de Intelectuales Libres explaining what they are all about, March 1947, AHPCE 
(UIL, Caja 126, Carp. 1.8).
7 Message from the UIL to the Italian government and Italian intellectuals, November 1946, AHPCE 
(UIL, Caja 126, Carp. 1.8).
8 Report by the Union de Intelectuales Libres explaining what they are all about, March 1947,
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through the union of all the Republican forces, and published manifestos encouraging 
the Spanish people to fight against the Franco regime: “JOIN THE RESISTANCE 
AND FIGHT AGAINST TERROR! DOWN WITH THE TERRORIST REGIME OF 
FRANCO! LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC!”9
The organisation also advocated the rebirth and democratisation of culture in 
Spain. To spread this message, two illegal intellectual reviews, Democrito and 
Cuademos de Estudio, were published by the UIL between 1945 and 1947. 
According to one of the organisation’s leaders, Manuel Tunon de Lara, the UIL at 
one point had up to 500 members. However, the conditions for the development of 
such a project in 1940s Spain were extremely harsh. The isolation in which the 
members of the UIL had to carry out their activities, as well as the police repression 
against them, meant that it could not possibly last very long. In April 1947, the entire 
secretariat of the organisation was arrested.10 Among others, Guisasola was 
sentenced to 10 years in prison. Tunon de Lara, on the other hand, avoided detention 
and subsequently went into exile.11 By the end of 1947, the UIL had disappeared.12
From this point onwards, the only person who kept alive any kind of 
Communist influence amongst the intellectuals in Spain was Cirilo Benitez Ayala, a 
civil engineer who lived in Madrid. On his own initiative, he worked as a contact 
between what was left of the UIL and the new poetry magazines that were surfacing 
in the country such as Cuademos de Poesia, edited by the brothers Millares in Las
AHPCE.
9 Manifesto by the UIL’s Provincial Counsel in Malaga, 26 January 1947, AHPCE (UIL, Caja 126, 
Carp. 1.8).
10 For more information on the UIL see “Report by Tunon de Lara”, November 1947, AHPCE 
(FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, Microfilms 98-101) and “Report by the General Secretary of the 
UIL”, March 1947, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, Microfilm 96).
11 For more information on the UIL see Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, pp. 80-84.
12 Dossier about the UIL sent by Felipe Comarero, no date, AHPCE (UIL, Caja 126, Carp. 1.8).
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Palmas, and Espadana, edited by Gabriel de Nora in Leon.13 He also became very 
close to Juan Antonio Bardem and together they would carry out some activities on 
behalf of the PCE.14 Benitez Ayala died in a train accident on 6 April 1950.15
As far as the university was concerned, the 1940s were a dark period for the 
opposition movement in Spain, let alone that of the Communists. In 1940, the Fascist 
Sindicato Espanol Universitario (SEU), which had been created shortly after the 
Falange in 1933, became the only authorized political organisation for students.16 In 
this manner, the SEU came to replace the pre-war Federation Universitaria Escolar 
(FUE), whose members were now being persecuted by the authorities. The SEU’s 
goal was to give the students a political, professional and military education.17 
Membership was compulsory. In addition, the regime carried out a “witch-hunt” 
against those teachers or professors that had any kind of liberal inclination. This left 
an academic vacuum that was never properly filled by the less apt Falangists and 
immensely damaged the development of the university in Spain.18 The Law of 
University Organisation {Ley de Ordenacion Universitaria) on 29 July 1943
13 To Espadana contributed authors such as Gabriel Celaya , Bias de Otero, Jose Hierro and Agela 
Figuera, Juan Pablo Fusi, Un siglo de Espaha. La cultura (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1999), p. 120.
14 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001; Juan Antonio Bardem, Y todavia sigue. Memorias de un 
hombre de cine (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2002), p. 33
15 For more information see Moran, Miseria, p. 230; Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, 
p. 162; Bardem, Memorias, pp. 130-134; Statement at the police headquarters of Juan Antonio 
Bardem, 15 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 209-216. This book edited by Mesa includes a 
massive amount of police reports written during the period surrounding the events of February 1956.
16 Salvador Giner de San Julian, “Power, Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939- 
75” in Preston, Spain, p. 184.
17 Manuel Juan Farga, Universidady democracia en Esparia (30 anos de lucha estudiantil) (Mexico: 
Ediciones ERA, 1969), p. 37.
18 By 1944, 155 of the 278 professors in the university had been appointed since 1939. For more 
information also see Jose Maria Nasarre Lopez, “Depuracion de maestros en la provincia de Huesca” 
and Manuel Ortiz Heras, “La depuracidn del Magisterio en la provincia de Albacete. El lenguaje de 
los expedientes de depuracion” both in Juan Jose Carreras Ares and Miguel Angel Ruiz Camicer 
(Ed.), La Universidad espafiola bajo el regimen de Franco (1939-1975) (Zaragoza: Institution 
Femado el Catolico, 1991), p. 115; and Giner de San Julian, “Power, Freedom and Social Change...” 
in Preston, Spain, p. 184.
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established that the university was also Catholic and had to be administered in 
accordance with the principles of the Falange. The Rector of the University had to be 
a member of the Falange, and those who opted for a post in the University needed to 
prove their “firm adhesion to the fundamental principles of the state, credited by a 
certificate from the General Secretariat of the Movimiento” 19 During this harsh 
repressive period, some small clandestine groups of students would be formed. 
However, the first real attempt to reorganise the opposition would not take place until 
the victory of the Allies in the war became clear and, the attempt to “fascistize” the 
university, as described by Salvador Giner, was reversed by those inside the regime 
who wanted to marginalize the Falange.20 In the academic year 1944-1945, at the 
same time as the SEU held its first mock elections for student delegates, a clandestine 
FUE began to function. One year later, in January 1946, the FUE published a 
manifesto, created committees in the main universities and during a short period, 
published a magazine called Peninsula.21 However, in April 1947, the national 
committee of the clandestine FUE was arrested following a police search at the Liceo 
Frances. Its members were sentenced to jail and the organisation disappeared 
completely in Spain 22 As we shall see, the fighting spirit of the students would not 
recover until the mid 1950s, and on that occasion, the PCE would find itself in the 
middle of the action.
19 Carlos Paris, La universidad espanola actual: Posibilidades y  frustraciones (Madrid: Editorial 
Cuademos para el Dialogo, 1974), pp. 56-57.
20 Giner de San Juli&n, “Power, Freedom and Social Change...” in Preston, Spain, pp. 185, 187.
21 Carreras Ares y Ruiz Camicer, La Universidad, p. 120; Farga, Universidad, p. 41
22 Two of those condemned, Nicolis Sanchez Albomoz and Manuel Lamama, managed to escape in 
August 1948, Carreras Ares y Ruiz Camicer, La Universidad, p. 120; Farga, Universidad, p. 41. The 
FUE continued to exist in exile until 1952, Giner de San Julian, “Power, Freedom and Social 
Change...” in Preston, Spain, p. 187.
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On the other hand, the work of the exiled leadership among the intellectuals in the 
1940s and early 1950s consisted of unofficial meetings with isolated figures that 
would often contact the party through the PCF in Paris.23 In 1949, the PCE leaders in 
the French capital met the engineer and professor Jose Entrecanales.24 Though not a 
Communist, Entrecanales belonged to the opposition against the regime and was 
willing to provide the PCE leadership with information concerning the situation in 
Spain. His view about the possible support for the Communists among the country’s 
university youth was rather pessimistic. Talking about the students at the Civil 
Engineering School, he said, “I don’t think you have anybody there that supports you, 
though I do not personally talk to them...”.25 The party held new interviews with 
Entrecanales and with his wife and daughter in 1950 and 1951, and again in 1953, 
but nothing much came out of them. Others that became involved with the PCE in 
exile during this period were the painters Jose Guinovart and Juan Guanse. The party 
got in touch with them through Emilio Garcia, a Spanish student that met Jorge
77Semprun while studying in Paris on a scholarship. The musician Luis Cobos, 
another contact of this period, would be one of the few to end up joining the PCE.28
A more important example of these initial contacts of the party with the 
intellectuals was the relationship between the poet Eugenio de Nora and Manuel 
Azcarate. In 1950, Santiago Carrillo asked Azcarate to travel to Switzerland to meet 
De Nora, who had expressed interest in contacting the party. De Nora had a degree in 
philosophy and was a well-known young poet in Spain. He had won a scholarship to
23 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
24 Interview of the PCE with Entrecanales, 20 May 1949, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Caja 11, Carp. 3).
25 Interview of the PCE with Entrecanales, 17 and 20 August 1950, AHPCE (ACTIVISTAS, Carp. 
47).
26 Interviews of the PCE with Entrecanales and his wife and daughter, 20 and 21 April 1951, and 1953, 
AHPCE (ACTIVISTAS, Carp. 47).
27 Conversation with Emilio Garcia, 31 October 1952, AHPCE (INFORMES, Caja 126, Carp. 1.9.2).
study in Switzerland and took the opportunity to arrange a meeting with the PCE. 
According to a report written by Azcarate, when they finally met, De Nora said, “I 
am as close to you as one can be without belonging to the party, because I do not 
know it well enough”. Azcarate had to explain to De Nora basic things such as the 
difference between a bourgeois revolution and a Socialist revolution. “He would 
immediately agree with what I said. He seemed to be honest. He agrees with the 
party, with the policies of the party and he wants to get to know it better, because he 
knows nothing”. According to Azcarate, when talking about the philosopher Jose 
Ortega y Gasset, the young poet said that he was totally despised by the people, “that 
he was a speaker for snobs and nothing more; that there was no one younger than 30 
who had any respect for him; maybe some old Republicans but only a few. His 
prestige is alive only among the ladies of the aristocracy”.29 This proved not to be 
the case in later years, when the death of Ortega set off a radical response by the 
students against what they perceived as the regime’s lack of respect for the 
philosopher, a response that eventually culminated in the famous events of February 
1956, as we shall see later in this chapter.
Azcarate went on to criticise the fact that the young poet was not proposing 
any specific action to be carried out in Spain and that he was looking at his 
professional future developing within the parameters of the regime. Nevertheless, he 
added:
He (De Nora) says that he is at the total disposal of the party, for whatever it feels 
would be useful, either something general or among the intellectuals. He wants help 
for his training, books, etc, and a link that will allow him to become a party 
activist.30
28 Report about conversations held between the party and Jos6 Guinovart, Juan Guanse and Luis 
Cobos, 1953, AHPCE (INTELECTUALES PCE-PSUC, Informes, Caja 126, Carp. 1.9.2).
29 Report by Azcarate about his meeting with Eugenio de Nora, 11 February 1950, AHPCE 
(INTELECTUALES PCE-PSUC, Informes, Caja 126, Carp. 1.9.2).
30 Report by Azcarate about his meeting with Eugenio de Nora, 11 February 1950, AHPCE.
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As mentioned above, De Nora, as well as other young writers of progressive 
inclinations such as Gabriel Celaya, had created the intellectual review Espadafia. 
Azcarate wrote:
Everything that Nora was telling me had nothing to do with the “Francoist Spain” of 
hunger and terror that was talked about in Mundo Obrero. In 1950, when we had our 
first meeting, that black Spain was still predominant but a new reality was starting 
to grow, especially among the youth. And Nora was the first one to show us this.31
Once Azcarate returned to Paris after their first meeting, he was told by 
Carrillo to keep in contact with De Nora, and in the future, maybe even with the 
progressive friends the young poet had referred to during the interview. Azcarate and 
De Nora would see each other on several occasions. Soon, De Nora started to write 
Communist poems, using the alias Carlos del Pueblo (Carlos of the People).32 They 
were published in the party’s newspapers and theoretical journals. Subsequently, the 
poet Bias de Otero arrived in Switzerland and joined De Nora in meetings with the 
party. Bias de Otero had left the country intending to become an exile and publish an 
incendiary book of poems.33 Azcarate became close to both De Nora and Bias de 
Otero and predicted a bright future for the PCE inside Spain. By 1951, De Nora’s 
optimism about the party’s possibilities of action with intellectuals increased rather 
unrealistically. According to Azcarate, De Nora believed that “more than half of the 
students are open and well-disposed to contacts with the Communists. ... A quarter 
of the students could be considered already to sympathise with the Communists”.34
31 Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 323.
32 Poems by Carlos del Pueblo, AHPCE (POESIAS, Caja 29); Cuadernos de Cultura, n. 4, 1952.
33 In 1952, Azcarate introduced Bias de Otero to Jorge Sempnin who became in charge of the poet’s 
well being. According to Sempnin, Bias de Otero became very anxious as the time for the publishing 
of the book came closer. Eventually, with the agreement of the party, he decided not to publish the 
book and returned to Spain. Sempnin, Autobiografia, pp. 95-96.
34 Report by Azcirate about his meeting with Eugenio de Nora, 20 and 21 April 1951, AHPCE 
(INTELECTUALES PCE-PSUC, Informes, Caja 126, Carp. 1.9.2).
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These new contacts were evidence, more than anything else, of the PCE’s 
awakening to the student/intellectual opposition in Spain, emphasizing, nevertheless, 
the limited information and direction that the exiled leadership still had regarding 
these matters. Azcarate’s work with the intellectuals came to an end when he was 
suddenly called to answer for his past sins as Monzdn’s associate. “Overnight, I 
became a persona-non-grata on whom a file had to be opened. I received Carrillo’s 
order to leave my work at once to other people and to terminate my contacts with the 
intellectuals”. However, as Azcarate’s door to the intellectuals closed, a new more 
daring one had begun to open.
In 1950, a young intellectual called Jorge Sempnin was put in charge of the party’s 
new theoretical journal, Cultura y  Democracia,36 At the age of fourteen, Sempnin 
had left Spain with his family in 1937 and had lived in The Hague for two years 
before settling in Paris in 1939. During the Second World War, he joined the French 
resistance against the Nazi invasion. He was arrested by the Germans in 1943 and 
deported to the concentration camp of Buchenwald on January 1944, where he 
belonged to the clandestine Communist organisation. Sempnin returned to Paris in 
1945 and worked as a translator for UNESCO before becoming fully involved with 
the PCE. From 1953, he would transform the party’s relationship with the cultural 
opposition movement that was starting to grow in Spain. Subsequently, he became 
the most influential person in the revival of intellectual and student underground 
organisations. The young leader had a perfect profile to take over the party’s
35 Azcirate, Derrotas, p. 325.
36 Cultura y  Democracia was created as an attempt to influence the intellectual world. However, the 
ideological restrictions imposed by the era of Zdanov, meant that the cultural and theoretical journal 
became nothing more than a space for dogmatic representation. For more information see “Cultura y 
Democracia”, AHPCE (PUBLICACIONES PERI6DICAS, Sig. 208) and Estruch Tobella, 1939-
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relationship with the cultural world in Spain. As with most of those who would later
move closer to the Communist cause, Sempnin came from a comfortable family, had
been to university and wrote poetry.37 In his own words:
I was there at a moment when they needed someone without a prison record, that 
knew languages and with some intellectual education. As it happened, I was the 
identikit of this description. A few years earlier nobody would have noticed me and 
a few years later there would have been many others with the same qualities.
According to Carrillo:
From very early on, I considered Sempnin as a possible leader of the party, at a time 
when there were no intellectuals among our leadership. Until then, the established 
criteria meant that the leadership had to be formed exclusively by workers ... With 
Jorge Sempnin a new period opened during which the veto against the intellectuals 
would disappear.38
In August 1953, Jorge Sempnin travelled to Spain for the first time under the 
name of Jacques Grador, a French friend of the young Communist leader who lent 
him his passport to cross the frontier. There, he would encounter a generation about 
to wake up to the world of the opposition. His arrival would herald the 
transformation into real activists of those isolated cases the party had encountered in 
exile.39
One month before this trip took place, the PCE leadership had had a meeting 
with the cinematographer Ricardo Munoz Suay in Paris, which would serve as a 
boost to the party’s influence in the intellectual world and help Semprun during his 
visit to the country.40 Mufioz Suay had been part of the UIL and had belonged to the 
PCE in Valencia, as a result of which he had spent time in Francoist jails. At that
1956, pp. 158-159.
37 He had a degree in Philosophy from the Sorbonne University. Gregorio Moran wrongly points to 
Semprun as the first university figure in the party when the first one had actually been Gabriel Leon 
Trilla, Mor&n, Miseria, p. 224.
38 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 437.
39 Interview with Jorge Sempnin, May 2001.
40 Munoz Suay was contacted by Victor Velasco upon his arrival to Paris for a cinema event, interview
103
time, he was involved with a group of progressive cinephiles in Spain with whom he
founded a magazine called Objetivo, which according to Mor&n would serve “as a
vehicle of progressive culture” and gave birth to the influence of the PCE in the
cinematography world.41 Munoz Suay eventually became an important member of
the party’s Committee of Intellectuals in Spain and participated in the first contacts
of the party with the students.42
Semprun’s first visit to Spain was prepared by Victor Velasco and Santiago
Carrillo. Given the lack of experience the party had in Spain, the trip was badly
organised. In three weeks he was supposed to visit Barcelona, Zaragoza, Valencia,
Alicante, Las Palmas, Seville, the Canary Islands, Madrid, Salamanca and San
Sebastian.43 In all of these places, he was expected to establish contacts with groups
of intellectuals with whom the party had had no previous organic relationship 44 Most
of the information they had about potential sympathisers had been gathered through
visiting students in Paris at the Colegio de Espafia in the Cite Universitaire. “We had
to look hard for contacts because there was no party organisation left in Spain
amongst middle class sectors”, Semprun recalls 45 Moreover, he was not even given
enough money to survive during this period. In his memoirs, he explains:
As always, on that occasion reality also prevailed, and I had to modify the 
programme on the way. I went neither to Andalusia nor to the Canary Islands. In 
that manner, from my first experience, I was able to verify, with something as
with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
41 Moran, Miseria, pp. 232-233; Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals 
written by Jorge Semprun, April 1954, AHPCE (INFORMES, Caja 126, Carp. 1.9.2). Also see 
Bardem, Memorias, pp. 115-116.
42 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001; Report on the different aspects of the work with the 
intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 1954, AHPCE.
43 Schedule of Semprun’s trip, 1953, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, Microfilm 14); 
Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 55-56. In Autobiografia, Semprun does not include Las Palmas as part of 
his trip. In contrast, a document found in the archives states that Semprun was supposed to go to Las 
Palmas but there is nothing regarding Seville and the Canary Islands. At any rate, he does say in his 
memoirs that he did not go to either one. It could be assumed that he did not go to Las Palmas either.
44 Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 55-56.
45 Interview with Jorge Sempnin, May 2001.
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simple as a visit of that kind, the enormous distance that existed between the 
illusions of the party and the demands of reality.46
During this visit, Semprun met with people such as the poet Gabriel Celaya
and his wife Amparo Gast6n, the doctor Jose Antonio Hem&ndez, and the poet
Vicente Aleixandre. Semprun would introduce himself as a French Hispanist and,
“only in exceptional cases would the conversation develop in such a manner that I
would reveal my identity as a clandestine party delegate, as happened with Celaya
and his partner Amparo Gaston”. At Celaya’s house, Semprun also met Enrique
Mugica, a contact that in the following years “made possible an opening in the
University of Madrid”. As soon as he arrived, Mugica started to rave against the
regime to an extent that Celaya felt obliged to caution him: “You don’t know who
this person is... He could be a policeman”.47 Even so, Semprun did not reveal his
real identity to the young Basque. It would take another year of Mugica’s tireless
activity for the two finally to hold a meeting with an “official character”.48 Back in
Paris, Semprun presented to the Party an optimistic view on the potential for a
student and intellectual Communist movement in Spain. According to Carrillo:
The fact that before the victory of the young guard over the old guard, I had been in 
charge of the work of the party in Spain made me aware of what was happening 
inside the country instead of amongst the emigres. This very much helped me to 
perceive the new things that were happening and to promote people such as 
Semprun, who could help us connect with the new generations.
Semprun’s years as a Communist clandestine figure had finally begun, a role 
he played in masterly fashion until 1963. During this time, he would travel regularly 
back to Paris to keep the exiled leadership up-to-date with developments inside
46 Sempnin, Autobiografia, pp. 55-56.
47 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
48 Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 
1954, AHPCE.
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Spain. He immediately became an important party leader, embodying to a certain 
extent the PCE’s new emphasis on underground organisations after the arrival of the 
Parisians to the high command of the party. However, his presence in Spain also 
meant that he was exchanging the bureaucratic world of exile for the active world of 
the underground. As a result, the young leader would eventually become an “activist” 
and this could only mean that his perception of Spanish reality would at some point 
come into confrontation with what he himself had described as the “illusions of the 
party”. However, before this happened, the PCE and the intellectual class were about 
to embark on what Moran has fittingly described as a “honeymoon”.
2. The early stages of a new opposition
As explained above, in the early 1950s the party took a new interest in the intellectual 
and student opposition in Spain. The latter would soon develop into a movement that 
for many years would be seen by the PCE as essential for their struggle.
It was initiated in 1954 when several events of a progressive character, such 
as the Legal Poetry Encounters and the Congress of Young Writers, were organised 
at the University of Madrid. These activities were possible thanks to the cultural 
opening promoted by the new Minister of Education, Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, and the 
Rector of the University of Madrid, Pedro Lain Entralgo, both disillusioned 
Falangists who were also close to the poet Dionisio Ridruejo.49 In fact, the approach 
taken by these men echoed the cultural awakening of a generation that had not fought 
in the Civil War, and therefore did not feel closely connected to the regime. Its
49 For more information about the role of Ruiz Gimenez in the Ministry of Education see Pablo 
Lizcano, La generation del 56, pp. 79-80.
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members expressed their protest against repressive Francoist society through the arts.
Intellectual reviews such as Indice, tnsula and Aldebaran, novels such as El Jarama,
the so-called Cine-Clubs and the social poetry of writers such as Bias de Otero,
Gabriel Celaya or Eugenio de Nora, were all manifestations of a political drive that
aimed at the awakening and mobilising of the people against the regime. As in the
novel El Jarama, the mere reflection of reality was used by this generation to expose
a negative image of Franco’s Spain, its inequalities and the political apathy that had
taken over the people.50 In the view of Josep Maria Castellet, one of the most
influential literary critics of this period:
The writers of the generation of the “mid century” constituted, to a certain extent, a 
special case. Astounded observers, passive victims of the war, they grew up at the 
end of the latter, in a cultural dessert... and were trained under the principles of the 
“new order”. Nevertheless, and maybe due to different motivations, they soon 
rebelled against the principles under which they had been educated. This rebellion 
found different expressions and can be seen already in the first works of these 
authors. ... They not only felt linked to each other by a common political activity of 
resistance but also they subscribed to a certain aesthetic creed, that of realism.51
Enrique Mugica, a Basque bom in 1932, was one of the main promoters of
opposition activity at the University of Madrid. Jorge Semprun would in later years
describe Mugica in the following manner:
Active, imaginative, full of projects. During those early years, his contribution to the 
activities of the Party in the university was decisive. Without him, the Poetry
50 Rafael Sanchez Ferlosio, El jarama (Ediciones Destino, Barcelona, 1955). El Jarama was very well 
received when it was published and won the Nadal Prize in 1955 and the Critica Prize in 1956. It was 
also very innovative, specially its tape-recorder style dialogue. The book recounted the story of a 
group of friends who went for a picnic in El Jarama (where one of the bloodiest battles of the Spanish 
Civil War took place). “His work exposes the vacuity, the tedium of life in post-Civil War Spain, the 
political anomie of the period”, Fusi and Carr, Spain, p. 115. Juan Goytisolo, one of Spain’s best 
known contemporary novelist, would say about it in later years: "El Jarama represented the apotheosis 
of Spanish neo-realism, which explains why those works that followed seemed redundant, branches 
that don’t add anything to the trunk. ... El Jarama puts a brilliant end to a whole cycle of our novel, 
excluding, because of its own perfection, the possibility of descent”, Juan Goytisolo, Disidencias 
(Barcelona: Seix-Barral, 1977), pp. 163, 165.
51 Josep Maria Castellet, Literatura, ideologia y  politica (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1976), p. 
137. For more information on the literary movement of the 1950s see Fernando Moran, La novela 
realista en la Espana de los afios 50 (Madrid: Tauros Ediciones, 1971); Jose Maria Martinez Cachero, 
Historia de la novela espanola entre 1936y  1975 (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1972) pp. 151-223.
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Encounters in the university, the Congress of Young Writers and the University
Manifesto of February 1956 would not have been possible.52
Mugica is in fact a very good example of the members of this generation that 
would eventually join or become fellow travellers of the PCE. As was the case with 
many of them, he became acquainted with the Communist movement by first being 
active in the cultural world. In 1949, he entered the Circulo Cultural Guipuzcano. 
“It was there that I heard for the first time Marxist terminology, concepts such as 
class struggle and the seemingly eternal discussions between Socialists and 
Communists.”54 Then, in 1952, he travelled to Paris with his grandfather and his 
brother Fernando. He saw his first Soviet films in the French capital and visited a few 
bookshops where he was able to buy Soviet books as well as poetry by Antonio 
Machado and Pablo Neruda. “I discovered a free country and an atmosphere where 
left wing ideas were manifested with strength, which signified a new stage in my 
salutary and surprising progress towards Communism.”55 Indeed, Paris became a 
reference point for many intellectuals, not only because of its value as an example of 
political freedom and cultural openness, but also because there, they would often 
meet the exiled leaders of the PCE. At the end of that year, Mugica became 
acquainted with the Communist poet Gabriel Celaya who would serve as his first 
contact with the PCE. Celaya introduced him to several people related to the 
underground Communist movement, amongst others the cinematographer Eduardo
52 Sempnin, Autobiografia, p. 59.
53 The Circulo Cultural Guipuzcano was the successor of the Ateneo, which had been closed down 
after the end of the Civil War.
54 Enrique Mugica, Itinerario hacia la libertad (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes Editores, 1986), pp. 23-24.
55 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 26.
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Ducay who had recently joined the party.56 These encounters gave Mugica something
the cultural circles he had been relating to did not:
My early encounters with the Communists seemed to offer me ample possibilities of 
action to influence reality. It was not just about having a sense of history acquired 
from prior knowledge, but being able to express it through determination and social 
change, taking us to an active leadership from a convincing ideology, and this was 
something that the rest were not proposing.57
In October 1953, Mugica moved to Madrid to complete the fourth year of his
law degree. At university, he would soon meet fellow students Javier Pradera and
Ramon Tamames, who would also become important members of the PCE’s
intellectual and student organisations in Spain. Soon afterwards, in January 1954, an
event took place that gave expression to the discontent and potential revolutionary
value of the students.58 Lain Entralgo himself would later describe 1954 as the year
that marked the beginning of the political disorders in Spanish universities.59 It began
when the Falangist student union, SEU, organised a demonstration against the
presence in Gibraltar of the Queen of England.60 Once the protesters were in front of
the British Embassy, things got out of hand and the police suddenly charged against
them under orders from the Minister of the Interior to dissolve the demonstration.
Jose Luis Abelian, a writer and student who was very active in the democratic
opposition inside the university during these years, writes:
A demonstration that had been ‘officially’ called by a Falangist organisation was at 
the same time being ‘officially’ repressed by the members of the Mounted Corps of
56 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
57 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 27.
58 In general, there are a lot of contradictions on the dates and order of events of this period at the 
University of Madrid. Whenever this happens, I always choose the most likely version of events, 
whether it is confirmed by a second source or whether it is the only one that fits in the chronology of 
the period. As many of the sources are, or rely on, memoirs, it is only normal that sometimes the dates 
or events are confused and even changed over.
59 Pedro Lain Entralgo, El problema de la universidad (Madrid: Cuademos para el Di&logo, 1968), p. 
30.
60 Fernando Sanchez Drago, Una vida magica (Madrid: Anjana Ediciones, 1985), p. 41.
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the Armed Police. It would be difficult to forget for those who lived through the 
events, the mixture of surprise, irritation and rage that we felt as a result.61
The following day the press acted as though nothing had happened, which
irritated the students who had attended the demonstration.62 Ram6n Tamames with
other left wing students organised a small meeting during which it was decided that a
new demonstration in front of the Direction General de Seguridad should be called
under the slogan of freedom of the press.63 They also published a manifesto
complaining about the manipulation they had been victims of. “We have been
betrayed!” they claimed.64 In the view of Mugica:
That, which had started as a pro-SEU demonstration against Great Britain, therefore 
with Falangist antecedents, became a demonstration of students that had directly 
experienced police repression, a police force that was describing them as hooligans. 
This was the first awakening, albeit indirect, of the University of Madrid.65
The demonstration was a success and around 10,000 students gathered at the 
Direction General de Seguridad. The students called for freedom of the press and 
burned newspapers.66 Once the demonstration dissolved, a small group took over the 
radio station Madrid in an attempt to broadcast a proclamation. The police, which 
until that point had not intervened, now moved to evict the students. Later that 
afternoon, new clashes took place around the University as the police tried to 
apprehend the students that were in the street.67 As a result, those who were already
61 Jose Luis Abelian, Ortega y  Gasset y  los origenes de la transition democratica (Madrid: Espasa, 
2000), p. 245.
62 Julio Fernandez, Enrique Mugica (Madrid: Grupo Libro 88, 1991), p. 47.
63 Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 171; Mugica, Itinerario, p. 32; Lizcano, 56, p. 
97.
64 Manifesto of the Madrilean students denouncing the manipulation they had been object to during the 
demonstration in front of the British Embassy, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, Microfilm 
62).
65 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
66 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
67 Lizcano, 56, pp. 97-98.
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in the University building locked themselves inside, throwing anything they could 
find at the authorities that were besieging them.
At this point, a group of students went to talk to Pedro Lain Entralgo, the 
Rector of the University, to complain about the police attack and informed him about 
a student who had been shot in the leg. Lain went to see the injured boy and also took 
the chief of the SEU, Jorge Jordana, who was inside the building, to a safe place.68 
He then went out with his hands in the air, to work as a mediator. According to 
Lain’s recollection, he managed to prevent the students’ arrest on the condition that 
they would immediately evacuate the building. “In the evening, I managed to get 
those besieged back to their houses. But they had to come out with me in groups of 
40 or 50. Not a single arrest took place.”69 The following day, Lain felt obliged to 
lecture the students on the wrongfulness of their behaviour. “The prestige of Lain as a 
liberal man almost collapsed,” writes Mugica. “The most important thing, however, 
was to emphasize what Lain really was and not the image he was giving at that 
point.”70 Lain would prove his liberal inclinations in the following years.
At any rate, this incident brought into the open the students’ disagreement 
with the imposition of an official student union, which did not answer their demands 
for a more open and free atmosphere at the University. According to Pablo Lizcano, 
author of La Generation del 56, the SEU “had been damaged beyond repair”.71 In 
1955, Lain wrote a report called, On the spiritual situation o f  Spanish youth, in an 
attempt to make Franco aware of the relevance of the student problem.72 As Paul
68 Pedro Lain Entralgo, Descargo de conciencia, 1930-1960 (Barral Editores, Barcelona, 1976), p. 
404.
69 Lain, Descargo, p. 405.
70 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 34.
71 Lizcano, 56, p. 98.
72 Lain argued that the mood of the students was a reflection of the popular mood that only dared be 
expressed in private. He thought that more freedom was needed. Otherwise, the dissatisfaction of the
I l l
Preston writes, Lam’s report “was a plea for the windows of the regime to be opened 
before Marxism began to grow in its fetid atmosphere”. Franco, nevertheless, 
answered the problem with a speech that oozed contempt for Ortega and the liberal 
intelligentsia, calling “upon the loyal intelligentsia to combat subversion”. This was a 
disappointment for many of his supporters, Preston writes, and “found echo only in 
the most reactionary sections of the Falange”.73
In contrast, the leaders of the PCE in Paris, the so-called young guard who would 
soon reach the highest position in the party, was already starting to appreciate the 
development of a student opposition.74 Once informed about the university riots of 
January 1954, they concluded that what the students were implicitly demanding was 
a change of regime; “their fight is essentially political, and they are spontaneously 
fighting it on the same positions as our party”. Semprun was strongly encouraged to 
continue with the good work: “We are now convinced that in our work we have to 
give special attention to the students. ... Carry on!”.75 Moreover, it was argued that 
this opposition movement would not develop to its full potential unless it had some 
leadership, and this had to come from the Communists.76 Hence, the time had arrived 
for the PCE to have the first official contact with Mugica, which was arranged by his 
friend and party member, Eduardo Ducay.77 In great secrecy, Ducay took Mugica to
students could eventually develop towards dissidence, Lain, Descargo, pp. 414-416; Mesa, Jaraneros, 
pp. 45-53; Farga, Universidad, p. 47.
Preston, Franco, pp. 646-647.
74 Letters written by an activists using the name of “Celso” to the exiled leadership about the student 
demonstrations, 28 January 1954, AHPCE (ORGANIZACI6N UNIVERSITARIA DEL PCE EN 
MADRID, Informes, Caja 123, Carp. 2.1.2).
75 Letter from the Political Bureau to Semprun, February 1954, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA 
CULTURA, Microfilm 79).
76 Report on the discussion between the party leadership about a Congress of the Falange, 24 February 
1954, AHPCE (ACTIVISTAS, Caja 92, Carp. 67).
77 By this time, Eduardo Ducay was being considered by the party as a good candidate to direct the 
work of the party among intellectuals. Semprun writes about him: “Regardless of his age (26 years
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7ftmeet “someone” in a Cafe at the Plaza de Manuel Becerra in Madrid. Waiting for 
him was Jorge Semprun, who went by the alias Federico Sanchez. The two would 
work closely for the next few years. As mentioned above, Mugica had already met 
the young Communist leader a year earlier at Celaya’s house in San Sebastian, when 
Semprun was visiting Spain on his first clandestine mission with the PCE.79 Now, 
Semprun revealed to Mugica his true identity as a party delegate. They then engaged 
in a conversation about the latest events that would be the onset of the party’s 
involvement in the students’ opposition activities at the University. According to 
Mugica:
I gave him a short explanation of what was happening, the development of events 
and how the meaning of the demonstration had changed. He interrogated me about 
the possibilities of creating a broad organisation of opposition against the Falange 
and I replied that those possibilities existed and that until then I had been alone, 
since there was no Communist organisation in the University, but just a few 
dispersed students with rebellious ideas.80
The interview marked Mugica’s enrolment in the party as a full member and
his appointment as the person in charge of the party’s activity in the Law Faculty. For
some time afterwards, Mugica and Semprun held bi-weekly meetings in order to
discuss events and the party’s approach in many different areas.81 Semprun,
nevertheless, believed that Mugica underestimated the revolutionary nature of the
recent student riots. In a report to the leadership, he wrote about their encounters:
It was possible to convince him (Mugica) that no matter how much spontaneity 
characterized the students’ actions, the students were more radicalised than he
old), Ducay is a man of certain experience in different areas of intellectual work and could pay a great 
service to the party. Moreover, he has the great advantage of being completely unknown to the 
repressive apparatus. Due to his social and family origins and his age, he is a person without any kind 
of police dossier or suspicious antecedents”. Report on the different aspects of the work with the 
intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 1954, AHPCE.
78 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
79 Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 
1954, AHPCE.
80 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 33.
81 Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 
1954, AHPCE.
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thought, that it was necessary to make a considerable effort to find these students or 
group of students.82
Already in this and other reports written at the time by the party delegates 
coming from France, differences in the perception of the reality of the situation in 
Spain between those inside the country and those in exile becomes clear. For 
instance, when talking about the anti-American policy, Semprun criticised Mugica’s 
argument that the installation of American bases was unavoidable, a conclusion that 
for someone living in Spain seemed rather obvious. Another party delegate also 
mentioned Mugica’s underestimation of the forces of the masses, but he added: 
“Semprun has told me that they have argued about this quite a lot and that he is 
beginning to correct his point of view”.83 This different appraisal of the conditions 
for a struggle against Franco would eventually lead to the disenchantment with the 
party of many intellectuals and students who felt the leadership in exile was applying 
the wrong policies to fight the regime. As we shall see, even Semprun as well as 
another party leader, Fernando Claudin, would in later years object to the party’s 
evaluation of the situation in Spain, something that would eventually lead to the 
crisis of 1964.
Soon after the student riots of January 1954 and the first meetings with the party, 
Mugica organised the legal Poetry Encounters at the University, which were 
sponsored by the SEU’s Aula de C ultura l By this time, he had become part of the
82 Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 
1954, AHPCE.
83 Report by Carlos Semprun Maura, April 1954, AHPCE (ORGANIZACI6N UNIVERSITARIA 
DEL PCE, Comite Universitario Estatal, Informes, Caja 123, Carp. 1.1).
84 The name Poetry Encounters is not the one used by Mugica in his memoirs, he uses the name 
Encounters between Poetry and University. Nevertheless, I will use the name Poetry Encounters 
because it is better known and the one used by most of the Encounters’ protagonists. As for Aula de 
Cultura, it had been founded by the Seccion Femenina of the SEU to give access to all students to
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Cultural Activities Committee of the student union, which gave him good cover for 
his other role as a “Communist agitator”. According to Semprun:
Mugica was the brains and the animator; his activism was immense. The Poetry 
Encounters in the University and everything that comes after that was done in 
contact with the party but not everything is the result of the party’s initiative or 
suggestion. The Encounters were Mugica’s initiative.85
For this event, Mugica had also managed to obtain the support of the ex- 
Falangist poet Dionisio Ridruejo.86 The Encounters were held in the spring of 1954 
and basically consisted of a series of lectures by known poets, after which a debate 
took place between the poet and the students. A number of the poets that were 
present, or whose poems were recited by others, belonged to the left or to the 
opposition to Franco, such as Eugenio de Nora, who had actually been contacted by 
Jorge Semprun himself to attend the Encounters.87 The latter’s brother, Carlos 
Semprun Maura, who at this point had been sent into Spain as an instructor of the 
PCE’s Central Committee, was present during De Nora’s recital. “My brother/boss 
ordered me to go to the conference as a thermometer, that is, to measure the pulse of 
the masses”, he writes in his memoirs.88 Semprun Maura soon became the secretary 
of the Committee of Communist Students in Madrid.89
seminars in different fields such as Theology, Philosophy, Physics, Biology and Anthropology. The 
seminars, held by the Aula most often in the old Law Faculty in San Bernardo, would usually have an 
attendance of no less than 200 students.
85 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
86 Dionisio Ridruejo was a poet who had entered the Falange in 1933. He became the chief of 
Propaganda in 1938 and held the post until 1940. That year, he founded the theoretical journal 
Escorial with Pedro Lain Entralgo. In 1941, Ridruejo joined as a volunteer the Spanish Division Azul 
that fought with the Nazis in the Soviet Union. On his return, he moved away from the regime, and 
eventually left and resigned from the posts he held in the Falange. Consequently, Ridruejo was 
ostracised by the regime and had difficulties obtaining work. He eventually left for Rome to work as a 
correspondent for the newspaper Arriba. Ridruejo continued his political evolution towards more 
liberal positions and became involved with the student opposition in the mid 1950s.
87 Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 
1954, AHPCE. Gabriel Celaya was also contacted by Semprun but was unable to attend the 
Encounters.
88 Carlos Semprun Maura, El exilio fue una fiesta (Editorial Planeta, Barcelona, 1999), pp. 66-67.
89 Carlos Semprun Maura would leave his work as a party delegate in Spain at the beginning of 1957. 
In July of that year, he would leave the PCE altogether. Subsequently, he would join other political
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The scheduled programme of the Encounters was followed by spontaneous
student gatherings to discuss what had taken place at the session. Among those who
attended the Aula de Cultura in the spring of 1954 were Julio Diamante, Jesus Lopez
Pacheco, Jaime Maestro, Julidn Marcos, Jose L6pez Moreno, Javier Muguerza,
Fernando Sanchez Drag6 and Ignacio Sotelo. The peak of the Encounters came when
the poet Leopoldo Panero read his Canto Personal, which was a critique of Pablo
Neruda’s Canto General. Outraged, the students made a strident protest.90 In a report
to the authorities written after the events of February 1956, which will be looked at
below, Ridruejo described the session in the following manner:
The day on which the poet Panero had to talk, it was clear that between a poet that 
had been honoured by the regime and a poet against the regime, a great number of 
youngsters preferred the second one just because of that. However, I could see that 
the majority of those who preferred the second one had read neither the Canto 
General nor the Canto Personal.9I
Ridruejo still thought that the debates that took place during the Encounters 
had been “lively and interesting, but each a little more polemical than the one 
before”. Moreover, he added, it was possible to discern “the beginning of the 
circulation of certain confused ideas that are usually described as dangerous and 
extremist... The inclination towards all that is prohibited and proscribed, all that is 
officially condemned, was the dominant note in this aspect.”92 Nevertheless, he never 
suspected the Communist affiliation of Mugica, or others participating in the 
Encounters. In the above-mentioned report, he included a passionate defence of these 
students denying any possible relationship between them and the PCE. Regarding 
Mugica, Ridruejo wrote, “he is not a Communist nor does he sympathise with any
parties, such as the FLP in 1962. For more information see his memoirs, Semprun Maura, El exilio.
Abelian, Ortega, p. 246.
91 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, written to the members of the 
Junta Politico of the FET that were to pass judgement on the situation, AHPCE (FRENTE
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Communist theses, nor has he seen in his life, any more than the rest of them, a
Communist in the flesh.”93 Little did he know that not only was Mugica a
Communist himself but he had been using the Encounters as a recruiting ground for
the PCE. In fact, since the event attracted the most politically conscious students at
the University, it was a good opportunity for Communist students to single out those
who had the potential to join them. In the view of Mugica:
At that time, social poetry was itself a way of doing politics, a type of political 
activism, a political action that was not clandestine but that could be manifested 
through social poetry. At the Encounters, we could see who was in favour of social 
poetry, and those who are closest to us we could bring in the organisation of the 
party at University.94
Indeed, during the organisation of the Encounters, Mugica met Julian Marcos, 
from the Law Faculty, and Jesus Lopez Pacheco, from the Humanities Faculty, who 
knew each other and apparently considered themselves to be Communists. Soon 
enough, Mugica received Semprun’s approval to ask both students to join him in 
leading the Communist organisation at the University of Madrid. There followed 
meetings between Marcos, Pacheco, Mugica and Semprun to discuss the PCE’s legal 
and non-legal possibilities of action. The fight against the SEU and the creation of a 
strong organisation in the University were established as their most important goals. 
They were also in charge of distributing the party’s propaganda in the university.95 
“Organise, organise, organise,” Semprun told them.96 At one point, he talked about 
the possibility of sending Mugica, Lopez Pacheco and Marcos to Paris in order to
UNIVERSITARIO ESPAftOL, Caja 125, Carp. 4).
92 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, AHPCE.
93 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, AHPCE.
94 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
95 Report by Carlos Semprun Maura, April 1954, AHPCE.
96 Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 
1954, AHPCE.
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receive political and ideological education from the party leadership.97 Indeed, at the 
end of that year in the French capital, Enrique Mugica would meet Santiago Carrillo 
for the first time.98 The future General Secretary was pleased with the PCE’s new 
acquisition: “He was a Basque of good appetite, with a lot of vitality, very 
enthusiastic, very imaginative... at that time Enrique Mugica played a very 
interesting role. He was one of the first”.99
Javier Pradera, who met Semprun through Julio Diamante, also became 
involved with the party during this period.100 Pradera’s position, nevertheless, was 
special. As Carlos Semprun would later describe, his link to the party was “individual 
and because of this, he did not have to go to cell meetings, and he only had to 
account for his activity to the party hierarchy, almost always that would be Federico 
Sanchez, or in his absence, me”.101 Pradera himself defines his role as Semprun’s
107“kind of personal assistant”. In the view of Semprun, Pradera’s special situation
was mainly a result of the party’s attempt to protect such a significant member:
The day that I met him we talked until four in the morning, I realised he was an 
extremely brilliant man and a fantastic signing for the party. But since he was a 
Pradera (the grandchild of a very important pro-Francoist journalist) and he had just 
passed the examinations for the judicial Air Corps, becoming a Second Lieutenant, I 
did not want him to fall in any small police raid. A person like Pradera had access 
and could talk to many different people. It was appropriate for him to have a direct 
relation with the party. He did not always join those activities that could most easily 
be hit by the police. This was also the case of Ram6n Tamames (who worked with 
Pradera and Mugica from early on but would not join the party until 1956).103
97 Ibr more information see report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by 
Jorje Sempnin, April 1954, AHPCE.
98 Iiterview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
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100 Julio Diamante belonged to one of the first Committees of Intellectuals of the PCE. He was 
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In the late 1950s, Pradera would become the person in charge of the party’s 
relations with other political forces that appeared at the time in the Spanish 
underground scene.104
It is clear from the reports written after January 1954 that the Communist leadership 
in Paris was very excited about the new opposition movement flourishing in the 
student and intellectual sectors. In the view of Santiago Carrillo, “this opposition was 
the only thing we could hold onto at the time, the only link that would allow us to 
connect with the new things that were appearing in the country”.105 Moreover, as 
Semprun explains, the policy of the Anti-Francoist National Front (the National 
Reconciliation policy would not be established until 1956) meant that the party had 
to disseminate its ideas among a wider sector of society. “Even though our policy 
was very sectarian regarding the party’s internal structure and procedures, there was 
little sectarianism when it came to propaganda and the diffusion of ideas. Therefore, 
we had to reach out”.106
3. The Congress of Young Writers
The next stage for the young Communist organisation at the University in Madrid 
was to organise the Congress of Young Writers, a project on which they worked for 
more than a year. With this activity, Communist students were attempting to build on 
what had been achieved with the Poetry Encounters. Although the Encounters had a 
progressive character, they were, after all, organised within the parameters of the
104 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
105 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001.
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SEU and had taken place at the SEU’s Aula de Cultura. The organisers of the 
Congress, on the other hand, felt confident that on this occasion the event could be 
carried out independently of the official student trade union. They also hoped that the 
scope of the Congress would enable them to reach more students than had been 
possible through the Encounters. However, their intentions, while subtle, were to say 
the least suspicious for the zealous guardians of order at the university. As a result, 
the organisers went through a great deal of tense negotiations with the SEU’s leaders 
that concluded with the Congress being cancelled. Nevertheless, the events 
surrounding its preparation would serve to strengthen and make more apparent the 
student’s resistance to remaining under the control of the official trade union.107
It is not at all clear where exactly the idea of the Congress came from. In the view of
Ridruejo, it was he who incited the students to go ahead with such a project. “It (the
idea of the Congress) did not come from a specific order coming from a mysterious
place,” Ridruejo wrote referring to the regime’s accusation of a Communist
conspiracy behind the organisation of the Congress.
It might not be convenient for me to confess it but it is the truth. They formalized 
their project and drew it up according to the line that I had suggested, with no 
intention of using it as political propaganda or action outside the university.108
On the other hand, Moran maintains that the idea was bom at Semprun’s 
house in Paris during the first meeting between Mugica and Santiago Carrillo in 
December 1954, but this cannot be the case as the preparation for the Congress had
106 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
107 “Los universitarios espafioles en la lucha contra la dictadura franquista y por la amnistia”, June 
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already been started by the spring of that year.109 It is likely, then, that the meeting 
Mor&n is referring to was used to confirm the details surrounding the organisation of 
the event.
The most plausible explanation is the one given by Mugica, who places the
idea for the Congress right after the celebration of the Encounters during a meeting
between Lopez Pacheco and Semprun in a field next to the University of Madrid.110
As explained above, they used these occasions to discuss the latest events, their
implications and the opportunities for further action. On this occasion, L6pez
Pacheco suggested the possibility of organising a Congress of Writers.111 There and
then, they began to develop the details of the new project. Initially, the Congress was
supposed to take place as part of the SEU’s cultural activities. “Given the chaotic
situation of the SEU it would be easy to have Mugica, Pacheco and Marcos in the
Secretariat of the Congress,” Semprun wrote in a report to the leadership in exile.112
Later, as has already been mentioned, they abandoned this idea for a more daring one.
As Mugica explains:
It (the Congress) had to break somehow the monopoly of the SEU. .. .We considered 
that it was very important to break it because that would have a very attractive 
connotation for many students who rejected the imposed organisation and refused to 
participate in its activities.113
The following stage in the organisation of the Congress was to obtain the 
support for the project of the Rector of the University, Pedro Lain Entralgo.114 
According to Lain, “a group of students wanted to organise in Madrid a Congress of
109 Mor&n, Miseria, p. 281; Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
110 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 37.
111 There are other accounts that point to L6pez Pacheco as the person behind the idea of the Congress, 
Abelldn, Ortega, p. 246; J&uregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 191. Jauregui and Vega 
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1954, AHPCE.
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Young Writers and they asked for my help: Dionisio Ridruejo had already talked to 
me in positive terms about these students.”115 Lain agreed to help them, allocating 
15,000 pesetas from the cultural funds of the Rector’s office to the project.116 In his 
memoirs, he places this meeting sometime before December 1955. However, this is 
probably a lapse of memory since it is clear that, during the 1954-1955 academic 
year, the organisation of the Congress was at full speed and had had from its 
beginning the support of Lain. Furthermore, the Congress had already been cancelled 
by the time Lain places the students’ decision to organise it. The students must have 
talked to Lain about their project sometime during the spring of 1954 since their first 
intention was to hold the Congress in May of that year, an unrealistic deadline due to 
the amount of work necessary to carry out a project of that size.117 In addition, there 
are a series of letters between Lain, Mugica and the chief of the SEU, Jorge Jordana, 
regarding the Congress that date from June-July 1954.118 In one of them, Jordana 
specifically mentions Lain’s support of the Congress and complains about the SEU 
not having been informed about the matter.119 Nevertheless, Lain told the students 
that his support ultimately depended on their understanding with the SEU, since the 
latter was the only official student organisation in the University. For the Rector, 
however, it was more a matter of formality than anything else. Lain, just as Ridruejo 
and the students, agreed that it was best to keep the Congress as independent from 
the SEU as possible. In a letter to Mugica, Ridruejo wrote:
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Pedro Lain tells me that the SEU has vehemently claimed its right to intervene 
formally. I think he has managed to convince them that nobody ever thought about 
ignoring them or leaving them aside, but also that it was convenient not to affiliate 
the Congress to any political discipline. His intention is to defend your argument 
about not having the SEU as the head of this action even if it is and must be part of 
it, a thing that, on the other hand, will be unavoidable inside the university.120
The national character of the Congress also meant that Mugica needed to
contact the Minister of National Education, Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, and the General
Director of Education, Joaquin Perez Villanueva. Mugica met with Perez Villanueva,
who gave the Congress his approval, but he too insisted that the SEU’s support for
the project was essential.121 Inside the SEU, Mugica was on good terms with Gabriel
Elorriaga, who welcomed the idea of the Congress. He saw as plausible a joint
organising committee made up of those members selected by the Rector’s office and
those selected by the SEU.122 Some time afterwards, Elorriaga and a few other
Seuists became part of the organising committee of the Congress, along with Mugica
and those students selected by the latter with the approval of Lain.123 Elorriaga
belonged to the left wing sectors inside the Falange and was rather cynical about the
attitude of some of the leaders of the SEU towards the Congress. That summer, in a
letter to Mugica, he wrote:
I read in ABC a few days ago a note on the Congress of Young Writers. It is being 
talked about in the upper circles of the SEU. Moreover, I had consecutive 
conversations with Jaime Ferran and Jorge Jordana himself, with “naive” 
interventions by Marcelo Arroita. Oh well, you have probably heard about the 
reaction of the chief through D. Pedro Lain (he reacted in a logical and reasonable 
manner, more intelligent than that of his subordinates). We will talk when we see 
each other, hopefully soon, about the already well-known Congress.124
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The Congress had become known after Mugica, encouraged by the PCE, had 
written and printed a leaflet about it.125 Copies were then handed out at the university 
and among those outside the university realm that would be interested in such an 
event. The organisers significantly printed the leaflet containing only the University’s 
shield, and not the mandatory SEU shield.126 According to Mugica, “for the first 
time, and due to the fact that it was not accompanied by the Falangist symbol, an 
important university activity was undertaken by self-aware students in a way that 
foreshadowed a break with the system”.127
Initially, the organisers of the Congress worked from the premises of the 
Pabellon de Gobierno of the University of Madrid, which had been assigned to them 
by Lain. They also began to write an intellectual review for the Congress called 
Boletin Informativo, which managed to publish three numbers during 1955 before it 
was banned.128 Boletin Informativo covered a wide range of issues on events of a 
progressive character such as the Cinema Conversations in Salamanca organised by 
Juan Antonio Bardem, a review of Bardem’s film Death o f  a Cyclist (1955), and an 
illustration of Don Quixote by Pablo Picasso, a known Communist.129 By May 1955, 
and due to the conspicuous political nature of Boletin Informativo, Mugica and the 
other organisers of the Congress were asked to move from the Pabellon to an office 
outside the university, a measure aimed at isolating them from the students. Even
125 Report on the work and situation of the students, summer 1954, AHPCE.
126 Announcement on the Congress of Young Writers, June 1954, AHPCE (CONGRESO DE 
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Ridruejo, who strongly favoured the students, would later say that some of the
« ™
opinions expressed through Boletin Informativo had caused alarm.
Even so, the preparations for the Congress continued to take place in the
recently assigned premises. During this time, the party came into contact with new
students, such as Emilio Sanz Hurtado, Fernando Sanchez Drago and Jose Luis
Abelian, developing with some of them a strong relationship. According to Sanchez
Drago, for two years after July 1955, when Julian Marcos first introduced him to
Jorge Semprun, he held meetings with the party delegates almost every week.131 It
was then that the PCE’s first Committee of University Students was established.132
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that many of those joining the party were
doing so as “anti-Francoists not as Communists”.133 In the view of Pradera,
“politically we had grown up under the dilemma ‘Franco yes, Communism no’ so we
had turned it around and said ‘Franco no, Communism yes’”.134 Mugica explains this
attitude in the following manner:
During the Franco regime, the memory of the Civil War gave a different tone to 
Communism. Many of those who joined the PCE were not Marxists but they 
became involved out of other sensibilities and because they believed that the 
Communist Party was the only party from which to struggle against Francoism.135
Carrillo further corroborates this argument when he says: “the PCE managed 
to be the only anti-Francoist party really in existence and many who did not have 
ideologically a Communist education, but who wanted to fight Franco, joined the 
party.”136
130 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, AHPCE.
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Finally, on 27 May 1955, more than a year after they had come up with the idea in 
the first place, the students conducted a ceremony to present the Congress at the 
Economics and Political Science Faculty. It was presided over by Pedro Lain 
Entralgo, Julio Diamante, Enrique Mugica and the president of the Association of 
Young Spanish Writers and Artists, Enrique Chena.137 The Congress was expected to 
take place the following November. However, that summer, Mugica had a 
conversation in San Sebastian with the chief of the SEU, Jorge Jordana, which 
exposed the inevitable failure of the project. According to Mugica, after explaining to 
Jordana that their only aim was to expose the problems of literary creation and the 
student’s thoughts on the matter, the SEU leader responded: “Sure, I have heard that 
enough times, and maybe an inexperienced observer would buy it. But I know that it 
(the Congress) has other goals and we are not going to allow you to take advantage of 
us.”138 Though it was unlikely that he suspected that the PCE was behind the 
Congress, Jordana was obviously aware that the “problems of literary creation” were 
not the real agenda of the project. When Mugica tried to reply to this, the SEU leader 
cut him off. “You defend your interests and I mine, which are obviously different 
and, therefore, I will prevent the Congress from happening.”139 Nevertheless, the 
threat took some time to materialise and actually, it would not be Jordana who 
carried it out, as we will see further down. In the meantime, nevertheless, the plans 
for the Congress proceeded.
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It is worth mentioning here other cultural projects and fronts for struggle that 
appeared around the same time as the Congress of Young Writers and represented 
similar political concerns. Principally, the foundation of the intellectual review 
Aldebaran, and the Cinema Conversations in Salamanca. In the words of Sanchez 
Drago:
At the same time as the Congress o f Young Writers was being organised, I, as well 
as J. R. Marra-L6pez, Carlos Romero, Manuel Morales and eventually Javier 
Muguerza, founded the intellectual review Aldebaran. It was an intellectual review 
o f poetry that eventually became an intellectual review o f prose in homage to Ortega 
y Gasset the day that he died. Therefore, the Congress o f Young Writers, Aldebaran 
and the Cinema Conversations in Salamanca, became the three legs, the three 
mainstays o f the intellectuals’ effervescence and the students that opposed the 
dictatorship.140
As soon as the founders of Aldebaran had the first issue in their hands, they 
went to the literary circle of the established theoretical journal Revista de Occidente 
to introduce to its members their new creation. In the view of Abelian, “they were 
completely astonished. It was obviously rather unusual that regardless of the dead 
weight of the Franco dictatorship, a generation like ours could have emerged from 
the catacombs of the regime”.141
At the same time, Jorge Semprun was keen to emphasise the work of the party 
in the literary world outside the university. He promoted the relationship of the PCE 
with Communist writers that had first contacted the leadership in the early 1950s. 
However, his efforts in this respect were not particularly successful. Semprun 
reported back to Paris on his failure to get writers such as Gabriel Celaya, Bias de 
Otero or Gabriel de Nora to be as involved as he had hoped in the activities of the 
party. He talked about Gabriel Celaya’s disillusion with the role he could play in the
139 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 43.
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struggle against Franco. “I am a bit tired of being the ‘enfant terrible* of our poetry”, 
Celaya wrote in a letter to Mugica as an explanation for his refusal to attend the 
Poetry Encounters at the University. Semprun also told the leadership that Bias de 
Otero was unavailable because he had entered what he described as a “neurasthenic 
silence”. In addition, De Nora, one of the party’s most important contacts, was living 
abroad and only worked for the party during his short holidays back in Spain. That 
left only the contacts of Mugica with young writers and poets.142
Regarding the Cinema Conversations of Salamanca, they were organised in 
May 1955 by Juan Antonio Bardem and the team of the magazine Objetivo, fellow 
travellers Basilio Martin Patino and Luciano Gonzalez Egido, and the Seuist Cine- 
Club of the city’s university.143 It was then and there that Bardem launched his 
famous attack on Spanish cinema. He defined it as being “politically inefficient, 
socially false, intellectually wretched, aesthetically void and industrially stunted.”144 
In contrast, Bardem, as well as other young directors, such as Luis Garcia Berlanga, 
preferred the neo-Realism of Italian cinema, which could be found as a strong 
influence in his film, Death o f a Cyclist, an international success and a clear critique 
of Francoist society.145 As already mentioned, Ricardo Mufioz Suay, soon joined by 
Juan Antonio Bardem and Eduardo Ducay, helped to increase the party’s influence in 
the Spanish cinema world. It was considered that through the Cine-Clubs, the 
magazine “Objetivo” and the Instituto de Investigaciones y  Experimentos
Marra Lopez and Manuel Morales. For more information see Lizcano, 56, pp. 114-115.
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Cinematograficos, the party could create an important front for agitation amongst 
students and the middle classes.146
As the students continued to prepare the Congress, an event took place that would 
permanently change the course of their plans. The death of Jose Ortega y Gasset on 
18 October 1955 would provoke a series of protests that eventually culminated in the 
banning of the Congress of Young Writers by the SEU authorities and would lead to 
the student riots of February 1956.
C. The turning point: February 1956
1. The death of Ortega y Gasset
Jose Ortega y Gasset, probably the most important Spanish philosopher of the 
twentieth century, returned to Spain 8 August 1945 after a ten year exile that had 
started with the outbreak of the Civil War.147 Before leaving the country, Ortega had 
been actively involved in public debate, often about the so-called idea of Spain. 
However, following his departure on 20 August 1936, the philosopher retired from 
public life and refused to comment upon the war that was tearing the country apart, 
something for which he was later criticised. On his return from exile, Ortega 
continued to keep silent on anything related to politics, expressing neither criticism
146 Report on the different aspects of the work with the intellectuals written by Jorge Semprun, April 
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nor praise about the Franco regime. In 1953, he was implored by Pedro Lain Entralgo
to return to the University, where he had held a chair at the Philosophy and
Humanities Faculty during the Second Republic. Ortega declined. In the view of
Lain, his failure to achieve the return of the old professor back into the Spanish
University system was the “most emotive and pleasant failure” of his years as Rector,
“even if such an affirmation seems a parody”.148 The refusal by Ortega to teach at the
University was taken by Lain as part of Ortega’s silent protest against the regime,
which explained Lain’s “emotive and agreeable” feelings about his “failed
mission”.149 However, as Moran points out in his book about Ortega under Franco,
the philosopher still accepted his salary as a professor until his death; “the regime
was not granting him a voluntary leave of absence, but rather it was simply giving
him a salary to keep him quiet”.150
On 18 October 1955, Ortega died. Regardless of the “silence” he had kept
during the last 10 years of his life, the authorities thought that the philosopher’s death
could still have a dangerous effect among progressive sectors of the intellectual
world. Preventive measures were taken in order to avoid any exaggerated
demonstrations of mourning by his admirers. In fact, as we shall see, these
precautions were not unfounded. When talking about the feelings provoked by
Ortega’s death, Abelian writes:
The fact that only a few steps away from the University rooms, the most eminent 
Spanish thinker of the twentieth century had died, without anyone of us having had 
the slightest opportunity to hear his voice or listen to his teachings, became 
automatically an emphatic and unequivocal accusation against the political regime 
that allowed for these things to happen. The reaction was blunt and violent.151
148 Lain, Descargo, p. 412.
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The Direction General de la Prensa only permitted three articles and one
biographical note about the philosopher to be published in each newspaper, and all of
them had to emphasise Ortega’s mistakes on religious matters. Moreover, in the
biography, the fact that Ortega had received confession before his death had to be
mentioned, a much questioned matter.152153 The day of the funeral, on 19 October
1955, thousands of students gathered at the mortuary house to give their farewell to
the philosopher. As Preston says, “the students knew little about Ortega but he
symbolized critical thought and the free interplay of ideas, things ruthlessly
suppressed under Franco.”154 The fact that the press described Ortega’s death as
Catholic did not help to soothe the anxiety felt by those who thought the regime was
using it to its own advantage. As Abelian explains, “this was an unworthy
manipulation that pretended to distort a life that -according to his own
manifestations- had tried to behave a-Catholically in all of its acts”.155
At this point, the organisers of the Congress of Young Writers handed out at
the university an obituary on Ortega’s death. It had a black border and it did not
include a cross. At the bottom of the page, the following words could be read: “DON
JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET. LIBERAL SPANISH PHILOSOPHER. The University
Congress of Young Writers is saddened by the loss of such a significant Spaniard, at
the time when his contribution was most necessary”.156 In the view of Mugica:
That obituary represented an important step forwards on our symbolic road, and it 
led to a unique anti-establishment demonstration of students to the cemetery,
151 Abell&n, Ortega, p. 214.
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independent from official projects, that culminated in a fervent reading of his most 
exciting texts on freedom.157
Mugica was referring here to the demonstration that took place two days after 
Ortega’s burial, on 21 October 1955. Aware of the students’ discontent regarding the 
official funeral of the philosopher, Mugica’s group decided to capitalise on it and 
organised a tribute to “the teacher they never had” that would express their 
classmates* true and deepest distress.158 These actions, the Communists believed, 
would also serve to express the anti-Francoist feelings in the University of Madrid.159 
Firstly, a meeting was held at the courtyard of the old Law Faculty in San Bernardo. 
There, Julio Diamante and Lopez Pacheco among others, read texts from Ortega’s 
Mision de la Universidad, La Rebelion de las masas and El tema de nuestro 
liempo.160 At this point, the dean of the University, Manuel Torres L6pez, appeared 
in an attempt to keep the event under control, but failed to do so.161 As soon as the 
readings were finished, it was decided to go to the cemetery and place on Ortega’s 
tomb a laurel wreath the students had bought for the occasion. On the wreath, in large 
golden letters, could be read “UNIVERSITY YOUTH, TO THEIR TEACHER”.162 
The procession was headed by a group of female students from the Philosophy and 
Humanities Faculty, where the old philosopher had been a professor during the 
Second Republic.163 In this manner, the students hoped to make clear to the regime
157 Mugica, Itinerario, pp. 43-44.
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their rejection of the ideological manipulation of the philosopher’s death.164 As
Abelian writes in reference to Ortega’s death, “we wanted to give a public testimony
of our attitude, so instead of going directly into the cemetery by the shortest way, we
took a detour through the busiest areas.”165 Once the funeral procession was in front
of the philosopher’s tomb, a manifesto was read. Among other things, it said:
This posthumous tribute to Ortega y Gasset, professor of the Philosophy and 
Humanities Faculty, is a tribute by those who could have been his disciples; those 
who are not and are suffering the void he left after abandoning his chair in 
Metaphysics for well-known reasons. It is the tribute of the university youth, of the 
university students without a university. We who have had to leam many things 
outside the classes, in books that are not textbooks, in languages that are not 
Spanish.
We are disciples without a master. Between Ortega y Gasset and us there is 
an empty space, badly occupied. Everyday we notice something is missing; someone 
is missing. No one tells us what is the purpose of the university. And we are 
convinced that it is worth very little, and that it is necessary to change it a lot. But 
no one tells us how to do it. No one defends us as the basis of the university.
The police were scandalised by the students’ refusal to read a funeral oration 
before the tomb of the philosopher: “One of the ladies present hinted at the 
convenience of praying a paternoster; but one of the organisers, apparently Enrique 
Mugica, said that the event was over, therefore emphasising its secular character”.166 
The authorities concluded that the Spanish Communist Party was behind students 
such as Mugica, Tamames, Pradera, Diamante and Pacheco.167
At this point, Aldebaran printed a special edition that included a report on 
everything that had happened during the student’s tribute to the philosopher. As a
164 Abelian, Ortega, p. 216.
165 Abelian, Ortega, p. 221.
166 Police report on students’ activities in Madrid, 4 December 1955, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 40.
167 Police report on active Communist and Institutionalist groups at the University of Madrid, 10 
November 1955, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 34, 39; Police report on students’ activities in Madrid, 4 
December 1955, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 41.
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result, the intellectual review, already under suspicion, was closed down.168 The
police called one of its editors, Fernando Sanchez Drago, to give testimony:
They asked me if Aldebaran was financed by Moscow. I was left bewildered. Then I 
started laughing. ‘How could it be financed by Moscow?!’ I asked them. ‘Aldebar&n 
means Red Star’ they told me. And it was true, it meant Red Star, something that we 
did not know, we had chosen that name because it was the title of a poem written by 
Unamuno.169
The intellectual reviews Alcala and Laye were also closed down due to a 
special issue on Ortega. And insula and Indice were penalised too for the same 
reason.170 Boletin Informative?, whose team had been responsible for the obituary that 
was handed out at the University right after Ortega’s death, eventually published their 
own special issue dedicated to the philosopher that led it to suffer the same fate as the 
other intellectual reviews.
In the meantime, aware of the significance behind such an act of contempt by the 
students against the regime, the PCE was happy to embrace it in the party’s 
newspaper, Mundo Obrero. The homage to Ortega was seen as a “political act, not an 
act of mourning” that expressed “a national conscience that is rising before the tyrant 
and his fascist tyranny.” After many years of despising the philosopher, the PCE now 
described him as a “liberal man that knew how to pronounce himself worthily in 
favour of the Republic and freedom, and later on he did not give way before
168 Police report on active Communist and Institutionalist groups at the University of Madrid, 10 
November 1955, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 36.
169 Interview with Fernando Sanchez Drag6, September 2000. Drag6 was described by the police as a 
“furious atheist and recalcitrant blasphemer ... He is completely opposed to the word God appearing 
in Aldebaran. Others accused of him of being juvenile and hot-headed but it is unlikely they will break 
with him because they rather like him.” For more information see police report on active Communist 
and Institutionalist groups at the University of Madrid, 10 November 1955, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 36.
170 Mor&n, Ortega, p. 523.
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Francoism”.171 Mundo Obrero added that the inability of the police to stop the 
students’ demonstration was further evidence of the “weakness of the Francoists”.172
Finally, on 18 November, an official tribute took place at the Philosophy and
Humanities Faculty, where Ortega had taught. Professors and different personalities
were present during the act, which unlike the one organised by the students, had the
blessing, albeit reluctant, of the authorities. Nevertheless, it was still feared that the
act could suddenly turn into a protest. Apparently, the Minister of Education, Joaquin
Ruiz Gimenez, followed by telephone the development of the event to make sure that
at all times things were going smoothly.173 Everything went according to plan though
there were those who during their speeches made references on various occasions to
the limitations imposed on Spanish society by the Franco regime, and even placed
themselves outside its boundaries. However, as Abelian explains:
The tribute did not placate the high spirits. An ‘official’ and ‘academic’ act, no 
matter how sincere its intentions were, could not repair what had been a historical 
injustice of great dimensions. After the Christmas break, when the academic year 
restarted, the university atmosphere was heating up. It did not take long for incidents 
to arise, which culminated in very violent confrontations.174
2. The cancellation of the Congress of Young Writers and the 
University Manifesto of 1956
The repression that followed the death of Ortega y Gasset against certain progressive 
publications, including Boletin Informative*, and those who had participated in the 
students’ homage to the philosopher, would soon reach the Congress of Young
171 “Ensenanzas que se imponen”, Mundo Obrero, 30 November 1955.
172 “Una gran manifestacidn estudiantil antifranquista en Madrid”, Mundo Obrero, 15 November 1955.
173 Lain, Descargo, p. 413.
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Writers. Jorge Jordana had been replaced by Jose Antonio Serrano Montalvo in
September 1955 and though Jordana had from the very beginning opposed the
Congress, Serrano Montalvo had been appointed with only one end in mind: to
cancel the event at any cost. A few weeks before the Congress was meant to take
place, the organisers were no longer allowed to use the premises that had been
assigned to them. Significantly, Mugica was described by the police as the “brains”
behind the Communist organisation in the University.175 Subsequently, the
authorities cancelled the Congress and explained their decision as follows:
Due to the terms on which it was supposed to take place, the Ministry of National 
Education and the SEU banned the Congress of Young Writers because it 
presupposed a general attack on the regime while seeking protection in matters of an 
intellectual character.176
Nevertheless, as Mugica explains, they might have frustrated the eager 
expectations of the Congress’ celebration, but “they could not avoid the role of the 
latter in the awakening of the student sector, which was the Congress’ true 
objective.” Moreover, the Communist organisation at the University was not about to 
let the idea of a Congress slip away so easily. After the Christmas break, on 24 
January 1956, Mugica, Ramon Tamames and Javier Pradera met in a cafe at the Plaza 
de Alonso Martinez where they came up with an even more challenging plan. They 
decided to call a National Congress of Students completely independent from the 
SEU, a Congress that would directly question the legitimacy of the official student 
union. Learning from their previous experience, they resolved that on this occasion 
they would inform the foreign correspondents in Madrid about their intentions, so
174 For more information see Abelian, Ortega, pp. 225-227.
175 Police report on active Communist and Institutionalist groups at the University of Madrid, 10 
November 1955, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 30.
176 Police report on the document (Manifesto) handed over on 1 February in the University of Madrid, 
1 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 68.
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that the attention of the international media could be used as a safeguard in case of 
repression. If the new Congress were to be cancelled, as had happened with the 
Congress of Young Writers, at least news would spread on the important opposition 
student movement developing at the University of Madrid, and on the students’ 
legitimate demand for democratic representation.177
However, contacting the foreign correspondents in Madrid was not an easy 
task at the time. “We knew they existed, but we did not have their names. And this 
simple factor explains how we worked and under what conditions” writes Mugica. 
The Seuist Gabriel Elorriaga would be the individual to provide the addresses and 
names of the journalists. During a dinner in honour of the writer Rafael Sanchez 
Ferlosio for his novel El Jarama, Mugica and Pradera also came into contact with 
Miguel Sanchez Mazas, the editor of the theoretical review, Theoria, and a 
collaborator with the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. They 
described their plans to him and enthused by the idea, he offered them the possibility 
of holding a meeting to get more people involved at the club Tiempo Nuevo, of which 
he was a member.178 It was the coming together of those behind the Congress of 
Young Writers, who were frustrated with its failure, and, more moderate elements, 
who nevertheless wanted to find an alternative to the SEU.
It is interesting to point out that the exiled leadership of the PCE had not been 
informed about this new step taken by the party’s activists inside Spain. Clearly, with 
names such as Mugica, Pradera and Tamames, the National Congress of Students had 
a very important Communist component. Nevertheless, Jorge Semprun would not 
hear about it until the idea of the Congress was made public. While he was telling
177 Mugica, Itinerario, pp. 44,46-47.
178 Mugica, Itinerario, pp. 48-49. The Club Tiempo Nuevo (Alcala 93) belonged to the Ministry of 
Education. For more information on the Club Tiempo Nuevo see Lizcano, 56, p. 127.
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Mugica that the party believed the time had come for the students to embark on more 
daring action, the young Basque replied that on their own initiative they were already 
doing so. Astonished, Semprun then said that Carrillo had to be informed 
immediately because otherwise “he would read it in the press and think that we are 
not involved”.179 At this point, the power struggle in the PCE was about to take 
place. The ‘Parisians’, as we have seen in the previous chapter, would emerge as the 
victors and would continue to emphasize the role of the underground organisations in 
Spain.
On 29 January 1956, the brains behind the idea of a National Congress of Students 
met at the club Tiempo Nuevo. Among those present were Ridruejo, Sanchez Mazas, 
Tamames, Pradera, Mugica and Lopez Pacheco. As the meeting progressed, the idea 
of a manifesto in support of the Congress was developed, and its main outline 
elaborated. However, the manifesto’s aim was not completely clear. On the one hand, 
there were those like Ridruejo who did not want the manifesto to have an obvious 
political posture so that it could be accepted by a wider range of students. On the 
other, there were those like Miguel Sanchez Mazas who preferred the manifesto to 
have a more evident political commitment that would not only address the problems 
of the students at the university but also the situation of the country as a whole.180 
This position would eventually prevail, and the manifesto would criticise different 
aspects of the existing situation in Spain.181 A commission formed by Pradera,
179 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 52.
180 Abelian, Ortega, pp. 249-250.
181 The University Manifesto of 1956, February 1956, AHPCE (RECORTES DE PRENSA, Caja 125, 
Carp. 6). The police reports of this time suggest that Sanchez Mazas, who was the person responsible 
for printing the Manifesto, added at the last minute two more paragraphs “that went beyond the 
projects of the students and invaded in some way the political arena”. Police report on the activity of 
students and its possible leaders, 8 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 92.
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Tamames, L6pez Pacheco, Mugica and S&nchez Mazas, was assigned to write it. 
They met that very night in a bar close to the premises of the club Tiempo Nuevo, 
where they completed the final version of what would be known as “The University 
Manifesto of 1956”.
The document, which was addressed to the Government, the Ministry of 
National Education and the General Secretary of the Movimiento, dedicated a great 
deal of space to complaints about the economic difficulties of the students. However, 
behind this fafade, its main purpose was still obvious: to attack the SEU that was 
denounced as having “an artificial structure that does not allow, and distorts, the 
authentic expression and representation of students.”182 The manifesto went on to call 
for the summoning of a National Congress of Students that would “give a 
representative structure to the corporative organisation of the students”. This 
Congress, it was further demanded, should have representatives from all the different 
centres of higher education who would be freely elected by the students. In this 
manner, the authors of the manifesto were directly questioning the legitimacy of the 
non-democratically elected members of the SEU. As expected, the authorities quickly 
identified this demand as an attempt to create a Free Student Union, something 
strongly opposed by the regime at the time.183
On 31 January 1956, Jesus Lopez Pacheco read the manifesto before more 
than 70 people present at the club Tiempo Nuevo. It was then agreed to submit the 
text for signature by students at the University of Madrid the following day. 
According to Ridruejo, “I told my young friends that it was very likely we would end 
up in jail, which in terms of agitation could be more important than collecting
182 The University Manifesto of 1956, February 1956, AHPCE.
183 Police report, expanding the previous one, on the activities registered on the same date, 1 February 
1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 69.
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signatures or circulating manifestos”.184 At this point, the director of the club, Gaspar 
G6mez de la Serna, interrupted those gathered and asked them to leave the premises 
immediately.185 Nonetheless, that night, foreign correspondents in Madrid received a 
copy of the manifesto and as planned, the following day those involved in the project 
interrupted classes taking place in the university to read it out and ask for students’ 
support.186 According to Mugica, they managed to gather more than three thousand 
signatures in one hour.187 Though this number might be an exaggeration, even the
1XXpolice would say that the action had succeeded “more than had been expected”. In
the view of the historian Pablo Lizcano, the Manifesto and the gathering of signatures
“were, perhaps, the first public defiance of the Franco regime that was undertaken
from inside Spain, backed by an ample confluence of political options and endorsed
in such a massive manner”.189 As the students themselves would write four years
later in a report to the party analysing this period, “the repercussions of the manifesto
was immense; it produced a true commotion among the students”.190
In fact, the police had for some time been wary of the danger in the activities
of the progressive students at the University. Six young agents had been sent
undercover to infiltrate these students and inform on their activities. Among other
things, they would write regarding the organisers of the Congress:
Enrique Mugica Herzog, who has political ideas different to the Falange and the 
regime, has been in contact for a long time with the exiles in France. His father was
184 Dionisio Ridruejo, Casi unas memorias (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1976), p. 335.
185 Police report on the document (Manifesto) handed out on 1 February at the University of Madrid, 1 
February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 67.
186 The international press indeed covered to a great extent the events of February 1956. For more 
information see Gema Martinez de Espronceda Sazatomil, “La crisis universitaria del 56 en la prensa 
europea” in Carreras Ares and Ruiz Camicer, La Universidad.
187 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 51. Abelldn, on the other hand, says it took a few days to arrive to such a 
number, Abelian, Ortega, p. 251.
188 Police Report, 4 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 76.
189 Lizcano, 56, p. 131.
190 “Los universitarios espafloles en la lucha contra la dictadura franquista y por la amnistia”, June 
1960, AHPCE.
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executed by the Nacionales. Miguel Sanchez Mazas, son of the writer Rafael 
Sanchez Mazas, and Jesus L6pez Pacheco have not wasted any opportunity to 
oppose the actions of the SEU and show their repudiation of the actual regime and 
all its institutions.191
Following the publication of the Manifesto, the police interrogated many of 
those involved in recent events, such as Tamames, Garrigues, Gallardon and Sanchez
109Mazas. The authorities were concerned about the influence that these “elements” 
could have on the mass of students who were disappointed with the poor 
performance of the SEU.193 In fact, the Manifesto led the members of the student 
Falangist group Primera Linea to publish on 3 February their own declaration on 
what they saw as the problems and goals of the students, most of which coincided 
with those mentioned in the Manifesto.194 They shared a feeling of disenchantment 
about the SEU and complained about the lack of identification between 
representatives and those represented in the union. In contrast to the progressive 
students, however, these Falangists believed that the solution for the situation could 
still be found in the doctrine of National-Syndicalism.195 Nevertheless, as the police 
predicted, the stand of these sectors proved that those inside the system had become 
bold enough to criticise it and hence, it was feared, they could eventually fall prey to 
more radical political orientations.196 In fact, soon after, the authors of the Manifesto
191 Police report on the document (Manifesto) handed out on 1 February at the University of Madrid, 1 
February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 68,121,144-145.
192 Lizcano, 56, pp. 134-135.
193 Police report, 4 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 77.
194 Primera Linea was formed by a group of very active students who believed to be themselves the 
“real” Falangists. They were supposed to be in charge of running activities of political agitation but 
with the passage of time, they had come into trouble with the Falangist hierarchy whom they accused 
of having departed from the Falange’s original doctrine. Primera Linea was from then onwards 
ostracised in die Falange. For more information see Lizcano, 56, pp. 99-101,109.
195 Declaration by Primera Linea, 3 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 71-73.
196 Police report about the Sindical Chamber celebrated at the Law Faculty on 4 February 1956, Mesa, 
Jaraneros, p. 77.
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and some members of Primera Linea met to exchange views and find a common 
ground from which to solve the problems of the students at the University.
The first meeting took place on the morning of 5 February at the house of 
Juan Sebasti&n Garrigues Walker (by invitation of his son Juan) and the second one 
that same night at the house of the Monarchist Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon, assistant
107professor in the Law Faculty. Though the members of Primera Linea were not 
acting as official representatives of the Falange, their presence still meant that the 
ideas of the Manifesto had reached a wide range of political options in the 
University. The Falangists also confirmed how even at the highest level of the SEU, 
there were those who supported the need for a Congress of Students as called for by 
the Manifesto.198 It was then decided to draw up a document that would establish the 
bases for a new student organisation as well as report on the success of the 
Manifesto.199 Their plan was to distribute it at the university on 8 February. In 
addition, the Falangists agreed to talk to their friends inside the SEU about the ideas 
of the Manifesto in an attempt to gather support.200 It was also decided that the 
Manifesto, with all the signatures of the students, would be taken to a notary and then 
sent to the University’s Rector, Pedro Lain Entralgo.201 However, as we shall see, 
things got out of hand faster than anyone could have predicted, ultimately 
culminating in the student riots that would lead to one of the most important crises of 
the Franco regime.
197 Police report about the students, 7 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 86.
198 Statement at the police headquarters by D. Miguel Sanchez Mazas, 8 February 1956, Mesa, 
Jaraneros, p. 165.
199 Statement at the police headquarters by D. Juan Sebastian Garrigues Walker, 8 February 1956, 
Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 161.
200 Statement at the police headquarters by D. Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon, 8 February 1956, Mesa, 
Jaraneros, 171.
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3. The student riots
Regardless of the meetings between the authors of the Manifesto and the members of 
Primera Linea, and the attempts of the latter to gather support inside the Falange, the 
majority of the SEU’s high command was irritated by the recent activities of the 
progressive sector inside the University. Not surprisingly they ordered their 
supporters to oppose the signing of the Manifesto and “to provoke incidents so that 
the police could intervene and to eliminate from the university the promoters of the 
so-called agitation”.202 To further complicate matters, the Law Faculty planned to 
hold a Syndical Chamber on 4 February.203 More than 700 students attended. The 
SEU representatives were jeered and there were calls for the Chief of the University 
District to resign. On the other hand, there were cheers for those who proposed to 
reform the SEU and who supported free elections. The Dean of the Law Faculty, who 
was presiding over the meeting, agreed that from that point onwards Syndical 
Chambers would be held on a yearly basis and would include the presence of a 
student delegation per class-year elected freely by the students. There followed the 
elections for the representatives of the Second and Third year of the Law Faculty and 
the subsequent defeat of the Seuist candidates. Three days later, the voting for the 
rest of the classes resumed.204
201 Police report about the students, 7 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 87; Statement at the police 
headquarters by D. Juan Sebastian Garrigues Walker, 8 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 162.
202 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, AHPCE.
203 The dates that I use in the following description of the events of February 1956 are based on the 
police reports of this period. Even though one cannot expect a fair description of events from this 
reports, the dates are reliable enough since they were written as things were happening.
204 Police report on the students-Syndical Chamber, 4 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 77-78; 
Public statement of the students of the Law Faculty, 27 February 1956, AHPCE (ESTUDIANTES DE 
LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MADRID, Caja 124, Carp. 44). Again, there is a great deal of 
confusion about the dates of the elections, mainly due to the fact that they were split into two days, 
which has led many authors to believe they took place only on 7 February. However, the police reports 
clearly stated that the elections first took place on 4 February and were supposed to resume on 7 
February. As mentioned above, these reports, written as the events were happening, can be taken as a
However, the development of the latest events had kept the Falangists wary 
and they refused to quietly wait for what they saw as a further blow to the SEU’s 
power. On the morning of 7 February, a meeting took place among the 
representatives of the SEU from all of the different Faculties. It was decided then that 
the elections had to be stopped. As a result, members of the Falangist Frente de 
Juventudes, wearing their traditional blue shirts, went into the university soon after 
and hung up a note ordering the suspension of the elections and claimed that the 
votes that had already been cast were not valid. A large group of anti-Seuist students 
confronted them and started to scream “We Want Elections”. The Falangists 
responded by singing Cara al Sol. This led to confrontations between the two 
factions with some people being injured. The Dean, Manuel Torres Lopez, tried to 
intervene to stop the Falangists, insisting that the elections had to be held. He was 
then “harassed, insulted and shaken” and even threatened with a gun, news of which 
would soon spread and further upset anti-Seuist students.205 The fighting continued 
inside the University and at some point, a student grabbed an arrow from the wooden 
Falangist emblem that was on the wall of the building’s stairs, probably to use it as a 
defensive weapon. Once the fight was over, the chief of the SEU found it on the floor 
and interpreted the act as a symbolic insult to the Falange.206 As the sociologist 
Sergio Vilar points out in his book about the opposition against Franco, “the students 
and the Falangists chiefs considered this action graver than a provocation, almost a 
sacrilege, and they organised themselves to carry out a violent response”.207
reliable source when it comes to establishing the chronology of this period.
205 “El rdgimen de Franco en el banquillo”, Boletln de Informacidn (Unidn de Intelectuales Libres in 
Mexico), 15 August 1956.
206 Police reports on the students at the Central University, 7 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 81- 
88.
207 Vilar, Anti-franquismo, p. 250.
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In the afternoon, the Governing Body of the University held an extraordinary
Session to discuss the recent events. Rather optimistically, their only proposition to
deal with the problem was to appeal to the students’ sense of responsibility and ask
them to avoid future confrontations.208 The police, on the other hand, predicted that
the worst was still to come. It was feared that the agitation was being directed from
abroad by the Communists. As was reported:
The biggest conspiracy against the regime since its birth is being hatched. A 
conspiracy that has the collaboration of all the exiled forces but that is really 
promoted by Communism. A conspiracy in which, though perhaps in an incipient 
way, masons, liberals, monarchists and certain Falangists are collaborating.209
This was an exaggeration. According to Semprun, what happened next 
surpassed everyone’s expectations and was not the result of a planned action. “In 
1956, the PCE was behind the Manifesto and the Congress, everything was prepared, 
but nobody could have imagined the repercussions, nobody could have imagined the 
riots, the shooting... that was unpredictable.”210
On 8 February from 10 am to 11 am, the University was taken over by groups of 
people, who were clearly not students, wearing the Falangist blue shirt and carrying 
truncheons and other weapons.211 They had received orders from the Chiefs of the 
Falange to congregate in the University. Even the Minister of the Interior, Bias Perez 
Gonzalez, had given his approval to the action in a meeting with the latter the
208 Minutes on the extraordinary Session of the Directing Board of the University Complutense of 
Madrid, 7 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 89-90; Lain, Descargo, pp. 418-419.
209 Police report on the students, 7 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 88.
210 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
211 Letter from a student of the Law Faculty, 15 February 1956, AHPCE (ESTUDIANTES DE LA 
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MADRID, Caja 124 Carp. 44); Report by Manuel Torres Lopez on 
the events of February 1956, 8 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 100; Minutes of the Directing 
Board of the University Complutense of Madrid, 8 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, p. 102; Lain, 
Descargo, p. 420.
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previous afternoon.212 The Falangists started their offensive by attacking students and 
destroying University property. They also replaced and then guarded the arrow of the 
Falangist emblem that had been damaged the day before, their excuse for “invading” 
the university. The Dean of the Law Faculty and the Rector of the University asked 
them to leave but both were ignored, and the Falangists continued to harass students 
and some of the professors. Finally, they walked out of the building as they sang 
Cara al Sol, leaving behind a group of outraged students that, in retaliation for the 
Falangists’ attitude, assaulted the premises of the SEU and caused considerable 
damage. As Lain recounts, the Falangists left “feeling very proud about their punitive 
heroic action. And after that, violence for violence, the students assaulted the 
university premises of the SEU, destroying part of the furniture.”213 The violence 
then spread to the streets where there were new demonstrations by both the Falangists 
and the anti-Seuist students, which again resulted in confrontations. Eventually, the 
police was forced to intervene and dissolve the demonstrators with the use of water
214cannon.
That afternoon, the Governing Body of the University held a new 
extraordinary Session during which they expressed their absolute condemnation for 
what they called “the intolerable violence against the University by elements totally 
alien to university life that, organised and directed by their bosses, have entered the 
Law Faculty.” The fact that the Falangists were not students particularly upset the
2,2 Letters to the Minister of Government from the Vice-Secretary of the Movimiento, Jesus L6pez 
Cancio, and the National Chief of the Falange, J. A. Serrano Montalvo, 10 to 22 February 1956, Mesa, 
Jaraneros, pp. 117-119.
213 Lain, Descargo, p. 420.
214 Letter from a student of the Law Faculty, 15 February 1956, AHPCE; Police reports on the 
students, 8 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 89-108.
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University authorities. They also asked for the identification, and subsequent 
resignation, of those who had ordered the violent occupation of the University.215
Finally, on 9 February, the mounting tension of the previous days exploded. The 
sparks flew during a ceremony, scheduled for that morning, in memory of the student 
Matias Montero, a Falangist killed during the Second Republic. As it happened, a 
group of progressive students were having a parallel demonstration against the recent 
actions of the Falangists. The two demonstrations collided between Alberto Aguilera 
and Guzman el Bueno streets, and a fight ensued. In the middle of the riots, a 19- 
year-old Falangist called Miguel Alvarez was shot in the back of the head. Among 
the Seuists the shooting was attributed to one of their own.216 Nevertheless, the 
police reported that the perpetrator had been a student from the progressive sector. 
Sixty people were arrested. Later that day, the University Governing Body suspended 
classes until 13 February in order to express their condolences for the incident.217 
The rage of the Falangists, nevertheless, was not to be placated by any symbolic 
measure. They threatened to seek bloody revenge if Miguel Alvarez did not survive. 
There followed the preparations for what came to be known as “The Night of the 
Long Knifes”. So-called death squads gathered weapons and made lists of the people 
they would “take for a walk”. As Ridruejo explains, “I was told that my modest 
corpse, conveniently bruised, was among those which were supposed to appear the 
following day in the morgue.”218 Many did not sleep at home that night. The Rector 
of the University, Pedro Lain Entralgo, spent the night at the house of the Minister of
215 Minutes on the extraordinary Session of the Directing Board of the University Complutense of 
Madrid, 8 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 101-103; Lain, Descargo, pp. 419-421.
216 Moran, Miseria, p. 282.
2,7 Suspension of classes at the University of Madrid by the University Board, 9 February 1956, Mesa,
Jaraneros, p. 112.
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Education, Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, after being told by different sources it was unsafe
for him to return to his house.219 These individuals as well as the Dean of the Law
Faculty, Torres Lopez, headed the lists of the Falangists.
Fortunately for those on the lists, Miguel Alvarez did not die but the
Falangists remained ready to go into action in case his condition deteriorated.220 The
press in the mean time exacerbated the situation, feeding the rage of the Falangists.
The aggression was blamed on Communist elements and dramatic accounts of events
were published. The newspaper YA, for instance, would say: “The blood of the
injured Falangist was taken by one of his comrades, who soaked his blue shirt in
it”.221 The cancellation of articles 14 and 18 of the Fuero de los Espanoles on 10
February further increased the sensation of panic and chaos.222 Sanchez Drago gives
a graphic description of how the events developed from there:
The Falange was ordered to return to barracks. Ruiz Gimenez, who was my uncle, 
called my mother and told her, ‘The Falange has been ordered to return to barracks. 
There is a list with 40 names, among the first is your son, and they are going to take 
them for a ride if the kid dies’. The list was headed by Lain Entralgo, Torres L6pez, 
Gil Robles, and then us, the juniors. We were all terrified, and I went to Ferrol to 
my uncle’s house. Actually, everyone went to some relative’s house in the 
countryside to wait for the police to come to arrest us, because it was going to be the 
police that saved us from the Falange. So I went to Ferrol and two days later I got a 
phone call from my mother, telling me that the police had come for me and that I 
should go back. We were all put into jail. On that occasion, only Julian Marcos, 
Jaime Maestro, Jose Luis Abelian and myself were prosecuted by the military 
courts, by code 288 of military justice, concerned with ‘those that take arms under 
the orders of a foreign power’ and the sentence could be from twelve years to the 
death penalty. After three days, the Military Court decided that the claim had to be 
submitted to the Ordinary Court. Two months later, one by one we all started to be 
released. It took several years for the trial to take place and we were then 
acquitted.223
2,8 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, AHPCE.
219 Lain, Descargo, p. 422.
220 Miguel Alvarez would spend 18 months in a critical condition before he recovered.
221 “Agresidn contra un grupo de estudiantes”, Diario YA, 10 February 1956, Archivo Agencia EFE 
(AAEFE).
222 “El Gobiemo usara del rigor de la ley contra quienes directa o indirectamente pertuban el orden, la 
paz y la unidad. Se suspende la vigencia de los articulos 14 y 18 del Fuero de los Espanoles, relativos 
a la detention y el confinamiento”, Arriba, 11 February 1956, AAEFE.
223 Interview with Fernando Sanchez Drag6, September 2000. For more information on the 
whereabouts in the years to come of those who were arrested see Lizcano, 56, pp. 152-153.
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The police raids that followed the events of 9 February were directed at
anyone who had had anything to do with the activities of a progressive character
inside the University. The first to be arrested were Gabriel Elorriaga, Enrique
Mugica, Javier Pradera, Dionisio Ridruejo, Jose Maria Ruiz Gallarddn, Miguel
Sanchez Mazas and Ram6n Tamames.224 These names showed that the regime was
not only targeting Communists. Moreover, as Mugica writes in his memoirs, there
was something out of the ordinary about the whole affair:
For the first time in the list of the political arrests, the names were preceded by the 
title Don, and this was significant as until then the victims were usually referred to 
just by their first name, a nickname or a pejorative label.225
Pradera, a Lieutenant in the army, could not be arrested by the regular police 
and was instead detained at the Airport of Getafe having given his word of honour 
not to escape. According to Semprun, “I visited Pradera there, nobody asked you for 
your identity card to have access. I went with his wife and with Sanchez Ferlosio and 
visited him without any problem”.226 Soon Jose Luis Abelian, Jesus Lopez Pacheco, 
Jaime Maestro, Julian Marcos, Fernando S&nchez Drago, and Julio Diamante joined 
the others in Carabanchel jail.227 According to Abelian, this second list of arrests 
reflected the need of the regime to make credible the theory of a Communist
224 Enrique Mugica was arrested in San Sebastian where he was doing military service, and later taken 
to Madrid.
225 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 55. The newspaper Arriba published on 11 February 1956: “La Direccion 
General de Seguridad nos remite la siguiente nota: 'Con ocasion de las alteraciones del orden 
producidas en Madrid, y adem£s de las detenciones ya comunicadas en nota anterior, han ingresado 
como detenidos en esta Direccion General de Seguridad don Miguel Sanchez Mazas Ferlosio, don 
Dionisio Ridruejo Jimenez, don Ramon Tamames Gomez, don Jos6 Maria Ruiz Gallardon, don 
Enrique Mujica Hertzog, don Javier Pradera Cortazar y don Gabriel Elorriaga Fernandez, todos los 
cuadros han quedado a disposition de la autoridad.” Arriba, 11 February 1956, AAEFE.
226 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
227 Police dossier on the actions and declarations of the arrested, 17 February 1956, Mesa, Jaraneros, 
p. 216. There were other people arrested after the shooting, such as Pedro Schwartz Giron, Maria 
Luisa Cutanda Sanchez Cogolludo, Jose Garet Murillo, Alfonso Sastre and Juan Antonio Bardem,
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conspiracy, which could not be believed when names such as Ridruejo, Gallardon or
S&nchez Mazas, all known conservatives, were involved. “There were no more
Communists in this list than in the first one but, since they were not as well-known, it
(the idea of a Communist conspiracy) could be more credible for the average
person”.228 Though understandably the students’ first feelings were of anxiety and
concern about their futures, their spirits rose as soon as they began adapting to life in
prison. “During the day, the guards would leave the door of the cells open so we
could pass from one to the other,” continues Abelian.
We played chess, read books, could have visitors who would bring us food, we 
could go out to the patio during the breaks... and there was even some political 
activity through the notes that we passed to the lawyers in the visiting rooms.229
This peculiar group of prisoners composed behind bars the famous “Ballad of
the imprisoned students”, a hilarious ironic poem about their whereabouts and
circumstances.230 On a more serious note, Ridruejo, who was outraged by the
overreaction of the authorities, wrote then his famous declaration to the members of
the Junta Political of the Falange. Among other things, he repudiated the government
for having given an image “of confusion and fear that will be difficult to repair.” 231
He was convinced that there was no relationship between the progressive students he
had so willingly helped and the Spanish Communist Party. He said:
The magnifying factor has been -according to the press- the discovery of a 
Communist infiltration. The judicial way will refute, I believe, such a hypothesis,
Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 189-196,200-203,209-216.
228 Abelian, Ortega, p. 254.
229 Abelldn, Ortega, p. 260. For more information on his experience in prison see pp. 256-262.
230 “Compafieros, compafleros / quien os mando protestar.
Teneis en libros profundos / la Ciencia para estudiar.
Tennis un sindicato / si os quer£is sindicar
Sindicato, cato, cato / Sindicato Nacional 
de estudiantes sindicados / por su propia voluntad”
Report by Carlist students on the student movement and the crisis of the SEU, 12 July 1956, Ballad of 
the prisoner students, AHPCE (INFORMES EN GENERAL SOBRE EL MOVIMIENTO 
ESTUDIANTIL, Caja 125, Carp. 5).
231 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, AHPCE.
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because the police investigations have not proven -and I believe they have totally 
dismissed- any kind of contact of the students with any organisation of a subversive 
character.232
However, despite Ridruejo’s claims, the police continued to pursue their
theory of the involvement of the Spanish Communist Party in the student* riots. They
referred to the “Message from the PCE to the Patriotic Intellectuals” that had been
published in 1954 as evidence of the party’s activity among the students. Mugica,
Lopez Pacheco, Marcos and Sanchez Drag6 were thought to be in direct contact with
the PCE. Mugica was pointed out as the main intermediary between Madrid and
Paris.233 This led to a press campaign that reached its peak when the newspaper El
Espanol published an article called “La conjura tiene nombres propios” (There are
real people behind the conspiracy and we know who they are), which described the
events that culminated in the riots of February as a conspiracy orchestrated by
“diabolic” Communist forces from abroad. Subsequently, under an official order, the
article had to be published by the press of the entire country.234 It argued that the PCE
had given the orders for the riots to the students through an article signed by Jorge
Semprun/Federico Sanchez in Mundo Obrero. The article, nevertheless, had been
published on 10 February, the day after the riots. In the words of Semprun:
By pure coincidence, right before the student riots, the Pirenaica and Mundo Obrero 
made an analysis regarding the party’s recent activity of a purely propagandistic 
matter. The article was called “Without preconceived dogmatisms”.... Without 
preconceived dogmatism you have to work among the students, with a democratic 
line, using legal possibilities, no sectarian attitudes, etc. And hence, this article was 
thought to have been the one giving the orders for the battle of February 1956. The 
article was pure analysis and it had already been written and prepared before the 
riots. Mundo Obrero then published it on 10 February when the riots had already 
occurred. As a result, the Francoist press transcribed it into their papers and said, 
“see, the riots were a machination, a conspiracy, they were not spontaneous”. And 
since the article was signed by Federico Sanchez, it was at this point that in the
232 Declaration by Dionisio Ridruejo after the events of February 1956, AHPCE.
233 Police report about the Communist infiltration in the university of Madrid, 20 February 1956, 
Mesa, Jaraneros, pp. 148-152.
234 Abell&n, Ortega, p. 263.
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police reports the search for Federico Sanchez began, a name that did not ring any
bells to anyone.235
However, the arrests of those who had been involved in the Manifesto were only a 
side effect of the riots of 1956. More dramatic was the government crisis that ensued. 
Franco blamed the loss of control over the students on the liberalising policies of the 
Minister of Education, Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, and on the weakness of the Minister- 
Secretary of the Movimiento, Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta, both of whom were 
forced to resign.236 Fernandez Cuesta would be replaced with Jose Luis de Arrese, 
who had held the same post in 1942 and would have a great impact on the 
dictatorship the following year. In addition, the Rector of the University, Pedro Lain 
Entralgo, the dean of the Law Faculty, Manuel Torres L6pez, and the Rector of the 
University of Salamanca, Antonio Tovar, were also dismissed. What had begun as a 
problem of public order had turned into a political problem. This crisis would come 
to reflect the divisions between the political families of the regime. However, as 
Preston says, the changes implemented by Franco on this occasion “were not 
deliberate and considered changes of direction but rather botched emergency repairs 
along the road” 237
In any case, the change of cabinet would serve to raise many hopes in the PCE 
about what the opposition could achieve in Franco’s Spain. In the Official History of 
the PCE, the events were said to have emphasized the political crisis of the regime 
“which had now entered its most acute and open phase”.238 The student riots were
235 Interview with Jorge Sempnin, May 2001.
236 Ruiz Gimenez was replaced by the Falangist Jesus Rubio Garda-Mina.
237 Preston, Franco, p. 651.
238 Ibarruri & W AA , Historic del PCE, p. 252.
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widely covered in the party’s newspaper, Mundo Obrero, including a transcription of
the University Manifesto of 1956.239 Among other things, it was reported:
The facts are clear: the university youth, in a few hours, has shaken the pillars of the 
Franco regime. The fear caused by the cries of the students calling for freedom has 
made the regime nervous and has led the authorities to cancel articles 14 and 18 of 
the Fuero de los Espanoles. People that not so long ago were collaborators of the 
Movimiento, such as Don Miguel S&nchez Mazas and Don Dionisio Ridruejo, have 
been arrested.240
In effect, the riots had ended up strengthening the democratic opposition in 
Spain. For many, the reaction of the regime revealed the impossibility for reform 
from within. As Abelian states:
I suffered the experience of living under a regime imposed by fear and terror; my 
decision to fight against the Franco dictatorship became irrevocable. I think I was 
not a unique case, but rather I was following an impulse that overcame us. The 
opposition inside Spain had irreversibly become stronger.241
In addition, the repression that followed further contributed to the SEU’s loss
of power and prestige. Though the official student union would try to democratise
and reform itself from within, its days were numbered. 1956 would be a turning point
in the development of a democratic student movement that became particularly
strong in the 1960s. As Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi in Spain explain in
Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy:
It was also the beginning of the ‘university problem’, that sea of troubles which, 
advancing and retreating over the next twenty years, was to embarrass the regime 
and erode its legitimacy. ... the events were revealing as evidence of the increasing 
politicisation of university students; a process which even if it affected only a 
minority of students from the privileged sectors of society, proved nevertheless to be 
irreversible, an indication of the failure of the efforts of the regime to attract the
• 242post-war generation.
239 Mundo Obrero, February 1956.
240 “Tkg university youth points to the way to follow”, report to the party from the university of 
Madrid, February 1956, AHPCE (ORGANIZACION UNIVERSITARIA DEL PCE EN MADRID, 
Informes, Caja 123, Carp. 2.1.2)
241 Abelian, Ortega, p. 261.
242 Carr and Fusi, Spain, pp. 146-147.
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In contrast, the PCE proved capable of doing the exact opposite. In return, and
albeit involuntarily, the students provided the party with a new vehicle to transmit
their new policies. The PCE was no longer the advocate of a violent strategy, an
image that had been established through its role in the Civil War, its submission to
the USSR and its promotion of the guerrilla movement in the 1940s. Now, they were
about to embark on the policy of National Reconciliation, which would be
established after the victory of the ‘Parisians’ over the old guard. The children of the
victors of the Spanish Civil War, the so-called Generation of 1956, would help the
party to change their image and come closer to the reality of a new Spain. In an
article in the French Communist newspaper, Carrillo wrote: ‘The working class
greets the admirable fighting spirit of the students that, once more, as in the past
throughout our history, fight alongside it for democratic liberties and national
independence”.243 In the words of Manuel Azcarate:
The Student movement o f 1956 was for the PCE like a new birth in the eyes of 
Spanish society. It appeared different from the Party’s traditional image, with new 
leaders like Javier Pradera, Enrique Mugica and some others that became figures 
with an important national projection. This was due mainly to the extraordinary 
work carried out by Jorge Semprun on his clandestine visits to Spain.244
D. Conclusion
The development of a student organisation can be said to have been the PCE’s first 
successful project in Spain since the end of the Civil War. The party was able to use 
the discontent of a new generation to create a crisis that, while failing to overthrow 
the regime, strengthened the democratic opposition in Spain and exposed the
243 “La lucha del pueblo espafiol contra el Franquismo”, L ‘Humanite, February 1956.
244 Azcarate, Derrotas, p. 339
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weaknesses of the Francoist system to deal with a generation that was meant to 
inherit and welcome the values of the Crusade. One of the main reasons for the 
success of the party in attracting the members of this generation lies in the fact that 
the exiled leadership, particularly those in Paris, allowed activists inside the country 
to mark the rhythm and direction of their actions. Semprun proved able to catalyse 
and understand the potential of the opposition that was emerging at the University of 
Madrid. Many of those who participated in the Poetry Encounters, the Congress of 
Young Writers, the homage to Ortega and the Manifesto of 1956, were not 
Communists and of those who were, many would in later years leave the party. 
However, the events that led to the student riots of 1956 laid the foundations for a 
democratic movement inside the University that in the 1960s would achieve their 
most precious goal, the disappearance of the SEU, and more importantly, would help 
to undermine the Franco regime.
Moreover, the success of the PCE with the University underground 
movement and its impact on many different fields of the Spanish cultural world, are 
essential to understanding the failure of the party to continue down the path initiated 
with the arrival of Jorge Semprun to Spain. As we shall see, based on this success, 
the leaders in Paris became increasingly overconfident regarding the party’s potential 
to overthrow the regime. Once in power, the ‘Parisians’ would once again impose the 
will from exile upon the activists in Spain; the “illusions of the party”, as Semprun 
described them, imposed upon reality.
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IV. THE EXILE RULES
A. Introduction
The previous two chapters have established the initial impact of the destalinisation 
process in the Spanish Communist Party, both in exile and in Spain. In Chapter II, it 
was shown how the secret speech of Khrushchev in February 1956 was decisive in 
ensuring the victory inside the PCE of the Parisians over the old guard. At the same 
time, Chapter IE has shown how the Parisians had been able to catalyse and direct the 
revival of the student and intellectual opposition against Franco. These changes 
seemed to point towards a new beginning for the PCE, even more so after the party 
proclaimed the policy of National Reconciliation. However, it would not take long 
before the extent of the reforms would be challenged by new events. As we shall see, 
the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops in October 1956 marked the limits of this 
process in the Soviet Union and by implication in the international Communist 
movement. The Spanish Communists not only eagerly supported the invasion but 
also reacted in a similar manner to the Soviets when criticism arose within their own 
ranks: such was the case with the group in Mexico.
As for the organisation inside Spain, the months that followed 1956 witnessed 
a continuation of activity in Madrid and the birth of a new student and intellectual 
opposition in Barcelona, which eventually became organised under the PSUC. 
Communist activity in the Catalan capital reached a critical point during the tram
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strike of January 1957, which served to detonate a number of demonstrations against 
the regime in other parts of the country. The success of these actions would 
eventually give rise to what the journalist Gregorio Moran has described as 
Jomadismo, a strategy by the PCE aimed at organising a series of major peaceful 
strikes in order to create a crisis that would lead to the overthrow of Franco’s regime.
B. Setting the limits
1. Hungary and Poland
Before explaining the limits of the destalinisation process inside the PCE, it is 
important to first look at how these limits were set in the Soviet Union and the 
international Communist movement. As was described in chapter n, the death of 
Stalin in 1953 had led to the relaxation of the worst features of Stalinism in the 
USSR, which eventually culminated in Khrushchev’s condemnation of the dictator 
himself during the XX Congress of the CPSU in March 1956. The shock wave 
produced by Khrushchev’s secret speech would quickly travel throughout the 
Communist world, strengthening the feeling of anti-Sovietism in the satellite states of 
Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary and Poland. As a result, the Soviet leadership 
was forced to face the effects of the destalinisation process among those who had 
been most oppressed by the Stalinist system. Their reaction would mark the limits of 
the reform started after the death of Stalin.1
1 Aside from the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the movements that developed in Hungary and 
Poland, another factor clearly exposed the limits of the destalinisation process. In June 1956, Palmiro
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In Poland, problems began in June 1956 in the city of Poznan where thousands of 
workers demonstrated to demand better economic conditions. During the months that 
followed, the opposition against the control of the Soviet Union over the country 
escalated: Soviet officials were asked to leave the Polish army, and Wladyslaw 
Gomulka, who had been jailed in 1951 under the Stalinist regime, returned to the 
Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party and would soon become its 
General Secretary. Subsequently, a liberalisation of the Communist system took 
place, which led among other things to the reestablishment of the Government’s 
relationship with the Polish Catholic Church. The Polish people demanded the 
formation of a multiparty system and the institution of free elections.
However, the Soviet leadership, refusing to remain inactive before such a 
challenge to its authority, threatened the new Government with military intervention. 
This was followed by negotiations between the Polish leaders and Nikita Khrushchev 
as well as other leaders of the Politburo who had arrived in Warsaw at this point. 
Once the Soviets became aware of the volatile situation they were dealing with, they 
agreed that Gomulka would be left in power for he was the only one capable of 
controlling the people. In exchange, the commitment of the country to Soviet foreign 
policy was re-established: Poland would stay in the Warsaw Pact and the Communist 
Party would retain its supremacy in the country. This compromise would also allow 
for the relaxation of internal policies.
Togliatti in an interview to the theoretical magazine Nuovi Argumenti, would take much further than 
anyone else the critique of the Stalinist years, arguing that Stalin alone was not responsible for what 
had happened, and rather there was something intrinsic in the Soviet system that had allowed him to 
act as he did. He then received harsh criticisms from the Soviets whose unwillingness to take the 
analysis of Stalinism any further was confirmed in Hungary and Poland.
Such a peaceful outcome would not be the case of Hungary, however. In this country, 
Khrushchev’s secret speech had discredited the pro-Soviet leadership of the 
Hungarian Communist Party led by Matyas Rakosi since the end of the Second 
World War, which had been responsible for much of the repression carried out 
during the worst years of Stalinism. In July 1956, the Soviets appointed the Stalinist 
Emo Gero as the party’s new leader, instead of Imre Nagy, a more popular choice 
amongst the Hungarian people.2 Unwilling to bring the expected reforms to the 
country, the new government soon faced increasing social upheaval, which 
eventually led to ongoing student demonstrations starting on 23 October. The 
students, partially inspired by the events that were taking place in Poland, demanded 
reforms, democratisation, and the return of Imre Nagy. As the Soviet troops 
intervened against the demonstrators, Nagy was appointed Prime Minister in an 
attempt to control the situation, which was now turning into a revolution. 
Subsequently, Janos Kadar replaced Gero as the party’s general secretary, a change 
that allowed the new government to implement the promised opening and reform. 
Political prisoners were released and censorship relaxed. By 27 October, Nagy 
formed a coalition government that included non-Communist elements, something 
unheard of in the Soviet sphere of influence, and continued to announce a series of 
drastic reforms in the country.
The tolerance of the Soviet Union with the events taking place in Hungary 
came to an end when, after many unmet requests for the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Hungarian soil, Nagy declared the country’s neutrality and its withdrawal from 
the Warsaw Pact. The challenge was soon taken up by the Soviet Union. On 4
2 Imre Nagy had been appointed Primer Minister in 1953 but was dismissed in 1955 because Moscow 
considered him to be too liberal. Emo Gero had been a delegate of the Comintern in Spain during the 
Civil War.
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November, Soviet forces attacked Budapest, facing fierce resistance. The 
Hungarians, nevertheless, had little chance, especially after the government’s calls 
for help from the Western democracies were left unanswered. By 9 November, the 
revolution had been defeated. Nagy’s regime was replaced by a puppet government 
and massive repression against the Hungarian people followed. In 1958, Nagy and his 
closest associates were executed.3 Not long after the secret speech of Nikita 
Khrushchev, the true character of the destalinisation process had been dramatically 
revealed in Hungary.
2. The PCE’s reaction
Officially, the USSR claimed that the Red Army had acted in response to a call for
help from the Hungarian government -a puppet government formed behind Nagy’s
government- to fight the Fascist counter-revolutionaries that were trying to destroy
socialism in Hungary. As it happened, the Spanish Communist Party had no problem
in accepting this explanation. In an article defending the invasion, Pasionaria wrote:
There is no single honest worker, unless he is mistaken or confused by reactionary 
propaganda, that does not feel a deep appreciation towards the Soviet Union for 
having responded to the call of the Hungarian government for help in counter-acting 
the criminal situation of the counter-revolution in Hungary.4
Moreover, she added:
The international reactionaries sympathise with the Hungarian counter-revolution. 
The working class, and first of all the Communists, sympathise with the Hungarian 
people in their fight to maintain and defend their socialist conquests. We 
sympathised with the Soviet Union which once again presents itself to the masses of 
the entire world as the defender in all terrains of the democratic and socialist 
conquests of each country and its right to independence and national sovereignty.5
3 Westwood, Endurance, pp. 421-422.
4 “No podemos ser neutrals ante el fascismo”, article by Dolores Ibdrruri on the Soviet intervention in 
Hungary in 1956, Montalban, Pasionaria, p. 475.
5 “No podemos ser neutrals ante el fascismo”, article by Dolores Ibarruri on the Soviet intervention in
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A few weeks after the invasion, Jesus Izcaray would confirm the party’s line
in a report that stated: ‘The fascists had taken over the situation in the streets of
Budapest and in other places in Hungary. They hung and burned alive Communist
workers and other defenders of the regime of the popular democracy.”6 On the other
hand, Carrillo would later argue that he and Claudin always had some reservations
about the invasion. They decided not to voice their doubts for they did not want “to
create a friction that would put the renewal initiated through the Plenum of National
Reconciliation at risk”.7 Nevertheless, Claudin challenges Carrillo’s version and
maintains that he was the only one to question the invasion. In his own words:
Carrillo, without reservations, made the official Soviet thesis his own that it had 
been a counter revolution organised by the imperialist and Hungarian reactionary 
forces taking advantage o f the errors made by the Communist Party. I maintained, 
on the contrary, that the role o f both factors -im perialism  and the Hungarian 
reactionary forces- was secondary. The main factor, the factor that had unleashed 
the revolution was, I thought, the policy o f the Communist Party. In my opinion, this 
experience confirmed the need to get to the bottom o f the Stalinist phenomenon. We 
both held intransigently to our points o f view and the discussion took a very violent 
turn. In the end, the position o f Carrillo was approved.8
In contrast, at the time of the invasion, Claudin gave a different appraisal of
events in a letter written to the party’s centre in Andalusia dated 1 November 1956.
While acknowledging the mistakes of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party in
Hungary, he nevertheless maintained that these mistakes had been corrected since the
CPSU’s XX Congress. He then attributed to the reactionary forces in Hungary a
much more important role than he would do in later years:
The imperialist agents, the Hungarian reactionary forces, have taken advantages o f 
the profound disappointment created among the masses by these mistakes (the
Hungary in 1956, Montalb&n, Pasionaria, p. 476.
6 “Lo que ellos dicen de Hungria”, report by Jesus Izcaray, 12 December 1956, AHPCE 
(DIRIGENTES, Jesus Izcaray, Caja 12, Carp. 5.1).
7 Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 461-462.
8 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 126.
161
mistakes of the Communist Party), to inflict a harsh blow to popular democracy in 
Hungary and the socialist camp in general.9
Two months later, in December 1956, he posed the following question
regarding the Soviets’ possible response to the events in Hungary:
Should the Soviet Union, acting in this case as a representative of the interests of the 
working class worldwide, of all the people, passively allow the fascist and 
imperialist forces to reach their objectives, as was done with Hitler in 1933?10
Claudin acknowledges to a certain extent some of the contradictions between 
what he actually said in 1956 and what he later claimed to have thought. He explains 
the discrepancy by what he describes as his “schizophrenic years”, during which he 
thought one thing but said another. By his own account, in 1956 Claudin questioned 
the superficial analysis of the destalinisation process in the Soviet Union and argued 
that rather than just blaming Stalin for all mistakes, an investigation of the internal 
contradictions of the Soviet system, which had allowed for Stalinism to happen, was 
necessary.11 This argument was in line with the comments made by Togliatti to the 
intellectual review, Nuovi Argomenti, in June 1956. However, Claudin continues, 
after he had a confrontation with Carrillo over the Hungarian issue, he held back 
from pursuing the “Stalin question” following the advice of Jorge Semprun, who 
agreed with his point of view but thought it was better to introduce these polemical 
opinions into the party gradually.12 Claudin’s doubts in 1956 have been confirmed by 
different sources, including Carrillo himself.13 Hence, his contradictory behaviour 
during this period is to a certain extent understandable given the implications of
9 Letter of Fernando Claudin to the party’s centre in Andalusia on the invasion of Hungary, 1 
September 1956, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, 
Carp. 3)
10 “Sobre una respuesta negativa”, Mundo Obrero, November-December 1956.
11 Claudin, Documentos, p. HI; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 127.
12 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
13 Falc6n, Asalto, p. 336; Carrillo, Dialogue, p. 117.
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acting against the party line. The gap between Claudin and Carrillo would continue to 
widen in the coming years, leading to the expulsion of the former from the party in 
1964. The confrontation, as it will be argued here, was finally triggered by the 
subjectivism of the party’s perception of the situation in Spain and how this 
subjectivism affected the policies taken to fight the regime.
Returning to the Spanish Communists’ position towards the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary, a third international conflict, the Suez Canal Crisis, was further used to 
justify the USSR’s action.14 On 26 July 1956, in an act of defiance to the West, the 
president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal as part of his 
strategy to achieve strategic predominance in the area. This led to an alliance between 
Great Britain, France and Israel to challenge this action, as the three countries had 
strong interests in the area. After diplomatic attempts to solve the situation failed, the 
Israelis, supported by the French and the British, launched an attack on Egypt on 29 
October, achieving a quick victory. British and French troops moved in and occupied 
the Canal. In the meantime, the Soviet Union, which had strong ties with Egypt and 
was keen to enhance its position in the Middle East, gave its support to the Egyptian 
government in the form of an arms deal through Czechoslovakia. It further threatened 
to intervene if the aggressors did not leave the country at once. Without the support 
of the United States and under pressure from the UN, Britain, France and Israel were 
forced to abandon the area. Subsequently, a UN emergency force replaced the British 
and French troops. The implications in world politics of these events fall beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but it is interesting to point out that, effectively, the Suez Canal 
Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary, exposed to the international community
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the division of the world into two superpowers, the USSR and the USA. Moreover,
the Russians used the whole affair to repair their image in the eyes of the world,
damaged after the invasion of Hungary. They could now claim to be the liberators of
the oppressed in the Third World. In the view of Carrillo:
It (the Suez Canal Crisis) helped us conclude that any weakening o f the Soviet block 
would carry the danger o f the imperialistic power starting dangerous adventures that 
would threaten the peace and independence o f other countries, something that in 
such a situation seemed to be true.15
The contradiction between protecting the freedom and peace of the people 
against the “imperialistic powers” but not against the Soviet Union did not seem to 
concern Carrillo then or subsequently.16 Azcarate would say in later years: “The 
invasion of Hungary was the moment when the Western Communist parties touched 
bottom: our strategy was reduced to nothing more than backing the state interests of 
the Soviet Union”.17
Predictably, these conflicts at an international level resulted in a reversal of the 
liberalisation process started after the death of Stalin in the Soviet Union. This 
process would briefly recover following the failed attempt of the Stalinist elements 
inside the CPSU to overthrow Nikita Khrushchev in June 1957. However, only four 
months later, the first meeting of the Communist Parties of the World took place in 
Moscow where “revisionism” instead of “dogmatism” was once again described as 
the main enemy of the Communist movement.18 Moreover, the position defended by 
Mao and Thorez that saw the CPSU as the “ leading party” within the Communist
14 Law, Pasionaria, p. 175; Carrillo, Memorias, p. 462.
15 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 462.
16 For the party’s explanation on the Suez Canal crisis see “Declaration del Buro Politico del CC del 
PCE sobre la situation intemacional”, 12 November 1956, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 37).
17 Manuel Azcarate, Luchas y  transiciones. Memorias de un viaje por el ocaso del comunismo
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movement, prevailed over Togliatti’s, who defended a “polycentric” approach that 
respected the possibility of different national paths to reach Communism. At the 
same time, the congress brought into the open the divisions inside a Communist 
movement that until then had prided itself on its unity. The Sino-Soviet conflict was 
beginning to emerge and the recent reconciliation with Yugoslavia was again 
becoming more problematic. As for the PCE, it supported the idea of the CPSU as 
the leading party and was happy to embrace the attack on revisionism.19
3. Mexico
Soon after the Hungarian invasion, the Spanish Communist Party would face its own 
internal opposition from those who wanted to take the destalinisation process further. 
The problem would first arise in Mexico, the most important enclave of the PCE in 
Latin America.
Following the Civil War, the Mexican government opened its doors to Spanish 
exiles. As a result, many PCE activists and leaders fled to Mexico, especially when 
the Second World War broke out and France was invaded by the Germans. Mexico 
DF would then become one of the headquarters of the PCE in exile, the other being 
Moscow. Once the war was over, Paris regained its status as a main party centre and 
Mexico’s importance declined. Throughout this time, the relationship between the 
PCE leadership and the party’s local organisation in Mexico, which had around 500 
members, survived varius crisis, such as the assassination of Trotsky, the expulsion
(Madrid: El Pais Aguilar, 1998), p. 60.
18 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 129.
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of Margarita Nelken and the problems with Jesus Hernandez.20 In 1953, conflict
arose with the rank-and-file. According to the philosopher Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez,
one of the leading figures among the Spanish Communists in Mexico, around this
time the local activists began to feel growing unease and dissatisfaction with the
behaviour of the leadership’s representative, Felipe Mufioz Arconada, who was
0 1perceived as being too authoritarian. However, they would keep quiet for some time 
due to the “political climate of terror” Arconada had imposed 22 This would change 
when, in accordance with the new spirit that had followed Stalin’s death, the PCE 
leadership sent two documents to the organisation in Mexico denouncing such 
behaviour among party leaders.23 As a result, those dissatisfied figures came out into 
the open and began criticising Arconada’s methods.24 The situation became so tense 
that the leaders in Paris asked Arconada to send a report on the situation. 
Unconvinced by his explanations, they wrote a resolution on the matter to the local 
organisation: though the leaders seemed to be agreeing with the rank-and-file’s 
complaints, they nevertheless shifted the blame from Arconada’s tyrannical 
leadership onto that of his assistant, Esteban Vega, who was removed from his post 
in Mexico and expelled from the Central Committee.25 At the same time, they asked 
the local organisation in Mexico to organise an Assembly to discuss the recent
19 Ibarruri & W AA , Historia del PCE, pp. 256-257.
20xxxxxx.
21 Aside from Arconada, the PCE also had a delegation of the Central Committee in Mexico composed 
by Juan Jose Manso and Wenceslao Roces.
22 Interview with Adolfo Sanchez V&zquez, May 2002. Also see Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez, Del exilio 
en Mexico. Recuerdos y  reflexiones (Mexico: Editorial Grijalbo, 1997), p. 219; documents from 
Mexico received between the 9 and 11 June 1954, AHPCE (Documentos, Carp. 35); Santiago Alvarez, 
Memorias V. La larga marcha de una lucha sin cuartel (1954-1972), (A Coruna: Edicios do Castro, 
1994), pp. 58-60.
23 Letter from Dolores Ibarruri to the organisation in Mexico and Letter of the Central Committee. 
References made to these documents in “Resolution on the work of the party in Mexico”, 1953, 
AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 34).
24 Interview with Adolfo Sanchez Vdzquez, May 2002.
25 Resolution on the work of the party in Mexico, 1953, and “Informacidn sobre el cojo”, 1 June 1954, 
AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 34).
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problems.26 It began on 19 September 1953. Arconada did not attend. Apparently, he 
had to go to the Soviet Union for a medical operation (which never took place).27 
Again, it would be up to Vega to deal with the complaints expressed by the local 
members. After three months and 60 sessions, those present decided that Arconada 
would have to be removed from his post in Mexico. However, the Political Bureau 
did nothing in this regard. The following June, a meeting of the delegates of the 
party’s cells took place. This time it included Arconada who had just returned from 
his lengthy Russian visit. As the talks began, the divisions between delegates 
became clear. One small group supported Arconada. A second wanted his expulsion 
from the party (his old assistant, Vega, was the apparently the main leader of this 
group). The third, more conciliatory, asked for Arconada’s removal from his post in 
Mexico and his expulsion from the Central Committee but not from the party. The 
latter group also addressed the need for a more general democratisation process 
mside the party. However, once again, no measures in this direction were taken by 
the Political Bureau.
The problems would still be unresolved when the V Congress of the PCE 
took place the following September. It was during its celebration that the 
confrontation between the Mexican local organisation and the leadership’s 
representative would turn into a confrontation between the local organisation and the 
PCE leadership itself. As it happened, the Mexican delegation to the Congress was 
formed by three members of the Central Committee, Juan Jose Manso, Wenceslao 
Roces and J. Ambou, who did not share the majority’s criticisms against Arconada
26 Interview with Adolfo Sanchez Vdzquez, May 2002.
27 On Arconada’s trip to the Soviet Union, see contribution by Vicente, April 1957, AHPCE 
(DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 38).
28 Documents received from Mexico on 9 and 11 June 1954, AHPCE.
29 Interview with Adolfo S&nchez Vazquez, May 2002.
and wanted to avoid any sanction against him, and four activists democratically 
elected by the members of the local organisation, Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez, Gonzalo 
Sanz, Barreiro and Gonzalo L6pez, the last two also in favour of Arconada. 
Therefore, only Sanchez Vdzquez and Sanz represented the critical position of the 
majority of the Mexican organisation. Their mission was to start a discussion in the 
Congress on the problems they had been facing as well as to combat the re-election 
of Arconada to the party’s Central Committee. However, according to Sanchez 
Vazquez, just before the Congress began, he was approached by Santiago Carrillo 
who asked him not to address the matter for it was better to concentrate on the 
struggle of the party in Spain. Sanchez Vazquez told Carrillo that the problems in 
Mexico were not exclusive to their organisation and that the whole party suffered 
from the authoritarian leadership criticised in Arconada, which would justify 
debating the issue in the Congress. He did not convince Carrillo, however, though 
they agreed that a discussion between the Mexican delegation and the Political 
Bureau would take place after the Congress.30 Nevertheless, while Sanchez Vazquez 
and Sanz did as ordered by Carrillo, Manso, Roces and Ambou addressed the 
problems in Mexico and accused those who criticised Arconada of being a threat to 
the principles of the party. The discussion did not go any further and Arconada was 
re-elected to the PCE’s Central Committee.31
Following the Congress, the meeting between the leadership and the 
representatives of the local organisation took place. Though the leadership accepted 
the criticisms made by Sanchez Vazquez and Sanz against Arconada, it still justified 
his re-election to the CC on the basis of him “being an old cadre who had to be saved
30 Interview with Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez, May 2002.
31 AHPCE (V CONGRESO, Actas Congreso).
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or recovered”.32 Moreover, the organisation in Mexico was prevented from 
expressing “petit-bourgeois democratism” and asked to overcome past problems.33 
Nevertheless, as Arconada’s situation in Mexico seemed to be unsustainable, they 
decided to replace him with Santiago Alvarez.34 After the return of the delegation to 
the Mexican capital, a new Assembly took place on 11 December 1954 at which the 
local activists were informed about recent events. The majority of those present were 
pleased with the replacement of Arconada but thought such an action lacked any 
meaning for he had still been re-elected to the CC.35 At the same time, those who had 
wanted the expulsion of Arconada from the party now began openly to attack the 
Political Bureau. In contrast, Arconada’s supporters were delighted with the action 
taken by the leadership as they felt it backed their position and strengthened them 
vis-a-vis the other activists.
Therefore, the intervention of the Political Bureau had served only to deepen 
divisions. Furthermore, as Sanchez Vazquez points out, “there was a considerable 
reduction -almost a halt- in the activity of the organisation in practical matters”. 
During the following months, there were several attempts to lessen the tension 
between the different factions inside the organisation. A new Committee of the party 
in Mexico was elected in June 1955, when the representatives of the most 
conciliatory position prevailed (Sanchez Vazquez and Manuel Barberan among 
others). They were, nevertheless, unable to find a solution to the problems, among
32 Interview with Adolfo Sanchez V&zquez, May 2002.
33 Resolution of the Political Bureau on the problems of the organisation in Mexico, 1 September 
1956, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 37).
34 Alvarez, Memorias V, p. 57.
35 Alvarez, Memorias V, p. 74.
36 Alvarez, Memorias V, p. 80,
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other reasons because the Political Bureau never showed its clear support for their 
actions.37
The tension came to a head in March 1956, when Khrushchev gave his secret
speech during the XX Congress of the CPSU. A great number of the activists in
Mexico identified the criticisms and problems acknowledged by Khrushchev with
those that had crippled their own organisation and which they had been denouncing
since 1953. A meeting took place between the Committees of the PCE and the PSUC
in Mexico to discuss the resolutions adopted by the CPSU during its XX Congress
and the subsequent resolution of the PCE, whose delay on this question was also
criticised. In the conclusions drawn during this meeting, the Committees accepted the
resolutions of the CPSU’s XX Congress and pointed to the clear existence inside the
PCE of the cult of personality as dennounced by Khrushchev. They then criticised the
party’s failure to recognise that dimension of the resolution. In addition, they also
questioned the policy of National Reconciliation and the manner in which it had been
adopted. However, according to S&nchez Vazquez:
While the criticisms made by the Committee had been welcomed by the majority of 
the organisation, they were not accepted by the delegation o f the Central Committee 
and a sector in the organisation that had in the past resisted changing the 
authoritarian methods o f Arconada therein.38
Santiago Alvarez and the members of the Central Committee resident in 
Mexico would subsequently impugn the authority of the local Committee on the 
basis of the contradictions between its conclusions and the PCE’s resolution on the 
CPSU’s XX Congress. To this, the local Committee replied by appealing to the local 
organisations for the right to disagree with the representatives of the PCE. With the 
situation getting out of hand, the leaders in France invited two representatives of the
37 Interview with Adolfo S&nchez V&zquez, May 2002.
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local Committee to come to Paris for a discussion. The Committee replied that the 
position of the Political Bureau had been made clear to them by its representatives in 
the Mexican capital and that there was no longer any reason for holding the meeting: 
the invitation was therefore declined. This was the first challenge to the leadership’s 
authority since the beginning of the destalinisation process and the response was 
emphatic: the invitation was now an order that if refused would mean a break-up 
with the PCE.39 “We, the members of the Committee, thus faced a demand we could 
not ignore”, says S&nchez Vazquez, who was one of the two delegates chosen to go 
to Paris for the meeting.40
There, they once again challenged the leadership by criticising what they saw 
as a superficial reform of the party’s internal structure and the contradictions of the 
National Reconciliation policy. The Mexican delegation questioned the delay in the 
application of this policy as well as the fact that the party was agreeing to support a 
liberal coalition government in Spain while rejecting the same thing for Hungary. 
They were told that, though such an option in Spain meant the overthrow of a fascist 
government, it meant the opposite in Hungary and the victory of the counter­
revolution. The leadership went on to accuse the Mexican organisation of harbouring 
“divisive and conflict-ridden elements” that, as a result of distorted interpretations of 
the XX Congress and events such as the one in Hungary, suffered from “strong 
revisionist tendencies and are in conflict with the Party’s ideology, policy and 
leadership”.41 The spread of so-called revisionism was blamed on the fact that a large 
number of the activists in Mexico did not belong to the working class; too many were
38 Interview with Adolfo S&nchez Vazquez, May 2002.
39 Mor&n, Miseria, pp. 302-303.
40 Interview with Adolfo S&nchez Vazquez, May 2002. Aside from Sanchez V&zquez, the meeting 
included Manuel Barberan, Santiago Alvarez, Santiago Carrillo, Fernando Claudin and Ignacio 
Gallego, Alvarez, Memorias V, pp. 187-188.
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intellectuals and their interests were linked to those of the petit and middle 
bourgeoisie. “In the name of an abstract democracy ... there now exists a putrefied 
liberalism”, Carrillo alleged.42 As their criticisms were all dismissed and their 
backgrounds brought into question, the Mexican delegates submitted. In his only 
reference to this episode, Claudin writes:
I also had to contribute to the critique of “revisionism” in our ranks, as it happened 
in relationship to comrades exiled in Mexico that had been infected a bit by such a 
dangerous virus —among them my good friend Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez, a known 
Marxist philosopher. I was forced, in short, to think one thing and say another.43
According to Sanchez Vazquez, Fernando Claudin in fact played the “leading 
part” during the meetings in which the Mexican delegation was under attack 44 Being 
the only intellectual equal to Sanchez Vazquez, it seems understandable that he was 
given this job. Subsequently, the two delegates would retreat to Mexico where the 
local organisation was informed about their defeat. Afterwards, the party published a 
document called “Letter to the members of the organisation of the PCE in Mexico” 45 
It gave the bureau’s version of the whole affair. From then onwards, the Mexican 
organisation would never cause any further problems. In the view of Sanchez 
V&zquez:
The conflict was resolved in accordance with the usual application o f the rules of 
democratic centralism: the unconditional submission o f the inferior organisation to 
the centre. In this conflict one could find already, in nuce, all the problems of 
dogmatism, authoritarianism, centralism, exclusion o f internal democracy... etc, 
which called for a new solution in the Communist world movement. The old 
solution given to our conflict seriously affected my practical, militant activity; from 
then onwards I promised to be only a regular activist and devote myself mainly to 
my work in the theoretical field.46
41 Report by Santiago Carrillo, April 1957, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 38).
42 Report by Santiago Carrillo, April 1957, AHPCE.
43 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 127.
44 Santiago Alvarez also confirms in his memoirs the main role played by Claudin during the meeting, 
Alvarez, Memorias V, p. 188.
45 “Carta a los miembros de la organizacion del PCE en Mexico”, 21 April 1957, AHPCE 
(DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 38). Alvarez maintains that it was he and Gallego who wrote the “letter”, 
Alvarez, Memorias V, p. 188.
46Ana Galvdn Chavez, Adolfo Sanchez Vazquezy el marxismo.
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The party’s attitude towards the organisation in Mexico as well as its support of the 
Soviet Union’s invasion in Hungary had revealed the limited scope of the changes 
that had taken place since the death of Stalin. Shortly afterwards, these limits would 
be felt in Spain where the policies of the party in the years that followed the student 
riots of February 1956 would lead the underground organisation into a series of 
failures.
C. The aftermath of the Student riots in February 1956
1. The University of Madrid
As explained in Chapter ID, the student riots of February 1956 had led to the arrest of 
many of those who had been involved in the activities of a progressive nature in the 
University of Madrid. Those arrested would gradually be released from jail during 
the months that followed. Apart from the disruption to their lives, February 1956 
would have an important effect on the opposition movement inside the university.
On 27 February, a new manifesto was published by a sector of students in the 
Law Faculty, demanding the release of those arrested and affirming their support for 
the Manifesto of 1 Februaiy.47 As there was no response to their demands, a new 
appeal was published on 16 March, criticising the SEU as well as the Minister of
47 “Escrito de los estudiantes de la Facultad de Derecho a la opinidn”, 27 February 1956, AHPCE 
(ESTUDIANTES DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MADRID, Caja 124, Carp. 44).
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Government, Bias Perez, who they referred to as Blas-Himmler.48 On 1 April, a new 
document was published that condemned the regime and called on the students to go 
on a general strike on 12-13 April to demand a National Congress of Students.49 The 
manifestos were all followed by further arrests, which aside from preventing the 
strike, led to trials and sentences against the accused.50 Nevertheless, regardless of 
the repression, these actions consolidated the continuation of the struggle initiated by 
Mugica’s group in 1954. Behind the manifestos were the efforts of new political 
organisations that had started to grow in the aftermath of February 1956.
One of these organisations was the Agrupacion Socialista Universitaria 
(ASU) created on 26 February. Its founders were Luis Alcaide, Pedro Ramon 
Moliner, Miguel Rubio, Carlos Zayas, Emilio Sanz Hurtado, Alfonso Laso de la 
Vega and Luis Gonzalez, and their aim was to bring Socialist students under a 
common roof.51 The ASU was responsible for the March appeal as well as for the 
April manifesto, which was printed and distributed with help of the PCE.52
48 “Llamamiento que los estudiantes de las Facultades de Derecho y Ciencias Economicas de Madrid 
dirigen a sus compaiieros de toda Espana y a toda la opinion publica en general”, 16 March 1956, 
AHPCE (ESTUDIANTES DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MADRID, Caja 124, Carp. 44).
49 “Llamamiento de huelga a los estudiantes madrilefios para el 12 y 13 de abril 1956, con motivo de 
las detenciones que siguieron a la petition universitaria del 1 de febrero”, 1 April 1956, AHPCE 
(ORGANIZACI6N UNIVERSITARIA DEL PCE EN MADRID, COMUNICADOS, Caja 123, Carp. 
2.1.4); “Prosigue la agitation estudiantil en Madrid”, Mundo Obrero, April 1956.
50 More than 200 arrests followed the April manifesto according to Farga, Universidad, p. 49. Some of 
those who were arrested in March would later go to trial and be defended by Gil Robles who used this 
platform to carry out a critique against the regime. For more information see “Los universitarios 
espafioles en la lucha contra la dictadura franquista y por la amnistia”, June 1960, AHPCE; Mesa, 
Jaraneros, pp. 259-353; Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, pp. 201-203; Tusell, 
Oposicion, pp. 294-295.
51 Lizcano, 56, pp. 174-175. At first, the ASU did not have any contact with the PSOE in exile. In 
August 1956, one of its members, Victor Pradera, would contact Llopis and they would agree on the 
organic relationship between both groups while respecting the political autonomy of the ASU in the 
university. Nevertheless, their relationship would always be tense. For more information see Abdon 
Mateos, “La Agrupacion Socialista Universitaria, 1956-1962” in Carreras and Ruiz, La Universidad, 
p. 544. Also see Lizcano, 56, pp. 181-183.
Abd6n Mateos, “La ASU...” in Carreras and Ruiz, La Universidad, p. 544; Lizcano, 56, p. 176.
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According to Semprun, he himself was responsible for the text of the manifesto.53
Sanchez Drag6 argues that the help of the PCE in fact went much further than that:
The PCE realised that in the University there was a group of young people not 
radical enough to enter the PCE but radical enough to enter the Socialist Party, but 
since there was no Socialist Party in the University, the Communist party founded 
the Socialist party.54
Though Sanchez Drago is correct in pointing out the PCE’s infiltration of the
ASU, it does seem, according to other accounts, that this was undertaken after the
organisation had been created, and not before.55 As Lizcano explains in his book on
the generation of 1956, the ASU was formed as an alternative to the organisation of
the PCE in the university, but unlike its older brother the PSOE, the Socialist
students did not bear any grudges against the Communists. On the contrary, they
recognized and appreciated their role in the opposition movement in the university
and hence, considered them as a natural ally in the fight against Franco. This trust
proved to be their undoing. The Communists went on to recruit members of the ASU
such as Carlos Zayas, Emilio Sanz Hurtado and Raul Asensio Peral, and obliged
them to a double militancy as a secret. In the words of Javier Pradera:
The “mole” was Emilio Sanz Hurtado. We put him in contact with Semprun, and 
then Semprun, in bold, sexist and metaphorical terms, “screwed” him. He joined the 
PCE, as did Carlos Zayas. And then the party, instead of doing what it should have 
done, which is to let it be known that they had entered the PCE, told them to 
continue without mentioning it.56
In this manner, the Communists were able to control the ASU and use it for a 
variety of purposes. Under the ASU cover, they came into contact with other political
53 Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 43-44.
54 Interview with Fernando Sanchez Drag6, September 2000. It is true that the manoeuvres of the PCE
damaged its relation with other political forces in Spain. Nevertheless, it is important to remember 
that, as has been explained throughout this thesis, the relationship between the PCE and other forces in 
exile was already damaged before 1956, which also accounts for the mistrust about Communist 
activists that the rest of political groups in Spain eventually developed.
35 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000; Semprun Maura, El exilio, pp. 68-69.
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forces that it would have been impossible to reach were they known as Communists. 
It was also used to give to their actions the appearance of wide support among the 
opposition against Franco.57 And as S&nchez Drago mentions, it served to recruit 
moderate left-wing students who would not join the PCE, and would otherwise have 
nowhere to go. However, in the summer of 1956, Carlos Zayas was invited by the 
party to visit the Soviet Union.58 When he returned to Spain, he was upset and 
disappointed by what he had seen. Zayas then confessed to the rest of the members of 
the ASU his double militancy as well as that of the other “moles” in the 
organisation.59 This obviously led to a crisis and the expulsion of the PCE’s members 
from the ASU. More dramatically, the relationship between the Communists and the 
Socialists was damaged as a result.
To a certain extent then, the monopoly the PCE had had amongst the left 
opposition movement in the university was ending with the appearance of these 
groups. Their attempts to control them would only work as long as the Communist 
activists in these organisations remained under cover. A similar case to the ASU 
would be that of the Frente de Liberation Popular (FLP).60 This group brought 
together left wing Christians and independent Marxists. Though the FLP, also known 
as Felipe, really took shape in 1958 and would reach its pinnacle during the 1960s, its 
first steps were taken in the period that followed the events of February 1956. The 
future Felipes came together around the person of Julio Ceron, a young diplomat that
56 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
57 Moran, Miseria, p. 285.
58 Estruch Tobella, Historia oculta, p. 202.
59 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000. Javier Pradera also explained during this interview 
how after the “moles had been discovered”, some members of the ASU took a picture of Jorge 
Semprun, which the police would have been delighted to get their hands on. But according to Pradera, 
they had no intention of using the picture in this manner but rather they hoped to protect themselves 
with it from any possible Communist reprisals. Incidentally, the picture is the one used on the cover of 
Jorge Semprun’s Autobiograjia de Federico Sanchez.
60 Semprun Maura, El exiliot pp. 68-70.
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had been holding social gatherings in his house since 1955 among Catholics of left 
wing inclinations. Ignacio Fernandez de Castro was also another important figure in 
the group. By the beginning of the academic year 1957-1958, Ceron’s group had 
created a university organisation called Nueva Izquierda Universitaria. (New 
University Left), which would lead to the creation of the FLP. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, the FLP was one of the two organisations that supported the PCE in the 
Comites de Coordinacion Universitaria and the national strike of 1959.61
2. The policy of National Reconciliation
As has already been explained in Chapter n, the aftermath of the student riots in 
February 1956 also witnessed the outcome of one of the most important power 
struggles in the history of the Spanish Communist Party. The confrontation between 
the party’s old guard and the ‘Parisians’ was resolved in favour of the latter. In 
addition, the changes in the Communist leadership also prompted the adoption by the 
PCE of a new policy called National Reconciliation. On 18 June 1956, two months 
after the meeting of the Political Bureau that confirmed the downfall of Uribe and the 
promotion of Santiago Carrillo to the leadership of the party, a document was 
published entitled Declaracion del PCE por la Reconciliacion Nacional, por una 
solucion pacifica del problema espanol (Declaration of the PCE for National 
Reconciliation, for a peaceful solution to the Spanish problem).62 The document 
explained to the rank-and-file the main points of the doctrine of National
61 Aside from these left-wing groups, a more conservative opposition also began to organise itself 
during this period, among others, groups of Christian Democrats, such as Action Democratica 
Espanola (ADE), led by Dionisio Ridruejo, or the Accidentalistas, led by Jesus Barros de Lis.
62 “Por la Reconciliacion nacional, por una solucion democratica y pacifica del problema Espafiol”, 
AHPCE.
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Reconciliation, such as the union of all of those who opposed Franco so that the 
changes towards democracy could take place peacefully. It also specified the party’s 
demands for the new government: the suppression of censorship, amnesty, and the 
unions and freely-elected peasant associations. National Reconciliation has often 
been portrayed as a breakthrough in terms of the party’s previous policies regarding 
the internal situation in Spain.63 It is important to expand here on the arguments used 
in Chapter II to challenge this view.
First of all, the abandonment of a violent route to overthrowing the regime 
had already taken place following the tram strike in Barcelona in 1951 and was part 
of the PCE’s Anti-Francoist National Front policy. Second, the idea of unity between 
all forces, including those of the right who did not support Franco, was already 
present in the 1940s policy of National Unity as well as the subsequent Anti- 
Francoist National Front and even the Popular Front of the Civil War period.64 
During the Political Bureau’s meeting of April-May 1956, Pasionaria herself 
acknowledged the existence of this concept in past policies of the PCE but she 
argued, “we saw the main base of the Anti-Francoist Front in the old forces of the 
Republican camp.”65 This leads us to the third point. The abandonment of the 
emphasis on the Republican forces to fight Franco was not a novelty of the policy of 
National Reconciliation, as Ib&rruri suggests above. Already in September 1942, the 
PCE had published a manifesto where it was specified that it should be for the people 
to choose the Constituent Assembly that would elaborate the constitution of the new
63 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001; Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 118-119; Carrillo, Memorias, 
pp. 455-457; Mujal-Le6n, Communism, pp. 1, 22; Hermet, The Communists, p. 57; Mor&n, Miseria, 
pp. 276-277; Carabantes and Cimorra, Un mito, p. 287.
Santiago Carrillo himself remarked on this similarity during the discussions with the Mexican 
delegation in January 1957. For more information see report by Santiago Carrillo, January 1957, 
AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 38).
65 Meeting of the PCE’s Political Bureau, Pasionaria’s speech, 10 May 1956, AHPCE. This similarity
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government after Franco’s overthrow.66 This shift had been taken in order to attract 
into an alliance right wing forces such as the Monarchists, who obviously would not 
join a coalition that called for the return of the Republic. It nevertheless resulted in an 
enhancement of the other pro-Republican forces’ animosity towards the PCE. From 
then onwards, the Republican option would be advocated or abandoned depending on 
how convenient it was for the PCE to maintain good relations with the Republican 
forces, something that varied throughout these years.67
Therefore, it can be concluded that the policy of National Reconciliation was 
a continuation of previous party policies, not a dramatic break. National 
Reconciliation did however emphasize more than previous party doctrines the very 
idea of reconciliation by incorporating it into its name. In this manner, the party 
leadership made the policy more attractive to the new generations that had not fought 
in the Civil War. It is true, however, that now the idea of “reconciliation” was a bit 
closer to reality than ever before. Whether for this reason or because the leadership 
managed to convince the rank-and-file that they were actually taking a 
groundbreaking step, National Reconciliation was generally welcomed with open 
arms and excitement as a great change of direction by the party. According to 
Sanchez Montero:
Federico (Jorge Semprun) gave me a copy and I told him what I thought the 
following day. I was very excited about it and I thought it had a great significance, 
even historically. The policy of national reconciliation was attempting to overcome 
a history of military coups and civil wars, of violence and hatred in the political and 
social life of Spain.68
with past policies is also noticed by Irene Falcon, Asalto, p. 319.
66 Again, this is acknowledged by Santiago Carrillo during the discussions with the Mexican 
delegation in January 1957. For more information see report by Santiago Carrillo, January 1957, 
AHPCE.
67 Moreover, the Anti-Francoist Front, referred to by Pasionaria, called not just for the Republicans but 
also for the Monarchists and disappointed Falangists to unite under a common roof for the 
establishment of a democratic government, not necessarily a Republic.
179
As we shall see, in the years that followed, the party would stick to the main 
goals of the policy of National Reconciliation. However, the PCE itself would 
become the biggest obstacle in the achievement of unity among the forces that 
opposed Franco.
3. The University of Barcelona
The PCE’s adoption of the policy of National Reconciliation would also coincide 
with the awakening of a student opposition in the University of Barcelona. Here, a 
feeling of opposition against the regime and the SEU had been growing for some 
time, but it only turned into political activism after the student riots of February 1956 
in Madrid. At first, there were groups of students and intellectuals coming together to 
discuss politics, literature and cinema. One of the best-known places for these 
encounters was the seminar “Juan Boscan” at the Instituto Iberoamericano.69 Among 
the Catalan intellectual opposition, Josep Maria Castellet, Juan and Jose Agustin 
Goytisolo, Jaime Gil de Biedma and Carlos Barral were the most influential figures. 
In the University, this role belonged to students such as Luis Goytisolo, Jordi Sole 
Tura, Joaquim Jorda and Salvador Giner.70 Eventually, the student gatherings 
become more and more concerned with politics and the route to follow that would 
help in the overthrow of the dictatorship. A major influence in the shift from words 
to action was Manuel Sacristan, who joined many discussions and encouraged those 
in attendance to go a step further in their opposition to the regime. Sacristan was a 
rather mysterious figure, a professor of Philosophy who had abandoned his early
68 Sanchez Montero, Memorias, pp. 228-229.
69 Vilar, Anti-franquismo, p. 251.
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Falangism after spending some time at Munster University in Germany, where he had 
joined the Communist Party. According to Sole Tura, “he reappeared in the 
University scene of the 1950s with a halo of the clandestine activist, the universal 
wise man, the master without limits, the tireless pedagogue, the strict and relentless 
activist”.71
Then came the homage to Ortega y Gasset by the students in Madrid. In the 
view of Sole Tura, “it had great repercussions in our university, but we neither had 
the necessary drive nor the minimum organisation to initiate a movement equivalent 
to the one in Madrid”.72 The students in Barcelona tried to show their solidarity with 
small actions such as throwing a chicken from the top floor of the university into the 
patio, an act that was supposed to be perceived as a metaphor of how they were being 
treated by the authorities and thus incite their fellow students to recover their “virile 
honour” and carry out solidarity actions with the students in Madrid. However, as 
S0I6 Tura has noted, “the majority of the people did not give a damn about the matter 
and some said that maybe we were right but that they pitied the poor sacrificed 
chicken”.73 More daring activities included the painting of the university walls or an 
attempt to bring to the stage a play by Salvador Espriu, Primera Histdria d ’Esther, a 
work concerned with the division and reconciliation of Spanish society after the Civil 
War. The students even met the poet who was pleased with the idea, but the project 
never took off.74
70 Jordi Sole Tura. Una historia optimista. Memorias (Madrid: Aguilar, 1999), pp. 84-85.
71 Sold Tura, Memorias, p. 86.
72 Sold Tura, Memorias, pp. 87-88. Among the intellectuals, the Literary Seminar Boscan in 
Barcelona, which included people such as Josep Maria Castellet and Carlos Barral, held an open 
conference on the occasion of the death of Ortega y Gasset and was dissolved as a result, Salvador 
Giner de San Julian, “Power, Freedom and Social Change...” in Preston, Spain, p. 190.
73 Sold Tura, Memorias, p. 88.
74 Sold Tura, Memorias, pp. 88-89.
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Finally, an opportunity arrived to take the opposition movement out of the
shadows of private gatherings and “rudimentary activities” and place it in the front
line of the fight against the regime. The University of Barcelona organised a
demonstration against the Soviet invasion of Hungary, which the students then turned
into a protest against the Franco regime. Once the authorities realised what was
happening, they tried to put an end to it. Semprun would write about the event:
An attempt by the SEU to organise a demonstration for ‘freedom’ in Hungary has 
turned into a violent and decisive anti-Francoist university demonstration. This is 
very interesting as a clear symptom of the students’ mood.75
Mundo Obrero praised the students’ great political consciousness and 
elevated sense of initiative.76 Moreover, according to Luis Goytisolo:
For the first time there were portraits of the dictator thrown out of the windows of 
the Paraninfo. The police charged against the protesters, an action that raised hell. 
We were all completely surprise by the turn of events, and there were many arrests. 
But the police did not know us yet and they arrested those close to the left of the 
Falange.77
After the demonstration, Octavi Pellisa, a very active student in Sole Tura’s 
group, suggested to the rest that the time had come to contact the PSUC.78 He then 
organised a meeting with a member of the PSUC’s Political Bureau, Miguel Nunez, 
with whom Pellisa had had previous contact. Following this meeting, many of the 
students joined the party. Ironically, a protest against a Soviet action had somehow
75 Letter from Semprun to Carlos (most likely his brother) on the demonstration in Barcelona against 
the invasion of Hungary, 17 November 1956, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, Microfilm 
200).
76 “Los Estudiantes de Barcelona se manifestan en la Universidad al grito de jAbajo la dictadura! 
jViva la libertad!” Mundo Obrero, November-December 1956.
77 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
78 As has been explained, ever since the expulsion of Comorera from the PSUC, the Catalan party had 
lost its autonomy from the PCE and though it still maintained the structure of an independent party, it 
was in fact run by the Spanish Communist leadership in exile. It would take some time for it to regain 
its status as an independent party other than on paper.
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led to the creation of the first Communist organisation in the University of Barcelona. 
According to Goytisolo:
We knew the party supported the invasion, they had told us so. But we had read an 
edition of the magazine Temps Moderns, edited by Sartre, about the changes in 
Hungary. It was written by those who had been arrested, and we realised that they 
were right. I cannot talk for the people that I don’t know, but for those I do, I can 
say our attitude of support to the party was almost a moral attitude of support to the 
only existent opposition in the country. But real Communists, aside from Sacristan, I 
don’t think that there were many others.79
Moreover, the students were being taken over by a sense of destiny. As Sole 
Tura says about his first meeting with Nunez:
The truth is that I was captivated by Miguel Nufiez. He was a legendary character, 
even if we had not heard anything about him until that moment. He was so because 
he was a clandestine leader and also because he behaved very naturally. We felt that 
we were talking to a myth, but a myth that was offering us the possibility of sharing 
his condition as such. We, students without experience, called on him to take an 
active role in the final struggle against Francoism. That humble and accessible hero 
was opening a door that we felt to be immensely distant and was putting within our 
reach the possibility of being real protagonists in a collective moment.80
Whether it is for reasons of morality or as a way to participate in the 
overthrow of the regime, the first Communist organisation in the University of 
Barcelona had finally been established two years after that of Madrid. Pellisa became 
the person in charge and was also responsible for the contacts with the leadership of 
the party. There followed a period of activity that reached its peak during the tram 
strike of January 1957..
D. The Transport Strikes
79 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
80 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 92.
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1. Barcelona 1957
On 9 January 1957, the people of Barcelona were faced with a new increase in the 
tram fares. The PSUC, as well as other organisations, carried out an intense campaign 
calling for a boycott against public transport to start on 14 January. Their efforts 
proved to be very successful. For two weeks, the trams were hardly used.81 The 
students participated massively in the strike and portraits of Franco and Jose Antonio 
Primo de Rivera were burned. As a result, the police occupied the University and 
arrested several students, among them Joaquim Jorda who was detained on 17 
January. Two days earlier, Emiliano Fabregas, a member of the PSUC’s Political 
Bureau, had also been arrested and accused of printing the leaflets of the boycott.82 
Classes were suspended until the following month and many students expelled from 
the University.
However, the effects of the strike were not over and the regime would soon 
have to face a new outburst of activity in the University. In fact, the students' support 
for the cause had been considerably increased by the repression. As soon as classes 
were resumed in mid February, they began to organise an assembly for the following 
21 February. When the day came, more than 700 students locked themselves in the 
Paraninfo. Domenec Madolell, who had been very active during the actions of the 
previous months, proclaimed the meeting in the Paraninfo to be the first Free 
Assembly of Students of the University of Barcelona. His colleagues embraced the 
idea. A number of resolutions were then approved and a manifesto read out: the 
students called for the police to stop entering the university campus; for the 
abandonment of the disciplinary proceedings started against some students as a result
81 J&uregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 230.
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of the tram strike of January; for the dissolution of the SEU; for the celebration of a 
National Congress of Students and the organisation of a free student trade union; and 
for freedom of speech, language and association.83 According to Sole Tura:
That half-improvised, half-structured meeting with almost a thousand students, 
ended up becoming a great encounter, an act of confraternity and a collective 
affirmation and, overall, an act of denunciation of the regime and a general call for 
freedom.84
Shortly afterwards, the police arrived and surrounded the Paraninfo. The 
students refused to come out and stayed for several hours. Eventually, they were 
forced to leave one by one with their student identities to hand so that the police 
could check them. Those who were suspected of being the leaders of the action were 
arrested. A few days later, the authorities announced that the female students 
involved in the action would be reprimanded and the male students expelled from the 
university until the following academic year. Subsequently, an important number of 
intellectuals and personalities connected to university life, such as Buero Vallejo, 
Gregorio Maranon and Enrique Tiemo Galvan, wrote a letter to the Minister of 
Education asking for these sanctions against the students to be lifted.85 A similar 
letter also addressed to the Minister was signed by a significant number of students at 
the University of Madrid a few days later.86
Aside from the sanctions on the students, important activists were also 
arrested by the police such as Francesc Vicens, who had just taken charge of the 
small intellectual organisation of the PSUC, and Octavi Pellisa. The repression 
represented the first important blow against the Communist intellectual and student
82 For more information about those arrested see Vilar, Anti-franquismo, pp. 262-264.
83 “Los universitarios espanoles en la lucha contra la dictadura franquista y por la amnistia”, June 
1960, AHPCE.
84 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 97.
85 “La anulacion de las sanciones contra los Estudiantes de Barcelona”, Mundo Obrero, March 1957.
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organisations in Barcelona, which according to Goytisolo were almost dismantled at 
that point.87 However, the events of February 1957 in Barcelona would eventually 
lead to the adoption of some of the changes called for by the students as the 
authorities felt sufficiently pressured to bring about a certain degree of reform in the 
University. This could be most clearly seen in the reorganisation of the SEU in 
October 1958, when democratic representation of the students at Faculty level was 
introduced.88
A few weeks after the Assembly, the university organisation of the PSUC 
began to regroup under the command of Sole Tura who had replaced Pellisa. 
“Without any experience and with a rather rudimentary political education, I found
on
myself acting as the person in charge of the university cell”, he writes. At first, it 
was almost impossible for them to carry out anything of importance. This was 
particularly the case following the arrest in the autumn 1957 of Miguel Nunez, who 
was blamed for the organisation of the tram strike the previous January.90 However, 
shortly afterwards the organisation of the party in Barcelona would become involved 
in one of the most ambitious projects of the PCE: a general strike that came to be 
known as the Jornada de Reconciliacion Nacional (National Reconciliation Day, 
JRN). As we shall now see, the idea for this action, decided and orchestrated in 
exiled, was sparked off by the transport boycott in Madrid that came as a direct result 
of the tram strike in Barcelona.
86 “Lo que piden los estudiantes”, Mundo Obrero, March 1957.
87 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
88 While the president of the SEU and the presidents of the districts would still be appointed by the 
government, the Chamber of Delegates in each faculty was now to be formed by elected 
representatives, Maravall, Dictatorship, p. 103; Salvador Giner de San Julian, “Power, Freedom and 
Social Change...” in Preston, Spain, p. 192.
89 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 98.
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2. The transport boycott in Madrid
For the duration of the tram strike in Barcelona, there had been several attempts to
carry out solidarity actions in the city of Madrid but all had been unsuccessful. In late
January, however, Simon Sanchez Montero, the person in charge of the PCE’s
workers’ organisation in the capital, had a meeting in his house with two party
delegates, Luis Lucio Lobato and Juan Soler. To respond to the events in Barcelona,
it was then decided to organise a two-day long boycott of transport in Madrid 7 and 8
February 1957. Montero wrote an appeal for the strike to the people and sent the text
to Paris so that it could be aired by Radio Pirenaica. Among other things, it said:
People of Madrid! As in Fuenteovejuna, WE MUST ALL UNITE TOGETHER! 
The route marked out by the people of Barcelona is the road to victory. It is the 
road which will lead to the end of all the thefts by the government, the expensive 
living standards and the misery. It is the road which will lead to the overthrow of the 
dictatorship of General Franco and which will achieve democracy in Spain.91
A few days later, Semprun met with S&nchez Montero and expressed 
reservations about the possible success of the action. He thought that the people 
might not react to their call since, unlike in Barcelona, the tram fares had not been 
raised in Madrid. “You’ll see”, Sanchez Montero replied. With Semprun was 
Francisco Romero Marin, an associate member of the party’s Political Bureau who at 
the time was only visiting the capital to report on events back in Paris but who would 
later become part of the clandestine apparatus of the PCE in Madrid. The next step 
for the Communist organisation was to print and distribute all around the capital 
leaflets about the strike. When the day came, the people reacted as Sanchez Montero 
had predicted. In the words of Semprun:
90 He was tortured and then sentenced to twenty-five years and six months in prison, Jauregui and 
Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 231.
91 Radio Espafia Independiente, 5 February 1957, AHPCE.
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The boycott was massive, a surprise for us. We were shocked by the success, I think 
it was die most exciting political day of my life, the day that Madrid did not take the 
trams and a flow of people went to work and returned from work by foot, walking... 
it was really something. Romero Marin, who we called Aurelio, was in Spain at that 
moment. It was his first time in Madrid when he suddenly run into a ‘river of 
people’ flowing down the Cibeles, walking up and down because they were not 
taking the trams.92
The students also tried to show their solidarity with the strike by congregating 
around the front doors of the old University, but the police managed to disperse most 
of them before they reached their destination.93 They then walked to the Calle Gran 
Via calling for freedom and cheering for Barcelona.94 The success of the strike had 
been such that even the Francoist press reported on it.95 More significantly, this strike 
as well as the one in Barcelona the previous month and the student riots in Madrid in 
1956, served to increase the optimism of the PCE leadership in exile regarding the 
actions that could be carried out against the regime. Mundo Obrero published the 
following headline: “In an impressive civic demonstration, the people of Madrid tell 
Franco to go”.96 It is important to remember that the workers’ movement until then 
had been rather quiet. Since the tram strike in Barcelona in 1951, the only strikes of 
importance had taken place in the spring of 1956 in Pamplona, the Basque Country 
and Asturias, and these were economic protests. The workers were reacting to the 
drastic rise in the cost of living. They demanded a minimum salary, something to 
which the government eventually agreed though not at the level the workers had 
hoped for. It would be the success of the transport boycott in Madrid, a political 
demonstration, that had the most impact on the party’s expectations on both the 
power of strikes and the workers’ movement. The latter was starting to regain its
92 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
93 Farga, Universidad, pp. 49-50; “Las manifestaciones estudiantiles”, Mundo Obrero, February 1957.
94 “Los universitarios espaholes en la lucha contra la dictadura franquista y por la amnistia”, June 
1960, AHPCE.
95 Sdnchez Montero, Memorias, p. 233.
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prominence in the eyes of the exiled leadership after a period of emphasis on the 
student and intellectual organisations. However, as Semprun points out:
On the basis of this initiative in Madrid, without analysing it thoroughly, just 
because it had worked out, Carrillo began to elaborate the idea of enlarging these 
strikes. At first, I thought that it was only logical that we gave more consistence, 
more organisation and more coherence, even ideological, to the strikes, which until 
then had been partially spontaneous, or done with very little resources. On the other 
hand, these strikes succeeded because there was a spontaneity in the struggle, but if 
you raise the targets too quickly, on the basis of your own wishes, that are laudable 
and respectable but that are not the wishes of those who actually have to go on strike 
(the workers who are not Francoist but from whom you’re asking that they should 
risk losing their job and freedom), then, a big gap appears and it is a gap that is 
humanly legitimate and real. So from that point onwards, we tried to impose a single 
shape to these strikes, when the good thing would have been to continue to support 
the movements that would spontaneously emerge.97
As we shall see in the next chapter, the PCE would then embark on a policy 
aimed at organising a series of major peaceful strikes in order to create a crisis that 
would lead to the overthrow of Franco’s regime. The first attempt in this direction 
was the Jornada de Reconciliacion Nacional.
3. The workers’ movement
At this point, it is important to give some general background to the effects that the 
recent economic changes in Spain were having on the workers’ movement. This will 
help to put into context the policy of general strikes followed by the PCE and some 
of the reasons for its failure. As has been explained above, the beginning of the Cold 
War had marked the end of Spain’s political isolation, especially through the 
development of relations with the USA that had soon taken the form of economic 
aid. In exchange for this assistance, the regime of General Franco was forced to
96 Mundo Obrero, February 1957.
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abandon its policy of autarchy and gradually embraced new liberal economic 
policies. This change led to an expansion in economic activity, which also influenced 
industrial relations.
In 1956, two decrees were introduced to allow management to work more 
independently from the state, and make firms more competitive while stimulating 
productivity. As the economy developed, the labour movement began to gain 
strength. State control over labour relations and the Vertical Syndicates no longer 
responded to the demands for agreements on productivity and wage increases in the 
growing economy. A new type of workers representation, which did not exist within 
the corporatist order, needed to be established. As a result, there was a development 
in informal collective bargaining and workers representation at the shop-floor level in 
the mid 1950s. The government tried to respond to this by creating between 1953 and 
1958 the so-called Jurados de Empresa (similar to the shop steward committees) and 
a system of collective bargaining.
These changes allowed for the reorganisation of the working-class movement. 
The Jurados de Empresa came to be used by underground groups as legal platforms 
for working class mobilizations. As we will see below, this would eventually lead to 
the creation of Comisiones Obreras in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the party saw in this 
transformation evidence only of the weakness of the regime but failed to appreciate 
the change of mentality that was taking place. As happened during the economic 
strikes of March 1958 in the mines of Asturias, their successful resolution was 
achieved by the use of a new system of collective bargaining. Subsequently, it 
became less likely that a general strike would take place as the workers came to see
97 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
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the possibilities opening up in the new system and became less willing to risk their 
livelihoods.
E. Conclusion
The months that followed the secret speech of Khrushchev in March 1956 set the 
limits of the destalinisation process in the Soviet Union and the satellite states of 
Eastern Europe. Hungary and Poland were the first victims of the false expectations 
created by the thaw that had taken place in the Communist movement after the death 
of Stalin. As for the PCE, its support of the Soviet Union and its reaction to the 
criticisms emanating from their own organisation in Mexico, confirmed that the party 
was not willing to take reform any further. The Stalinist methods that had been so 
suddenly rejected after two decades of praise were back in action.
In Spain, the aftermath of February 1956 also brought about a period of 
activity in the university that saw the emergence of several organisations, which 
would join the Communists in the opposition against the regime. However, the 
party’s desire to control these forces often ended in failure, as was the case with the 
ASU. This would in the future damage the Communists’ chances of achieving a 
coalition among the opposition forces in Spain, since many of them would find it 
difficult to trust the PCE. At the same time, the party was involved in a number of 
strikes and demonstrations against the Franco regime that often surpassed the 
leadership’s expectations. As had been the case in the University of Madrid from 
1954 to 1956, by supporting the movements that would spontaneously emerge in the 
country, the PCE had been able to help direct the action and focus the discontent of 
the people into political protest. However, this strategy would not prevail. Based on
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recent successes, the party would embark on a policy of general strikes that ignored 
the structural changes that were taking place within Spanish society and 
overestimated the readiness of the people to struggle under the leadership of the 
Communists.
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V. DISSENT
A. Introduction
This chapter will look at the policy followed by the PCE after the events that 
culminated in the transport strikes of Barcelona and Madrid in 1957. The exiled 
leadership, after years of claiming that the regime was about to fall with a frustrating 
lack of results, was quick to embrace the successes of these strikes as a precursor to 
“the final assault”. This led to the party advocating the organisation of national 
general strikes in Spain to overthrow the regime. Though there were voices inside the 
country that urged caution, the leadership ignored them. Those who had left Spain 
almost twenty years before argued that activists in Spain were too isolated to be able 
to see the true reality of the situation.
In September 1957, the party summoned the so-called Jornada de 
Reconciliacion Nacional for 5 May 1958. Less than a year later, the party embarked 
on the organisation of a new general strike, the Huelga Nacional Pacifica (National 
Peaceful Strike, HNP). Both actions called for high commitment from the activists in 
Spain, who put themselves at risk in the preparations. However, their efforts would 
be in vain. Though the leadership insisted on portraying both the JRN and the HNP 
as successful, the truth was that both actions failed dramatically. As we shall see, this 
would mark the beginning of the divisions within the leadership that had reached the 
highest positions in the party after the power struggle of 1956. In addition, the
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intellectuals and students who had joined the party in the mid 1950s and played such 
an important role in rebuilding the opposition movement in Spain would now start to 
question the party’s policy and its internal structure. Carrillo’s insistence on the 
success of the strikes only created further suspicion among them since they were well 
aware of the barrenness of their efforts. Moreover, the celebration of the VI 
Congress, aimed at neutralizing the negative effects of the party’s recent failures, 
would eventually have the opposite effect when most of those who had attended were 
arrested on their return to Spain. As we shall see, this period would mark the 
beginning of the end of the most powerful underground organisation the PCE had 
had in Spain since the end of the Spanish Civil War.
B. “Jornadismo”
1. The JRN
After the success of the transport strikes in Barcelona and Madrid, the party began 
preparing a press boycott in the capital to take place on 28 March. This would 
become the first example of the PCE’s failure to adjust to or clearly perceive the real 
situation in Spain. The attempt failed and actually led to several arrests. The party 
was forced to take Sanchez Montero and Soler out of the country, as there was fear 
for their safety during the ensuing repression. Soler would actually remain in Paris 
for many years while Montero would return to Madrid seven months later.1 
Nevertheless, the press boycott did not deter the party from the idea of a national
194
2
strike to overthrow the Franco regime, a policy known as Jornadismo. Several
factors contributed to the leadership’s decision to follow this route.
Firstly, as mentioned, the success of the February transport strike in Madrid
made the party believe that the time was ripe to move forwards in the struggle. As
was pointed out in an article published in Mundo Obrero the following April:
We have reached a situation in which the masses not only feel the need to act but 
also can see the material possibility o f doing so. What an immense force this lever 
represents! Through the experience o f the masses and the forces that are organising 
for action, the conditions are being created for a leap to superior forms, for the 
culmination o f a great national demonstration in which the whole o f Spain will 
affirm itself in a unanimous plebiscite.3
Secondly, according to Santiago Carrillo, the party’s abandonment of a 
violent route to overthrow the dictator had made a national peaceful strike the only 
choice:
The idea o f a national strike, o f a movement with a pacific national character, 
emerged because we had renounced the violent popular revolt that we thought was 
possible during the 1940s. When the perspective o f an armed movement against 
Franco was shown to be impossible, we came to the conclusion that a national 
strike, in which the bourgeoisie would participate with demonstrations in the streets, 
could develop into a peaceful movement that would eventually overthrow the 
dictatorship. We were basing this concept also on other experiences such as the one 
in Colombia, where an apparently spontaneous movement that went out in the street 
and demonstrated in a unanimous manner forced the dictator to leave.4
Thirdly, the reshuffle in Franco’s cabinet in February 1957 convinced the 
PCE leadership that the regime was now weaker than ever before. Carrillo would say: 
“this is not a simple governmental crisis, but a crisis of the ruling dictatorship.”5 
Hence, the leadership reasoned, the time had come for the Communists to lead the 
final blow against the dictator with a mass action. To place this change of cabinet of
1 Sanchez Montero, Memorias, pp. 234-235; Juaregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 233.
2 “La opinion nacional en marcha”, Mundo Obrero, 15 April 1957.
3 “La opinidn nacional en marcha”, Mundo Obrero, 15 April 1957.
4 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001. The Dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla was 
overthrown on 10 May 1957.
Franco’s government in context, we have to go back to 1956 and the nomination of
Arrese as the new Minister-Secretary of the Movimiento following the student riots of
February 1956.6 From that point onwards, Arrese worked to regain a central role for
the Falange and eventually elaborated a draft of Leyes Fundamentales for this
purpose. However, when the text became known, it received strong criticisms from
all quarters. As Preston explains, “Monarchists, Catholics, archbishops and generals
joined in opposing a text which proposed giving the Movimiento totalitarian control
over all aspects of Spanish life”. Eventually, the battle was won by those such as
Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco and the administrative lawyer Laureano Lopez Rodo,
who defended an authoritarian monarchy instead of a single party to guarantee the
continuity of Francoism. This confrontation between the political families inside the
regime combined with the economic crisis the country was going through and the
strikes that had been taking place in recent weeks, forced Franco to reshuffle his
cabinet. On 22 February, he announced the changes to his ministers. The new
appointments confirmed the decline of the historic Falange and the rise of the
technocrats of Opus Dei who would initiate the much-needed reform of the Spanish
economy.8 As has been mentioned, the economic reform would have important
effects in the country, transforming among other things the workers’ movement.
According to Preston:
Over the next two years, it would become clear that the new appointments had 
meant the abandonment of every economic idea that the Caudillo had ever held dear 
and the uninhibited embrace of modem capitalism.9
5 Statement of the PCE, 9 February 1957, and comment of the PCE on the crisis, 2 March 1957, 
AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 38).
6 See chapter III, section C (The Student riots).
7 Preston, Franco, p. 662.
8 Carr and Fusi, Spain, p. 173.
9 Preston, Franco, p. 666.
The last factor that contributed to the PCE’s embrace of a national strike
came from a development in the opposition movement in exile. On 23 February
1957, Spanish political forces in exile met in Paris, without the PCE, to discuss their
response to a document recently signed by Enrique Tiemo Galvan, Dionisio Ridruejo
and Jose Maria Gil Robles that favoured a Monarchist solution to Spain.10 They
proceeded to sign their own document that came to be known as the “Pact of Paris”,
where they advocated the replacement of Franco’s regime with a provisional
government that would consult the people to decide on whether Spain was to be a
Monarchy or a Republic. Initially, the Spanish Communists reacted to their exclusion
from the meeting by expressing their support for the main points of the Pact of Paris,
hoping to obtain a positive reaction from the signatories.11 However, their
conciliatory attitude did not pay off: they continued to be ignored by those that,
during the last two decades, had grown more and more suspicious of their every
move. Consequently, as Mor&n explains:
The only possible resort was “to go to the masses”, something which when 
translated in plain language meant that they had to foster popular actions that would 
serve to hound both the regime and the anti-Communist opposition through the 
exhibition o f the PCE’s potential.12
In September 1957, during a meeting of the Central Committee, the leadership 
decided to issue a call for the organisation of a national strike to overthrow Franco’s 
regime, the so-called Jornada de Reconciliacion Nacional.13 Sanchez Montero, the 
person responsible for giving the report on the JRN during the meeting, described the
10 J&uregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, pp. 207-208; Tusell, Oposicion, pp. 362-366.
11 Meeting of the Political Bureau, March 1957.
12 Mordn, Miseria, p. 312.
13 Resolution on the Jornada de Reconciliacion Nacional, September 1957, AHPCE 
(DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 38); Ibarruri & W AA, Historia del PCE, p. 261.
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JRN as “a demonstration against the high cost of living, against the economic policy 
of the dictatorship, for a wide-ranging amnesty of prisoners and exiles and for 
freedom”.14 Moreover, according to the official history of the PCE:
The party conceived it (the JRN) as the culmination o f a series o f small and large 
actions; as the work o f thousands o f organisers and agitators o f all social classes, of 
all anti-Francoist ideologies and parties; as the coming together o f Catholics, 
Monarchists, Liberals, Republicans, Nationalists, Socialists, the CNT and 
Communists.15
A few weeks later, the date for the strike was set for 5 May 1958.
Regardless of the leadership’s expectations, many party activists inside Spain did not 
believe that the situation was ripe for an action of this magnitude. They received the 
news for the planning of the JRN with disbelief. According to Sole Tura, the idea 
was seen as a “leap into the abyss”.16 When they expressed their reservations about 
the project, the leadership refused to listen and told them that they lacked faith and 
were too isolated to perceive the mood of the masses and the weakness of the 
dictatorship. The changes in the cabinet, the recent strikes and the widening of the 
opposition movement were seen by those in exile as clear indications that the 
moment had come for a national strike. It was up to the Communists to steer the 
masses and other political forces into such an ambitious project. The rest of the 
political forces in exile that had dared to exclude the PCE from their plans would 
now see with whom they were dealing. However, time would show that the leaders in 
exile were allowing their illusionsto take precedence over the reality in Spain: the 
crisis of the regime, the protests of the masses and even the rise in activism of groups
14 Meeting of the Central Committee, “Las luchas de las masas y la Jornada Nacional de Demostracion 
Pacifica” by Vicente Sainz (Simon Sanchez Montero), September 1957, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, 
Carp. 38); also see Resolution of the Central Committee on the JRN, September 1957, AHPCE 
(DOCUMENTOS, Actas del Pleno del CC, Carp. 10 Tomo III).
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such as the Christian-Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Nationalists, might all have
been true to a certain extent. However, these advances did not necessarily mean that
the great majority of people were willing to go out in the streets on the command of
the Communists, risking their livelihoods and freedom. Nor did the party have the
strength to organise such a massive enterprise. As pointed by Sole Tura when
speaking about Catalonia:
The party was forgetting that in Barcelona and Catalonia there was hardly anyone, 
that the organisation o f the party had been destroyed, that we did not know o f any 
other group who would be willing to fling itself into such an action and that we, 
particularly, did not have the people or the means to organise a strike in Barcelona, 
let alone Catalonia.17
Such problems were not restricted to Catalonia, of course. As we shall see, 
the strike proved to be a failure throughout Spanish territory. In his memoirs, Carrillo 
justified the organisation of the JRN and the national strike of 1959 as experiments, 
rehearsals: “By the end of the 1950s, it was thought among the party leadership that 
the idea of a peaceful national strike had to be popularised amongst the Spaniards 
before it came off; that some rehearsals were needed.”18 However, as the 
Communists well knew, 1950s Spain was no place for rehearsals: organising and 
participating in a strike was a risky enterprise that could lead those involved to arrests 
and long periods in imprisonment, and even the death penalty. In fact, nothing 
suggests the party’s goal at the time was simply to popularise the idea among 
Spaniards. The organisation of the JRN was taken very seriously, a great deal of time 
and effort went into its preparation; and, as the documents of the time suggest, great 
results were expected. The methods used to organise the strike were, nevertheless,
15 Ib&rruri & W AA , Historia del PCE, p. 262.
16 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 107.
17 Sole Tura, Memorias, pp. 107-108.
18 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 487.
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rudimentary. In Barcelona, the party organisation in the university led by Sole Tura 
had only a simple manual duplicating machine for printing the leaflets calling for 
support for the action. Around 30,000 leaflets were claimed to have been handed out 
in the city.19 In Madrid, the resources were similar to those in Barcelona. In February 
1958, S&nchez Montero arrived in the capital to help with the preparations, but 
confronted a difficult situation with little support from other political groups of the 
opposition. It did not help the Communists that Javier Pradera, the activist in charge 
of the party’s relation with other political groups, had been in prison since the new- 
year after being arrested for attending the VI Youth Festival in Moscow in the 
summer of 1957.20
Moreover, in exile, the PSOE was refusing to talk to the PCE and did not 
even reply to a letter written by Santiago Carrillo for a meeting to discuss the 
possibility of a national strike. The PCE had been attempting to have talks with the 
PSOE since the summer of 1956. The Socialists ignored their calls and by the end of 
1956, Fernando Claudin published an article in Mundo Obrero comparing the 
Socialist leadership to the Francoist leadership and to the “most reactionary elements
tof the whole world”. In April 1957, Carrillo and Lister decided to pay a surprise 
visit to Llopis at the PSOE’s headquarters in Paris. Under pressure, he agreed to see 
them but the conversation did not lead anywhere. Moreover, before long, Llopis 
informed the PSOE’s rank-and-file that the meeting had no significance whatsoever
19 “Los universitarios espanoles en la lucha contra la dictadura franquista y por la amnistia”, June 
1960, AHPCE.
20 Basic precautions were overlooked by those in charge of sending the students to the Congress. For 
instance, the students returned to Spain in groups instead of one by one and did not bother using 
aliases. As they arrived, the authorities proceeded to arrest them. Among the 44 arrested were Javier 
Pradera, Emilio Sanz Hurtado, Fernando Sanchez Drag6, Julian Marcos, Javier Maguerza, Carlos 
Alvarez and Eloy Terron. Their case came to be known as the “prosecution of the 44”. They would be 
liberated a few months later thanks to the general pardon given by the regime after the death of Pope 
Pio XII in October 1958. For a tale of the events surrounding the arrests see S&nchez Drag6, Una vida, 
pp. 57-59, 65-66.
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and warned them against any contacts with the PCE.22 A new attempt was made the 
following October without results.23 Finally, in March 1958, the PCE published a 
document calling for the unity of all political forces that opposed Franco and blaming 
the Socialists for being “one of the main obstacles” to its achievement.24
Even so expectations continued to grow, a result both of the activists’ desire to go 
into action and the leadership’s insistence that the time was ripe. According to 
Mugica, who travelled to Paris to finalize the details of the JRN with the exiled 
leaders, “we, the Communist youth of the time, would go to Paris and after 
conversing with the leadership, our possible doubts would disappear and we would 
return with the same spirit to the fatherland”'25 However, the fighting spirit of the 
activists and their trust in the party leadership were about to be tested by more than 
words.
2. The failure and “success” of the JRN
During the long months of preparation, the party did not manage to gather support 
from other political groups for the Jornada and also found it hard to get their 
message across to the masses due to the difficulties imposed by clandestinity and the 
lack of propaganda tools. Nevertheless, throughout this time, the leadership
21 “Sobre una respuesta negativa”, Mundo Obrero, November-Deceraber 1956.
22 Mor&n, Miseria, p. 320.
23 Letter of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PCE, October 1957, AHPCE 
(DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 38).
24 “Ante la situation en Espafia el PCE se dirige a todas las Fuerzas politicas y sociales del pais”, 
March 1958, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS Carp. 39).
25 Mugica, Itinerario, pp. 60-61.
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maintained that they were getting a terrific response from the people and that the JRN
was going to be a success. One month before the Jornada, Mundo Obrero said:
During this time, very many intellectuals have been the spokesmen o f this idea (the 
JRN) that Spain has made its own. Repeatedly, they have announced the Jornada de 
Reconciliation National in cultural associations and universities, in professional 
gatherings and literary circles.26
According to Mugica, one of the reasons the leadership in exile thought the
strike was going to succeed was because they believed the positive reports that came
from the activists in Spain. At the same time, the activists in Spain would transmit to
the leaders in exile the positive reports they knew those in Paris wanted to read.
“They all lived in a bubble. Carrillo even told me that they had been forced to
exercise moderation among the comrades in Valencia because the masses could not
wait to go out on the streets. . .”27 It is not surprising that this catch-22 situation arose:
not only was the perspective of a positive outcome very attractive but also, whenever
anyone had previously expressed doubt about the party line they had been
admonished. Such had been the case of Sole Tura and Mugica himself.
As the day came closer, the activity of the party increased. There were calls to
the students, the workers and the peasants, even to those in exile who were asked to
donate their salary of the day of the JRN to the party as a gesture of solidarity with
the people in Spain and to help the activists in their task.28 However, when the day
came, the masses did not respond to the call of the PCE, as some activists had
warned. Sole Tura’s description of the day goes as follows:
We distributed ourselves among different neighbourhoods so that we could directly 
check the results o f the strike and the force o f the demonstrations. I had to cover 
Poble Nou and there I went with my motorbike, ready to count the thousands and
26 “La participation de los intelectuales”, Mundo Obrero, 30 April 1958.
27 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
28 Manifesto of the Spanish Communist party for the 1st of May, 30 April 1958 (DOCUMENTOS, 
Carp. 39); “A las organizaciones y militantes del partido que se encuentran en la emigration”, April 
1958, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 39).
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thousands o f demonstrators and participate in the massive struggle. But to my great 
surprise and consternation, I could see that in Poble Nou not a single factory or 
commercial enterprise had closed down, all the trams were working normally and 
not the least symptom o f a strike could be felt, not even ten people together. That 
night we met to make a balance and we all arrived to the same conclusion: there had 
been no strikes, neither large nor small. The Jornada had been a failure.29
In San Sebastian, the most successful and expressive sample of the action was 
the scattering of leaflets in the streets by an activist who had a motorbike.30 As 
Mugica explains:
When the moment o f truth came, the inevitable happened and the Jornada went flat 
as a balloon that had been punctured by mere contact with reality, because reality 
had many more edges than the wise promoters o f the great idea thought.31
Luis Goytisolo points to the lack of information the masses had regarding the 
JRN. While everyone had been aware of the tram strike in January 1957, on this 
occasion the PCE had proved incapable of transmitting the message. “The people in 
the street did not know about the strike, and even if they had known, they would have 
never understood it,” Goytisolo explains.32 Semprun, who at the time praised the 
strike, would later say that by the party’s standards, the JRN had in fact been a 
failure, “a failure when compared to what had been thought, expected and 
announced.” Claudin would describe the mobilization for the action as 
“minimal”.34 Still the party refused to recognize that their project had failed and 
regardless of the evidence, the JRN was portrayed as a great success. Mundo Obrero 
dedicated a special issue to the Jornada, which was said to have brought to Spain 
“hours of excitement and hope”. As its description of the day became more detailed, 
it also became more surreal:
29 Sole Tura, Un historia, p. 109.
30 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 61.
31 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 61.
32 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
33 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
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During the course of 5 May, the almost totality of workers in construction in Madrid 
and Valencia; and a great number of workers in the metallurgical, graphic arts, 
chemistry and transport industries of these cities, including the Valencians Dockers, 
have gone on a total or partial strike.
A considerable number of workers have participated in the Jornada in the 
same manner in Murcia, Guipuzcoa, Seville, Zaragoza, Malaga, Alcoy, Sabadell, 
Jaen, Valladolid, Asturias, Galicia, Leon, Torrelavega, Santa Cruz de Tenerife and 
other places.
In many agricultural towns of the Levant, Andalusia, Extremadura and 
Castile, the agricultural workers have stopped working for the first time since 
fascism has existed; thousands of peasants have joined the action in different ways, 
for instance, by not going to buy products to the market.
A very exciting feature has been the participation of women in the Jornada, 
handing out leaflets, refusing to do their shopping, etc.
In a general manner, the small and medium merchants and industrialists 
have contributed actively to the Jornada becoming a success and popularising it. 
Employees and civil servants sympathised openly with the demonstration, and in 
Madrid, Valencia and other places, they have shown this by refusing to use the 
trams and buses and in some cases, remaining inactive in their offices.33
A year later, in a letter to Pasionaria talking about the preparation of the
forthcoming HNP, Carrillo described to her how the repressive forces had been
totally “overwhelmed during the JRN and did not know where to go”.36 In 1960, the
official history of the PCE continued to give credence to this version of events:
The Francoist government used all its repressive apparatus against the Jornada. The 
Army was mobilized with the excuse of a military parade on 4 May; the big cities 
were militarily occupied. The VI Fleet of the USA placed itself in the main Spanish 
harbours of the Mediterranean, backing the dictatorship with its presence.37
Those who had supported the JRN could be counted in the millions, they 
maintained. Of course, the party leaders could not explain how under such pressure 
the regime had not crumbled that day, something which should have occurred had 
any of their interpretations been backed up by reality. Those who had seen with their
34 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 134.
35 “Declaracion del Partido Communista de EspafLa sobre la Jornada de Reconciliation Nacional”, 
Mundo Obrero, 15-31 May 1958.
36 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 9 June 1959, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores 
Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4); also see “A las jerarquias eclesiasticas, a los catolicos 
espanoles”, 24 May 1958, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 39)
37 Ibarruri & W AA , Historia del PCE, p. 264
38 Ibarruri & W AA, Historia del PCE, p. 264.
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own eyes the failure of the JRN not surprisingly demanded answers from the 
leadership. According to Sole Tura:
From the initial disappointment we moved to a feeling of rage: we had already told 
them that there were no conditions for a general strike, they had not listened to us 
and the result was a failure, a step backwards. We demanded an explanation and we 
refused to accept new orders just like that one for the JRN unless they would be well 
founded. That was the message I had to transmit to the leadership when a few weeks 
later I was summoned to Paris to analyse events.39
Upon his arrival in Paris, Sole Tura was taken to Prague where he then met
Santiago Carrillo and Jorge Semprun. He would soon be introduced to other historic
leaders such as Dolores Ibarruri, Antonio Mije, Enrique Lister and even Vicente
Uribe. From Prague, he travelled with the leadership to East Germany where a
meeting would finally take place to discuss the latest events. Once in East Germany,
he had dinner with Josep Moix, General Secretary of the PSUC, and Gregorio Lopez
Raimundo. The transcript of their conversation evokes very well the parody of the
situation. Once Sole Tura confirmed his intention to reveal that the strike had been a
total failure, he was told by Moix:
-We understand very well your worries and your disenchantment after the effort that 
you made. But we want to clarify a few things for you so that you have a global 
perspective that you unavoidably lack. You will then be able to explain it in detail to 
the other comrades. We appreciate your immense work and surely, you were in no 
condition to do much more, but you did not go all the way and you missed some 
things. For instance, where were you on the day of the strike?
-In Poble Nou- I replied-. And the other comrades had been posted around every 
neighbourhood of Barcelona.
-And what did you see?
-Nothing, absolutely nothing. Not the most remote sign of strikes. No one stopped. 
-But this was in Barcelona, right?- insisted Moix-. And who was in Badalona? And 
in L’Hospitalet?
-We did not get to Badalona and L’Hospitalet- I answered-, but we did not hear 
about any big factory closing there for the strike.
-So- exclaimed Moix- You do not know that in Badalona the whole Cros and the 
whole industry halted. And in L’Hospitalet the whole metal industry stopped too? 
And in Sabadell the whole textile industry stopped as well?
I was bewildered and I did not know if I had understood well.
39 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 109.
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-Are you telling me that there was a strike in the whole of Catalonia except for
Barcelona?-1 finally asked.
-Exactly.40
Furthermore, he was told the JRN had also been a success in Madrid and 
Andalusia. After the meeting, Sole Tura concluded that, just as the leadership had 
been insisting, activists in Spain indeed had a limited point of view. He could not 
distrust what he was being told and hence felt he could no longer talk about a failure 
at the coming meeting with the PCE leaders. Instead, he gave them an optimistic 
appraisal of the situation in the University and Catalan society in general. Only 
Claudin would later question him in private about what had really happened in 
Barcelona during the JRN. According to Sole Tura, by the end of the meeting, the 
leadership was euphoric and the decision was reached that they should organise as 
soon as possible a new general strike, even greater than the last one. “Optimism was 
necessary, but as we would see early enough, an optimism removed from tangible 
facts and the immediate reality could take you directly to crisis and confrontation”, 
Sole Tura explains. He then went back to Barcelona and told the rest of the activists 
about the success of the JRN that they had somehow missed. Their response was not 
very enthusiastic and even Sole Tura’s recent optimism started to evaporate. 
Eventually, he wondered about the reasons behind the leadership’s misrepresentation 
of reality. The JRN was the first test of the new leaders and their new political 
orientation. Hence, to recognize failure would have meant to diminish their value 
before the old guard. “Was it us, those in Spain, who had to endorse, precisely, the 
new policy with the immediate evidence of action?”, S0I6 Tura asked himself.41 
There seems to be some truth behind his reasoning, as the ‘Parisians’ had only
40 Sole Tura, Memorias, pp. 115-116
41 Sole Tura, Memorias, pp. 122-123. Pradera agrees with this interpretation, interview with Javier
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recently reached the high command of the party and there were still those who felt 
bitterness because of this. Nevertheless, subjectivism was nothing new to the PCE. 
Since the end of the Civil War, they had been foretelling the immediate downfall of 
the regime and exaggerating the successes of the opposition against Franco. This 
approach might, at the very beginning, have been a mistake but, as time passed by, it 
could only have been deliberate, as Carrillo would later recognize.42
At any rate, Sole Tura was not the only one who experienced doubts 
regarding the JRN and the party’s appraisal of the action. Among others, Enrique 
Mugica said:
Once the strike was over, we knew that it had not really worked out. Then the party 
said that indeed it had and that made me start doubting. But the argument was that 
even if it had not been a success here, it could have been a success 300 km away, 
and how are you going to doubt what the party tells you?43
Luis Goytisolo would describe the leaders’ attitude as grotesque, “it had been 
a total failure and still they would not accept it”.44 Moreover, the strike had also led 
to the arrest of fellow comrades. Enrique Mugica, arrested with other activists from 
San Sebastian, would spend the next four months and half in prison. During this 
time, he would meet and become close to the Socialist Antonio Amat, his mentor in 
the years to come and an important influence in Mugica’s move from the PCE to the 
PSOE in 1963 45 In addition, while in prison, Sanchez Drago and Julian Marcos 
would face a serious clash with the PCE that would lead to their temporary
Pradera, September 2000. So does Jorge Semprun, interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
42 Contribution to the discussion by Santiago Carrillo to the meeting of the PCE, 11 February 1964, 
AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Plenos Comitd Central); Claudin, Documentos, pp. 61-63.
43 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000.
44 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
45 Fernandez, Mugica, p. 59. This meeting would lead to Mugica leaving the party a few years later. 
Antonio Amat had joined the PSOE in 1952 and was the person in charge of the activity of the party 
inside Spain.
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abandonment of the organisation.46 Through a jail officer of left wing inclinations,
Sanchez Drago had managed to have access to a copy of the newspaper YA. Soon
after this happened, he was contacted by the party leadership in jail:
They told me: ‘Fernando, you cannot pass the YA to your comrades, because it is 
the press of Franco... they read it and they get demoralized. You can read it because 
you are the one who receives it so we allow you to, but once you have read it you 
have to pass it to a censure committee that will be responsible for elaborating a 
newsletter with the news that we think the comrades should read.’ I told myself 
enough was enough; I let the cat out of the bag and told the rest what was 
happening. Then, those from the philosophy faculty (Juli&n Marcos, myself and 
others) decide to break with them and we built our own liberal party.47
They would eventually return to the PCE but their case exposes the distress 
that was starting to be felt by many intellectuals with the ways of the party.
In addition, the failure of the strike further strained the relationship between 
the PCE and other political forces that had been opposed to it from the very 
beginning. According to Claudin, this was also the result of the sectarian and
A Q
disproportionate self-appraisal of the Communist leaders. Still, the official history
of the PCE claims, “the JRN promoted Unitarian currents in the anti-Francoist
camp.”49 In later years, Carrillo would recognize the failure of the national strikes but
he would put the blame on those political forces that did not support the action:
While the Socialists, the Christian-Democrats and the liberals were waiting for 
Franco to die, we wanted to overthrow the regime. This idea was from an early stage 
criticised by the political groups who did not want the Spanish problem to be solved 
in the streets. We defended this position because we wanted a peaceful outcome but 
also we wanted to end the dictatorship. We did not want to wait for Franco to die in 
bed. This was the idea behind the national strikes, and though there was no national 
strike in the end, during the transition there were a lot of strikes, a lot of 
demonstrations that contributed to making acceptable that change had to include the 
PCE, Comisiones Obreras and the forces of the left.50
46 Sanchez Drag6, Una vida, pp. 72-73.
47 Interview with Fernando Sanchez Drago, September 2000.
48 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 135.
49 Ibarruri & W AA, Historia del PCE, p. 264
50 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001. The same argument can also be found in Carrillo, 
Memorias, p. 487.
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Moreover, as Claudin would later explain, inflating the results of the JRN for 
propaganda purposes had other dangerous results, as the party’s evaluation of the 
strike would “actually became the basis for the appreciation of the political situation, 
in which they took as real the possibility of a rapid overthrow of the dictatorship”.51
3. The HNP
The failure of the JRN and the refusal of other political groups to join the PCE in this 
action did not deter the party from pursuing this policy again. During the months that 
followed, the leadership continued to play with the idea of a national strike though it 
was not summoned until March 1959. The decision to go-ahead was triggered after 
an important meeting of the members of Union Espafiola (UE) took place on 29 
January 1959 at the Hotel Menfis in Madrid.52 Union Espafiola, a political 
organisation of liberal Monarchists founded in 1957, favoured a democratic solution 
for Spain and was willing to negotiate with other opposition forces, but not with the 
PCE. The Spanish Communists, feeling alienated, decided to demonstrate their 
strength to the UE, as well as to any others who objected to working with them, by 
calling a new general strike. According to a party report, the Communists’ power to 
mobilize the masses would push these groups into talks: “There came the decision to 
publish three successive editorials in Mundo Obrero, where the idea of a national 
action is outlined that finally shaped into a general strike of 24 hours”.53 The strike
51 Claudin, Documentos, p. 77.
52 Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 211. For more information on Union Espafiola 
see Tusell, Oposicion, pp. 340-349.
53 Letter from Tomas Garcia (Juan Gomez) to Dolores Ib&rruri, 1959, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Tomas 
Garcia, Caja 10, Caip. 3.2).
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known as the Huelga Nacional Pacifica (HNP) would eventually be set for 18 June 
1959.
The quest for support began earlier with a meeting on 11 March between the 
PCE and members of the Christian-Democrat group Izquierda Democratica 
Espafiola (IDC), including its leader Jesus Barros de Lis.54 According to the 
Communist delegation, the IDC expressed its desire to establish an alliance with the 
PCE on the HNP but warned them about the difficulties they could encounter in 
making pacts with other political forces in Spain, such as Union Espafiola. “All these 
groups say: What guaranties does the PCE offer that it is going to comply in the 
future with any agreements that would be adopted?”.55 This attitude, which the party 
had been facing in exile since the end of the Spanish Civil War, made the leadership 
ever more determined in finding further allies for the action in Spain. There were 
conversations between Jorge Semprun, Javier Pradera and Dionisio Ridruejo, now 
leader of a group called Action Democratica Espafiola (ADE), who was not 
convinced about the plan.56 Santiago Carrillo also held talks in Paris with the leader 
of the FLP, Julio Ceron.57 Just like Ridruejo, Ceron was reticent about the wisdom of 
a general strike though eventually the FLP would agree to join the action.58 The PCE 
then proposed to hold a round table the following May with the IDC, the ADE and 
the FLP in the hope that they could achieve better results. However, it never took
54 For more information on the IDC see Tusell, Oposicion, pp. 327-336.
55 Meeting with the representatives of IDC, 11 March 1959, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Activistas, 
Caja 92, Carp. 15).
56 Dinisio Ridruejo had always maintained a very good relationship with both Pradera and Semprun. 
For more information see Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 296-297.
57 Claudin, Carrillo, 138.
58 Letter from Tom&s Garcia (Juan Gomez) to Dolores Ibarruri, 1959, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Tomas 
Garcia, Caja 10, Carp. 3.2); Meeting with the representatives of IDC, 11 March 1959, AHPCE.The 
ADE had been constituted in November 1956. For more information on how this group came about 
see Tusell, Oposicion, pp. 309-310.
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place.59 Nor did the PCE succeed in its attempt to approach Gregorio Maranon and 
the members of Union Espafiola. In the end, only the FLP and the Agrupacion 
Socialista Universitaria (ASU) would join the Communists on the strike. The IDC 
would pull out a day before it took place.
The case of the ASU’s support for the HNP deserves some explanation. The 
arrival at a decision to collaborate with the PCE turned out to be anything but 
smooth. The ASU had faced strong opposition from the Socialist leadership in exile 
regarding their position on this matter, though the tension between the two 
organisations was nothing new. Ever since its foundation, the ASU had kept an 
organic relationship with the PSOE while still trying to maintain a certain degree of 
autonomy. The PSOE agreed to this as long as the young organisation limited its 
sphere of action to the University, something to which its members resisted. Friction 
with the Socialist leaders in exile developed during the following years due, not just 
to structural problems, but also to ideological differences between both organisations. 
The relations of the ASU with the PCE did nothing to improve this. From 1956 to 
1958, the ASU expanded considerably with sections in San Sebastian, Valladolid, 
Valencia and Salamanca. The organisation also came into close contact with the 
Socialist group in Barcelona, Moviment Socialista de Catalunya (MSC). In June 
1957, the ASU founded the Unitarian platform, Union Democratica de Estudiantes
59 Letter from Tom&s Garcia (Juan Gomez) to Dolores Ibarruri, 1959, AHPCE; Letter from Dolores 
Ibarruri to Santiago Carrillo, 1 June 1959, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores Ibarruri, 
Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4); Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 9 June 1959, 
AHPCE.
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(UDE).60 The MSC would take a similar step in Barcelona with the creation of the 
Federation National de Estudiantes de Cataluna (FNEC) on February 1958.61
However, the PCE was not invited to take part in any of these projects. The 
Communists would eventually achieve their Unitarian goals with the creation on 
February 1958 of the Comites de Coordination Universitaria, a platform that aimed 
to unite the efforts of the university opposition to fight for a democratic student 
union. The presence of the ASU and the MSC meant that they had abandoned their 
respective Unitarian platforms, the UDE and FNEC, and had joined with the
f f )Communists, therefore helping them out of their isolation. Moreover, the ASU also 
collaborated with the Communists in specific activities, such as the protests of the 
medical students in Barcelona on 25 March 1958 and the homage to Antonio 
Machado on the twentieth anniversary of his death on 20 February 1959.63 During 
this period, the PCE would define its relationship with the ASU as excellent. “The 
ASU has returned to its original idea, meaning, an autonomous organisation, not 
organically dependent on the PSOE”.64 Not surprisingly, the Socialist leadership in 
exile was opposed to this emerging amity. The tension reached its peak when the 
ASU insisted on supporting the HNP.65 The MSC and Vicente Girbau, who was
60 This organisation included the Partido Social Accion Democratica, the Union Democratica 
Cristiana (later on known as Izquierda Democratica Cristiana) and the Asociacion Funcionalista, 
J&uregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 550.
61 This organisation would include the Christian Democrats of the UDC and the nationalists of the 
Front Nacional de Catalunya (FNC), Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 550.
62 The first manifesto of the Comites de Coordinacion Universitaria came out on 28 February 1958. 
These Committees would eventually develop into the FUDE in 1961. For more information on 
everything relating to the expansion of the ASU see Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, 
pp. 549-550.
63 The protests of the medicine students had been preceded by protests at the University of Barcelona 
on 21-22 February in commemoration of the Free Congress of Students the previous year. The homage 
to Machado’s death took place in Collioure where the poet was buried. For those who could not 
attend, another homage took place in Segovia, Abd6n Mateos, “La ASU...” in Carreras Ares y Ruiz 
Camicer, La Universidad, p. 551. For more information on the homage in Collioure also see Miguel 
Dalmau, Los Goytisolo (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1999), pp. 344-347.
64 Letter from Tomas Garcia (Juan Gomez) to Dolores Ibarruri, 1959, AHPCE.
65 The same problem arose within certain sectors of the UGT in Spain who also wanted to support the
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responsible for the relationship between the ASU and the PSOE in exile, had 
intervened with the Socialist leadership in Toulouse in favour of the HNP.66 As in the 
past, Llopis refused to collaborate with the Communists and publicly announced the 
party’s position in El Socialista on 2 April 1959.67 The PCE replied on 1 June with a 
declaration broadcast by Radio Pirenaica in which the Socialist leadership was 
strongly criticised yet asked one last time to join the action.68 Subsequently, the 
PSOE made a public declaration against the strike.69 The ASU and the MSC, on the 
other hand, continued to support the HNP. In the aftermath of 18 June, the PSOE 
would threaten to break any organic relationship with the ASU unless it agreed to 
fully integrate into the structure of the party. In this manner, the Socialist leaders in 
Toulouse wanted to prevent any new independent stand from the young organisation 
in the future.70
The support of the ASU and the FLP for the HNP was important, but the PCE had 
been expecting to get many other organisations involved. The lack of support from 
groups such as the ADE, IDC and the UE was upsetting for the Communist leaders 
who had remained optimistic until the end about their possibilities of achieving a
HNP.
66 Letters from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 7 April/6 June 1959, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, 
Dolores Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
67 To the Executive Commission of the PSOE, 1 June 1959, AHPCE (REI); Letter from Santiago 
Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 7 April 1959, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores Ibdrruri, 
Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4). Also see Abd6n Mateos, “La ASU...” in Carreras Ares y Ruiz 
Camicer, La Universidad, p. 555.
68 To the Executive Committee of the PSOE, 1 June 1959, AHPCE.
69 “La crisis en el Partido Socialista”, Nuestra Bandera, n. 24, August 1959. Also see Moran, Miseria, 
pp. 326-327.
This happened a few weeks after the HNP took placed. The PSOE first demanded that the ASU’s 
delegation in exile to publicly repudiate the ASU in Madrid for their collaboration in the HNP. By July 
1959, they received an ultimatum: either the ASU was affiliated to the PSOE and its youth 
organisation JJSS, or the party would break any organic relationship with it. For more information see 
Abd6n Mateos, “La ASU...” in Carreras Ares y Ruiz Camicer, La Universidad, pp. 555-566.
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broad coalition. However, it did not come as a surprise. The PCE’s isolation during
the JRN probably contributed to their caution on this occasion. In a letter to
Pasionaria, Juan Gomez wrote:
The morale o f the party is excellent. In these days the position o f other forces is 
being decided. If  we managed to get their collaboration, it will be an extraordinary 
success. We have never been so close to forcing them to take a decisive step. If after 
all they turn back, ... we can still, through the masses, strike a new blow against the 
Francoists, much harder than during the Jornada. In this manner, the process o f 
decomposition o f the regime, the radicalisation o f the situation, will be accelerated 
considerably.”71
Carrillo also emphasised on several occasions the possibility that some of the 
forces that were showing signs of support for the HNP could change their mind at the 
last minute, as indeed happened with Izquierda Democratica Espafiola (IDC). In a 
letter to Ibarruri, he warned her against false hope regarding the organised 
participation of other forces in the strike. “Action speaks louder than words”, Carrillo 
wrote.72
Aside from the search for allies, the PCE also put a great deal of effort in reaching 
the masses. In Barcelona, to upgrade the party’s propaganda apparatus, the leadership 
made financial contributions to the clandestine organisation and sent two experts 
from France to help, though apparently neither one really knew what they were 
doing.73 According to the writer and PCE sympathiser Juan Goytisolo, who arrived in 
Barcelona at the end of May, an atmosphere of hope had taken over the city, “an 
enthusiasm and effervescence almost pre-revolutionary had taken over the
71 Letter from Tomas Garcia (Juan G6mez) to Dolores Ib&rruri, 1959, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Tomas 
Garcia, Caja 10, Caip. 3.2).
72 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 7 April/6 June 1959, AHPCE.
73 A year later, after the PCE’s VI Congress, these two experts would be arrested by the police and 
would “talk” during the interrogations. This eventually led to the exile of Jordi Sole Tura from Spain. 
For more information see Sole Tura, Memorias, pp. 134-144.
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opposition.”74 In Madrid, there were plans to distribute a million leaflets and strike
committees were created to direct the organisation in each different industry.
Expectations were rising: “All the comrades agree that the idea of the HNP has been
accepted faster than the JRN”, Pasionaria was told at one point.75 Jorge Semprun,
Simon Sanchez Montero and Francisco Romero Marin were in charge of the
preparations in the capital, and soon would be joined by the party’s number two,
Fernando Claudin. According to Semprun, “Claudin told us how the strike was going
to be according to the leadership in Paris: an Apocalypse. And we thought, are they
crazy or could this be true? Maybe we did not notice because we were focused on
only one area.”76 Claudin went back to Paris and gave a very positive report to
Carrillo. “I still interpreted the doubts and reservations of those in Madrid as an
expression of the logical difficulties of such a wide-ranging action and not of
something more fundamental”, he would explain later.77 Other party heavyweights
such as Ignacio Gallego and Julian Grimau were also sent from Paris into different
parts of Spain to lead the preparations. In addition, the party published
announcements directed at specific groups less likely to sympathise with them, such
as the army and the Civil Guard.78
Nevertheless, as had been the case with the JRN, there were still those who
questioned the party’s decision to summon a new strike. According to Sold Tura:
Our circumstances and the experience of the JRN made us see the new initiative 
with a lot of scepticism. Even if the organisation of the PSUC was better than the 
previous year, it was still precarious and lacked resources.79
74 Dalmau, Los Goytisolo, p. 341.
75 Letter from Tom&s Garcia (Juan G6mez) to Dolores Ib&rruri, 1959, AHPCE.
76 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
77 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 138.
78 “To the generals, chiefs and officers of the land, sea and air armies”, April 1959; “To the members 
of the Civil Guard Corps”, May 1959, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 49).
79 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 134.
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Sanchez Montero expressed his doubts about the potential of the HNP to the 
Political Bureau, “I thought that the strike would not be widespread, not because the 
workers did not wish to join in but rather out of fear. They thought it was a very 
grave matter, a challenge to the Government.” Still, Sanchez Montero explains, he 
worked as hard as he could on the preparation of the strike as “I did not want anyone 
to think that I had not put all my effort in achieving its success”.80 His doubts were 
justified: as we shall see, the repressive forces were very active before and after the 
strike. Pasionaria also questioned the idea of the HNP.81 According to Falcon, “she 
was concerned about the risks both direct and indirect that such an initiative 
implied”.82 In a letter Ibarruri wrote to Carrillo during this period, she seems rather 
upset at the fact that the decision had been taken without seeking her approval. She 
wrote: “I was impatient to know the reasons that have driven you to take such a brave 
step that could be a serious blow to the dictatorship.”83
However, the blow never came. In the words of Claudin, the HNP was “an 
unmitigated disaster”. The party had sent a number of French comrades to act as 
observers of the action. They all returned and reported to the leadership that there had 
been no sign of mobilization: normality had been absolute.84 Juan Goytisolo, who 
was also in Spain working as an under-cover correspondent for the French magazine 
L 'Express, described how on the date of the strike he had only found “open shops 
and commerce, packed public transport, factories working in apparent normality”. He
80 S&nchez Montero, Memorias, p. 241.
81 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 140; Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 8.
82 Falcdn, Asalto, p. 319. Alvarez also says that at first Ibarruri was not happy with the idea of the 
HNP and that he was sent by Carrillo to Moscow to try to convince her, which he did, Alvarez, 
Memorias V, p. 212.
83 Letter from Dolores Ibarruri to Santiago Carrillo, 1 June 1959, AHPCE.
84 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 138.
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had spent three days in Madrid and Barcelona waiting for the “peaceful explosion of
the masses” that never came. Moreover, he added:
The leaders o f the opposition in Madrid that I was able to see, all admitted the 
failure. The explanations given were the following: in the preceding years, the 
strikes that had taken place in Barcelona, Madrid, Asturias and the Basque country 
had been partial successes because they emerged spontaneously from the base. On 
this occasion, the order came from above and the date was set by the leadership of 
the political groups not, in accordance with the Spanish situation, but according to 
the date that they managed to agree on.85
Nevertheless, just as had happened with the JRN, the HNP would not be
accepted as a failure. It was argued that even though the action may not have been the
popular demonstration the Communists had hoped for, the political agitation and the
propaganda of the idea for a national strike that preceded the 18 June meant that the
party’s strategy had succeeded.86 Only a year later after the failure of 18 June 1959,
Carrillo was telling the press in La Habana:
I f  the anti-Francoist forces would agree to organise a general national strike with 
mass manifestations and the sympathy o f the armed forces, such an action would 
provoke the overthrow o f the Franco regime. Franco would not be able to resist for 
more than a few weeks, maybe months, against the unity and struggle o f the anti- 
Francoist forces.
Carrillo might have been right about this but nothing guaranteed that his 
desires would turn into reality. The PCE had not achieved the union of anti-Francoist 
forces, nor had the party managed to incite the people to go out on to the streets and 
much less did the Communists enjoy the sympathy of the armed forces. In fact, the 
Spanish Communists were now to face the terrible effects of their latest failed 
enterprise.
85 Dalmau, Los Goytisolo, pp. 342-343.
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C. The hangover from the HNP
1. Arrests
After months of hectic activity, the day of the HNP had passed by without the 
slightest indication of mass agitation. Moreover, the repression before and after the 
event was ferocious. On 19 May, eleven members of the ASU were arrested in 
Madrid, Valencia and Salamanca.87 Eighteen members of the FLP, including its 
leader Julio Cerdn, were arrested a few days after the HNP. As for the PCE, one of its 
most prominent figures, Simon Sanchez Montero, was arrested on the eve on the 
action.88 Other Communist leaders such as Luis Lucio Lobato, Emilio Sanz Hurtado 
and Enrique Mugica, as well as hundreds of activists, suffered the same fate.89
Unavoidably, the work needed to prepare for the HNP had placed the activists 
in a much more vulnerable position vis-a-vis the repressive forces. For instance, the 
leaders of the party in Madrid, Sanchez Montero, Romero Marin and Semprun 
himself, would under normal circumstances meet once a week in a safe house. As the 
day of the HNP came nearer, the number of meetings rose and often would take place 
in the street. On the day of Sanchez Montero*s arrest, they had scheduled three 
appointments. By the time of the last one, Sanchez Montero was already in the hands 
of the Brigada Socialf as the secret police were known. Certainly, the activists were
86 “Declaration del PCE sobre la Huelga National”, July 1959, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carpeta 
40); Carrillo, Memorias, p. 488; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 139.
87 On the arrests of the members of the FLP, as well as its leader, Julio Ceron, see Tusell, Oposicion, 
pp. 338-340 and Moran, Miseria, p. 329. According to Vilar, Ceron was arrested before the HNP not 
after, Vilar, Anti-franquismo, pp. 274-275. On the arrest of the members of the ASU see Abdon 
Mateos, “La ASU...” in Carreras Ares y Ruiz Camicer, La Universidad, pp. 553-554 and Lizcano, 56, 
pp. 249-250.
For information on his arrest see Sanchez Montero, Memorias, pp. 243-258 and Jauregui and Vega, 
Antifranquismo 1939-1962, pp. 236-237.
89 Luis Lucio Lobato was arrested on 12 May. For more information on his arrest see Jauregui and
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aware of the risks involved in their activity, which were impossible to avoid when 
acting against a dictatorship. However, the fact that the strike failed to achieve any 
results made the arrests all the more difficult to swallow. This was particularly so 
among those who had experienced doubts on the policy being followed by the party. 
Moreover, the arrests did not help the PCE become any more popular with the 
political forces that had opposed the action. In a way, it confirmed the reasoning 
behind their refusal to collaborate. There was no point in encouraging the sacrifice of 
so many activists when the results were not going to have a major effect on the 
country.
At the same time, an increasing number of Communist intellectuals began to
criticise the PCE leadership. Many were becoming aware of the contradictions
between Spanish reality and the party’s claims. Luis Goytisolo, for instance,
abandoned his political activism, though not yet the party, soon after the HNP.
Miguel Dalmau, author of a biography on the Goytisolo brothers, describes how the
failure of the strike had a strong effect on Luis: “To his progressive political
disenchantment one could now add the failures of the strikes.”90 Another intellectual
who questioned the leadership was Sanchez Drago:
At first we had mythologized the leaders in exile but later, we realised that it was all 
very grotesque, those strikes that they would call for and no one would follow.... A 
fracture between the PC in Spain and the PCE in exile began to take place. We were 
more reasonable mainly because we were in contact with reality and we knew what 
was happening, but those in Paris had no clue. Hence, a dichotomy was created.91
As we shall see, the disenchantment of the intellectuals would, from this point 
onwards, only deepen.
Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, p. 236.
90 Dalmau, Los Goytisolo, p. 343.
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2. Dissent at the top
Problems were also arising in higher circles. Claudin, who had shared the high 
expectations about the strike, now questioned the wisdom of the policy and 
subsequently clashed with Carrillo during a leadership meeting to analyse the results 
of the HNP. As previously stated, Carrillo argued that the action had succeeded 
because the party had managed to carry out an important propaganda campaign for it. 
Moreover, he also maintained that the support from other political groups received by 
the PCE had exposed the attempt by forces such as Union Espafiola and the PSOE to 
isolate the Communists. In turn, these forces had been the ones cut off from the rest. 
Claudin challenged his statements and insisted that it was very important for the 
party “to see things as they were”, and to recognize the total failure of the action so 
that they draw the pertinent conclusions. He then maintained that the failure of the 
HNP had been a political blow to the prestige of the party as well as facilitating 
further repression. It had helped the dictatorship and diminished the PCE’s credibility 
in the eyes of its allies. “However, the most important lesson that in my opinion we 
should draw from this failure is our mistaken perception of the working class’ 
political consciousness and the real force of the people”, Claudin added. 
Subsequently, he suggested that a letter should be sent to the party’s organisations in 
the country in order “to open up a discussion that will examine carefully the 
weaknesses of the party and discover the causes behind our subjectivism in the 
analysis of the situation of the country.”92
Apart from Ignacio Gallego and Santiago Alvarez, who at first supported 
Claudin’s views, the rest agreed with Carrillo. Claudin believes that the future
91 Interview with Fernando Sanchez Drago, September 2000.
220
General Secretary was afraid of losing authority if the party were to take such
measures. On the other hand, Carrillo argues in his memoirs that Claudin was just
very negative and did not want to emphasize the positive results of the HNP, “even if
they were limited”. In the end, Claudin submitted to the opinion of the majority, with
which Gallego and Alvarez had already aligned themselves. It is difficult to know the
exact content of this meeting. Other than the recollections of the participants, there is
no record of it. Nevertheless, Claudin’s position fits in with the versions given by
Semprun and Sole Tura about the meeting and the shift he began to make from this
point onwards.93 On the other hand, the position of the PCE regarding the effect of
the HNP proved to be the one that Claudin attributes to Carrillo. As early as July
1959, the party published a document called “Declaration of the PCE on the HNP”
where those positions were defended.94 According to Claudin, the Declaration was an
effort “to close the path to any divergent opinion inside the party by accusing it ahead
of time of exploiting our failure in the same manner as done by the government, the
Francoist press and the international press.”95 When talking about this whole episode,
Semprun, who would in later years join Claudin in his divergence, says:
The failure o f the strike was a terrible intellectual blow for Claudin, and it was then 
that his sedition against Carrillo started. I knew that the strike had been a mistake, 
but I thought that the leadership would not be able to easily accept this. We had to 
make them understand step by step. ... The difference between Claudin and I is that 
he broke away with such brutality that in a way made sense given his previous 
dogmatic vision. He made a break and, while I had a clearer vision than he did, I 
also thought that you had to give it time. The goal was the same: the transformation 
o f the party, a democratisation o f its internal structure.96
92 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 139.
93 Sol6 Tura, Memorias, p. 135; interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
94 “Declaration del PCE sobre la Huelga National”, July 1959, AHPCE.
95 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 141.
96 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
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Carrillo argues in his memoirs that during the leadership’s meeting, Semprun 
confronted Claudin and Gallego and defended the opinion of the majority.97 
However, Semprun writes in his memoirs that at this time he was still in Spain and 
therefore, could not be at the meeting.98 On the other hand, Claudin maintains that 
Semprun sided with him but believed that it was not a good idea to have a direct 
confrontation with Carrillo.99 In fact, it would still take some time for Semprun to 
express his disagreement with the party line and Santiago Carrillo. As we shall see 
later, only a year after the HNP, Semprun would clash with Javier Pradera when the 
latter challenged the party’s perception of Spanish reality.
3. Pasionaria resigns
There was another important event that took place in the aftermath of the HNP, 
though it was not a direct result of the strike’s failure and would have occurred 
sooner or later anyway. In July 1959, a delegation of the party’s Political Bureau 
formed by Santiago Carrillo, Jorge Semprun, Enrique Lister and Santiago Alvarez 
arrived in Moscow for a meeting with Ibarruri to analyse the outcome of the HNP.100 
Pasionaria must have been aware that the action had not succeeded. However, by 
then she would also have seen in the party’s journals the distorted view the leaders in 
Paris had given of the whole affair. Rather than passively wait for Carrillo’s 
explanations about the “success” of the HNP, Ibarruri surprised all of those present 
with her resignation. According to Semprun:
97 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 488.
98 Semprun, Autobiogra/ia, p. 8.
99 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 142; Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
100 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 475; Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 8; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 142; Falcon, 
AsaltOy p. 320.
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We went to Moscow to convince Pasionaria that the recent and definite failure of 
the HNP was no such thing but, on the contrary, a terrible success. Then, like a blow 
from nowhere, Dolores suddenly announced her irrevocable resignation o f the post 
o f General Secretary.101
Claudin also agrees on how unexpected her resignation was.102 Carrillo, on 
the other hand, argues that there was no surprise as there had already been talks 
within those in Paris about Ibarruri’s future replacement and the possibility of 
creating the post of President of the party.103 However, even if Pasionaria was aware 
about their plans, as her secretary Irene Falcdn also suggests, to resign was still 
something unheard of in a Communist Party: a leader had either to die or be 
ejected.104 Moreover, despite the fact that since 1956 Santiago Carrillo had been 
basically running the PCE single handedly, Dolores Ibarruri was still a very popular 
figure in the party and probably the person with most influence among the Soviets. 
According to Claudin, when Pasionaria broke the news to the delegation, Carrillo 
whispered to Semprun: ‘What manoeuvre is she preparing now?’105 In his memoirs, 
Carrillo denies ever saying this.106 At any rate, Ibarruri did not have a hidden agenda. 
As Claudin says, “it was a gesture that honoured Pasionaria, her sense of dignity”.107 
She was now 64 years old and had been in politics for more than 46 years. Following 
her resignation, the members of the Political Bureau nominated Santiago Carrillo as 
the new General Secretary. Next, someone proposed Dolores Ibarruri as the new 
President of the party, a post that did not exist but was now being conveniently 
created. In addition, the Political Bureau was renamed as the more Spanish sounding
101 Semprun, Autobiogra/ia, pp. 7-9.
102 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 142
103 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 476.
104 Falcdn, Asalto, p. 320.
105 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 142. Santiago Alvarez says in his memoirs that Ibarruri had been expressing 
her feelings about resigning for quite some, Alvarez, Memorias V, p. 221.
106 Carrillo, Memorias, p. 475.
107 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 143.
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Executive Committee. All these changes would become official during the VI 
Congress of the PCE.
D. Criticism from below
1. The VI Congress
Soon after the disappointment of the HNP, the Spanish Communist Party embarked 
on the organisation of its VI Congress. Behind such activity was the need to make 
official Santiago Carrillo’s nomination as the new General Secretary and Dolores 
Ibarruri’s as the first President of the PCE. In the words of Sole Tura, “the goal of the
I OKVI Congress was to give a definite solution to the problem of the leadership”. 
Since 1956, Carrillo had been running the party de facto and now the time had come 
for him to start doing so in name. Moreover, the Congress was also used to reconfirm 
the policy of National Reconciliation through the organisation of general strikes 
whose wisdom and practicality had been questioned by so many activists after the 
fiasco of the HNP.
On 24 December 1959, the members of the party’s Central Committee met on 
the outskirts of Prague in what was supposed to be “an important party meeting”. 
Once there, they were informed that the following day the VI Congress of the PCE 
would take place. This was done in order to prevent the spread of news about it and 
hence protect those delegates coming from Spain on their return. In addition, the date 
of the Congress had been chosen to make the activists appear to the Francoist
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authorities as if they were going abroad for a Christmas vacation.109 Postcards were 
written in Paris and left with a comrade who then sent them to the activists’ families 
in Spain on different days to make their “holiday” more credible. However, as we 
shall see later, the hasty preparations meant that the Congress lacked other basic 
security measures that would prove fatal for those returning to Spain.110
Once the Congress started, everyone became aware that major changes were 
about to take place. Santiago Carrillo gave the opening speech. Shortly afterwards, 
the party delegates were informed about his nomination as General Secretary. 
Claudin delivered the report of the party’s programme which set the following short 
term goals: the development of a united struggle against the dictatorship through a 
peaceful general strike; the reestablishment of all political liberties, without 
discrimination; a general amnesty for both sides in the Civil War; the improvement 
of the living conditions of the workers, peasants, employees, civil servants and the 
people in general; a foreign policy in favour of peaceful coexistence; and constituent 
elections with full democratic guarantees to choose a new government. The party’s 
long-term goals were the socialist transformation of Spanish society as a first step 
towards the establishment of Communism in the country.111 Dolores Ibarruri, now 
the new President of the party, gave a speech on the less relevant topic of the PCE’s 
40th anniversary. She was not on full form and missed some of the Congress’ 
sessions on account of the flu. Jorge Semprun’s speech was mainly based on the so- 
called “system of contacts”, which referred to the method used by the party leaders to 
communicate with the rank-and-file in Spain by the use of one to one meetings. The
108 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 139.
109 Dalraau, Los Goytisolo, p. 352.
1,0 There were 24 delegates from exile and 60 delegates from inside Spain, Moran, Miseria, p. 335.
111 “Se ha reunido el VI Congreso del PCE”, Mundo Obrero, 15 February 1960; Programme of the 
Spanish Communist Party, VI Congress, 28-31 January 1960 (this date was given in order to confuse
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activists were then expected to pass on information to those comrades in their
industry or field of work. Semprun pointed out the limitations of this system which
only allowed for “unilateral” communication and which put the activists at risk as the
number of meetings increased during times of great activity. He advocated the
creation of committees that would give more independence to the rank-and-file and
increase the reach of the party. This went well with the leadership’s idea, promoted
during the Congress, to make the PCE in Spain a “mass party”. Semprun said: “What
we need nowadays are political committees that are able to work by themselves, even
if they temporarily lose contact with the party’s provincial leadership or its Central
Committee”. Moreover, he added:
A Communist leader not only has to know how to explain our policy, he also has to 
know how to listen. And to know how to listen is not as easy as it seems: to know 
how to listen to the comrades, to know how to listen to the masses, to know how to 
listen to the voices and rumours o f the social reality o f our country.112
According to his memoirs, these extracts were an indication of his coming 
divergence with Santiago Carrillo. Nevertheless, as we will see through the tension 
that arose between Semprun and Pradera soon after the Congress, he still had a long 
way to go before arriving at the conclusions that led to his expulsion.113 A similar 
case was that of Claudin whose speech showed no discrepancies with the PCE’s line. 
However, according to Sole Tura, when the proposed party programme was being 
“discussed”, it was obvious that Claudin “was not sure of some of the things he was 
himself saying, and even more, of the things other members of the leadership were 
saying.”"4
the Francoist secret service), AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 41).
112 Speech by Jorge Semprun, 1960, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 41).
113 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 205.
114 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 140.
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Regarding the restructuring of the party, the VI Congress saw the promotion 
of Jorge Semprun, Sim6n Sdnchez Montero, Ram6n Mendezona, Santiago Alvarez 
and Tomas Garcia to the Executive Committee.115 The long disregarded Secretariat 
of the Central Committee, which was supposed to be the governing body of the party 
between congresses, was revived. It included Santiago Carrillo, Fernando Claudin, 
Ignacio Gallego, Antonio Mije and Eduardo Garcia, hence making it not much 
different from the Political Bureau.116 Among those elected to the Central Committee 
were Manuel Azcarate, Domingo Malagon, Miguel Nunez, Jesus Izcaray, Lucio 
Lobato and Pere Ardiaca.
In conclusion, the VI Congress served to reaffirm the party line and erased the doubts 
that the failure of the HNP had created. There was nothing dramatic about it and no 
obvious divergences of opinion. Just as had happened during the V Congress, the 
changes that took place had already been agreed beforehand by the leadership. As the 
Congress came to an end, euphoria and what Goytisolo describes as “fake smugness” 
had taken over those present. This was encapsulated in the notion of the coming 
downfall of the regime that once again was accepted, if temporarily, by everyone.117
2. Welcome home
The euphoria of the VI Congress was soon overshadowed by the repression that 
followed the Communist activists’ return to Spain. Their arrests led to hundreds 
more, affecting the whole structure of the party’s underground organisation in Spain.
115 Gregorio L6pez Raimundo and Francisco Romero Marin were elected as associate members.
116 “Se ha reunido el VI Congreso del PCE”, Mundo Obrero, 15 February 1960.
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The blow was tremendous, reaching Barcelona, Madrid, Santander, Seville, Asturias, 
Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Valencia, Zaragoza, Valladolid, Badajoz, Leon and the Canary 
Islands.118 “It is the most serious repression carried out against us in many years”, 
wrote Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri on 2 February I960.119 Those who 
managed to avoid the authorities were forced to lay low for a few months before they 
could resume any kind of activity.
Among the many arrested, special mention should be made of Luis Goytisolo 
for it created a great deal of stir. As we saw above, Goytisolo had become 
disenchanted with the possibilities of the PCE against Franco after the failure of the 
HNP. He had come to the conclusion that the only way to fight the regime was 
through literature. A few months before the Congress, Goytisolo had informed the 
PCE leadership that he was leaving Barcelona to have some time off to write. It was 
during this retirement in the town of San Julian de Vilatorta that he was called back 
by the party to attend “an important meeting”.120 Goytisolo agreed only after Sole 
Tura insisted, “I really did not feel like it. I was not even in Barcelona, I was in the 
countryside writing my second novel”. The days of the Congress are described by
171Goytisolo as depressing. However, the worst was still to come.
On the night of 5 February, Goytisolo was arrested and spent the next 24 
hours being interrogated. He soon realised that the police inspector in charge was the 
same person he had suspected of following him since his return from the Congress. 
Goytisolo describes the interrogations as tough, but not extreme. In his opinion, the
117 Sol6 Tura, Memorias, p. 140; interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
118 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 23 March 1960, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, 
Dolores Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
119 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 22 February 1960, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, 
Dolores Ib&rruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
120 Dalmau, Los Goytisolo, p. 351.
121 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
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authorities were probably careful with him because they were aware that as a well- 
known writer news of his arrest could easily spread and cause protest, as indeed 
happened. During the interrogations, Goytisolo was shown a photograph of the fake 
passport he had used to cross the frontier, which gave weight to the theory of the 
presence of an undercover agent at the Congress. In fact, Mordn believes that the 
possible infiltrator could have been the delegate from Pamplona, who was hardly 
known by anyone and was never heard from again.122 It is not clear if that is the same 
person that Carrillo refers to in his memoirs, where the existence of an informer is 
taken as a matter of fact. In 1960, however, he expressed serious doubts about this 
and, as we will see below, would put the blame somewhere else.123
Jordi Sole Tura, also affected by the repression, blames the party organisers 
for being too flexible regarding the Congress’ security measures: a year earlier during 
his trip to Prague for a meeting with the leadership the precautions taken on his 
behalf had been far greater.124 Now, after his return to Spain from the Congress, he 
was informed that the two experts on propaganda the party had sent to Barcelona 
during the preparations for the HNP had been arrested. His close relationship with 
them meant that the police could soon find out about him. His situation became all 
the more uncertain when Luis Goytisolo was also arrested. The party would then ask 
Sole Tura to hide and eventually to travel to France. He would stay there for the next 
five years.125
122 Morin, Miseria, pp. 339-340.
123 Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 477,481. On the other hand, Lister says that the arrests were due to the fact 
that during the Congress many delegates went to the home of Santiago Alvarez in Prague, who was 
most likely being watched by the Spanish secret service, Lister, Carrillo, p. 126.
124 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 141.
125 Sole Tura, Memorias, pp. 141-144.
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The risks taken by the party during the Congress received a lot of criticism from the
activists working in Spain, who began seriously to doubt the authority of the
leadership. Goytisolo would publicly complain about the PCE’s disregard for security
during the event. It was becoming clear that the delegates had not been properly
checked before inviting them to the Congress. “One day in a corridor, Santiago
Carrillo even called me by my real name instead of my alias”, a basic security
measure for those who came from Spain, Goytisolo recalls. In addition, the
celebration of the Congress had been publicly announced in Mundo Obrero soon
after it had taken place, which would have put the police on its guard if they did not
know about it already. According to Claudin, this oversight took place because of
the Communists’ perception of the dictatorship’s imminent downfall and hence their
belief in the need for the party to start emerging from clandestinity.127 There were
also many pictures taken during the Congress, another basic security measure that
was breached.128 At one point, the rumour spread that the arrests had actually been
provoked by the leadership for propaganda purposes. According to Goytisolo:
The people arrested were not very important for the party but their dispersal gave 
the idea that the PCE was a very important organisation. I do not believe anyone 
would recur to such things because it could be extremely dangerous, but in practice 
the party used the arrests for this purpose.
There is indeed no evidence that the leadership itself would have provoked 
the arrests. Moreover, just as Goytisolo points out, it seems very unlikely that they 
would have embarked on such a dangerous scheme. The results of the repression 
affected the whole organisation and not just a few delegates from the Congress. 
Nevertheless, it is true that on a practical level, the leaders in exile appreciated in
126 “Se ha reunido el VI Congreso del PCE”, Mundo Obrero, February 1960.
127 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 145.
128 Moran, Miseria, p. 339.
positive terms the propaganda effect that the repression was having for the party. At 
the same time, there was resistance to accepting the party’s responsibility in the onset 
of the arrests. Even though a commission had been appointed to investigate the 
reasons behind the raid, Santiago Carrillo was making it clear before obtaining 
results that the operation had been organised by the police before the Congress and 
without it having any knowledge about it. The repression against the delegates was 
explained by the fact that some of those first arrested had “talked” during the 
interrogations. The party was particularly keen to point its finger at Luis Goytisolo. In 
a letter to Dolores Ibarruri, Carrillo maintains that the picture of Goytisolo’s passport 
was given to the police by his girlfriend who had been interrogated before him as a 
result of her relationship with another detainee. The General Secretary then went on 
to accuse the writer of “talking” more than he should have without even being 
maltreated, and provoking the downfall of the Congress’ delegates.129 Taking into 
account the mistakes made by the party regarding the security of the event, it seems 
that the accusations against Goytisolo were invented to cover the leadership’s back 
on the matter and discredit his criticisms at the same time. The PCE was reluctant to 
defend the writer in the amnesty campaign for those arrested carried out during the
1 i nmonths that followed. Indeed, it was up to his brother, Juan Goytisolo, to get a
protest in his favour moving. According to Luis:
The party did not do anything. Juan did it quite well and gathered a lot of signatures 
in Mexico and France. It is fair to say also that the party did not have the capability 
to mobilize so many people, while through the left wing intelligentsia in Paris, it 
was much easier for Juan to reach everywhere.131
129 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 23 March 1960, AHPCE.
130 “Saludo a los presos y llamamiento por la amnistia”, Mundo Obrero, 15 February 1960; “La 
protesta intemacional contra la represion”, Mundo Obrero, 15 March 1960; Letter from Santiago 
Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 8 June 1960, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores Ibarruri, Correspondencia, 
Caja 16, Carp. 4).
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For a letter denouncing his brother’s arrest, Juan managed to obtain the 
signatures of many prominent European intellectuals, such as Picasso, Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Carlo Levi. The stir he was causing was soon acknowledged and criticised 
by the Francoist press. At one point, the authorities visited his father and promised to 
liberate Luis if the protest initiated by Juan would stop. This only made Juan more 
eager to continue with it.132 In the meantime, Luis had been sent to Carabanchel 
where he was kept in solitary confinement for five weeks. Finally, thanks to his 
brother and the help of his cousin, Juan Berchmans Vallet, a notary who intervened 
with the authorities for his liberation, Goytisolo was let out on probation on 18 May 
I960.134
As we have seen, the party’s mistakes during the VI Congress had led to hundreds of 
arrests that had destroyed the underground organisation in Spain. The leadership not 
only refused to take any responsibility for this but, after the initial shock, also denied 
something as obvious as the extent of the blow inflicted on the PCE: “The trust in the 
party has not been weakened: we have verified this with the intellectuals in Madrid 
and Barcelona that were not arrested. ... The organisation is still standing”, Carrillo 
wrote in the middle of the raid. This statement shows the extent to which the leaders 
in exile were removed from the real situation in Spain. Though the underground 
organisation would eventually recover, the gap between the leaders in exile and the 
activists in Spain that had opened during the fiasco of the HNP was now becoming
131 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
132 On the campaign organised by Juan Goytisolo for the liberation of his brother see Dalmau, Los 
Goytisolo, pp. 357-361; Letter signed by intellectuals to the editor-in-chief of the journal El Pueblo, 2 
April 1960, AHPCE (INTELECTUALES -  PROFESIONALES -  ARTISTAS, Manifestos, Caja 126 
carp. 1.1).
133 It was during this time in prison that Goytisolo worked out the idea for his most important book, 
Antagonia. For more information see Dalmau, Los Goytisolo, p. 361.
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insuperable. Aware of this danger and in an attempt to disguise it, Carrillo wrote that 
April in Nuestra Bandera: “The political and ideological unity, the fusion between 
the interior and the immigration, between the veterans and the young generations of 
our party is a reality that the VI Congress has brilliantly shown.”135
3. A widening gap
While the PCE’s underground organisation was facing repression, the leadership in 
exile was still promoting the idea of a coalition of the opposition forces in Spain to 
call for a general strike. In addition, the party was very critical of the stabilization 
plan implanted by the regime in 1959 to bring Spain from an autarchic economy to a 
market economy.136 The perception of the regime collapsing in the near future was 
widely defended by the leaders, as well as the prominent role the Communists would 
play in the subsequent transition. In an interview to the French journal France 
Nouvelle, Carrillo warned that the longer these forces took to join the Communists, 
“the stronger our voice will be, the more weight our word will carry”.137 In a letter to 
Ibarruri, he argued that this was also the view of the rest of the opposition forces, 
including those that did not hold the Communists in great regard. Nevertheless, this 
was nothing more than wishful thinking as in the same letter he himself recognized
134 All these information can be found in Dalmau, Los Goytisolo, pp. 355-365.
135 “Cuarenta anos de lucha por la democracia y el socialismo”, Nuestra Bandera, n. 26, April 1960.
136 Interview of Santiago Carrillo with France Nouvelle, 11 March 1960, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, 
Santiago Carrillo, articulos, Caja 3. carp. 1.1.5); Letters from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 
March-June 1960, AHPCE; Declaration of the PCE, 1 July 1960, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 
40); “El fortalecimiento del partido y la lucha contra la represion policiaca”, Nuestra Bandera, n. 27, 
July 1960. The stabilization plan had been adopted by the regime on 6 March 1959. It meant the 
freezing of wages, a devaluation of the peseta, a reduction of public spending and the opening of Spain 
to foreign investment. Though at first Spain went through a period of massive unemployment and high 
inflation, after 1962 the economy would recover and slowly change the country’s social structure. For 
more information see Maravall, Dictatorship, pp. 24-26.
137 Interview of Santiago Carrillo with France Nouvelle, 11 March 1960, AHPCE.
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the difficulties the party was facing in finding allies.138 The Communists’ reputation, 
especially among the Socialists and their sympathisers, made them come across as 
untrustworthy. This negative image was emphasized by the arrests that had followed 
the HNP and the party’s VI Congress, which made them appear careless as well. It is 
ironic that around this time Carrillo was telling Ibdrruri about the shame felt by those 
political groups that had not supported the PCE on 18 June 1959, and how they 
would now gladly support the next general strike under the leadership the 
Communists. “It is very true that the so-called ‘failure’ has provoked very important 
changes, that could be decisive for all future developments”.139 Carrillo was not 
giving up his ambitions to organise a round table that would include all the 
opposition forces in Spain though this idea was eventually replaced by that of a 
meeting of “those who supported us on the 18 June”, which ended up not taking 
place anyway.140 The activity of the party during these months was hence limited to 
words: on the one hand, the repression had played havoc with the underground 
organisation; on the other, the party continued to apply a policy that had already 
proved ineffective.
Indeed, by May I960, a new critical voice coming from the underground organisation 
reached Paris. On this occasion, the complaint originated from one of the most 
important party activists at the University of Madrid, Javier Pradera, an old time 
favourite of Jorge Semprun. Pradera, who had been the person in charge of the
138 In its publications, the PCE would nevertheless continue to call the opposition to attend a round 
table, letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 23 March 1960, AHPCE; Declaration of the 
PCE, 1 July 1960, AHPCE.
139 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 23 March 1960, AHPCE.
140 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 23 March/7 May 1960, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, 
Dolores Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4); Interview of Santiago Carrillo with France 
Nouvelle, 11 March 1960, AHPCE.
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party’s relations with other forces between his stays in prison, was asked by the 
leadership after the VI Congress to write a report on the situation in Spain. He took 
the opportunity to criticise the optimistic portrayal of the HNP the leadership had 
forced upon the rank-and-file. According to Pradera, “I did not believe what they had 
told me about the strike being a success in the rest of Spain.”141 He argued that the 
underground activists would not have been discouraged by failure alone. In fact, they 
rejected not so much the development of the strike but the party’s “previous 
previsions and the later interpretation.” He challenged Carrillo’s view that the strike 
had been a success as a propaganda tool and maintained that such a purpose was not 
good enough to justify its organisation. It was clear to him that the party had rushed 
into the HNP without the conditions existing to carry it out successfully. “As for the 
relationship with our allies, the immediate effect has been that the moderate right 
wing now underestimates the value of mass actions and reject any contact with us.” 
Pradera concluded:
It is important to accept that last June we overrated our chances of success, that 
there is a lot left to do, and that an excessive optimism could break the morale of 
those who do not see the resistance and difficulties faced in the struggle of the 
masses.
Moreover, Pradera not only criticised the party’s perception of the situation in 
Spain but also questioned its belief in a future alliance between the working class and 
the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie to lead to the overthrow of the regime, for there 
were too many contradictions between the two.142 This was the more so since Spain 
was going through important economic changes. Pradera argued that the possible
141 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
142 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 146.
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entry of Spain in the Common Market could have many implications for the party’s 
strategy, which had therefore to be reconsidered.143
As we have seen, such bold criticisms were extremely uncommon in the PCE and 
were obviously not welcomed by the leaders in exile. It is easy to imagine the 
bewilderment they must have felt in Paris when they read Pradera’s letter. Semprun 
was the one responsible for putting the young intellectual in his place. According to 
Claudin, Carrillo entrusted to Semprun such an “ungrateful task” because he had 
realised that Pradera was defending similar views to the ones recently defended by 
Claudin:
In this manner, he was not just obliging him (Semprun) to use his prestige among 
Communists intellectuals in Madrid in order to cut the Praderista “revisionist” 
outbreak, but also to leave written proof of the differences in position from the one I 
had maintained a few months earlier.144
Hence, in June 1960, Semprun replied to Pradera with a remarkably harsh and 
derogatory letter. He started by describing Pradera’s letter as “anti-dialectical” and 
his arguments as abstract “not to say frankly metaphysical”. He then argued that this 
was partially the result of Pradera’s isolation in relation to real problems, further 
aggravated by his stay in prison, and was also due to his theoretical education, that 
Semprun described as being “excessively bookish”. At one point, when talking about 
Pradera’s references to the contradictions between the working class and the non- 
monopolistic bourgeoisie, Semprun replied: “your analysis of the contradictions is 
simplistic, dogmatic, and overall, anti-dialectical, I have been startled by it. ... All
143 Letter from Javier Pradera to the party leadership in Paris, May 1960, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA 
CULTURA, Microfilm 106)
144 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 146.
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your comments are infested with contradictions.”145 He then accused Pradera of 
lacking faith in the force of the masses.
However, things did not stop with this letter. Pradera would write back to 
Semprun and reply to the storm of accusations he had naively unleashed. His letter is 
very long and detailed and shows his distress and disappointment at Semprun’s 
reaction, “In my opinion, you have not chosen a good path to be convincing”, he tells 
him. “I thought that one thing was dialogue with a friend and another polemics with 
the enemy; one thing controversy and the other impertinence.”146 The last paragraph 
of the letter reads:
I don’t like this tone for discussing with friends. Since you are twice a friend, a 
“friend” and a personal friend (to whom I owe a lot in all fields), it upsets me even 
more. As in the fights between children, I say to you “I did not start it”. If “I have 
continued” it is because when things are not taken out into the open, they end up 
rotting and rotting you.
Though it would take two years for Pradera to go to Paris and talk to the
leadership about the problems that had risen over his report, the effects of the
disagreement were instantly noticeable. Pradera became an outsider and was removed
from the party’s everyday activities. In his view, Carrillo now considered him to be
the origin of all evils.147 As he explains:
I was cut off, isolated, they told me I could not talk to anyone in the party. Semprun 
said that it was very dangerous to open a discussion; that any discussion would have 
to take place in Paris with the leaders of the party. He told me I could not have this 
discussion with the activists in Madrid. FORBIDDEN!148
Ironically, Pradera’s views that so infuriated Semprun were very similar to the 
ones later defended by Semprun and Claudin against Carrillo. It seems that in 1960
145 Letter from Jorge Semprun to Javier Pradera, June 1960, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, 
Microfilm 107).
146 Letter from Javier Pradera to Jorge Semprun, July 1960, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, 
Microfilm 221-222).
147 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
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Semprun was not as clear as he later claimed on his vision about the mistakes of the 
party or was just not ready to confront the General Secretary. Though a break was 
about to take place, at this point Semprun sided with the leadership in exile and acted 
in accordance with the party’s usual manner of dealing with criticism from below. 
Semprun and Claudin would take a few years to fully develop their positions and 
eventually formed a common front against Santiago Carrillo.
In fact, when two years later the meeting between the Executive Committee 
(former Political Bureau) and Javier Pradera took place in Paris, neither Claudin nor 
Semprun sided with the dissident. As Claudin recognizes in his biography of Carrillo, 
when the latter criticised the opinions defended by Pradera, “neither myself nor 
Semprun expressed any objections”.149 According to Pradera, the meeting was 
extremely unpleasant, “it did not finish well on an ideological level”. However, 
Carrillo avoided a total confrontation by blaming Pradera’s isolation from the party 
on Ricardo Munoz Suay, the person in charge of the intellectual organisation in 
Madrid who had recently left the party.150 Munoz Suay had been very important in 
building up the PCE’s influence in the cinematography world, first through the 
magazine Objetivo and then through UNINCI (Unidad Industrial del Cine Espanol). 
The production company included several members of the party such as Juan 
Antonio Bardem, Domingo Dominguin and Francisco Rabal. The problems of the 
party with Munoz Suay arose in 1961 around the film Viridiana, directed by Luis 
Bufiuel and produced by Uninci (against the wishes of Bardem who found it to be too 
“reactionary”).151 Viridiana had not been chosen by the Spanish Association of
148 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
149 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 151.
150 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
151 Introduction to the film Viridiana by Agustin Sanchez Vida at the “Rencontres du Cinema Espagnol 
de Nantes”, 3 March 1995.
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Producers to represent the country at the Cannes Festival for it was considered to lack 
“enough technical and artistical qualities”. However, those involved in the film had 
subsequently managed to get an invitation for its entry from the director of the 
Festival, Fabre Le Bret. Viridiana would then go on to win the Palme D’Or. The 
prize was accepted by the Spanish General Director of Cinematography and Theatre, 
Jose Maria Munoz Fontan, who would lose his job as a result: only a few days after 
the film’s success in Cannes, it was declared blasphemous by L ’Osservatore
1 S9Romano. Subsequently, under some complicated financial premise, the Francoist 
regime managed to prohibit the screening of Viridiana. The film was still shown 
elsewhere in Europe but this meant that Uninci had now to face a legal battle in 
Spain. The situation for the company became extremely delicate.153
What happened after this is confusing. On the one hand, Juan Antonio 
Bardem maintains that just as Uninci was being forced to reorganize and reduce 
costs, Munoz Suay decided to sell his shares in the company and threaten to report its 
commercial relationship with the USSR, China and other Eastern European 
countries, if he were not immediately paid. Gregorio Mor&n, who gives a similar 
version, adds nevertheless that Munoz Suay did not have much choice as his 
livelihood was solely based on the income he received from Uninci.154 At any rate, in 
order to cover the costs of the latter, the company was forced to borrow money from 
the PCE. Santiago Carrillo would then write a letter to Munoz Suay that, according to 
Bardem, had a conciliatory tone and tried to avoid his break with the party. At the
152 Juan Antonio Bardem, “Gloria y Martirio”, El Cultural, numero especial.
153 Bardem, Memorias, pp. 305-306.
154 Mor&n, Miseria, p. 348.
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same time, he would tell Bardem, “in a different era, this traitor would have turned 
up in a ditch”. Soon after, Mufioz Suay was expelled from the party.155
On the other hand, Carlos Semprun Maura, who had become a close friend of 
Munoz Suay while working for the PCE in Spain during the mid 1950s, maintains 
that he was actually expelled from the party because he had become an 
uncomfortable element inside Uninci.156 Bardem, particularly, was upset at Munoz
1 ^ 7Suay for having insisted on the production of Viridiana. According to Semprun 
Maura, “Bardem thought that Uninci was his production company, that it should
I f O
produce his films and only his.” Moreover, in Semprun Maura’s account, his
brother Jorge Semprun would later tell him that the reason Munoz Suay had been
“separated” from the party was because he had “talked too much” during an
interrogation by the police after his return from a holiday in Crimea, and that they
were evaluating the consequences of his actions before taking a definite decision.
Mufioz Suay would deny this and give the following explanation:
Federico (Jorge Semprun), Bardem (mainly him), Domingo Dominguin and Pradera, 
for a number of reasons ... and given the Stalinist mentality that they all had, which 
had also been my own, thought that the cheapest and simplest way to get me out of 
Uninci was by expelling me from the party.159
The animosity between Mufioz Suay and Bardem as well as the latter’s 
opposition to the production of Viridiana has been reported in different sources.160
155 Bardem, Memorias, pp. 307-308.
156 Semprun Maura, El exilio, p. 297.
157 Jorge Berlanga also makes a reference to the problems between Bardem and Mufioz Suay who 
according to him, “acabaron a hostias”, in Berlanga. Perversiones de un sonador, interview by Juan 
Cobos, J. L. Garci, Antonio Gimenez-Rico, Miguel Marias y Eduardo Torres-Dulce in “Rafael 
Azcona: Estudios Criticos”, Centro Virtual Cervantes.
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Nevertheless, it is not enough to assess the reasons behind the departure of Mufioz 
Suay from the PCE. Rather, what we do know is that he would be used by Carrillo as 
an excuse for the way Pradera had been treated by the party during the previous two 
years.161 It seems that the General Secretary did not want to give up an activist as 
influential as Pradera. The loss of Mufioz Suay had already sufficiently weakened the 
intellectual organisation in Madrid. Nevertheless, it would turn out to be a quick fix: 
the relationship was doomed and Pradera would soon be involved in a new 
disagreement between the intellectual organisation in Madrid and the leadership in 
exile.162
E. Conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, during 1958 and 1959 the exiled leadership imposed 
its will on the activists in Spain and entered a number of projects that did not take the 
existing situation into account. Not only did the JRN and HNP fail but they also 
resulted in the arrests of hundreds of activists and the alienation of the party from 
other political forces that had not approved of these actions. The PCE’s refusal to 
accept the failure of the strikes would also create distress among the party’s 
intellectuals and students. The irreconcilable distance between the Spain as perceived 
by the exiled leadership and the Spain the underground activists were living amongst, 
was about to be exposed. Among others, Javier Pradera criticised the party’s policy
1995.
161 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
162 In addition, 1962 was also the year that saw the definitive departure of Luis Goytisolo from the 
PCE. It was at this time that he met the leaders in Paris and informed them about his decision to leave, 
interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
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and the unrealistic perception about Spain held by the leaders in exile. The VI 
Congress did nothing to improve the situation. Many activists would blame the 
arrests that followed on the recklessness of the leadership.
In addition, the failure of the HNP created divisions within the Communist 
leadership and marked the beginning of the dispute between Santiago Carrillo and 
Fernando Claudin. This would eventually develop into the crisis of 1964, which, as 
this thesis argues, will give further evidence that the old Stalinist internal structure of 
the PCE never disappeared: the destalinisation process was nothing more than a 
facelift.
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VI. STALINISM STRIKES BACK
A. Introduction
As we have seen so far, the successful period that followed the arrival of the 
Parisians to the high command of the PCE in 1956, had been replaced by a period of 
failures mainly in the form of general strikes. This created tension within the 
Communist leadership as well as among its student and intellectual organisations in 
Spain. Already after the HNP, there had been a clash between Fernando Claudin and 
Santiago Carrillo. From this point onwards, their relationship would slowly 
deteriorate. The party’s number two thought that the time had come for the party to 
face the reality of the situation in Spain, and apply its policy accordingly. His views 
were in a similar tone to the criticisms made by some intellectuals in Spain, such as 
Javier Pradera and Luis Goytisolo. Carrillo, however, refused to listen.
It was just a matter of time before the tension escalated into a full-scale 
confrontation, Fernando Claudin, supported by Jorge Semprun, would shortly attempt 
to change the party’s policies inside Spain as well as its internal structure. The 
varying motivations behind this struggle are almost impossible to establish with total 
certainty though an attempt will be made in the conclusion of this thesis to give a 
plausible explanation. At any rate, the two Fs (as Fernando Claudin and Jorge 
Semprun, whose alias was Federico Sanchez, came to be refered to by the leadership)
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would fail, exposing with their downfall the limits of the destalinisation process in 
the Spanish Communist Party.
B. Spain in the early 1960s
1. The workers
Regardless of the growing unease with the PCE’s policy in Spain, the leadership 
declared during a meeting of the Central Committee in August-September 1961, that 
the first phase of the policy of National Reconciliation had been achieved and that the 
PCE was stronger than ever before. “The Spanish Communist Party will not vacillate 
in assuming the initiative and leadership of a struggle to overthrow Franco and 
ensure peace. It will not vacillate in leading the new democratic situation we will 
have in Spain as a result”.1 The General Strike, which now became defined as the 
General Political Strike, was still the party’s main strategy to achieve this goal. On 
the other hand, just as had happened in the early 1950s, the international situation 
was about to capture the attention of the leadership. Not only had the conflict 
between the Soviets and Chinese come out into the open during the Conference of 
the Communist Parties of the World in 1960, but other matters such as the break 
down of relations between Cuba and the United States in January 1961, the erection 
of the Berlin Wall the following summer and the conflicts in the Congo, all marked 
the opening of a new critical period of the Cold War.2 However, it would not take
1 III Plenum of the Central Committee of the PCE, October 1961 (August), AHPCE 
(DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 42).
2 Under such radicalisation, the Spanish Communists renewed their criticisms against the presence of 
American military bases in Spain and, according to Gregorio Mor£n, even considered the organisation 
of armed groups for an eventual intervention against them. The plan was rejected in 1962, Moran,
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long for events in Spain to receive the full attention of the PCE: the end of the 
Stabilization Plan in 1962 would lead to an explosion of workers’ protests that would 
reach a peak in April-May of that year. The workers movement would then regain its 
prominence in the eyes of the party. As a result, the weakening of the intellectual and 
student organisations would no longer be mourned by the leadership.
As was explained in Chapter IV, the workers movement had experienced drastic 
changes since the early 1950s when the Regime started to move from an autarchic to 
a market economy. This shift had begun with the opening of relations between the 
United States and Spain and continued to strengthen after the arrival of the 
technocrats to the government in 1957. As the Vertical Syndicates and the state 
control over labour relations no longer responded to the needs created by the 
economic changes, a new system of collective bargaining and the so-called Jurados 
de Empresa (shop steward committees) were slowly introduced into the country. The 
austerity of the 1959 Stabilization Plan, which aimed to lessen the effects of the 
previous economic policy, would bring with it a wage freeze and massive 
unemployment (palliated to a large degree by the immigration of workers to Northern 
Europe). However, by 1961 and especially with the end of the Stabilization Plan a 
year later, the economy started to experience a speedy recovery, which translated into 
an increase of collective bargaining through the use of legal platforms such as the 
Jurados de Empresa as well as other illegal forms of workers’ representation.3 This 
created the space the workers needed to begin reorganising. As we have seen, 
infiltration of legal platforms was the tactic supported by the PCE, which in 1961
Miseria, p. 347.
3 Maravall, Dictatorship, p. 28.
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created its own trade union Oposicion Sindical Obrera (OSO).4 On the other hand, 
the CNT, the UGT and the Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos, rejected 
“infiltration” and would form their own alliance, Alianza Sindical, to fight the regime 
through open boycott.
By the beginning of 1962, the increase in collective bargaining led to a wave 
of strikes that reached Valencia, Barcelona, Madrid, Cartagena and the Basque 
Country. Between April and June, the strikes spread to the mining industry in 
Asturias; metal, chemical, electrical and shipbuilding industries in the Basque 
Country; the metal industry in Barcelona; and parts of Madrid. This would result in a 
major change in the Regime’s approach to labour relations. According to Maravall, 
the large number (425) of industrial conflicts during 1962 meant that they could no 
longer be declared acts of sedition as defined in the penal code. Economic strikes 
were subsequently legalized under a complicated mechanism of compulsory 
mediation and arbitration, which meant that the workers now had a new tool to 
negotiate with management.5 In addition, a movement of workers’ committees (shop- 
floor committees democratically elected and independent from the official trade 
unions) appeared around this time. It would eventually develop into the trade union 
Comisiones Obreras (mainly controlled by the Communists), which also combined 
the use of legal platforms with semi-legal ones to fight the regime.6
4 This would also be the case of other groups like the left-wing Catholics who would create their own 
syndical organisations, Accidn Sindical de Trabajadores and Union Sindical Obrera. The PCE had 
created in the late 1950s the Oposicion Sindical Obrera, and it would not be until 1966 that the party 
would give it up in favour of Comisiones Obreras.
5 Maravall, Dictatorship, pp. 29,30.
6 The first Workers Commission would be the one of the Metal Industry of Madrid in 1964. 
Comisiones had a semi-legal existence: they were carrying out a struggle both from within and from 
outside of the corporatist organisation.
For the Spanish Communists, the strikes of 1962, to which they had contributed 
(particularly in Asturias), seemed to confirm the wisdom of the party line: the 
workers had managed to organise in a common action and an important number of 
their demands had been subsequently met. Carrillo interpreted these results as a step 
forward for the use of a general strike to overthrow the Regime, and concluded that 
1959 had just been too early for this strategy.7 According to Pradera, “the strikes of 
April and May seemed to prove the party right in the discussion we had had. 
Subsequently, I started to work with the party again, jumping on the merry-go-round 
of the strikes.”8 However, as time would prove, Carrillo was mistaken about the 
events’ significance: the workers’ demands were all economic and the strikes had 
been used as a bargaining tool, not a revolutionary one. The working class of the 
early 1960s was very different from the working class of the 1930s and 1940s, and it 
now wanted to benefit from the country’s economic expansion. Hence, industrial 
conflict was the result of an expanding economy, not a failing one as the party 
thought. In the long term, the workers movement would make an important 
contribution to the erosion of the Regime, and the strikes, which eventually became 
more political, would indeed play a major part in this strategy. Nevertheless, what the 
party was unable to see was that Spain’s social structure was changing, and in doing 
so it diminished any desires among the working class to carry out a revolution. 
Essentially, the goals of the working class were now increasingly similar to those of 
the working classes of the European democracies.
7 Report by Santiago Carrillo, meeting of the Executive Committee of the PCE, April 1962, AHPCE 
(PLENOS, Carp. 27); Carrillo, Memorias, p. 488; Claudin, Documentos, p. 71; Moran, Miseria, p. 
352.
8 Interview with Javier Pradera, September 2000.
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2. The opposition
At the same time as the recovery of a working class movement was giving new hope
to the leaders of the PCE, another front was leaving the Communists behind. Since
the beginning of 1960, the opposition forces against Franco had been working to
achieve some kind of coalition but without taking the Communists into account. One
of these projects would be the so-called Union de Fuerzas Democraticas (UFD). This
organisation, founded in 1961, included groups such as Action Republicana, Partido
Nacionalista Vasco, Izquierda Democratica Cristiana and the PSOE. Their goal was
the re-establishment of a democratic regime in Spain with all guaranteed freedoms.
As was specified in the agreement they would sign soon after, this could only be
achieved through the union of all democratic forces against the Regime:
The democratic political forces of the country, conscious that only a common action 
of the different groups could precipitate the downfall of the totalitarian dictatorship 
that Spain suffers, and to avoid the chaotic situation that a new dictatorship of any 
sign would carry, agree to make a commitment.
However, the PCE was not to be part of this common action:
Reaffirming the open opposition to all types of dictatorship, the forces signing the 
present agreement will not accept any kind of coalition with forces of a totalitarian 
character, whether Communist or Fascist.9
Hence, the forces in the UFD were claiming to be doing exactly what the 
Communists had been urging them to do for many years, but without taking them on 
board. Carrillo refused to accept the party’s exclusion and would privately insist on 
the Communists’ imperative “to reinforce those positions in the alliance that
9 Tusell, Oposicion, p. 379.
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favoured an agreement with us.”10 In public, however, he would adopt a more
aggressive attitude towards those who were choosing to ignore them:
Today the popular disenchantment is more profound than in 1959 and the 
dictatorship weaker. If the forces of the opposition on the left and on the right would 
come to an agreement, a national strike could be achieved in the near future. That is 
why the responsibility of those political leaders who reject or postpone such an 
agreement is so immense.11
According to Mugica, around this time Carrillo would ask him to meet 
Dionisio Ridruejo and Joaquin Ruiz Jimenez and inform them that if they did not 
make a pact with the Communists, Soviet submarines could easily access the Spanish 
coast and provide arms for guerrilla action to take place.12 There was no reaction to 
such an absurd threat. Moreover, in less than a year, these political leaders, whose 
responsibility Carrillo had questioned, carried out a new project that once again did 
not include the PCE. In June 1962, short after the wave of strikes carried out by the 
workers, a wide spectrum of political organisations including Union Espanola, the 
FLP, the IDC and the PSOE, were invited to attend the IV Congress of the European 
Movement in Munich.13 In the days preceding the Congress, they met to discuss “the 
eventual integration of Spain in Europe”, which gave them an excuse to discuss the 
steps necessary for the arrival of a new democratic regime in the country and the 
characteristics of the latter.14 There were 38 delegates representing the Spanish forces 
in exile and 80 from inside the country. Certain tension developed between the two
10 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 4 July 1961, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores 
Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
11 “Organizar la lucha de masas”, Nuestra Bandera, n. 31, August 61.
12 Mugica, Itinerario, p. 67.
13 Tomds Garcia would go to Munich as a PCE representative and held talks with some of those 
present but he would not attend the meetings. For more information see Jauregui and Vega, 
Antifranquismo 1939-1962, pp. 272-273. Carrillo would later emphasize the importance of a 
Communist presence during Munich and use it to justify the party’s support to the resolutions taken by 
the rest of the forces. Report by Santiago Carrillo, meeting of the Executive Committee of the PCE, 
April 1962, AHPCE.
14 Tusell, Oposicion, p. 392.
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factions but they would eventually manage to draw up a basic agreement that called 
for a representative elected government, respect for basic human rights, recognition 
of national minorities and union freedoms.15 The consequences of the Contubernio 
de Munich (the Munich Conspiracy), as the meeting came to be described by the 
Franco regime, were varied: on the one hand, it confirmed that the opposition forces 
inside Spain were becoming more important than those in exile; on the other, the 
repression carried out by the Spanish authorities against those returning from “the 
Munich conspiracy” and Franco’s subsequent criticisms against the European 
Movement, hurt the Regime’s image and weakened even further the chances of Spain 
joining the European Market.16 According to Preston, after Munich, “Franco undid 
much of the patient labour of his technocrats and diplomats, and also provoked 
ridicule at his own expense”.17
As for the PCE, the agreement between the opposition forces was seen as an advance 
for its policy of National Reconciliation. Ignoring the fact that they had purposely 
been left out from the negotiations, the leadership published a declaration on 13 June 
1962 that affirmed the party’s approval of the agreement signed in Munich, which 
was described as having the potential to become “the fundamental basis for a 
political agreement between the left and right wing forces of the opposition”.18 The 
PCE went on to call for the opposition forces to unite in the preparation of a national 
strike that would lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship.19 The Communists’ 
support for Munich could only be explained by their fear of isolation, which puts into
15 Preston, Franco, p. 702.
16 The regime had requested on 9 February 1962 joining the European Economic Community. For 
more information on Franco’s reaction to Munich see Preston, Franco, pp. 702-704.
17 Preston, Franco, p. 703.
18 Declaration of the PCE, 13 June 1962, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 43).
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question the authenticity of the leaders’ belief in their claims about the strength of the
party as well as the working class and the imminent downfall of the regime.
Otherwise, it is hard to explain why they would give their support to those who did
not want it and to an agreement that favoured Spain’s incorporation into the
European Market, something to which the Communists had been openly opposed.
Fernando Claudin would explain the party’s position in the following manner:
Our Party has just given new evidence of its political realism by the position it has 
taken on the agreements of the forces that met in Munich. Our opposition to the 
integration of Spain into the Common Market has not been an obstacle for us in 
proclaiming our agreement with a platform that coincides, essentially, with the 
minimum programme that for many years we have been defending for the transition 
period.20
Still the same argument applies: had the party believed in the strength it
claimed to have, the leadership would not have felt the need to take such a desperate
measure. On the other hand, it is interesting to look at Claudin’s praise of the party’s
political realism in the context of his relationship with Santiago Carrillo at this time.
A few months earlier, in March 1962, both leaders had had a clash over the party’s
agrarian policy: “the land for he who works it” was the new slogan being considered
to propagate this policy among the Spanish people. Claudin, supported by Semprun,
believed it to be dangerous and unrealistic taking into account Spain’s economic
development, and argued that it would only serve to alienate an important sector of
agrarian capitalism that did not sympathise with the regime. Claudin wrote:
It is now essential to promote the most ample coalition between the social and 
political forces against the fascist form of domination of the monopolist oligarchy; 
from the working class and working peasants to the non-monopolistic bourgeois, of 
which the agrarian bourgeoisie is a part.21
19 “Urgencia de la unidad”, Mundo Obrero, 1 July 1962; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 149.
20 “Urgencia en la unidad”, Mundo Obrero, 1 July 1962.
21 “Mi opinion sobre el texto definitivo de la resolution intema acerca de la consigna ‘la tierra para 
quien la trabaja’”, letter from Claudin to the members of the Executive Committee, 26 March 1962,
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Carrillo, on the other hand, believed the slogan to be the best way to mobilize 
the masses. Furthermore, he said, the struggle of the party was not just against the 
regime but also against its social structure. The question then turned to the 
implications this had in the party’s claim for a peaceful solution to the Spanish 
problem. The struggle against the regime’s social structure could hardly be peaceful, 
Claudin and Semprun argued, and would make impossible the policy of alliances 
with other forces sought by the PCE. In a way, their awareness of the changes taking 
place in Spain meant that they were losing their ability to share Santiago Carrillo’s 
voluntarism. Semprun describes the moment he realised things were no longer the 
same as follows:
I had arrived in Spain in 1953: it was a gloomy, grey, humiliated and sad country. I 
remember perfectly well the day I realised Spain had changed and that our policies 
were directed towards a country that no longer existed. It was at the beginning of the 
1960s, a Sunday afternoon at the Plaza de Espafia. I was killing time while I waited 
for a comrade. The people of Madrid that had spent the day at the Casa de Campo 
were returning home and I suddenly realised that those young men and women that 
were coming back had nothing to do with that miserable Spain we were directing 
our propaganda towards. The self-confidence of the young women, the way they all 
talked, their scooters, the colours of their clothes. What is happening here? I 
wondered.22
In a similar fashion, Goytisolo explains:
Claudin and Semprun were both in closer contact to Spanish reality and they 
realised what was causing the failures of the party: the economic expansion. 
Suddenly, the people were no longer thinking about taking or not taking a tram but 
rather about buying a Seiscientos. That made the policy of the PCE unworkable and 
that is what the two Fs (Claudin and Semprun) began to notice.23
At any rate, the dispute was won by Carrillo but only after it was voted on, 
something that had never been done before in the Executive Committee. This 
difference of opinion within the PCE leadership hinted at a wider ideological
AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS, Claudin-Semprun, Caja 110).
22 Josep Ramoneda, “Entrevista a Jorge Semprun”, El Pais, 19 November 2000.
23 Interview with Luis Goytisolo, September 2000.
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divergence that would explode in the following months, the details of which will be 
looked at below. Indeed, Carrillo would describe the problems over the agrarian 
question as the turning point in his relationship with Claudin: “It was at this point 
that I could feel I had lost him: he had broken away from me, even our personal 
relationship started to cool”.24
Hence, it can then be concluded that in the article about the party’s support 
for Munich, Claudin was praising the PCE for taking the realistic and pragmatic 
position he had been demanding in the previous months. Though for different 
reasons, supporting Munich was a decision that had been accepted by everyone: those 
who believed the party had to adapt their strategy to the changes taking place in 
Spain and those whose voluntarism let them overcome any contradiction involved in 
their policies.
3. The students
As we have seen so far, 1962 was a turning point for the situation in Spain: the 
foundations of the type of transition that would take place in the following decade 
were being created. On the one hand, the economic expansion that began after the 
end of the Stabilization Plan forced the regime to open up its policy towards labour 
relations. The working class, whose structure had been evolving since the economic 
changes of the early 1950s, now had different goals than those of the previous 
decades. The use of both legal and illegal platforms by the workers to achieve their 
demands would be a major factor in the erosion of the regime, especially after the 
emergence of Comisiones Obreras. On the other hand, the economic expansion also
24 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001.
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changed the political coalition within the regime itself, as the ruling elite’s interests 
ceased to be linked to the regime’s. Those conservative forces that had been to 
Munich, the so-called moderate opposition, were aware that for the continuation of 
Spain’s economic evolution, a gradual political opening would have to follow. After 
Munich, a cabinet reshuffle took place. On 10 July 1962, Manuel Fraga was 
appointed Minister of Information; among other things, he would carry out a partial 
liberalisation of the press. However, the supposed political opening of the regime 
during this period would never come close to sufficient, which in turn made the need 
for Spain’s political transformation all the more evident for those conservative 
forces. In addition, Munich also helped to convince the left opposition about the 
eventual participation of these forces in any future transition. According to Paul 
Preston, “during the 1960s, as the opposition came gradually to terms with the 
implication of economic development, they also began to realise that significant 
change without the collaboration of the Christian Democrats would be difficult.”25
These changes in the social structure of the country were ignored by Carrillo 
and his followers, who as we have already seen, interpreted recent events as a step 
forward in the direction marked out by the PCE’s policy. However, where the 
Communists found evidence of the coming downfall of the regime, the door 
permitting a political transformation from within was actually beginning to open. The 
PCE would still remain very influential in the workers’ movement all the way to the 
transition (through Comisiones) and in the student movement during the 1960s. 
Nevertheless, while their policy of infiltration in both of these movements was 
successful in eroding the regime, it also contributed to the success of the type of
25 Preston, ‘The Anti-Francoist Opposition...” in Preston, Spain in crisis (Sussex: The Harvester Press 
Limited, 1976), p. 145.
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transition that the Communists did not seek: that reached by reform from within, the 
so-called ruptura pactada, instead of a clean break.
As for the student movement, we will now briefly look at where it found itself during 
this period, which will complete our general picture of the situation in Spain during 
the early 1960s. The arrests that had followed the JRN, the HNP and the party’s VI 
Congress, had imposed a period of inactivity on the student movement, from which it 
only began to emerge in 1961. The small secret organisations of the mid 1950s began 
to be replaced at this point by a movement that could reach a wider spectrum of 
students through the use of the existing legal platforms of elective representation in 
the University, the so-called Chambers of Delegates.26 The struggle against the SEU 
continued to be a priority for the students but now they also began to resist the 
increasing control of Opus Dei over education. One of their most important 
achievements would be the creation in the autumn of 1961 of a democratic student 
union, the Federation Universitaria Democratica Espanola (FUDE), founded among 
others by a member of the 1956 generation, Fernando Sanchez Drago.27 Just like the 
UDE and the Comites de Coordination Universitaria had tried to do, the FUDE was 
meant to be an alternative to the SEU. Its founding manifesto claimed that the 
organisation did not have a political affiliation: “The FUDE ... is not a pact between 
political groups and it does not accept the orders of any political party”.28 However, it
26 Maravall, Dictatorship, pp. 105-111. The Chambers of Delegates had been set in 1958.
27 Interview with Fernando Sanchez Drago, September 2000. Sanchez Drago actually claims that he 
founded the FUDE by himself and that it was only later that the PCE took over, Sanchez Drago, Una 
vida, pp. 76-77. The FUDE published its first manifesto in January 1962, “FUDE: Federation 
Universitaria Democrdtica Espanola”, January 1962, AHPCE (FUDE, Caja 124, Carp. 56). At the 
beginning of 1963, the Christian-Democrat students would form their own organisation, the UED 
{Union de Estudiantes Democraticos) as an alternative to both the FUDE and the SEU. For more 
information see Carr and Fusi, Spain, p. 147, and Lizcano, 56, pp. 269-270.
28 Statutes of the FUDE, March 1962, AHPCE (COMITE DE COORDINACION UNIVERSITARIA 
DE MADRID V BARCELONA, Caja 124, Carp. 27).
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was formed mainly by members of the PCE, the FLP and the ASU (which by now 
was under the control of the Communists).29 As with Comisiones, the FUDE 
advocated from early on the use of legal and illegal platforms to fight the SEU.30 
Indeed, together with the Chambers of Delegates, the FUDE would play an active 
role in organising student demonstrations in solidarity with the workers during the 
strikes of 1962. By December 1963, and regardless of the repression its members 
often faced, the FUDE had expanded to Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Granada, 
Oviedo, Sevilla, Valencia, Valladolid and Zaragoza.31 It would play a major role in 
the erosion of the SEU, which was finally dissolved in 1965 after a period of great 
protests.32 From then onwards, the student opposition against the Regime would 
continue to grow. A new illegal trade union, the Sindicato Democratico de 
Estudiantes (SDE) would come into full operation during the academic year 1967-68. 
It was also controlled by the Communists but would soon face serious problems with 
the FUDE, which had been taken over by more radical elements in the university. 
Throughout the 1960s, the PCE would manage to maintain its influence on the 
student movement, but by the early 1970s, the Communists would come to be seen as 
too “reformist” and their space taken over by much more radical movements.33
29 As Lizcano points out on his book on the generation of 1956, the ASU “was a fiction maintained by 
the PC to add to the confusion and have one more vote,” Lizcano, 56, p. 263.
30 “Manifesto fundacional de la FUDE”, March 1962, AHPCE (COMIT6 DE COORDINACION 
UNIVERSITARIA DE MADRID Y BARCELONA, Caja 124, Carp. 27).
31 Maravall, Dictatorship, p. 108. For information on the arrest made during 1962 see “La repression 
en el presente afio”, 1962, AHPCE (COMITfi DE COORDINACION UNIVERSITARIA DE 
MADRID Y BARCELONA, Caja 124, Carp. 27).
32 For more information see Maravall, Dictatorship, p. 108
33 Carr and Fusi, Spain, p. 149; Maravall, Dictatorship, p. 114.
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C. Prelude to a rupture
1. Julian Grimau
In the summer of 1962, several party leaders in the Basque Country were arrested,
among others Ramon Ormazabal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of
Euzkadi, and Enrique Mugica. It would be during this imprisonment that Mugica
would finally leave the party. As mentioned earlier, his meeting with the Socialist
leader Antonio Amat while in prison during 1958/59 had had a great influence on
Mugica. Subsequently, the failure of the JRN and the HNP had weakened his faith in
the PCE. By 1963, once again in prison, Mugica informed his comrades that he
wanted to leave the party. His girlfriend would then tell Amat of his decision to join
the PSOE.34 According to Mugica:
The break with the PCE was very bad, as happens in the PCE to all of those who 
leave the Party with a capital P. First, they tell you that you’re going to a sister party 
and therefore it is important to keep a good relationship with each other. And then 
they start to play dirty tricks on you.35
The loss of Mugica was significant but was nothing compared to the shock felt by 
Communists with the subsequent fall of another party leader, Julian Grimau, who 
would be executed by the Franco regime in April 1963. He had been working in 
Spain since 1957 and had acted as Simon Sanchez Montero’s replacement in Madrid 
after his arrest in 1959. Grimau was a committed and hard-working activist; he had 
joined the PCE in October 1936 and had moved to Cuba after the Civil War. In 1947, 
he went to Paris where he would work under Carrillo’s orders until his departure to
34 Mugica, Itinerario, pp. 76-78.
35 Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000. For more information on the period that followed 
his departure from the PCE see Mugica, Intinerario, pp. 77-78.
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Spain ten years later.36 Semprun would later describe the party’s decision to send him
into the country as reckless: Grimau had belonged to the Criminal Brigade of the
police in Madrid during the Civil War and this alone should have prevented the
leadership from sending him back inside. There was little doubt that the Francoist
authorities would be particularly brutal to him were he to be arrested.37 For this
decision, Semprun blames Carrillo:
A general secretary that sent to work inside Spain an activist who has the 
background of Julian Grimau, without discussing this decision at least in the 
Executive Committee, without giving the members of the Executive all the 
information needed to make a proper judgement, that leader is irresponsible. Or 
better, he is responsible for what might happen later.38
Claudin writes in his biography of Carrillo that neither of them knew that 
Grimau had belonged to the Republican police during the Civil War. Nevertheless, as 
Moran brings to light, the leadership had to have known since Grimau had submitted 
to the Political Bureau an autobiography that specified this fact at least three years 
before he was sent into the country. It is possible that Claudin might never had read 
it or been told about it. At any rate, as he himself points out, “Grimau was already 
‘burnt’, as we used to say, and our delay in taking him out of Madrid was fatal.”40 In 
fact, Semprun had brought the matter to the attention of the leadership during a 
meeting of the Executive Committee in the summer of 1962. He described Grimau as 
imprudent and impulsive and warned about his tendency to spend too many hours in 
the street from one appointment to another, often making direct contact with irregular
36 Moran, Miseria, p. 360.
37 Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 210-211.
38 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 212.
39 All Central Committee’s members were required to write their autobiography (most of which can 
actually be found in the archives of the PCE), Moran, Miseria, pp. 359-360. In fact, Grimau’s 
autobiography is included in the documents of the PCE’s V Congress where an explicit reference to 
his role during the Civil War is made, AHPCE (V Congress, Carp. 35). Moreover, in his memoirs, 
Domingo Malagon, the activist in charge of the falsifying team of the PCE, also confirms that Carrillo 
knew, Asenjo and Ramos, Malagon. Autobiografia de un falsificador, p. 243.
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Communist groups that would suddenly come together and whose trustworthiness 
could not be guaranteed. Indeed, Grimau was turned in by an informer in one of these 
groups. In the view of Semprun:
Maybe one could say that this defect of Grimau was the reverse of his abnegation to 
his work, of his fighting spirit. No doubt. But it was mainly the direct consequence 
of the leadership’s erroneous conception of the timing and rhythms of the struggle, 
of the weakness of the dictatorship, always on the verge of collapse according to the 
PCE. It was mainly the consequence of our smugness, our arrogance, our 
subjectivism. Grimau was another victim of the subjectivism of the PCE.41
Semprun would then argue that unless his working methods were 
immediately corrected, Grimau would have to be removed from his post in Madrid. 
A letter was sent to him and Romero Marin in Spain but apparently they rejected all 
the criticisms made against them. Carrillo, who had not been present at the meeting, 
would later agree with Semprun that indeed something had to be done anyway. 
However, “weeks passed by, nothing was done and in the early days of November 
1962, Julian Grimau was arrested in Madrid,” Semprun recalls in regret.42
After his arrest on 7 November, Julian Grimau was brutally tortured. The 
police would later say that he had jumped out of a window but it seemed clear, taking 
into account the type of injuries Grimau had, that they were trying to conceal the 
terrible beating inflicted on him.43 With numerous legal irregularities, his trial took 
place on 18 April. He was condemned to death. Grimau was executed two days later, 
despite the PCE’s campaign and the great number of petitions from all over the world 
for his pardon, including a plea by Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini, Archbishop
40 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 154.
41 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 199.
42 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 207.
43 Grimau received a major blow to the head. It is believed that he had been hit with a gun on the head 
and that the police had then thrown him out of the window to cover up what they had done. Grimau 
himself could not remember anything that had happened at that time. For information on his arrest see 
Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo 1939-1962, pp. 25-30.
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of Milan.44 This act exposed the brutality of the regime and discredited both at home
and internationally its supposed liberalisation. The failure to save Grimau was also a
big blow for the PCE and was felt with impotence by the activists in Spain. Many
thought the party did not have the strength it claimed and was carelessly exposing its
leaders to repression.45 In contrast, Carrillo would later value in positive terms the
effects of the political assassination. He wrote to Ibarruri: “Grimau with his heroism
has resolved many problems, many of the difficulties the party was facing to achieve
the recognition of its role in the national struggle against the dictatorship by other
forces and sectors”.46 Moreover, he also said: “The reaction that took place in
relation to this crime, which nobody expected because everyone thought in the last
minute Franco would stop it, has a profundity we cannot yet measure.”47 His
optimism contradicts Claudin’s view on the matter. He believed the fall of Julian
Grimau needed to be assessed in the context of the general situation:
The analysis that the party leadership had been making for many years -extreme 
fragility o f the dictatorship, the proximity o f its collapse- were leading us to force 
premature actions: the Jornada o f 1958, the strike o f 1959, diverse “partial 
fights” ... We were using these actions to prepare for the “great day”, but were also 
making the police strikes against us very easy, resulting in the subsequent 
exhaustion o f the organisation. Obviously, the clandestine struggle against 
Francoism could not take place without losses, but the tactic o f forcing the struggle 
on the basis o f an unrealistic analysis o f the existing situation could not but 
aggravate them.48
Behind the PCE’s unrealistic analysis of the existing situation lay the main 
reasons for the coming crisis.49
44 Preston, Franco, p. 709.
45 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 23 March 1963, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores 
Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
46 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Ram6n Mendezona, 23 April 1963, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, 
Dolores Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
47 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 29 April 1963, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores 
Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
48 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 155.
49 Soon after the execution of Grimau, Manuel Sacristan would call for a demonstration (without the 
party’s approval) that would lead to his arrest. Moran describes this reaction as the result of
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2. The merging of the opposition
As we have seen, since the failure of the JRN and the HNP, the Spanish Communist 
Party had been suffering from two internal confrontations: one within the leadership 
and the other one between the leadership and a number of intellectuals and students 
inside the country. The party’s official interpretation of the different events that had 
taken place in Spain during 1962 only served to deepen these two conflicts, which 
were about to merge and lead to one of the most dramatic purges ever to take place in 
the history of the PCE.
At first, as explained in the previous chapter, the problems with the intellectuals 
developed on an individual basis. Javier Pradera, Ricardo Munoz Suay, Luis 
Goytisolo, Fernando Sanchez Drago and Enrique Mugica were among those who first 
faced clashes with the leadership in Paris, in some cases ending in their departure 
from the party altogether. By 1963, these individual confrontations had generalized 
and were affecting the whole of the intellectual organisation in Madrid. The activists 
were unhappy with their status in the party: they felt themselves to be nothing more 
than conduits for the orders coming from Paris. Instead, they wanted to contribute 
towards the development of the party’s strategy for they believed that they had a 
better understanding of Spanish reality than the leaders in exile.50 For instance, 
according to their view, the PCE leadership had done “insufficient theoretical 
elaboration” concerning the entrance of Spain in the Common Market and should
Sacristan’s frustration with the party’s inability to affect the course of events. Sacristan would 
subsequently ask for the party to return more orthodox positions.
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reconsider its position on the matter.51 They criticised the party’s presumption about 
the imminent collapse of the regime and its insistence on organising major actions 
instead of accumulating forces for the long term: Spain was now going through a 
neo-capitalist development and a monarchical outcome had to be taken as a real 
possibility.52
The situation was worsened by the arrival of Jose Sandoval to the capital in 
December 1962. He had been chosen by Carrillo to replace Semprun but had not been 
welcomed at all by the intellectual organisation.53 Sandoval had spent the previous 
seventeen years between the Soviet Union and Rumania and had little rapport, if any, 
with the Spanish intellectuals and students of the 1960s.54 Semprun, who had been 
much more popular among them, had been taken out of Spain by Carrillo for his 
safety. The young leader would later question the sincerity of this measure: Carrillo’s 
concern for security was expressed only in his case and not in that of other activists 
who were actually at greater risk, such as Julian Grimau and Romero Marin. In 
addition, the presence of Jose Sandoval in Spain was at every level more dangerous 
than Semprun’s since the former had spent half of his life behind the iron curtain and 
would have an extremely hard time to escape notice (he was actually arrested only a 
year after he arrived in Madrid).55 In effect, there was no more danger now in 
Semprun’s situation than there had been ever before: he was an excellent clandestine 
leader who had successfully avoided the Francoist authorities for almost ten years. It
50 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 153.
51 Letter from Costa (Jos6 Sandoval) to Santiago Carrillo, 24 March 1963, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE 
LA CULTURA, Microfilms 164).
52 Letter from Costa (Jos6 Sandoval) to Santiago Carrillo, 24 March 1963, AHPCE; Claudin, Carrillo, 
p. 153.
Letters from Costa (Jos6 Sandoval) to Santiago Carrillo, 24 March and 15 April 1963, AHPCE 
(FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, Microfilms 164).
54 Letter from Costa (Jos6 Sandoval) to Santiago Carrillo, 24 March 1963, AHPCE; Claudin, Carrillo, 
p. 153.
Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 246.
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would not be until September 1963, through a mistake made by Sanchez Drago, that 
the police would make the connection between Federico Sanchez (Semprun’s alias) 
and Jorge Semprun.56 Hence, it seems most likely that Carrillo decided to replace 
him after he had become aware about the seriousness of the developing differences 
between himself and Claudin and Semprun.
Hence, when Jose Sandoval informed Carrillo at the beginning of 1963 about 
the state of the intellectual organisation in Madrid, the General Secretary was not 
taken by surprise.57 He would tell Ibarruri about these activists: “They refuse to 
accept Sandoval’s help, they want to transform their committee into some kind of 
Central Ideological Committee”.5* Sandoval, nevertheless, took a conciliatory 
approach to the problem and suggested that the Committee of Intellectuals in Madrid 
should be reorganised and Pradera, whom he described as being the soul of the 
group, elected as its leader. In this manner, Sandoval reasoned, he would be forced to 
behave properly and the situation could be expected to improve.59 Following his 
advice, a meeting was organized in Paris between the leaders and the dissenting 
elements from inside Spain.60 Pradera did not attend it, however. Jose Ruibal, a 
student that had recently been elected as the secretary of the Committee, would be the 
one to defend the position of those in Madrid. His behaviour during the meeting
56 Interview with Fernando Sanchez Drago, September 2000. According to Sanchez Drag6, in 
September 1963, he was arrested by the police and while he was being interrogated he made the 
mistake of answering to a question about Federico Sanchez using the name Jorge Semprun. The police 
was startled as the link between the two names was finally made. Fortunately for those involved, 
Semprun was no longer in Spain and the mistake had no further repercussions. On the other hand, 
Semprun pointed out while interviewed by the author that Carrillo would also reveal his identity in his 
book Dialogue on Spain. When asked by Debray about Semprun, Carrillo replied using his alias 
Federico Sanchez. According to Semprun, he did this on purpose for “he wanted people to know that 
the Semprun that was starting to be well-known as a scriptwriter was the Semprun that had been 
expelled for being a ‘revisionist’”, interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
57 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 153. Juan Gomez, who had been in Madrid at the same time, also confirmed 
the delicate situation of the intellectual organisation in the capital.
58 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 23 March 1963, AHPCE.
59 Letter from Costa (Jose Sandoval) to Santiago Carrillo, 15 April 1963, AHPCE.
60 Letter from Costa (Jos6 Sandoval) to Santiago Carrillo, 24 March 1963, AHPCE.
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would shock the leadership. As Claudin explains, Ruibal “did not have party 
experience’” and was not aware “about the mandatory corollary of devoted respect 
for the leaders”. He therefore felt no constraints in launching a critique against their 
“lapsed working methods” which those in Spain blamed for slowing down the party’s 
numerical growth, political efficiency and ideological creativity. “There is a young 
generation of activists that detests these methods,” Ruibal told the leadership. He 
then asked for “material with less indications of admiration and more ideas”. 
According to Claudin, those present tried to find a conciliatory outcome to Ruibal’s 
attack. Even an irritated Carrillo made a controlled defence of the party’s policy and 
methods and was careful “not to provoke an irremediable rupture”. After the 
discussion, Claudin would try to convince Carrillo about the importance of including 
Pradera in the new Committee of Intellectuals that would shortly be elected. The 
General Secretary agreed but when the time came ignored Claudin’s suggestion, 
hence adding to the tension developing between the two leaders.61 Several accounts 
confirm Carrillo’s suspicion and dislike for Pradera at this time.62 The General 
Secretary believed the young intellectual to be carrying out a conspiracy and to be 
using Ruibal as a cover. Carrillo was only too aware about the similarities between 
the opinions of the intellectuals and those held by Claudin and Semprun.63 He was on 
the right track: those similarities would become all the more evident the following
61 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 154.
62 Interview with Pradera, September 2000; Claudin, Carrillo, p. 154; Mordn, Miseria, p. 350.
63 Speech by Santiago Carrillo, January-February 1964, AHPCE (REUNION DEL COMITE 
EJECUTIVO DEL PCE). Around this time, Juan Goytisolo would publish an article in L ’Express 
which argued against the image of Spain sustained by the PCE (though he did not directly mention the 
party). Since he was a good friend of both Semprun (who he had met during a holiday in Capri in the 
summer of 1962) and Claudin, Carrillo suspected that Goytisolo was acting in accordance with them. 
Text on the decision to suspend Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun from the Executive Committee, 
2 April 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Comunicados y Declaraciones, 
Caja 111, Carp. 2); Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 154-155; Carrillo,Memorias, p. 480.
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summer, during a seminar on philosophy and aesthetics for party intellectuals and 
students.
The Seminar of Arras, as the event came to be known, took place in July and August
1963 with more than one hundred activists coming from inside Spain. Among them,
two tendencies would clearly develop. On the one hand, there were those who like
Pradera defended Spain’s incorporation into the European Market and criticised the
internal functioning of the party. This group was therefore closer to the positions held
by Claudin and Semprun. On the other hand, there were those who, inspired by the
recent events in the international Communist movement, wanted to go back to more
orthodox positions. This group would become known as the pro-Chinese.64 The
discussions went on for several weeks and covered a varied number of topics.
Francesc Vicens gave a talk criticising the existence of dogmatism in the arts, which
displeased the General Secretary.65 Carrillo had been suspicious about the seminar
from early on, particularly about the discussions on the policy of the party. Already
during its preparations, he wrote in a letter to Pasionaria:
Now they are more interested not in the seminar about philosophical or economical 
questions but the political seminar. This one I am going to supervise personally. For 
that I need the collaboration of Manolo.66 He should spend two months here. The 
preparation for the subjects needs time: they are subjects for people who will be 
measuring every word and every comma.67
64 This group would eventually split from the party and fonn a Maoist group known as the PCEm-1, 
which in the following years would also go through its own splits as well as absorb new splits from the 
PCE. It will not be covered in detail here as it would mainly achieve prominence in the late 1960s. For 
more information see Fernando Jauregui and Pedro Vega, Cronica del antifranquismo, 1963-1970 
(Barcelona: Argos Vergara, 1983-1985), pp. 81-83; Hermet, The Communists, pp. 66-73; Ruiz 
Ayucar, El Partido, pp. 322-328. According to Jordi Sole Tura, the existence of a pro-Chinese faction 
inside the party contributed to the tension provoked by Claudin’s positions and to the radicalisation of 
the confrontation that followed as a result, Jordi Sole Tura, “La oposicion comunista...” in Fontana, 
Joseph (Ed.). Espafia bajo elfranquismo (Barcelona: Biblioteca de Bolsillo, 2000), p. 133.
65 Jauregui and Vega, Cronica 1963-1970, p. 80. Francesc Vicens used the alias Ferran.
66 Manuel Azcdrate, who at the time was in Moscow writing with Pasionaria the official history of the 
PCE.
67 Letter from Santiago Carrillo to Dolores Ibarruri, 10 June 1963, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, Dolores 
Ibarruri, Correspondencia, Caja 16, Carp. 4).
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Indeed, Carrillo would give a speech in one of the last sessions of the seminar 
whose purpose was to put the intellectual organisation back in its place. He was 
particularly critical of Vicens’ lecture and indirectly accused him of being a 
revisionist. Semprun received similar treatment from Carrillo who was also happy to 
remind the intellectuals and students about their limited knowledge due to their 
restricted access to Marxist texts. Dogmatism, he argued, could be confused with 
revisionism and Semprun and Vicens were manipulating the activists by not making 
a proper distinction between the two. Their approach did not take into account the 
specific conditions of the ideological struggle in Spain and its specific problems, the 
General Secretary continued.68 He then asked those present to focus on the fight 
against “the reactionary, fascist and bourgeois tendencies in the university and 
cultural centres of the country” before focusing on the destruction of dogmatism. His 
attacks felt ever more offensive to those involved because Carrillo had only attended 
the last part of Semprun and Vicens’ lectures and had also been absent from the 
majority of the other discussions. The irritation increased when as soon as he finished 
his speech, he left the Seminar without waiting for its closure. Vicens would then 
express his dissatisfaction with Carrillo’s comments and according to Claudin, “he 
addressed the fact that in a seminar such as the one we were holding, the didactic 
should not prevail”.69 To the surprise of those watching, Claudin responded to the 
absent General Secretary with a speech that brought their differences into the open. 
He would justify this action in the following manner:
I thought Carrillo’s appreciation of the general orientation and focus of the seminars
of philosophy and aesthetics was mistaken, and since he had expressed them openly
68 Speech by Santiago Carrillo, Arras Seminar, August 1963, AHPCE (FUERZAS DE LA CULTURA, 
Microfilms); Speech by Fernando Claudin, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
69 Speech by Fernando Claudin, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
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before all those present, I thought I had the right to do the same thing, to express my 
opinion openly.70
Claudin defended the critiques made during the seminar against what he 
described as “the dogmatic sclerosis that has crystallized for a long period in Marxist 
philosophy”. His generation might have had easy access to Marxist texts but these 
were interpreted in the same way as religious people take the Bible. Hence, he 
argued, the young activists’ attitude was better because it was more critical. In 
reference to how the Spanish leadership had been able to accept, and carry out, the 
cult of personality, he said: “We had been educated under a spirit of unconditional 
acceptance of the revealed truths and that is why it was very difficult to react to what 
was happening in our field, the field of Marxism”. One could say that with this 
speech, Claudin was preparing the ground for the battle that was about to emerge 
between himself and Semprun and the rest of the Executive Committee, especially 
when he added:
Someone has asked in one of our sessions: What is the guarantee that the cult 
phenomenon will not repeat itself? ... One of the guarantees, I believe, is that each 
Communist says what he/she thinks, expresses clearly his/her opinions, even if these 
do not coincide with the opinions of the highest authorities of our movement.71
As we shall see, Claudin would later be attacked by other members of the 
Executive Committee for the comments made during his speech in Arras.72 The 
seminar, which had attempted at reunifying positions, had in fact done the opposite. 
Many of the intellectuals and students present would soon leave the party, among 
them Javier Pradera, whom Carrillo had now managed to exclude from the new
70 Speech by Fernando Claudin, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
71 Speech by Fernando Claudin, Arras Seminar, August 1963, AHPCE.
72 Speech by Manuel Azcarate, January-February 1964, AHPCE,
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Committee of Intellectuals in Madrid. The confrontation inside the leadership was by 
this time unavoidable.
3. Preparing for battle
After the Arras Seminar, Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun continued with their 
struggle against the positions of the majority of the Executive Committee. Nuestras 
Ideas had been closed the previous year, hence taking away an important forum for 
the two leaders. However, following the complaints from the intellectuals in Madrid 
about the lack of material produced by the party, the Executive Committee decided to 
go ahead with the publication of a new theoretical review called Realidad. In order to 
avoid any possible repercussions from the French Government, as had happened with 
Nuestras Ideas in March 1962, Realidad was printed in Rome and financed by the 
Italian Communist Party.73 As a result, Claudin and Semprun took over its first issue 
which must not had been hard to do since they were in fact moving closer to the 
positions of the Italians. They each published an article that made clear their new 
attitude towards the party’s leadership: they were no longer prepared to keep quiet. 
“Without consulting Carrillo”, Claudin recalls, “Federico (Semprun) and I published 
two texts in which a position critical of the Soviets was transparent”.74
Semprun’s article analysed the changes that had taken place in the 
Communist movement since 1956 in which a critique of the preceding period in the 
PCE was implied. During the following months, the article would be violently 
attacked by the members of the Executive Committee. However, Semprun writes, “as
73 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 277; Moran, Miseria, pp. 378-379.
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I read this text again, what grabs my attention is rather the extreme prudence -not to 
say timidity- of its formulations”.75 It is likely that the PCE leadership was very much 
irritated by his reference to the new relationship that was being established between 
the Communist parties of the world: the replacement of a monolithic movement that 
saw the CPSU as the guiding party by the polycentrism defended by Togliatti.76 As 
he points out, this position would be embraced by the PCE with the arrival of 
Eurocommunism but at that time, it was the cause of great “scandal”.
Claudin’s article criticised the dogmatic implications of “socialist realism” 
and made a defence of freedom in artistic creation.77 The party’s number two also 
describes his text as “timid and moderate” but still “inadmissible to the philo-
* 70
Sovietism that prevailed in the Executive Committee of the PCE”. Indeed, Carrillo 
would later say that the publication of the articles had been “an act of indiscipline”.79 
Claudin and Semprun would never be able to publish a second issue of the magazine, 
whose editorship was soon assigned to other “more reliable” party members.80
In November 1963, the PCE held an Assembly of its Central Committee. It was now 
Carrillo’s turn to prepare his ground for the coming battle. The analysis of the 
Communist movement, particularly the confrontation between the Chinese and the 
Soviets, gave him space to warn, as he had done during the Arras seminar, against 
any attempted “revision” of the past.81 At the same time, the appraisal of the situation
74 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 161.
75 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 277.
76 “La revolucidn pictorica de nuestro tiempo”, Realidad, n. 1, September-October 1963.
77 “Observaciones a una discusi6n”, Realidad, n. 1, September-October 1963; Semprun, 
Autobiografia, pp. 277-279.
78 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 161.
79 Speech by Santiago Carrillo, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
80 Sole Tura, Memorias, p. 202.
81 Speech by Santiago Carrillo, 1-3 November 1963, AHPCE (Actas del Pleno del comite central del 
PCE).
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in Spain, delivered in a speech by Horacio F. Inguanzo, served to challenge any
possible criticism against the strategy of the party. The strikes in Asturias during the
previous summer, which had led to numerous arrests and weakened for years to come
the workers movement in the area, were described now as the decisive step towards
the Political General Strike:
The party was correct when it made the preparation of the General Political Strike 
the centre of its activities. ... The strike during this summer of the Asturian and 
Leonese miners is the most efficient contribution to the General Political Strike. It is 
the liveliest expression of the agreement of the Spanish working class’ main 
vanguard with the party’s idea of a general political strike. The Asturian and 
Leonese miners have shown, practically, that the general political strike is within 
reach of the workers and could give a mortal blow to the dictatorship.82
As we can see, not much had changed since the early days of the JRN
(Jornada de Reconciliation National). Carrillo would argue that if the general strike
had been impossible then, it was however possible now:
What seemed impossible before, is now real for the great mass of our people... I 
believe on this matter it is important to point out the following: our JRN -with its 
less positive and more positive aspects-, our attempts of a strike in 1959, and all of 
our propaganda campaign in relation to the National Strike and the General Political 
Strike -and not just all of our propagandist^ work but also our actions- have had an 
enormous importance in the achievement of this political result which I consider to 
have great value.83
As for Claudin and Semprun, the latter did not attend the meeting and the 
former did not intervene. “To say what I thought about the situation in Spain would 
have meant breaking (with the party); to say what I did not believe would have been 
impossible. I opted for silence.”84 Not for long, however.
A last attempt to unify positions took place on 8 January 1964 after Santiago Carrillo 
asked Fernando Claudin to meet for a private discussion about their recent
82 Speech by Comrade Inguazo, 1-3 November 1963, AHPCE.
83 Speech by Santiago Carrillo, 1-3 November 1963, AHPCE.
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differences. The meeting has been documented by both participants and while they 
agree on the general content, they each have a different interpretation of its meaning, 
just as could be expected.
The ideological differences between the two were soon addressed but the 
discussion was centred on the internal functioning of the party. The main problem 
was “one of method”, Claudin would tell Carrillo. He criticised the General Secretary 
for the manner in which he carried out discussion inside the Executive Committee, 
relying on his authority to impose his opinion. It was not uncommon for a member of 
the Executive immediately to change his point of view as soon as he realised it was 
not in agreement with Carrillo’s. Recalling this part of the conversation, the General 
Secretary would later say: “I asked Claudin if he thought I was making the discussion 
between us difficult. ‘No, you do not make it difficult but then everyone agrees with 
you.’ And so I asked him, but how is that my fault?”85 Clearly, Claudin did not mean 
to imply that the other members of the Executive changed positions because they 
were convinced by the arguments of the General Secretary, but rather that they would 
not dare express disagreement with him. Claudin continued to express his 
dissatisfaction with the internal functioning of the party. He wanted more diversity as 
there was in the Italian Communist Party, to which Carrillo replied by accusing the 
Italians of being rightists.
Their relationship was also addressed. Claudin complained about Carrillo’s 
total disregard for his opinion during the meeting with the intellectuals in May 1963, 
when he “forgot” to include Pradera in the new Committee of Intellectuals after 
having agreed with him to do so. A similar thing had happened during the meeting
84 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 162.
85 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 2001.
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about the agricultural policy of the party, when Claudin and Semprun were told by 
Carrillo to be more careful about expressing their opinions. The differences in their 
opinions, Claudin believed, were the reason behind Carrillo’s decision to separate 
Semprun from his work.86 However, while Carrillo expressed some regret on the 
Pradera affair and claimed that he had probably forgotten about it, he totally rejected 
the possibility of having an agenda against Semprun. It was Semprun who had been 
neglecting his work, he said. The General Secretary then said about the man who had 
successfully led the clandestine organisation of the PCE in Madrid for almost ten 
years: “Fede (Semprun) is not a man for one specific political or organisational task,
0*7
for that you need constant work, to be organized.”
Next came Carrillo’s turn to criticise Claudin: he accused him of having 
questioned his authority during the Arras seminar.88 “After talking to some people, I 
suspected there was something weird but I could not imagine you could give a speech 
like that. You presented me as someone opposed to a critical spirit, as a champion of 
dogmatism opposed to the new generations”.89 Claudin denied this to ever have been 
his intention.90 The conversation continued along these lines with both combatants 
maintaining firmly their position whilst continuing to express an apparent desire to 
find an agreement. At this stage, however, agreement was no longer possible. The 
discussion seemed to be more about assessing each other’s position than an authentic 
attempt at reconciliation. Still, the meeting ended on an optimistic, if false, tone 
regarding the future. The stage was set and the actors ready, the curtain about to rise 
for the final act.
86 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 163.
87 Santiago Carrillo, Memoria de la transicion (Barcelona: Editorial Grijalbo, 1983), p. 192.
88 Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 162-163.
89 Carrillo, Memoria transicion, p. 193.
90 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 163.
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D. The purge of Claudin and Semprun
1. The battle
In 29 January 1964, the Executive Committee of the PCE would meet to examine a 
document on the situation of the country written by Santiago Carrillo to be sent to 
Dolores Ibarruri and later presented at a conference of the Western Europe 
Communist parties that had formed a Commission of Solidarity with Spain.91 Only 
two weeks had passed since the conversation between Carrillo and Claudin 
mentioned above.
As expected, everyone, except Claudin and Semprun, accepted the optimistic 
portrayal of the situation in Spain given by Carrillo. According to Claudin, “we took 
the positive aspects of the document and tried to take them further than its author”.92 
For instance, at one point he conceded: “The improvement of the economic situation 
of the masses is the result of their struggle and the fact that the bourgeoisie has had to 
make concessions”. Then, he added: “If on the one hand this stimulates the struggle, 
on the other -as happened in Asturias- it could contribute to containing it.”93 Claudin 
asked the Executive to take into consideration the rise in salaries after 1962, the 
effects of tourism and the emigration to other European countries. It was also 
important not to overlook the possible effects of the Plan de Desarrollo, which could
91 Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 163-164; Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 267; Moran, Miseria, p. 381. The 
meetings would take place on the 29 and 39 January and again on 4, 10, 11 and 12 February.
92 Claudin, Carrillo, p. 164.
93 Speech by Fernando Claudin, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
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in effect lead to economic development (even if unfairly distributed) and present the 
oligarchy with new options. Moreover, Claudin was cautious about the growth of the 
opposition within the regime for he believed it had a double edge: while its members 
were critical about the limits of the actual reforms, they were also against the 
revolutionary forces. Nevertheless, both Claudin and Semprun seemed to be trying to 
avoid an open confrontation and made several optimistic remarks about the 
“excellent discussions” that were taking place. Such was also the case with Carrillo.94 
This would not last for long.
Eduardo Garcia and Enrique Lister would be the ones responsible for 
throwing the first stone.95 In their speeches, they directly addressed the divergences 
that were building up at the heart of the Executive Committee. It is difficult to know 
exactly why the General Secretary did not take the initiative himself. He argues that 
he was still hoping to come to an agreement with them and therefore did not want to 
spoil the chances of this happening.96 Claudin believes that behind closed doors, 
Carrillo had asked the two middle ranking leaders to carry out the attack 
themselves.97 In this manner, it would not look as if he were imposing his view on 
anyone, as Claudin had accused him of doing. Moran gives another possible 
explanation: Carrillo did not want to have the confrontation at this point and was 
waiting for a better moment, probably later that year. However, he was forced to 
change his tactics when Eduardo Garcia, who had worked in very close contact with
94 Speeches by Fernando Claudin, Jorge Semprun and Santiago Carrillo, January-February 1964, 
AHPCE.
95 Speeches by Eduardo Garcia and Enrique Lister, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
96 Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 480-481.
97 Claudin, Carrillo, pp. 164-165.
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the Soviets and could have been encouraged by them to initiate the rupture, made the
first attack against the two Fs.98
At any rate, however intentional or unintentional his reasons might have been,
the war had finally begun. The developments in the Arras Seminar were strongly
criticised. The Executive accused Claudin of starting a rumour about the crisis inside
the Executive with his speech in reply to Carrillo, an action that could easily be
portrayed as factional activity. Semprun defended their position in the Seminar by
demolishing Carrillo’s intervention and his criticism against their lectures. He had no
right to criticise, Semprun argued, for the General Secretary had heard only the last
part of each talk. He also complained about the fact that ever since the meeting with
the intellectuals in May 1963, he had been removed from political activity and had
not been called to attend any new meetings. Once again, Carrillo refuted this
accusation by turning the blame on Semprun:
There is a phenomenon of separation on his part: he could have come to the 
seminar; he could have come to the second part of the Central Committee meeting 
and he did not; he could have had contact with me and he is avoiding it. He has 
abandoned work with the youth. He abandoned Nuestras Ideas. What is going on?
He later added:
I think Federico knows much less philosophy than he thinks. The philosophical 
knowledge of Federico is still something to be seen. And I have to say the day he 
shows it to us I will jump for joy. ... Federico bombards us with all those words 
about the “institutional system”, many of us get very confused. Maybe you could 
say, ‘how ignorant you are!’ But the party is run by ‘ignoramuses’ and there is no 
chance that the ‘philosophers’ will run the party. ... Experience shows that 
Federico is an intelligent man who has political qualities but when it comes to the 
practical work of the organisation, he is a total calamity.
Other accusations about Semprun’s work inside the country followed. Then 
came Claudin’s turn to receive blows from the General Secretary:
98 Moran, Miseria, pp. 382-383. As stated in the introduction, Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun
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Fernando has given us a piece of his mind; he has got even about the agrarian 
discussion, and the discussions of 1956 and 1959, all the grievances he had been 
accumulating. If this gives Fernando some peace of mind, if it resolves his traumas, 
we should thank God for having raised the issues in such a way."
The two Fs were also accused of representing the concerns of the oligarchy. 
In addition, their attitude during the debate about the agricultural policy of the party 
was questioned. In turn, Semprun and Claudin openly attacked the party’s 
subjectivism and lack of internal debate. Semprun accused some members of the 
Executive of being nothing more than the puppets of the General Secretary. Though 
no names had been mentioned, Lister felt particularly offended and irritated.100 
Semprun pointed to the everyday more obvious division between the activists inside 
Spain and the leaders in exile. Finally, aware about their minority status in the 
present discussion, both Claudin and Semprun asked for a Congress or a Central 
Committee meeting to be called where their differences of opinion could be 
discussed with other members of the party. Their demand was rejected.101 Instead, 
Lister suggested continuing the discussion about “serious divisions within the 
leadership” in a new meeting of the Executive Committee that would include all its 
members, since some such as Dolores Ibarruri were not in attendance.102 His 
proposal was approved hence ruining the chances the two Fs might have had of 
success: inside the Executive, they were significantly outnumbered.
(Federico Sanchez) came to be refered to by the party’s leadership as the two Fs.
99 Speech by Santiago Carrillo, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
100 Speech by Enrique Lister, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
101 Speeches by Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
102 Speech by Enrique Lister, January-February 1964, AHPCE.
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From 27 March to 2 April 1964, the leadership of the party met close to Prague in
what has been described by Jorge Semprun as a Kafkaesque castle.103 While the lack
of internal democracy was still addressed by the contenders, the discussions were
now mainly centred on the interpretation that each side gave about the situation in
Spain and the political outcome of the Regime.
After a long and harsh exchange of opinions during which Claudin and
Semprun were once again attacked from all comers, the following arguments on each
side could be drawn: On the one hand, Carrillo and the majority of the Executive
Committee believed that Spain was in a similar social situation to where it had been
in the 1930s. The Regime was on the brink of collapse. The time had come for the
working class and the bourgeoisie to make an alliance and lead a democratic
revolution with an anti-feudal and anti-monopolistic character. This would come
about most likely through the organisation of a general strike. Once the revolution
had been achieved, there would be a gradual transition to socialism and eventually to
communism.104 On the other hand, Claudin and Semprun believed that Spain had
achieved such capitalist development that a democratic revolution was no longer
possible. Claudin argued that the bourgeoisie would not pact with the working class
to overthrow the system because the bourgeoisie was actually benefiting from that
system. In contrast, he predicted that monopoly capital would move through a
number of reforms towards a new stage of capitalist development, which could be
more or less democratic, depending on a number of factors. Claudin said:
We are not heading towards a revolutionary crisis but rather we are living through a 
political crisis, which will be solved by the struggle of those below and on the 
initiatives of those above, through a series of phases, partial reforms, both political 
and economic, through a path more or less gradual and peaceful.105
103 Semprun, Autobiografla, p. 231.
104 March 1964, AHPCE (REUNION DEL COMITE EJECUTIVO DEL PCE).
105 Speech by Fernando Claudin, March 1964, AHPCE (REUNION DEL COMITE EJECUTIVO DEL
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Hence, belief in the imminent collapse of the regime was not a realistic
appraisal of the situation. The party had to be looking at a long-term project and
change its policies accordingly. This was not something the rest of the Executive
Committee could accept, nor could it let others hold such opinions without
classifying them as traitors to the cause: defeatists, rightists and at one point, even
Francoists. The lack of democratic culture inside the PCE made such differences of
opinion impossible. Hence, a counterattack against the two Fs began. Santiago
Alvarez would say that Claudin was suffering from “objectivism” while Manuel
Delicado accused him of having a total lack of faith in the party and the working
class.106 Jos6 Moix, on the other hand, believed that Claudin and Semprun actually
suffered from “subjectivism” and were holding rightist positions. He then added:
“We should fight against dogmatism but without forgetting about the dangers of
revisionism, opportunism and the bourgeois influences that try to distract our Party
from its goals. 107 Dolores Ibarruri, who had not attended the first meeting, seemed to
be particularly irritated by Semprun and she interrupted him constantly during the
delivery of his speech. At one point, she gave the following explanation about the
attitude of the dissidents:
Age, exile, family and the environment in which one lives, all have an impact on the 
willingness to struggle and the readiness for combat, even more so if one does not 
have firm convictions. ... Fernando (Claudin) appears before me under a new light. 
He appears before me as a sceptical, pessimistic man who does not believe in 
anything, who doubts everything, who doubts the capacity for struggle of the 
working class, who doubts the theory of Marxism-Leninism, who doubts his own 
partners in the struggle and the leadership of the party that he is treating in a manner 
which is uncharacteristic of a comrade. ... His conclusions, more than those of a 
Marxist-Leninist, are the conclusions of a bourgeois sociologist or a Social 
Democrat.108
PCE).
106 Speeches by Santiago Alvarez and Manuel Delicado, March 1964, AHPCE.
107 Speech by Jose Moix, March 1964, AHPCE.
108 Speech by Dolores Ibdrruri, March 1964, AHPCE.
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Neither Claudin nor Semprun were willing to back off before these attacks. 
Soon, it became clear that no solution would be reached. The two Fs were asked to 
rectify their positions, something they categorically refused to do. As Semprun 
explains:
Everything that could be said had already been said, decided, atado y bien atado. It 
was clear that neither Fernando nor you could convince the rest, nor could the rest 
convince either Fernando or you. On the other hand, it was also clear that you were 
not going to capitulate. Everything was clear, therefore. There was no solution, at 
least not through the channels of Democratic Centralism.109
In later years, Semprun would describe the problems of the party at the time 
as follows:
Our objectives in 1963 -the National Strike, the democratic revolution, the 
liquidation of the power of the financial bourgeoisie and monopolistic industrial 
capital as the main corollary for the disappearance of Francoism- did not reflect the 
true economic structure or the dynamic of classes that there was in Spain. At first 
sight, these goals seemed very radical but since they did not take into account the 
whole capitalist transformation of the social structure of our country, they became 
an archaic programme that hid the problems of a strategy towards socialism. So, 
these conclusions were not the result of an analysis based on reality that could have 
taken us directly to our goals. In just a few words: we could either modify our 
strategic objectives in function of a specific analysis of reality, as Claudin and I 
wanted to do in 1964, or we could keep our illusory goals and close the door to any 
possibility of analysis.110
The party chose to keep the illusory goals. At the end of the meeting, Claudin 
and Semprun were suspended from the Executive Committee until a decision was 
taken by the Central Committee, which would be informed about the divergences 
through the dispatch of the necessary documentation concerning the 
disagreements.111 By accepting this channel, Claudin and Semprun were losing their
109 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 30.
110 Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 161-162.
111 Text on the decision to suspend Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun from the EC, 2 April 1964, 
AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Comunicados y Declaraciones, Caja 111, Carp. 
2).
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chance to hold a proper discussion before the CC and were entrusting to the 
Executive their “fate”. Indeed, the documentation sent to the CC’s members was as 
biased as might be expected when one side in the discussion does not contribute to it. 
Mor£n suggests that Claudin and Semprun were by now so tired of argument that 
they chose this method even if it did not favour them. It could also be, however, that 
though well-aware about the manner in which the leadership would deal with the 
“documentation” about the divergences, they thought this was a good opportunity to 
expose the PCE’s despotic internal structure. What followed closely matched the 
party’s previous manner of dealing with dissent, and hence, its deeply rooted Stalinist 
culture.
2. The knock-out
While Claudin and Semprun were waiting for the verdict of the Central Committee, 
the campaign of the Executive against them began. On 19 April 1964, an Assembly 
of the Party in Paris was organized to commemorate the anniversary of Grimau’s 
death. The occasion presented Carrillo with an opportunity to give to the rank-and- 
file his own version of the recent divergences. He spent a great deal of time 
defending the policies of the party since his rise to power as well as refuting any 
possible criticisms of intolerance. “Our party has shown that it rejects any kind of 
sectarianism, dogmatism. Our Party has not vacillated in criticising the final period of 
Stalin ...”112 The General Secretary then went on to defend the thesis of the majority 
of the Executive and compared the thesis of the “others” to those held by the
112 “Discurso ante una Asamblea de militantes del Partido”, 19 April 1964, AHPCE (DIRIGENTES,
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Mensheviks against Lenin and the Bolsheviks.113 The existence of currents of 
opinion inside the PCE was challenged on the basis that they “would break the party 
into a thousand pieces.” Carrillo never mentioned Claudin and Semprun by name but 
it was soon clear to everyone that they were the targets of his attacks: the two Fs were 
the only members of the Executive not present at the Assembly and rumours about a 
division within the leadership had already been spreading since the Arras Seminar the 
previous year. Moreover, according to Semprun, some party cadres had been ordered 
by Carrillo to pass on the word about who was on the receiving end of his 
accusations. “Carrillo was launching a public and general offensive against our 
positions, or better, against a grossly deformed interpretation of our positions, which 
he described as ‘revisionist’, ‘defeatist’ etc,” as he wrote in later years.114 Among 
those present was Jordi Sole Tura who felt as he were witnessing one of the trials that 
took place at the height of the Stalinist era.115 Since he sensed that those on “trial” 
were none other than Claudin and Semprun, he decided to visit the latter and told him 
about the Assembly. Semprun confirmed his fears. Sole Tura would then talk to 
Claudin and immediately identified himself with his positions in the Executive. As 
we shall see, the young Catalan would be one of the few to support the two Fs.116
Once they became aware about the launch of an attack against them, Claudin 
and Semprun wrote to Santiago Carrillo a letter of protest to be sent to members of 
the CC. They denounced the development of events at the Assembly and accused the 
leadership of violating the agreement taken a month earlier whereby no one could 
informed about the divergences until a decision had been made. They furthermore
Santiago Carrillo, Discursos, Caja 4, Carp. 1.1.1).
113 “Discurso ante una Asarablea de militantes del Partido”, 19 April 1964, AHPCE.
114 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 190.
115 Sol6 Tura, Memorias, p. 204.
116 Sol6 Tura, Memorias, pp. 204-205.
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accused Carrillo of deforming their views. “All this makes us think that it has been
decided to precipitate the course of events, to make impossible or at least hamper ...
a serious discussion between the party’s cadres and activists about the recent
problems.”117 They received no reply.118 By mid May, Claudin asked the party to
provide him with the minutes of the Executive meeting so that he could study them.
Though he had not had a chance to look at the documentation that was being sent to
the members of the CC, he was now expressing his doubts about its potential
accuracy and believed that only the complete minutes of the Executive meeting could
give a fair account of the divergences. Once again, we cannot know whether this
“bias” on the part of the Executive truly took the two Fs by surprise or whether they
had been expecting it all along. It seems strange that, experienced as Claudin and
Semprun were in the ways of the party, they had at any point believed that the
leadership would actually produce a fair account of events. At any rate, while
Claudin’s demand to see the minutes was not rejected, he was told that he could not
keep the documents at his house as had been the case in the past, and had to work on
them somewhere else. Subsequently, Claudin wrote to the Executive:
I have to tell you that this measure worries me .... It is a symptom of attitudes and 
procedures that should had been banished from the party. Unfortunately, this action, 
as well as the campaign initiated in the Assembly of 19 April against a supposed 
reformist and revisionist current in which you presented a grossly deformed version 
of mine and Federico’s views, seem to indicate that these methods of “bad 
memory”, themselves typical from a Stalinist period, are taking hold in our party 
again. While the CC has not yet reached a conclusion, the party is already being 
“prepared” to have an opinion, not about our real opinions, but about a falsification 
of them.119
Indeed, the members of the CC had already begun to send to the Executive
117 Letter from Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun to Santiago Carrillo and the EC, 22 April 1964, 
AHPCE (DIVERGENCES CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3)
118 Letter from Claudin to the EC and the CC, 3 September 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCES 
CLAUDlN-SEMPRUN,Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
1,9 Letter from Fernando Claudin to the EC, 1 June 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCES CLAUDIN-
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their replies on the divergences and there seemed to be unanimous support for the 
majority’s position.120 The letters are generally tedious and few actually discuss the 
divergences in any detail. A number of comments made against the accused reveal a 
hidden scorn against them: “It is a sad role played by an arrogant and pedantic leader 
who is in reality nothing more than the echo of a frightened writer” one reads about 
Claudin.121 Manuel Azcarate, who would in later years become an advocate of 
Eurocommunism in the PCE, argues in his memoirs that he never read the 
information sent by the Executive and in this manner avoided giving a response on 
the matter, for he feared he might have been closer in several aspects to the positions 
of the two Fs.122 This is not true, however: Azcarate sent his response to the 
leadership on 7 July 1964 where he explained in detail why he supported the 
resolution taken by the majority of the Executive.123 Around this time, the Executive 
would also publish a Declaration on the situation in Spain that defended the positions 
of Carrillo and his followers and defied those held by the two Fs.124 This upset 
Claudin and Semprun for they had not been consulted about it (they were still 
members of the Executive) and strengthened their argument that the leadership had 
been preparing the rank-and-file to agree with the majority’s position before any 
solution had actually been reached by the CC (the replies from its members kept on 
coming until late summer). Sole Tura, who wrote a letter to the Executive making 
clear his disagreement with the Declaration, stated at the time: “The declaration of 
June is the touchstone: you have to be either for it or against it. If you are for it then
SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
120 Letter by the members of the CC to the EC, March-July 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS 
CLAUDfN-SEMPRUN, Informes, Caja 110).
121 Letter by Pedro Mendez to the EC, May 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN- 
SEMPRUN, Informes, Caja 110).
122 Azcdrate, Luchas, p. 79.
123 Letter by Manuel Azcdrate to the EC, 7 July 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-
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you are a good boy. If you make an effort to analyse things by yourself and express 
doubts, then you are a traitor”.125 As we have seen, Sole Tura had been having doubts 
about the party’s policy for quite some time. However, it would actually be the 
methods used by the leadership against the two Fs, which he described as the 
“morbid rituals of a Stalinist era I had never known”, that made him side with the 
dissidents.126 It is clear when looking at the history of the PCE that these methods 
were anything but alien to its leaders. Divergence inside the party had always been 
dealt with in a similar way: by shutting up those who differed. Now, there were no 
executions or tip-offs to the police against the “traitors” but the strategy used against 
the two Fs was beginning to confirm that the destalinisation process had never taken 
a true hold of the party’s internal structure.
On 3 September 1964, the leadership held a meeting with the two Fs to discuss the 
Central Committee’s results; Santiago Carrillo was not present.127 The resolution on 
their suspension from the Executive Committee had been approved almost 
unanimously and some cadres had even proposed their exclusion from CC. While 
accepting the will of the majority, both Claudin and Semprun still expressed their 
disagreement with the resolution and presented an appeal against it for the next 
Congress. This was their right according to the statutes of the Party. However, they 
must have known the Executive would deny them this opportunity, as indeed
SEMPRUN, Informes, Caja 110).
124 Declaration by the PCE, June 1964, AHPCE (DOCUMENTOS, Carp. 45).
125 Letter from Fabra (Jordi Sole Tura), 14 September, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN- 
SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3); Letter from Fabra (Jordi Sol6 Tura) to Gregorio 
L6pez Raimundo on the PCE’s Declaration of June 1964, August 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS 
CLAUDfN-SEMPRUN, Informes, Caja 110).
126 Sol6 Tura, Memorias, pp. 206-207.
127 In the different documents of this period, there is several references to two meetings that the 
General Secretary held with Jorge Semprun during the summer. It seems they discussed the same 
topics that had been addressed during the meetings of the Executive earlier that year as well as the
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happened. Claudin also demanded that new material on the divergences be sent to the 
whole party, including documents written by the dissidents. He was already preparing 
his own document, he told the leadership. Furthermore, he wanted the results of such 
an enquiry to be published in a Bulletin for everyone to read. Once again, it is 
difficult to believe that Claudin was actually expecting any of these demands to be 
met. More likely, he wanted to accumulate further evidence against the leadership 
and its autocratic manner of dealing with dissent.
During the meeting, Claudin and Semprun were accused of factional activity. 
Throughout the summer, they had held talks with a number of activists coming from 
Spain to see them and Semprun had come into contact with the Italian Communist 
Party through Rossana Rossanda, a member of its Central Committee, in an attempt 
to inform its leader, Palmiro Togliatti, about the character of the divergences.128 The 
two Fs argued that since the leadership had been carrying out a campaign against 
them, they had had no choice but to give their own version of affairs to those who 
asked. This was done in accordance with the party’s Statutes in Article 2, which 
stated that it was the duty of every party member to avoid the hiding of the truth.129 
“If the majority of the EC would have given the ‘truth’ to all the members of the 
party, none would have been forced to obtained it from Federico Sanchez and me”, 
Claudin replied.130 Semprun made similar arguments attacking the PCE’s lack of 
internal democracy and the existence of vestiges of Stalinism and dogmatism that 
should have long been eradicated:
Assembly of 19 April. No agreement was reached.
128 Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 274-275. One of these meetings was organized by Jordi Sol6 Tura at 
his house in Paris and was discovered by chance by a party activist who immediately informed the 
leadership, Sol6 Tura, Memorias, p. 209. Also references in the minutes of the meeting between 
Fernando Claudin, Jorge Semprun and other members of the EC, 5 November 1964, AHPCE 
(DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDlN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
129 Letter by Fernando Claudin to the EC and the CC, 5 September 1954. (REUNIONES, Reunidn
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The manner in which a large part of the CC has found out about the discussions 
taking place in the Executive Committee is neither correct nor does it agree with 
Leninist principles. ... A large part of the members of the CC has only found out 
about it through verbal information, or a summary of the discussion, elaborated 
without the participation of comrade Claudin or myself. And in this summary, you 
have given a distorted, incomplete, grossly deformed version of our opinions. The 
problem has been taken outside of the framework of the CC, therefore violating the 
party’s Statutes. Since the Assembly of 19 April, and always following the same 
deformities and distortions, ... the opinions of Claudin and myself have been the 
object of a violent campaign of aggression, ... and we have never been allowed to 
be present at the meetings during which we were on the receiving end of serious 
political consequences.131
It is interesting to note here how, by this time, Claudin had moved his 
arguments on Spain further to the left. He was now claiming that as the democratic 
revolution was not feasible due to the development of capitalism in the country, the 
only possible solution to the problem of the Regime would be a socialist revolution, 
even if the latter could not take place in the short term. This more extreme position 
was presumably taken, as Moran suggests, to close down those who were accusing 
him of being a right-winger and a defeatist.132
After the meeting of 3 September, the campaign against the two Fs continued to 
escalate in tone. At a new Assembly of the party on 13 September, Santiago Alvarez 
insinuated that Claudin and Semprun (who once again were not present) were 
working for the Francoist Minister, Manuel Fraga. “We cannot subjectively say that 
Fraga is paying them. They are still getting their wages from the party, hence they do 
not have the need yet to get money from anyone else”.133 Whether or not he meant it
Comit£ Ejecutivo, Caja 111, Carp. 1).
130 Letter by Fernando Claudin to the EC and the CC, 5 September 1954, AHPCE.
131 Declaration by Jorge Semprun, 3 September 1964, AHPCE (REUNIONES, Reunion ComitS 
Ejecutivo,Caja 111,Carp. 1).
132 Moran, Miseria, p. 397.
133 Letter from Fernando Claudin to the EC and the CC, 22 September 1964, AHPCE 
(DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3); Semprun, 
Autobiografia, p. 185.
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literally, the implications of such a comment were obvious to everyone. Once word
got to Claudin, he wrote to the party to renounce his salary, giving back what he had
left from the last wages:
The method you are using is the method used by Stalin to destroy those in the party 
who dared have a different opinion: first, by deforming their positions and opinions; 
second, by proclaiming that those positions, previously deformed, and those who 
defend them, are working objectively for the enemy; third, by accusing those who 
objectively work for the enemy to subjectively be in his service, getting money from 
them, etc. 34
The slander campaign was not limited to Claudin and Semprun. Those who 
had expressed any agreement with their views, such as Jordi Sold Tura and Francesc
1 “ASVicens, were also beginning to suffer the consequences. In a letter to Gregorio
L6pez Raimundo, the PSUC’s General Secretary, Sole Tura wrote:
You are now carrying out a campaign of “information” in which those who express 
their disagreement are slandered and insulted, without given them, moreover, the 
chance to explain their position. ... How cannot anyone see that the party Statute 
which says that “the activists should participate in the elaboration of the party’s 
policy” means nothing to the leadership and that reality is very different? Inside the 
PCE, there is a minority that decides and a majority that executes. This 
contradiction could function at a given moment if the political analysis made by the 
minority is fair and produces a policy in agreement with reality. ... But when the 
analysis of the minority is false or partial -as it is the case in the Declaration of 
June- the contradiction explodes.136
Moreover, as Sole Tura explains, a political rupture at this time was also a
personal rupture that affected all the members of the family. When describing
Claudin and Semprun*s situation at the time, he wrote:
Jorge Semprun was also isolated but he was a personality in France, a well-known 
writer and scriptwriter and, therefore, with wider means of personal, intellectual and 
political survival. Claudin’s family, on the other hand, was a clandestine family who 
faced a lot of economic and personal difficulties. ... Suddenly, Carmen (Claudin’s 
wife) was losing her friends and the daughters were losing theirs.
134 Letter from Fernando Claudin to the EC and the CC, 22 September 1964, AHPCE.
135 Letter from Fabra (Jordi Sole Tura) to Gregorio Lopez Raimundo on the PCE’s Declaration of June 
1964, August 1964, AHPCE; Letters between Fabra (Jordi Sole Tura) and Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, 
14-25 September 1964, AHPCE; Semprun, Autobiografia, pp. 184-186.
136 Letter from Fabra (Jordi Sole Tura) to Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, 24 September 1964, AHPCE. 
For more information on Jordi Sole Tura’s fate at the time see Sole Tura, Memorias, pp. 208-214.
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As the situation deteriorated, a new meeting between the leadership and the
dissidents was arranged for 5 November 1964. Once again, the General Secretary did
not attend it, a clear sign that he considered the matter over and done with.137 The
arguments and accusations on both sides did not differ from those expressed in the
September meeting. The tone, on the other hand, was much more aggressive and the
frustration felt by the two Fs very apparent. In fact, there was no real discussion...
just a brawl of low punches. At one point, following several attempts by those
present to obtain from Claudin and Semprun the names of the party activists that had
contacted them, Claudin replied:
We are not telling you about those comrades that have talked to us because the 
methods the party is using against us in the first place, and with those who have 
similar opinions to ours, do not offer guarantees that you will not falsify the 
opinions of those comrades too and use them as an excuse to accuse them of 
factional activity and in this manner put at risk their position in the party.138
Once the meeting had finished, the leadership sent to the PCE’s organisations 
and committees an Internal Report refuting the two Fs’ criticisms against the 
accuracy of the documentation on the divergences sent during the previous spring to 
the members of the Central Committee. It was claimed that 54 out of 66 members of 
the CC had actually received the complete minutes of the Executive Committee 
meeting in March 1964, which amounted to 700 pages. Only those who were in 
prison, the leadership argued, received a summary of the meeting.139 This is very 
hard to believe, however, not just because of the logistics involved in such a vast 
task, but also because it is unlikely they would have expected the CC’s members to
137 Representing the Executive Committee were Ignacio gallego, Enrique Lister, Francisco Romero 
Marin and Gregorio Lopez Raimundo. Internal Report of the EC of the PCE, November 1964, 
AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Comunicados y Declaraciones, Caja 111, Carp. 
2).
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read them. Claudin would later maintain that only those in exile received a copy of 
the complete minutes. In any case, even if the information was indeed an accurate 
account of the divergences, it is most unlikely that many would have risked their 
position in a fight that could not be won. As for the Internal Report now being sent to 
the party’s organisations and committees, the leadership had to be given the name of 
each person that would receive a copy, all of which were numbered. The person in 
charge would then proceed to read it to the activists under his control and 
immediately send it back to Paris. No notes could be taken and no discussion would 
follow.140 These strict measures, which have strong reminisces to the measures taken 
for Kruschev’s’ secret speech, probably aimed to achieve two different things: on the 
one hand, to finalize the discussions that had been dragging on for almost a year; on 
the other, to find those who were still in contact with the two Fs by tracing back any 
possible leaks.
At the same time, the members of the Central Committee received, aside from 
the Internal Report, the letters that Semprun and Claudin sent to the Executive after 
the September meeting and the minutes of the October meeting. They were asked to 
approve the following resolutions:
1. To expel Claudin from the PCE’s Central Committee and to allow the Executive 
Committee to expel him form the party if he were to continue with his factional 
activity.
2. To relegate Semprun to a post of associate member of the Central Committee 
and to allow the Executive Committee to expel him from the party if he were to 
continue with his factional activity.141
138 Internal Report of the EC of the PCE, November 1964, AHPCE.
139 Internal Report of the EC of the PCE, November 1964, AHPCE.
140 Orders by the EC on the knowledge and use of the internal report about Fernando Claudin and 
Jorge Semprun, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Comunicados y Declaraciones, 
Caja 111, Carp. 2).
141 Standard document sent to Sebastian Zaparian on the two Fs, 5 December 1964, AHPCE 
(DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDfN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
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Once again the members of the Central Committee replied just as the 
Executive wanted them too. Not only were the resolutions approved but some asked 
for Semprun to also be expelled from the CC.142 Nevertheless, it is important to bear 
in mind that the enquiries surrounding the purge of the two Fs were never anything 
more than simple formality. As Claudin and Semprun argued, the leadership had 
distorted and deformed their views and refused to give them the chance to discuss 
them in public. Moreover, the CC had never really taken any autonomous decisions 
but just approved those which came from the Executive: it was not part of the PCE’s 
culture for the cadres and activists to question the leadership or the policies of the 
party. As we have seen, even during the downfall of the old guard and the rise to 
power of the Parisians in 1956, there had been no real criticism of the party’s past nor 
any analysis of its internal structure. Not surprisingly, the few who now attempted 
actually to discuss the divergences that were taking place, were ostracised and 
eventually expelled. The purge of the two Fs would therefore confirm that 1956 had 
not been a turning point in the history of the PCE. The purge fits in well with the 
pattern that the Communists had followed since the end of the Spanish Civil War: the 
party’s internal Stalinist structure was preventing any attempt at renewal or any sort 
of autonomy to develop among its organisations, which in turn led to the exiled 
leadership applying the wrong policies to fight Francoism in Spain, also provoking 
friction with other political forces.
3. Farewell
142 Letter by the members of the CC to the EC, December 1964-February 1965, AHPCE
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During the months that followed the meeting of October 1964, the relationship 
between the two Fs and the Executive would be limited to an exchange of letters and 
a few publications on each side.143 On 8 December, Claudin wrote to the Executive 
informing them that he had finished his Report on the divergences, of which a copy 
was attached. Since the party had only published a deformed interpretation of their 
views, he argued that he now had the right to correct it and would therefore start to 
distribute the Report among party members. With the help of Francesc Vicens, 
Claudin would actually manage to publish the text as a book in France early the 
following year. The latter would become an important source for anyone trying to 
understand the purge of the two Fs and a source of irritation for the leadership of the 
PCE. A second letter by Claudin written on the same day asked the Executive to 
return to him a passport that he had been given by the Cubans in the past and which 
he had left at the party’s headquarters in Prague. He had already requested the 
passport in October but had received no reply from the party on the matter. Claudin’s 
situation in France was rather delicate as he had no legal documentation; the Cuban 
passport could at least provide him with a semi-legal status.144
Jose Serran, who Moran describes as a “sinister party cadre”, replied to 
Claudin ten days later taking notice of his decision to pass on his Report on the 
divergences and hence continue with what he defined as his “factional activity”.145 
Claudin was also told that the Report, with his letter attached, would be sent by the 
Executive to the members of the Central Committee. There is no evidence that this
(DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Informes, Caja 110).
143 As the crisis of the two Fs was taking place in the PCE, an important change took place in the 
Soviet Union. On 16 October 1964, Nikita Khrushchev was replaced in the leadership of the USSR by 
Leonid Brezhnev.
144 Letters by Fernando Claudin to the EC, 8 December 1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDfN- 
SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
145 Moran, Miseria, p. 400; Letter from Jose Serran (alias Ramos) to Fernando Claudin, 18 December
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was ever done but the following January the party would publish a mishmash of the 
text in a special issue of Nuestra Bandera. It was printed in tiny letters, split in 24 
sections and accompanied by critical notes written in a much bigger font that took 75 
percent of the total space.146 It was also at this time that the party announced the 
expulsion of Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun from the Central Committee.
As for the passport, Serran referred to the offer Claudin had received from the 
party during the October meeting to move to a socialist country. At the time, Gallego 
argued that since Claudin had been brought undercover by the party into France to do 
a job that was also clandestine and, he was no longer doing such a job, it was only 
“logical” for him to move to a Socialist country. Not surprisingly, Claudin refused to 
do so. Now he was told that the passport had been given to him by the Cubans “not to 
establish himself legally in the country where he was living but to facilitate his 
movement while serving the party”. Hence, the PCE no longer had an obligation to 
return it. Nevertheless, the letter went on, the Cubans would be informed about the 
matter and if they agreed to still give him the passport, the Executive would proceed 
to do so.147 This was not the only “delicate matter” Claudin had to work out with the 
party’s leadership. A year later, when the last traces of the crisis were fading away, 
problems arose over the house he and his family were occupying, which had 
originally been rented by the party. On 9 October, Claudin wrote a letter to the 
Executive asking them to cover the rent of the house from April 1962, when the last 
payment had been made, to January 1965, when he stopped being a member of the 
Central Committee.148 A meeting followed with a party cadre who told Claudin that
1964, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDfN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
146 “Documento-plataforma fractional de Fernando Claudin”, Nuestra Bandera, January 1965, n.40.
147 Letter from Jos6 Serrdn (alias Ramos) to Fernando Claudin, 18 December 1964, AHPCE.
148 Letter from Fernando Claudin to the EC, 9 October 1965, AHCPE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN- 
SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
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the PCE would cover those expenses as long as he left the house; if he did not leave,
no payments would be made. Claudin replied that he could not afford to leave the
house for the time being, as it was almost impossible to find anything similar for a
low price and he was still struggling to make a living. He was told that such an
argument was not valid since he had found the money to publish his book as well as
other expenses, all related to his “factional activity” against the PCE. His financial
problems were his own responsibility. Just as he had so proudly returned his salary in
the past, he should now have the dignity to return the party’s house.149 In a letter to
Santiago Carrillo that November, Ignacio Gallego wrote:
We are going to show the crookedness of Claudin, clearly and strongly. We have not 
done that yet. But I think that element will not leave his house. In that case, I think 
we should not spend a penny on it. But if he pays for the rent himself, it will not be 
so easy to get him out. If he does not pay then he is out of there, we can report him 
to the landlord. The first thing is to expose things clearly and of course never to pay 
the rent to a swine.150
Fortunately for Claudin, he knew that legally he could postpone his departure 
for quite some time, and we can assume that this is what actually happened.151 These 
two examples of the party attitude towards Claudin revealed how far the leadership 
was willing to go in order to fight against those who would abandon the ship. In all 
fairness, after the October meeting, there is little doubt that the activities of the two 
Fs had clearly been directed at discrediting the leadership. Still, one cannot forget the 
context which led to this attitude on their part and the need they felt to clear their 
names.
149 Conversation between Pepe (a party cadre) and Fernando Claudin, 26 November 1965, AHPCE 
(DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Informes, Caja 110); Letter from Fernando Claudin to the 
EC, 26 November 1965, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 
111, Carp. 3).
150 Letter from Ignacio Gallego to Santiago Carrillo, 17 November 1965. AHPCE (DIRIGENTES, 
Ignacio Gallego, Caja 10, Carp. 10.2).
Just as was the case with the passport, the author has not found any more records on this matter.
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As for Jorge Semprun, he wrote to the Executive in January 1965 accusing them of
spreading a rumour among party activists that he had made his own self-criticism
about the whole affair. Semprun denied that he had ever done such a thing and stated
that the chances of him doing it in the future were now even slimmer in view of the
developments taking place in Spain and the methods that had been used by the party
to deal with the divergences. He also expressed his support to the Report written by
Claudin and added that he himself would also find the way to get to the activists a
truthful account of his opinions and situation.152 Carrillo would write back to
Semprun a harsh and ironic letter which in turn received a similar reply. In reference
to the coming publication of Mundo Obrero in which the expulsion of the Fs from
the party was going to be announced, Semprun wrote:
My decision to be a Communist -during the time of the military struggle against the 
Nazi invaders- cannot be broken by any resolution that you take. I will continue to 
be a Communist, acting as a Communist. That depends only on me and in that 
decision you cannot intervene, whatever you do and whatever you say.153
Later that year, Semprun was preparing the script for a film that would come
out the following year, Alain Resnais' La Guerre est finie, whose plot was strongly
linked to Semprun’s experience as a clandestine figure working in Spain for the PCE.
In the same letter that Ignacio Gallego told Carrillo about the tactics to follow in
order to evict Claudin from his house, he wrote regarding Semprun:
I have told the French comrades about the matter with the other swine. Manolo 
(Azcarate) has told me that the film they are preparing is garbage. Apparently, there 
is even a characterization of the General Secretary of the party. It is the film of a 
renegade. Aside from what the French comrades might be able to do about it, we 
could also find a way to let the people who are making the film know that the film 
is a stab in the back by a force that is in clandestinity, in the resistance. In one word, 
to bring down that garbage before it comes out. Clearly, Semprun is an authentic
152 Letter from Jorge Semprun to the EC, January 1965, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS CLAUDIN- 
SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
153 Letter from Jorge Semprun to Santiago Carrillo, 12 February 1965, AHPCE (DIVERGENCIAS 
CLAUDIN-SEMPRUN, Correspondencia, Caja 111, Carp. 3).
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renegade. The senorito does not know yet that he is playing with fire.154
The film would come out the following year with great success and 
Semprun’s reputation as a writer would only rise after that.155 Similarly, Claudin 
would go on to write several books on Communism and become the most important 
Spanish figure on the subject. The PCE would remain as one of the main forces of 
the opposition against Franco in Spain, but during the transition it would fail 
spectacularly to the astonishment of some, particularly Santiago Carrillo.
E. Conclusion
The expulsion of Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun from the Spanish Communist 
Party was made public in Mundo Obrero in April 1965.156 The purge mainly affected 
the organization of students and intellectuals in Madrid, with an estimated 200 
activists leaving the party as a result.157 Though this number is not very high and new 
generations of students and intellectuals would continue to join the PCE in the 
coming years, the purge of the two Fs was still one of the most important crises ever 
to affect the party.
This purge had all the characteristics of those that took place inside the party 
during the Stalinist years. The main difference now was that no denunciations to the 
police or executions occurred anymore. While this was in no way an unimportant
154 Letter from Ignacio Gallego to Santiago Carrillo, 17 November 1965. AHPCE.
155 In 1963, Semprun had already won the prestigious prize Formentor for his novel Le grand voyage 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1963).
156 “Resolucidn sobre la expulsion de Fernando Claudin y Federico S&nchez”, Mundo Obrero, April 
1965.
157 Moran, Miseria, p. 402. Jauregui and Vega report that in the organization of the party in the 
University of Madrid, the membership decreased from 117 to 3. Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo, 
1963-1970, p. 82.
change in the overall history of the PCE, the expulsion of Fernando Claudin and 
Jorge Semprun still proved that the liberalization process that had supposedly started 
in 1956 had never been completed. Discussion of the party’s line was not permitted 
as it had never been allowed in the past, not just in the party’s organizations and 
committees in exile or in Spain, but also inside the Executive Committee. This is an 
important distinction to make for in later years many PCE leaders would argue that 
the party’s clandestine status did not allow for a normal running of its internal 
democracy.158 The fate of the two Fs, both members of the Executive where the 
conditions for open discussion were theoretically much better, revealed that at no 
level could the decisions of the General Secretary be questioned, whether or not they 
were backed up by reality.
Moreover, the divergences of Claudin and Semprun with the party line were 
the result of the party’s unrealistic appreciation of what was happening in Spain. 
This, as we have seen throughout this thesis, was in turn the result of the party’s 
refusal to listen and give any autonomy to its forces within Spain. Indeed, since the 
end of the Civil War, the party’s autocratic internal structure had eventually led to the 
destruction of every strong organization that had flourished in Spain. Claudin and 
Semprun and the intellectual and students organizations in Madrid that had 
flourished in 1956 were just the newest victims of this structure.
158 Falc6n, Asalto, p. 338; Manuel Azcarate, “Comentarios personales sobre la Autobiografia de 
Federico Sanchez”, El Pais, 4 January 1978. Also references to this explanation given by Communist 
leaders in Mujal-Ledn, Communism, p. 95, 164.
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CONCLUSION
In November 1977, the prestigious Spanish literary prize Planeta was awarded to 
Jorge Semprun for his book, Autobiografia de Federico Sanchez.* The novel narrated 
his experience as a leader of the Spanish Communist Party from the early 1950s to 
the day of his expulsion in April 1965. Its publication had been preceded a few 
months earlier by the legalization of the PCE, an important step towards democracy 
in the transition process of Spain. In this context, Autobiografia became “the centre 
of attention of a polemic in which the whole of the Spanish media participated, 
turning into one of the reference points of the transition process itself.”2 Soon after, 
Claudin’s book on the divergences that he had published privately in France during 
1965 was published commercially in Spain, which added fuel to the debate initiated 
by Semprun.3 The attention received by both works is not surprising. As we have 
seen in this thesis, the events that led to the expulsion of Semprun and Claudin 
portrayed a Communist party disconnected from Spanish reality and in which no 
discussion could take place. This was not the image Santiago Carrillo wanted to 
present to the Spanish electorate, hence the party’s break from Moscow in 1968 and 
its subsequent adoption of Eurocommunism. At a time in Spain when the general 
consensus was to forget the past and look to the future, Semprun and Claudin were
1 Semprun, Autobiografia.
2 Buckley, La doble transicion, p. 51. For instance see Manuel Azcarate, “Comentarios personales 
sobre la Autobiografia de Federico Sanchez”, El Pais, 4 January 1978, and Jorge Semprun, 
“Contrareplica a Manuel Azc&rate sobre la Autobiografia de Federico Sanchez”, El Pais, 8 January 
1978. Also for more information about the debate that followed see Preston, “The PCE’s long road...” 
in Kindersley, Eurocommunism, pp. 39-43.
3 Claudin, Documentos.
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breaking the “Pact of Forgetfulness” and bringing the PCE’s past right into the 
present. It is no wonder that when asked about Autobiografia, Carrillo would always 
reply that he had never read it. Doing otherwise would have forced him to enter a 
discussion he clearly wanted to avoid. Could this episode have contributed in 
someway to the PCE’s inability to take advantage of its position as the best-organised 
opposition movement under Franco and thus find itself as a major political force in 
democratic Spain?
By looking at the crucial period between 1956 and 1964,1 hope to have shed 
some light on one of the main reasons the Spanish Communist Party lost its way in 
democratic Spain. It was during that period that the party failed to undergo a 
profound transformation of its internal structure. The purge of Claudin and Semprun, 
in effect, marked the limits of the destalinisation process started inside the PCE in 
1956. This conclusion has been reached by revealing two different aspects in the 
history of Spanish Communism. First, like his predecessors, Carrillo had enforced a 
despotic rule ever since he had gained power in 1956, which prevented the PCE from 
renewing itself. Moreover, as in previous decades, party-reformers were still denied a 
foothold. Second, the situation was further worsened because the PCE leadership 
attempted to rule the party from its position in exile. For fear of losing control over 
the underground party, the leadership anxiously smothered any new ideas and 
initiatives coming from the rank-and-file in Spain itself. This meant that the policies 
the PCE adopted often failed to take into account the existing situation in Spain.
As a result of these factors, when the first elections came in democratic Spain, 
the two main figures representing the PCE were Santiago Carrillo and Dolores 
Ib&rruri, both of them too closely associated with the Civil War. Unlike the 
Socialists, the PCE disregarded the potential value of the activists inside Spain to
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transmit a younger image of the party.4 The changes that took place in 1968 and 
thereafter were not enough to convince anyone that the party was now different from 
what it had been in the past. That is, while the party did in fact pragmatically adopt a 
moderate ideological programme, the way it was run proved to be less flexible. The 
PCE itself remained under the control of Santiago Carrillo, who, prepared to 
compromise on programmatic points, was not as willing to give up any of his power 
by democratising the party. The effect of this organisational ossification was crucial 
because it effectively undermined the more moderate ideological image that the PCE 
publicly aspired to during the Spanish transition.5 It led the party into a hybrid 
position that proved impossible to sustain. On the one hand, it embraced the spirit of 
the new era but, on the other, it firmly remained committed to the methods and 
individuals of a bygone age. In addition, the party’s attempt to present a more 
moderate ideological image also alienated, though for opposite reasons, those voters 
further to the left, particularly the youth whose support shifted to the Socialists.6 
Paradoxically, Santiago Carrillo would still make an important contribution to the 
establishment of democracy in Spain, which as much as the central role and sacrifice 
of the Communists activists during the Franco dictatorship, should be recognized. 
Nevertheless, it was not enough to make the PCE the option chosen to represent the
4 In contrast, the leadership of the PSOE was formed by a new generation of Socialists that had 
actually lived in Spain during Francoism, and hence were much closer, both physically and in spirit, to 
the people. There were other factors influencing the Socialists’ capability to take over the leftist vote, 
such as the support they received from the Socialist European parties. For more information see Pilar 
Ortuno Anaya, European Socialists and Spain. The Transition to Democracy, 1959-1977 (Hampshire: 
Palgrave, 2002).
5 Mujal-Le6n makes an excellent case in his study of the Spanish Communist party about the damage 
that the party’s ambiguities had on its success in democratic Spain. For more information see Mujal- 
Leon, Communism, pp. 76-102, 156-. This ambiguities are also pointed out by Paul Heywood to 
explain the collapse of the party, though he argues that it was not just the party’s internal inflexibility 
itself which caused its failure, but the way it was manipulated. For more information see Paul 
Heywood, “Mirror Images: The PCE and the PSOE in the Transition to Democracy in Spain”, West 
European Politics, Volume 10 Number 10, April 1987, pp. 193-210.
6 Carr, Raymond & Fusi, Juan Pablo, Spain. Dictatorship to Democracy, (George Allen & Unwin 
LTD, London, 1979) pp. 240.
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interests of the left in the new democracy.
It can be argued, however, that political parties are often run in a despotic 
manner and that does not destroy the people’s confidence in them as participating 
agents in a democratic regime. However, as Mujal-Leon points out, unlike the PCE 
most other parties “did not have totalist aspirations to effect radial and profound
• j
changes in society”. Moreover, the situation in which the Spanish Communists 
found themselves after Franco’s death was particularly tricky. The PCE’s image had 
been shaped by its submission to the Soviet Union, its role in the Civil War, the 
guerrilla actions during the 1940s and, more than anything else, 36 years of negative 
propaganda by the regime. Consequently, the party’s programmatic reforms could 
easily be taken as nothing more than a cynical ploy to lure voters, whilst beneath the 
surface not much had really changed. Indeed, the road followed by the party 
thereafter proved that this had been the case.
One wonders whether or not the PCE could have actually taken a different course. 
After all, it was a clandestine party working under an anti-Communist dictatorship. 
Democratising its internal structure under this conditions was, to say the least,
o
difficult. Nevertheless, while the party would have faced serious problems in 
carrying out discussions with the activists inside Spain, there is little justification for 
the manner in which the divergences of Claudin and Semprun were handled. Both 
men belonged to the party’s Executive Committee in exile and therefore, discussion 
inside this organism should have been feasible and, actually, necessary. Moreover,
7 Mujal-Le6n, Communism, p. 98.
8 Paul Heywood argues that if any relaxation of democratic centralism inside the PCE had been 
allowed, the party’s identity would have been called into question, as had been the case with the PCI. 
While he does not extend on this point, it would be interesting to see to what extent democratic 
centralism forms the identity of a Communist party. Heywood, “Mirror Images...”, pp. 202-203.
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the party’s autocratic structure was also partially responsible for the leaders’ 
unrealistic appreciation of the conditions in Spain. This was so much the case that 
even when the results proved the failure of its policy, they simply chose to ignore 
them and silenced those who urged a change. Hence, while it is not possible to know 
to what extent the party could have undergone a true democratisation process, it is 
clear that not doing so seriously hurt its chances of success. In the long term, the 
PCE’s autocratic internal structure, which arguably served to keep its leader in power 
and, to a certain extent, a united organization during the difficult Franco years, would 
ultimately prove to be the party’s undoing in democratic Spain.
Both Claudin and Semprun believed that things would have been very 
different had the party initiated its transformation in 1964. When interviewed by the 
author, Semprun said:
The party was eliminated by history. The people of Spain eliminated it because for 
the progressive left-wing middle Spaniard, the PCE, regardless how heroic it had 
been, represented the past. If in 1964 a profound shift had been made, the PCE 
would have played the role of the PSOE in the transition.9
In the updated introduction of his book about the crisis republished in 1978,
Claudin wrote in reference to the party’s future had the discussions about their
divergences ended differently:
Possibly, its role would have been more relevant and efficient in the fight for 
democracy. It would have established its credibility earlier as a truly democratic 
party, independent from Moscow. It would have made a greater contribution to the 
theoretical debate on the revolution in the West, and especially on the analysis of 
the Spanish situation. Its moral and intellectual authority would have been greater.10
This, of course, is a matter for counter-factual speculation, as is the question 
of the possible effect that Claudin and Semprun’s perception of reality would have
9 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
10 Claudin, Documentos, p. X.
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had on the activists* morale. Many have argued that it would have discouraged them
and that, in fact, it was the party’s subjectivism that kept them active in the
struggle.11 Carrillo himself said during the discussions on the divergences:
Under the conditions we endured, against a Fascist dictatorship, with enormous 
difficulties, that by their own nature could sow and actually do sow in the people a 
lack of faith, would it be possible to have a political struggle without a certain
degree of subjectivity and voluntarism? .....  Comrades: a certain degree of
subjectivity, regarding the pace of events -  not their ultimate conclusion, not their 
character -  is without doubt one of the inevitable ingredients of the tactics of any 
revolutionary force, and even more so when the situation in which it struggles is so 
difficult. The subjectivity, the voluntarism - 1 am always referring to the rhythm and 
not to policies, I am actually talking about tactics -  are factors of weight in the 
historical process.12
However, as this thesis has shown, the leadership’s subjectivity led the
underground party into an range of failed actions which resulted in the
demoralisation of the rank-and-file, and furthermore, in the weakening of the
underground organizations due to the repression that their ambitious actions would
unleash. Thus, the potential negative effects that a less optimistic view of the
situation of the regime would have had on the activists, has to be measured against
the negative effects of the party’s failed policy. Once again, this cannot be
established with total certainty but I believe that a more objective appreciation of
reality is at the centre of any successful strategy. As Semprun wrote in Autobiografia:
Subjectivism means that one is not analysing correctly the correlation of forces or 
the real possibilities of action. It means that one is underestimating the enemy. It 
means that one is setting erroneous goals that once they are not met provoke the 
demobilisation or demoralisation of the revolutionary forces.13
Finally, as I stated in the introduction of Chapter VI, I would like to attempt an
11 Jauregui and Vega, Antifranquismo, 1939-1962, p. 229; Mugica, Itinerario, p. 74; Falcon, Asalto, 
pp. 336-337; Preston, ‘The PCE’s long road...” in Kindersley, Eurocommunism, pp. 53-54, 60-61; 
Mujal-Le6n, Communism, p. 96.
12 Speech by Santiago Carrillo, January-February 1964, AHPCE (REUNION DEL COMITE 
EJECUTIVO DEL PCE).
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explanation to the reasons behind Claudin and Semprun’s decision to initiate their
crusade against the party line. Clearly, both men had become aware of the
leadership’s misperception of reality, particularly as Spain’s social and economical
transformation became more evident in the early 1960s. However, this alone would
not explain why they began an assault that they must have know could not be won.14
After all, Claudin and Semprun were familiar with the PCE’s autocratic internal
structure and manner of dealing with dissent. In fact, Claudin had been part of the
party leadership during its most Stalinist years; he had been responsible for the
discipline of the exiles in Russia in the 1940s. Even after 1956, he had witnessed the
treatment received by those activists in Mexico who questioned the policies and
internal running of the party. In the same manner, Semprun, whether pushed or not
by Carrillo, had himself punished Pradera for expressing a different perception of
reality than that of the leadership. Moreover, as he himself recognizes, he was well
aware that in 1956 “the leadership of the PCE had refused any public self-criticism,
limiting itself to placing the Stalinist rubbish in someone else’s backyard, rejecting
any kind of objective historical analysis of its past”.15 What, then, made them enter a
conflict with little chance of success and which, at least on the short term, would hurt
them on a professional and personal level? Semprun gives the following reply:
We never wondered whether or not we could actually transform the party, but if 
someone had asked me I would have said that no, we could not transform it, but we 
still had to fight that battle. We had to fight it and moreover, we had to make it 
public. We had to publish the documents on the divergences, explain them publicly. 
The only thing I decided at the time was not to publish anything that a regular 
activist would find difficult to interpret, not until the party was legal. That is why 
Autobiografia, which was conceived and prepared in my head in 1964, was not 
published until 1977, once the party had been legalized.16
13 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 214.
14 According to Preston, Francesc Vicens would describe as tactical lunacy for Claudin to have raised 
the issue at Executive Committee level, Preston, “The PCE’s long road...” in Kindersley, 
Eurocommunism, p. 53.
15 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 131.
16 Interview with Jorge Semprun, May 2001.
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Semprun seems to be hinting at an ultimate responsibility for the cause and
the party activists, which also appears to be behind Claudin’s comment during the
last meeting that they both held with the leadership in November 1964 when he said:
“I am talking here not so much for you as for the party.” On the other hand, Carrillo
would always say that Claudin had initiated his struggle in order to be expelled from
the PCE because he was tired of the fight. He had stopped “believing”, had stopped
being a “Communist”, had lost his “faith”. Unable to accept this, he then choose to
find problems and mistakes in the party so that it would become easier for him to
leave it.17 As for Semprun, Carrillo argues that he wanted to fulfil his vocation as a
writer and was therefore “stifling under the burden of party tasks”.18 These
explanations seem too simple, however. Neither Claudin or Semprun gave any
symptoms of “political fatigue” after their expulsion from the party, though Carrillo
is probably right to say they had lost their “faith”. According to Semprun:
The voices and rumours of social reality continue to get louder for me until they 
become deafening, until they silenced the beatific purr of our ideological discourse, 
more and more removed from reality. I had to choose between the reality of the 
discourse or the discourse of reality. I chose the latter.19
The “faith”, so often referred to by the Spanish Communists, seemed to be at 
the core of their Communism, an essential part of their struggle (which stood in 
contradiction to the scientific base that Marxism claimed to have). It was also this 
“faith” that allowed them to defend their “subjectivism” and in the same manner, to 
accuse those who did not share it of defeatism and pessimism. It was a “faith”, after 
all, that prevented discussion. This lack of a culture of debate inside the PCE meant
17 Carrillo, Memorias, pp. 477-478; Carrillo, Memoria transition, pp. 83, 93-95; Carrillo, Dialogue, p. 
117.
18 Carrillo, Dialogue, p. 118
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that any questioning of the party line would be immediately translated into an attack 
against the leadership that had implemented it. Sole Tura argues that in 1959 the 
party leaders refused to accept the failure of the General Strike because they feared it 
would diminish their value before the old guard they had so recently replaced.20
Indeed, Santiago Carrillo had won the battle against Ibarruri and Uribe on this 
basis. It had been a small disagreement over Spain’s entry into the UN that had 
released a power struggle at the end of 1955. Not surprisingly, there were those who 
thought that a coup against Carrillo’s leadership was at the heart of Claudin and 
Semprun’s criticisms.21 While this seems unlikely taking into account that neither 
one of them attempted to create a rival organization to the PCE once they were 
expelled, Carrillo’s refusal to open a proper discussion can still be explained by his 
fear of losing authority over the party. Its autocratic internal structure was so intrinsic 
that discussion could never be taken at face value and was rejected as a personal 
attack. And it is in this context that Claudin and Semprun’s decision to question the 
leadership can be explained. Once they had realised the contradictions between the 
party’s line and the reality of the situation in a new Spain, they could not possible 
continue with the work of the party without carrying on a discussion about it. As this 
was not possible, their job as intellectuals could no longer occur within the 
parameters of the PCE. I believe that Claudin and Semprun began discussions inside 
the party because they had no other choice. It was, therefore, a personal journey in 
which expulsion was a price they willingly paid.
As for the intellectuals and students that joined them, their split was less
19 Semprun, Autobiografia, p. 205.
20 Sol6 Tura, Memorias, pp. 122-123.
21 “Many friends told me then and after that they were convinced that Claudin’s attitude was due to his 
aspirations to become the General Secretary of the Party. I always thought this was not the case.” 
Carrillo, Memorias, p. 478.
traumatic and easier to explain. They were not as integrated into the party as Claudin 
and Semprun and had joined the movement under a different premise. As has been 
pointed out in this thesis, their Communism was an expression of their anti- 
Francoism, a threshold they had to cross in their political emancipation.22 Once they 
began to feel constrained by the party and became aware of the sterility of their 
activities, they moved away from it just as they had previously moved away from the 
oppressive Francoist regime. Indeed, the new generations of intellectuals and 
students that joined the PCE after 1964 would eventually go through a similar 
process. This is why a Communist party such as the Spanish could not succeed once 
democracy arrived in Spain. Its role as an opposition movement against the regime 
died with Franco and an alternative function was not found. The crisis of 1964, 
therefore, represented the party’s failure to transform itself into a credible democratic 
choice for the future. Therein lies the beginning of an explanation of its ill fortune in 
the 1970s and 1980s and its marginal standing in Spanish politics today.
22 Interview with Fernando S&nchez Drag6, September 2000; Interview with Javier Pradera, September 
2000; Interview with Enrique Mugica, September 2000; Interview with Santiago Carrillo, January 
2001.
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